Counter-narcotics (see separate CN paper)
POST-BONN
There has been tangible progress since the Bonn
Conference. Afghan institutional capacity is increasing; there
is interdiction action against traffickers, stockpiles and laboratories;
eradication is now targeted centrally against opium poppy cultivators
with access to alternative livelihoods; assistance programs are
being rolled out to maximise sustainable livelihood generation
for those involved in opium production; and there is an increasing
amount of information awareness material distributed to influence
Afghan attitudes to drugs. Nevertheless, as long as opium poppy
cultivation levels remains at current levels, the narcotics trade
will continue to be a destructive fact of life in Afghanistan.
The Afghan people witness daily the proceeds of drug trafficking
financing the warlords and commanders who undermine the extension
of central government authority into the provinces. There have
been some steps forward:
— Approval of the Afghan National Drug
Control Strategy (AN DCS), which set the objective of eliminating
the production, trafficking and consumption of illegal drugs in
Afghanistan
— The creation of the Counter Narcotics
Directorate (CND) to co-ordinated monitor and evaluate implementation
of the ANDCS across government.
— A new Drug Law, compliant with the
relevant UN Drug Conventions, is now in effect.
— The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
(CNPA) was created.
— Creation of the Afghan Special Narcotics
Force (ASNF) to conduct interdiction operations.
— The Government of Afghanistan has
established a Central Planning Cell to co-ordinate poppy eradication,
beginning this growing season. Work on a Central Poppy Eradication
Force is continuing.
— The roll out of programs to support
rural infrastructure, alternative livelihoods and wider employment
opportunities.
CURRENT SITUATION
Afghanistan is at a critical juncture in its
counter narcotics efforts. The 2003 UN opium poppy survey showed
that Afghanistan produced 75% of the world's heroin. Cultivation
is at a near-record level. Nevertheless the preconditions to tackle
this unprecedented problem are beginning to be implemented. An
elite Afghan interdiction force has begun operations. The Government
of Afghanistan has put into place a mechanism to co-ordinate eradication
efforts. Counter Narcotics Police forces are being trained at
an accelerated rate. Border Police forces are beginning to be
established. The international community is helping to strengthen
border controls. There is greater co-operation between the Afghan
authorities, international law enforcement, and intelligence.
But we must accelerate these efforts if we are to prevent the
poisonous opium trade from
— The five key elements of the strategy
are: the provision of alternative livelihoods for Afghan poppy
farmers, the extension of drug law enforcement throughout Afghanistan,
the implementation of drug control legislation, the establishment
of effective institutions and the introduction of prevention and
treatment programs for addicts corrupting the new institutions
of Afghanistan. In addition to rapid implementation of these policy
responses, the Government of Afghanistan and the international
community must seize opportunities to repress the traffickers,
destroying their labs, and seizing their assets.
The February 2004 International Counter Narcotics
Conference on Afghanistan set out the main areas where future
action is required to implement the ANDCS. The Conference agreed
action plans in the broad thematic areas:
— Alternative Livelihoods. The key
to alternative livelihoods is an integrated cross-ministry approach
to build capacity and allocate resources to where they will have
maximum impact in terms of alternative livelihoods and reducing
poppy production. This inevitably will be a medium to long-term
approach in terms of return on the investment made.
— Law Enforcement. As a priority, corruption
based on the illegal drug trade needs to be addressed and corrupt
officials, regardless of status, must be removed. Support to the
development of the CNPA is crucial to this, in particular as it
extends beyond Kabul.
— Judicial Reform. As law enforcement
capability increases, so there will be a need for clarity between
various elements to ensure that capability and authority exists
where it is needed. In particular, the development of drugs law,
training for judicial staff and those handling narcotics related
evidence needs to be improved. Critically, consideration needs
to be given as to whether the law can be implemented effectively
in the current system, or whether further legislation, clarification
or implementing mechanisms will be needed.
— Demand Reduction. Drug addiction
is not widely understood in Afghanistan. There needs to be training
for those people who do, or could, come into contact with drug
addicts through the course of their normal activities such as
teachers, imams and police officers.
— Public Awareness. Regular and effective
public awareness campaigns need to be implemented. Law enforcement
successes need to be widely publicised. To support this, appropriate
drug awareness materials need to be developed for a range of institutions
focusing on the damage that drug abuse can do to the individual,
the family and society.
