ISRAEL'S 'DISENGAGEMENT' POLICY
348. In our last Report in this inquiry, we noted
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's announcement of plans for 'disengagement'
from the Palestinians. We expressed our concern about such unilateral
action, especially given the link with acceleration of Israel's
construction of a security barrier in the West Bank.[456]
In its response the Government said:
We welcome actions by Israel and the Palestinian
Authority which are consistent with the RoadMap, including Israeli
withdrawals from the Occupied Territories and the closure of settlements
there… Israel's planning for unilateral steps of this kind
is taking place against the background of its reiterated commitment
to the RoadMap. The Israeli government is aware that we, and the
international community, oppose unilateral steps which are not
consistent with the RoadMap.[457]
This position was reiterated by the Prime Minister
on 16 April, when he welcomed the prospect of 'disengagement'
but said:
We reaffirm that this is part of a process to
get us back into the road map, which we continue to believe offers
the only realistic route to the two states, Israel and Palestinian,
living side-by-side in peace.[458]
The Quartet (Russia, the US, the EU and the UN) has
taken a similar position, welcoming the plan as an opportunity
for progress towards peace but insisting that it should be carried
out in a manner consistent with the Road Map.[459]
349. After meeting Prime Minister Sharon in April
2004, President Bush welcomed the plan and made the following
statement:
In light of new realities on the ground, including
already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic
to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be
a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and
all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached
the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final
status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually
agreed changes that reflect these realities.[460]
350. In May, the Government wrote to us that:
The Prime Minister has made clear that all final
status issues, including borders and refugees, must be agreed
in negotiations between the two parties. He also reiterated the
need to get back to the roadmap, which offers the best route to
the vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by
side in peace. We have reiterated this with our EU partners and
hope that the forthcoming Quartet meeting will do the same.[461]
The statement issued by the Quartet on 4 May noted
that,
no party should take unilateral actions that
seek to predetermine issues that can only be resolved through
negotiation and agreement between the two parties. Any final settlement
on issues such as borders and refugees must be mutually agreed
to by Israelis and Palestinians.[462]
351. Despite receiving international support,
the plan for 'disengagement' has suffered a number of domestic
setbacks. On 2 May, 59.5% of the ruling Likud Party voted against
it and Prime Minister Sharon then struggled to gain cabinet support.
On 6 June, the cabinet backed the plan but only after Sharon revised
it to provide for a delayed and staged withdrawal and sacked two
far-right members. The cabinet will need to approve each stage
ahead of the 'disengagement'.
352. The Committee heard from Dr Emanuele Ottolenghi
of St Antony's, Oxford, that 'disengagement' is likely to occur,
despite political opposition. He attributes this to Prime Minister
Sharon's determination to pursue the plan as well as broad popular
support for it.[463]
However, Dr Nomi Bar Yaacov was more circumspect. Dr Bar
Yaacov of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote
to us about the precarious state of coalition politics in Israel
and the risk that 'disengagement' could be stalled if Prime Minister
Sharon is forced to resign or call early elections. "Unfortunately
the fate of the Plan is subject to internal Israeli political
dynamics, political parties' interests and individuals' Knesset
members' aspirations."[464]
If progress is to be made a broader Israeli coalition will almost
certainly be necessary. On 12 July, Prime Minister Sharon and
Labour leader Shimon Peres held preliminary talks on forming a
coalition.[465] Labour
supports the 'disengagement' policy, although it would like to
see more substantial withdrawals from the West Bank and the opening
of direct talks with the Palestinians.[466]
The context of 'disengagement'
353. The key question regarding the plan for
'disengagement' is whether it is part of the Road Map process
or a prelude to de facto annexation of occupied territory. We
heard a great deal of scepticism about Prime Minister Sharon's
willingness to implement meaningful withdrawals from the West
Bank. A number of witnesses also highlighted the role played by
President Bush's endorsement of Israeli policy. Dr Rosemary Hollis,
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, wrote to us that:
US President George Bush has endorsed Sharon's
idea that his initiative involve a simultaneous consolidation
of Israeli settlement blocs to the east of the 'Green Line' that
marks the pre-1967 border between Israel and the West Bank. If
Sharon has his way, the area remaining to the Palestinians in
the West Bank will not make for a viable, contiguous, independent
Palestinian state that any Palestinian leadership could agree
to.[467]
Dr Bar Yaacov was similarly bleak in her prognosis:
Sharon and many of the Plan's supporters within
his ruling Likud party view withdrawal from Gaza as a trade off
for keeping a number of large West Bank settlement blocks under
Israeli control and eventually Israeli sovereignty. This view
was supported by statements made by Bush in mid-April after Sharon
presented the Plan to him in Washington.[468]
354. We asked witnesses for their analyses of
how 'disengagement' relates to the Road Map and the broader political
process. Dr Emanuele Ottolenghi and Dr Rosemary Hollis told us
that Israel's plan for 'disengagement' emerges from the Israeli