LOOKING OUT
TO 2006
By 2006, we should see:
— An effective Counter-Narcotics Directorate
(OND) as the sole organisation responsible for co-ordinating national
policies and programs on drug control with an effective presence
in Kabul and the regions and with clear lines of accountability
to the NSA;
— A strong Counter Narcotics Police
of Afghanistan (CNPA) as the lead drug enforcement agency under
the Ministry of Interior with an effective presence in 13 provinces;
— An effective Afghan Special Narcotics
Force capable of undertaking national interdiction operations
with clear lines of accountability to the Interior Minister;
— The establishment of a national eradication
planning capacity and a single national co-ordinated program of
poppy eradication;
— Effective rural or community development
programs to cover all opium poppy growing districts;
— Effective drug demand reduction programs
in Kabul and the regions;
— Mechanisms for the safe and fair
prosecution of drugs offences.
ISSUES
The international community and the Government
of Afghanistan need to press forward in implementing Afghanistan's
National Drug Control Strategy. Action Plans agreed at the February
2004 International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan
set out the priority areas for donor support. Further finance
and expertise, particularly in the area of drug enforcement, are
critical. Efforts should also be made to identify where modifications
to other programs will have a CN spin-off, especially those in
support of economic reconstruction. Drugs are a fact of life in
Afghanistan and cuts across work in all other SSR pillars. Efforts
to establish the rule of law and reform the judiciary, for example,
cannot be separated from tackling Afghanistan's drugs problem.
Counter-narcotics therefore needs to be integrated and supported
by the whole Security Sector Reform program if we are to achieve
success.
LAW ENFORCEMENT
POST-BONN
Kabul Police Academy, the venue for Officer
and non-Commissioned Officer training has been rehabilitated by
Germany and the US Government recently funded a Central Training
Center (CTC) in Kabul, providing training to constable-level recruits
over an eight-week basic course. Additionally, the US has opened
Regional Training Centers (RTCs) in Gardez, Kandahar, Konduz,
and Mazar-eSharif to assist in the acceleration of training 20,000
police officers by the end of June 2004 to support elections.
To date, the total number of recently trained Officers, non-commissioned
Officers, and constable-level police officers from the Police
Academy, CTC, and RTCs is some 5,800. In addition, the Federal
Republic of Germany has trained approximately 750 Border Police
Officers many of whom are now deployed at the Kabul International
Airport and the German Police Project has started a 90-day criminal
investigation training course, has built a criminal investigation
facility in Kabul and is providing essential office equipment
and vehicles. They have also refurbished the counter-terrorism
department and members have been trained in English and in IT.
Further assistance has been provided by Norway (Human Rights training
modules) and the UK (Crime Scene Investigators and equipment).
The UK and Germany have also trained 410 counter-narcotics officer
who are already making limited progress in the field.
CURRENT SITUATION
Numbers of trained police, especially away from
Kabul, are limited at the moment. With an additional effort over
the forthcoming months, by June 2004, there should be an additional
20,000 trained police officers, mid-level managers, and constable-level
officers with the requisite skill sets to handle a safe and secure
electoral process. Following the elections, the Mol has requested
an accelerated, basic police training program in order to meet
a deployment goal of 50,000 police officers nation-wide by December
2005.
LOOKING OUT
TO 2006
— A 50,000 member police force adequately
trained with substantial deployments throughout Afghanistan by
December 2005.
— A 12,000 member border police service
adequately trained and deployed by late 2005 and fully deployed
by late 2006 with accelerated donor assistance.
— A range of revenue-generating initiatives
that will increase the general budget, provide for enhanced public
security, safeguard the environment, and eventually lessen the
burden on donor nations. These initiatives include cover the registration
of new vehicles, vehicle inspection, traffic regulations, public
transport operator permits and the licensing of private security
firms and have the potential to generate substantial income even
in early implementation years.
Enhanced structures at the provincial and district
levels.
— Strengthen co-operation between the
police and the prosecutors for the handling of the criminal cases.
— The full deployment of highway patrols
with appropriate infrastructure.
— Enhanced support to poppy eradication
programs.
ISSUES
With continued donor pledges deliverables over
the next few years, Afghanistan will possess a confident, capable
police service that provides the primary safety and security to
the citizens it serves. The next two years are therefore key years
where not only donor pledges but donor delivery will be most critical
in assisting in capacity building through the procurement of much
needed basic police equipment for both the police and border service,
renovation of strategic police facilities, completion of Mol police
reform and administrative and financial reform, including the
development and implementation of a modern salary payment system.