belief that a political process is unfeasible at the present time.[469]
Nevertheless, some of our witnesses believe that the plan offers
an opportunity for progress towards a peace settlement. Dr Ottolenghi
suggested that in time, 'disengagement' could lead to the resumption
of a political process:
Israel relinquishing territory, dismantling and
evacuating settlements, removing troops from Gaza, are all steps
that can help de-escalate the tension, reduce the pressure on
the civilian populations and might create conditions for something
to open up once the process is over.[470]
355. Dr Bar Yaacov also wrote to us that although
'disengagement' is not part of the Roadmap, it,
can be viewed as consistent with the principles
of the Road Map… [and] If carried out intelligently, the
Disengagement Plan could lead to a two State solution, as envisaged
in the Road Map, but much will depend on what happens in Israel,
Palestine, and on the nature and scope of the Third Party role.[471]
Dr Ottolenghi agreed about the importance of the
international community:
active engagement, fostered by coordination between
the two sides on smooth implementation of each stage of the process
and support from outside players could turn a unilateral measure
into an opportunity to change the status quo.[472]
Indeed, Dr Bar Yaacov told us that Israel is showing
an unprecedented degree of interest in international involvement
in the context of its planned 'disengagement' from the Gaza Strip:
This openness creates a rare window of opportunity
for the international community to help move the peace process
forward, to ensure continuity of withdrawals from the West Bank
and to create the conditions for the conclusion of a permanent
status agreement and the establishment of a viable sovereign Palestinian
state.[473]
356. To take advantage of this opportunity, Dr
Bar Yaacov recommends that the international community should
consider:
how to support the withdrawal from Gaza and to
ensure stability, economic prosperity and continuity of the Plan
in accordance with the principles of the Road Map. It should start
addressing the question of the day after the withdrawal.[474]
In particular, Dr Bar Yaacov highlights the need
to:
- work closely with the Quartet
to implement the plan;
- support reconstruction and
Palestinian reform;
- consider what kind of peacekeeping
operation would be most appropriate; and
- support Egypt's efforts in
the region.
357. Egypt has offered to play a role co-ordinating
the handover in Gaza, proposing to send military experts to the
Gaza Strip to assist the Palestinian Authority with maintaining
security.[475]
The status of the border with Egypt will be a key question;
international assistance may be required to ensure the security
of this border in order to allay Israel's fears about infiltration
and Palestinian concerns about further incursions.
358. In May, the FCO wrote to us that:
We have encouraged Israel to make withdrawal
from Gaza as full as possible and will continue to do so. Currently
it appears that Prime Minister Sharon is not planning to withdraw
from the Gaza/Egypt border. We hope the plan will develop further
to include this. We will discuss with Israel, the Palestinian
Authority and Egypt ways the international community can help
achieve this.[476]
The recent deterioration in the situation in the
Gaza Strip has also highlighted the risk of instability following
'disengagement.' The Government is offering to provide assistance
to the Palestinian Authority to facilitate a smooth handover.[477]
ISRAEL'S SECURITY BARRIER
359. In our last Report in this inquiry we noted
and described Israel's construction of what it describes as a
'security fence.' According to the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as of July 2004 the
total planned length of the barrier (including East Jerusalem)
was 622 kilometres—at the time of preparing this Report,
255 kilometres are completed or under construction and work has
yet to start on a further 367 kilometres. Some 15 per cent of
the barrier follows the Green Line.[478]
451 HC (2003-04) 81, paras 124-25; HC (2002-03) 405,
paras 210-16; HC (2002-03) 196, paras 211-20; and HC (2001-02)
384, para 161. Back
452
HC (2002-03) 405, para 211; HC (2001-02) 384, paras 155-56. Back
453
HC (2001-02) 384, para 158. Back
454
Q180 [Gohel], Q176 Back
455
HC (2002-03) 405, para 211. In July 2002, we also stated that
"a linkage between the [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict …
and the war against terrorism is widely perceived among populations
and governments in the region … While the conflict in the
Middle East requires swift and fair resolution on its own merits,
this perceived linkage lends added urgency to the search for peace.."
HC (2001-02) 384, para 161. Back
456
HC (2003-04) 81, para 175. Back
457
Cm 6162 Back
458
Remarks by the Prime Minister, the Rose Garden, 16 April 2004,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040416-4.html Back
459
UN press release, SG/SM/9292, 4 May 2004, available at: http://www.un.org/News Back
460
Remarks by President George Bush, 14 April 2004, available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-2.html Back
461
Ev 69 Back
462
UN press release, SG/SM/9292, 4 May 2004, available at: http://www.un.org/News Back
463
Q258 [Ottolenghi] Back
464
Ev 190 Back
465
'More troubles ahead for Sharon', BBC, 15 June 2004; and 'Israeli
rivals move towards unity', BBC, 12 July 2004. Back
466
'Sharon threatens opponents with Labour links', Financial Times,
13 July 2004. Back
467
Ev 185 Back
468
Ev 190 Back
469
Q259 [Ottolenghi]. See also Ev 185. Back
470
Q259 [Ottolenghi] Back
471
Ev 189 Back
472
Ev 87 Back
473
Ev 190 Back
474
Ev 191 Back
475
'Israel and Egypt Conferring On the Gaza Pullout Plan', New
York Times, 8 June 2004. Back
476
Ev 69 Back
477
'Bush rejects UK calls for Israel 'monitors'', The Times,
27 March 2004. Back
478
'West Bank Barrier: Projections of land and population located
between the Barrier and Green Line', OCHA, July 2004, available
at: http://www.reliefweb.int Back