The forecast LOTFA shortfall for FY 2004 is some $45 million,
mainly against salaries. There also needs to be much closer linkage
to the development of judicial reform pillar, greater integration
with other SSR pillars and an information campaign will be required
to educate the public as the task and purpose of a police force.
RULE OF
LAW AND
JUSTICE REFORM
POST-BONN
Steady progress has been achieved by the Justice
institutions, assisted by Italy and other donors. The most recent
major success was the recent entry into force of an Interim Criminal
Procedure Code. There has also been progress on Afghan law collection,
training (for judges, prosecutors, lawyers and MoJ officers) and
the rehabilitation of the justice physical infrastructure. Recently
adopted laws have been published and distributed and preliminary
research on the functioning of the informal justice sector has
been initiated. Two of the courthouses under the 16 Court Initiatives
are complete with two more in progress. Gardez Courthouse opens
in early April.
CURRENT
SITUATION
The development of the justice system needs
to be linked to the overall strengthening of the authority, role
and competencies o f public administration in the permanent justice
institutions, such as the Supreme Court, Attorney General's Office,
Justice Department and other law enforcement agencies. This work
is ongoing and is exemplified in the Gardez Rule of Law Project,
which represents a pilot project of the general justice provincial
outreach process that should develop in line with other government
initiatives. The focus is on the introduction of Afghan owned
mechanisms to facilitate internally driven transformation of the
national justice system. The current position is therefore one
of consolidation, education and the construction of justice and
justice-related facilities.
LOOKING
OUT TO
2006
The functioning of the justice system and the
related rehabilitation processes present challenges at three distinct
levels: political, structural and legal. Constitutional provisions
are to be thoroughly implemented by carrying out the required
legislative process and by strengthening the efficiency and accountability
of law enforcement agents. Based on this assumption, short, medium
and long term development strategies have been devised with the
aim to achieving a renovated and law abiding justice administration
service. In the short-term, key goals are:
— Strengthening of organisational capacity
and financial management and full implementation of comprehensive
restructuring of justice institutions at HQ level; phased plan
with contribution of international expertise and financial incentives
under PRR scheme.
— Rehabilitation of physical premises
and communication means across the country with targets of full
rehabilitation of Justice physical infrastructures in Kabul and
at least 50% of judicial buildings at provincial and district
level by 2006.
— Comprehensive reform of penitentiary
system by 2004; rebuilding and/or restructuring of key corrections
infrastructure by 2006.
— Law revision, distribution of legal
texts, improvement of knowledge generation and professional capacity
concentrating on education and awareness campaigns.
— Establishment of equitable and expeditious
handling of justice countrywide with particular attention to the
rights of juveniles and women.
— Survey of the role of informal justice
and support to its functioning in the view of lawful interactions
between formal and informal systems.
— The establishment of the nationwide
judicial training center.
— The establishment. of an organization
comprising practicing lawyers with due regard to legal aid.
— A need to improve the legal education
system and infrastructure.
ISSUES
The strengthening of the justice system and,
in particular, of the formal mechanisms must start with the enhancement
of administrative capacity and the re-qualification of civil servants.
The growth of the justice system, however, cannot take place in
a vacuum. Indeed, it can only take place in the wider context
of public administration and civil service reforms which also
address corruption and nepotism.
The enhancement of governance at provincial
level requires that the justice system's rehabilitation be coordinated
with disarmament (DDR), public administration support (Public
Service Commission), police and army training and deployment,
the removal of non-statutory armed forces (AMF), and combating
various forms of trafficking, narcotics, organised crime, corruption,
tax evasion, land disputes and challenges posed by large volumes
of retuning refugees. To this end, close coordination amongst
all the relevant stakeholders in strategy definition, planning
and implementation, based on clear and shared criteria, is very
important.
DEFENSE SECTOR
REFORM
SINCE
BONN
Much has been achieved since December 2002 when
the Presidential Decree creating the Afghan National Army (ANA)
was signed. The reform of the MoD and General Staff began in September
2003. This will develop a national multiethnic, cohesive ministry
of Defense by establishing an organising structure, functional
procedures, and a professional trained staff to effectively provide
strategic direction, policy, resources and coordination of Afghan
military institutions and operations. The aim is a MoD that is
accepted by the people of Afghanistan and that effectively contributes
to national policy as part of an interagency team subordinated
to a central government.
The process of MoD reform began on 20 September
2003 with the appointment by President Karzai of a new leadership.
One subordinate level management/command has been appointed. The
organisational design of the new MoD/General Staff is now complete,
and subsequent staff will be appointed incrementally over the
next six months. All staff in the new structure have received
training to support their role in a reformed MoD, or will receive
training on appointment.
With the assistance of the United States as
lead nation for ANA training, the Kabul Military Training Center
has been established and serves as the single training site for
the ANA. The ANA has assumed complete responsibility for conducting
basic soldier training, is in the final stages of assuming basic
officer training and is projected to assume basic non-commissioned
officer training in late spring 2004. Units of the ethnically
diverse Central Corps have been operationally deployed on combat
operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In support of the
heavy weapons cantonment program, ANA units have been deployed
in the vicinity of Mazar-e-Sharif since November 2003. During
the Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003, the ANA was deployed
in the Capital Region to enhance security for the delegates to
this highly visible nationally historic event. At the time of
writing, ANA troops are being deployed to Herat in reaction to
recent violence. The Central Corps, the first command of Afghanistan's
newly formed and professionally trained army, completed fielding
in March 2004. Much has been achieved, but much remains to be
done.
CURRENT
SITUATION
From March to May 2004, soldiers graduating
from KMTC go into the Central Corps and its supporting garrisons,
increasing ANA strength to 100% of the authorized figure. From
there, the ANA begins fielding outside the Capital Region. Regional
expansion envisages four commands beyond the Central Corps giving
a total of 10 brigades outside of Central Corps. The MoD has approved
the Kandahar region as the vicinity for the 1st Regional Command
and the first brigade of that command will complete fielding in
October 2004, as the 2nd Regional Command in the Gardez area begins
fielding its first brigade. The MoD wishes to increase the training
throughput at KMTC. Increasing training capacity will allow faster
growth of the ANA, but does have financial implications. Equipping,
housing and sustaining a more rapidly expanding ANA requires either
an increase in near-year funding, a restructuring of how the units
are equipped and garrisoned, or a combination of the two.
LOOKING
OUT TO
2006
The draw-down of AMF forces continues, albeit
slowly, as the ANA grows and matures with the goal of complete
elimination of non-ANA forces no later than 2005. Key short-term
goals are:
Regional expansion to support the central government
away from Kabul. Current plans are for one brigade to be fielded
at each of the four regional commands in addition to the Central
Corps before beginning a second brigade at each command, so each
of the regional commands will have a complete brigade by no later
than June 2006. By this time, the ANA will have approximately
23,000 field soldiers in addition to those assigned to echelons
above corps level and the supporting institutions.
MoD also needs a basic airlift capability, an
unfunded requirement. This capability is critical to providing
the Government of Afghanistan with the means necessary to deploy
forces rapidly to troubled areas in support of internal security
needs. Additionally, it is only fitting that Afghan pilots and
aircraft provide transportation support to the President of Afghanistan.
The MoD approved force structure for the ANA includes an 8,000
person Air Element. The existing fleet of aircraft, with substantial
maintenance upgrades provided by the international community,
along with the current aircrew and support personnel will comprise
the initial cadre of the ANA Air Element but a larger air fleet
is required to accomplish rapid deployment missions.
ISSUES
The fielding rate of the ANA is limited by the
rate of financial and equipment donations. The production of trained
troops can be increased rapidly but long-lead garrison construction
and the acquisition of unit equipment requires an early commitment
and delivery of equipment and funds by donor nations. This is
particularly true for building the air element. Also, the MoD
desires more than four major commands specified by the Bonn II
Agreements while remaining within the 70,000 person limit for
the defense sector, in response to strategic and geographic factors.
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION
AND REINTEGRATION
SINCE BONN
Following the Tokyo Conference in February 2003
to discuss the process to start DDR, at which Japan, the United
States, the United Kingdom and Canada pledged a total of $50 million;
President Karzai expressed his firm intention to implement DDR.
However, due to the delay of the reform of the MoD, it was not
until 24 October 2003, when the President formally declared the
start of the process. The Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP),
created to implement DDR, inaugurated the pilot phase for DDR
in Kunduz. The pilot phase aimed to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate
up to 1,000 ex-combatants in each of 6 areas: Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif,
Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar and Bamyan.
CURRENT
SITUATION
As of March 2004 DDR has been successfully implemented
in Pilot form in 4 areas. Over 5200 soldiers have been disarmed
and demobilised and of these, some 3,300 have now been put into
reintegration with the remainder due to be completed this month.
A DDR Steering Committee was formed in January 2004, chaired by
the Ambassador of Japan, lead nation for DDR, and involving key
ministers to move the DDR process forward with greater Afghan
ownership and involvement. The next stage of DDR has been discussed
by MoD and the International Community and it sets a target of
a 40% reduction of excombatants, (including those who were disarmed
during the pilot phase, prior to July 2004) preferably from whole
unit decommissioning. In parallel, the Afghan Government has committed
itself to achieving 100% cantonment of heavy weapons by July 2004.
The International Community have committed to supporting this
goal. ISAF Heavy weapons Cantonment in Kabul, after a slow start,
has picked up pace. Efforts to complete a plan for execution of
this key phase of DDR are ongoing.
LOOKING
OUT TO
2006
The DDR process should be complete by 2006.
Current broad plans see disarmament and demobilization completed
within one year (by Fall 2005) and reintegration continuing out
to Spring 2006.
ISSUES
A consensus on a DDR strategy for the main phase
has still to be developed among key stakeholders and the litmus
test will be in the start of the main phase in April 2004. One
of the main lessons learnt from the pilot schemes was that reintegration
of commanders and unit decommissioning were key; not addressing
these issues fully risks not making sufficient improvements in
security in advance of elections. Achieving this will require
central and regional military leaders and political factions to
demonstrate their compliance and a willingness to dismantle illegal
militia. Of particular importance here is a strategy for the removal
of Commanders—an Appointments Panel has been set up within
the DDR Steering Committee to take this forward. This entails
the engagement of factional commanders in either government positions
or overseas training in business or administration and military
commanders being retired with a monetary package. The DDR process
has clear integration needs with the roll out of both the police
and the ANA. Careful planning will continue to be needed to avoid
security vacuums being created. In due course, a law and effective
enforcement will be necessary to curb the illegal holding of weapons.
The Reintegration Program is key to the success
of DDR and both the public and private sectors have roles to play.
It is however the private sector that will be the main engine
of economic development across the country and serve as the primary
source of employment for ex-combatants. The outcome of the process
is dependent on the ability to generate economic opportunities
for ex-combatants, thus innovative efforts to promote private
sector investment must be considered.
In terms of integration with other activities,
there needs to be collaboration and coordination with other efforts
such as establishment of legal system and governance security
by the ANA and reconstruction activities in local area.
It is imperative that the DDR process be closely
coordinated with other SSR initiatives, particularly the roll
out of the various national police forces and the ANA. Careful
planning will continue to be needed to avoid security vacuums
being created. In due course, a law and effective enforcement
will be necessary to curb the illegal holding of weapons and formation
of armed militias. Overall progress remains very slow.
THE NATIONAL
DIRECTORATE OF
SECURITY
The National Directorate of Security (NDS) is
undergoing a program of significant reform and restructuring,
both in Kabul and in the provincial offices. This program has
already resulted in major downsizing and the production of a new
charter in which its previously wide powers of arrest have been
restricted. The NDS has the objective to be fully non-partisan,
non-political and accountable. As a step towards this objective,
the NDS is implementing a merit based appointment system.
In order to meet effectively the security challenges
which face Afghanistan, particularly in countering terrorism and
organized crime, the NDS has need of greater resources in the
areas of logistics, especially communications equipment and transport
so that it can access remote areas of the country.
The NDS intends to establish an Intelligence
Academy with the aim of training 5,000 officers within five years.
To achieve this, the NDS will need to be sponsored and funded
by friendly countries.
The main elements to rebuilding security in
Afghanistan are: first, building an effective law and order system
(police and justice), and secondly (but concurrently) building
an effective and well run National army, responsible to the civil
authorities, for internal security duties. Both of these must
happen quickly if we are to accelerate progress in tackling the
drugs trade and disarming unofficial militias. The restoration
of security must also be achieved in compliance with the legal
rules based on the principles laid down in the Bonn Agreement.
Advances have been made over the last two years,
albeit slowly. Among the positive achievements so far; the MoD
is undergoing a complete restructuring and reform process to ensure
accountability and civilian control over the military. A start
has been made on creating a new Afghan National Army, which will
soon be 10,000 strong, plans are now being implemented to train
or retrain up to 20,000 existing policemen by June 2004, and the
National Police Training College has been restarted. A National
Drug Control Strategy has been adopted. A drugs policy and co-ordination
organisation, the Counter Narcotics Directorate (OND), as well
as a lead drug enforcement agency, the Counter Narcotics Police
of Afghanistan (CNPA), have been created. A national Judicial
Reform Commission has been set up, and a number of initiatives
have started in judicial training including preliminary assessment
of the status of justice, training of personnel, rehabilitation
of physical infrastructure and law simplification. There is now
an Interim Criminal Procedure Code. The Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission, which was mandated by the Bonn Conference,
has been established and has expanded its activities across the
country. These are all excellent initiatives but, to date, their
practical impact throughout Afghanistan has been limited.
The government must also fulfil the population's
expectation to extend its authority into the rural areas. Delaying
this will allow illegal structures, often linked to the drug trade,
to fill the vacuum. We must therefore greatly expand the present
district stabilisation initiatives. In particular these initiatives
must, be supportable from a security and judicial perspective.
This will enable the presence of central government to be appropriately
extended across the SSR spectrum.
The other very serious and immediate problem
Afghanistan faces is the increasing menace of poppy cultivation.
The illegal drug trade continues to threaten Afghanistan's future.
It creates insecurity, fuels corruption, undermines governance
and is a barrier to progress in many areas of the country. Tackling
drugs in isolation will not work. Counter narcotics specific activity
needs to be supported through reform and capacity building to
build a more effective state to enforce the laws of the Afghan
government and to develop the licit economy to create alternatives
to poppy cultivation. Interdicting the drugs trade and promoting
alternative licit livelihoods must go together so that the Afghan
people do not fall into further poverty and hardship. This will
require aggressive action against traffickers.
CONCLUSION
Looking back to 2002 it is now clear that the
need to fund the newly rebuilding Afghan security sector institutions,
and in particular to fund some rapid practical outputs in a post
conflict situation was greatly underestimated. The 2001 assessments
on which the plans were based perhaps naively assumed an improvement
in security which has not materialise, and this error needs correction
at this conference if Afghanistan's ambitious plans for creating
good governance and going forward with reconstruction are to materialise.
There has been much commentary and debate lately,
both in political and academic circles, on how the security environment
in Afghanistan can be improved. This debate is fuelled by a perception
of deteriorating security, slow progress on reconstruction and
reform, and disappointing results on the counter narcotics front.
There is some evidence for this. These difficulties, setbacks,
and a degree of institutional inertia must be acknowledged. However,
it is not the whole picture. Initiatives in SSR have made some
progress; in DDR; the creation of the ANA; and in police and judicial
training. DDR, ANA, CN, police and judicial reform are all driven
by the policy ideas and support of lead donor nations.
The Afghan government is fully committed, in
partnership with the International Community, to implementing
Security Sector Reform (SSR) to help to create a secure environment
for development. Without confidence in security, governance and
reconstruction will be slow. The lack of presence of NGOs, International
Organization and other aid agencies in some parts of the country,
notably the south and east, is testament to this and there is
still a perception in some areas of a security vacuum outside
Kabul.
To enable the pace of SSR to accelerate, there
needs to be more tangible coordination on four levels: multilaterally
between all donors and Afghanistan; between the donors themselves;
bilaterally between each donor and Afghanistan; and not least
between the different programs within each donor country. This
would reduce the risk of waste, overlap, inefficiencies and friction.
The current arrangements are insufficient. To increase co-ordination,
the President has therefore recently accepted in principle the
proposal of meetings every six weeks between both Afghan and International
Community stakeholders with the Coalition Office of Military Cooperation
for Afghanistan (OMC-A) and the Office of the National Security
Council together providing secretariat support.
This integration will be timely, as this coming
year should, according to plans, see major changes; AMF numbers
should fall rapidly through the DDR process, which must now be
driven hard after a slow start, the ANA should increase in size
and be deployed on a nationwide basis and effective police and
justice systems should reach out into the provinces. Many of these
nascent security organizations will be involved in the critical
provision of security for elections. Taken as a whole, this will
not be an easy process, as there will be varying degrees of scepticism
and friction that will require strong leadership and commitment
from the government and close coordination with the international
community to remain on track. Ultimately, the cost of this insecurity
will be far greater than the cost of investing in improved security.
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