G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation
At Evian, we recognised the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together
with international terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international
peace and security. This challenge requires a long-term strategy
and multi-faceted approaches.
Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back
proliferation, today, at Sea Island, we announce an action plan
to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime. We will work
together with other concerned states to realise this plan.
All states must fulfill their arms control,
disarmament, and nonproliferation commitments, which we reaffirm,
and we strongly support universal adherence to and compliance
with these commitments under the relevant multilateral treaties.
We will help and encourage states in effectively implementing
their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes, in particular
implementing domestically their obligations under such treaties,
building law enforcement capacity, and establishing effective
export controls. We call on all states that have not already done
so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation.
We strongly support UN Security Council Resolution
1540, calling on all states to establish effective national export
controls, to adopt and enforce effective laws to criminalize proliferation,
to take cooperative action to prevent non-state actors from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction, and to end illicit trafficking in
such weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.
We call on all states to implement this resolution promptly and
fully, and we are prepared to assist them in so doing, thereby
helping to fight the nexus between terrorism and proliferation,
and black markets in these weapons and related materials.
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
The trafficking and indiscriminate spread of
sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that may
be used for weapons purposes are a threat to us all. Some states
seek uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities
for weapons programmes contrary to their commitments under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We reaffirm
our commitment to the NPT and to the declarations made at Kananaskis
and Evian, and we will work to prevent the illicit diversion of
nuclear materials and technology. We announce the following new
actions to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and
the acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by terrorists,
while allowing the world to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful
nuclear technology.
— To allow the world to safely enjoy
the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the
danger of weapons proliferation, we have agreed to work to establish
new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation
potential will not be exported to states that may seek to use
them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist
hands. The export of such items should only occur pursuant to
criteria consistent with global nonproliferation norms and to
states rigorously committed to those norms. We shall work to amend
appropriately the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and
to gain the widest possible support for such measures in the future.
We aim to have appropriate measures in place by the next G-8 Summit.
In aid of this process, for the intervening year, we agree that
it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies
to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy
of prudence. We will also develop new measures to ensure reliable
access to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, including
nuclear fuel and related services, at market conditions, for all
states, consistent with maintaining nonproliferation commitments
and standards.
— We seek universal adherence to IAEA
comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol and urge
all states to ratify and implement these agreements promptly.
We are actively engaged in outreach efforts toward this goal,
and ready to offer necessary support.
— The Additional Protocol must become
an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.
We will work to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim
to achieve this by the end of 2005.
— We support the suspension of nuclear
fuel cycle co-operation with states that violate their nuclear
nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, recognising that
the responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with
national governments or the Security Council.
— To enhance the IAEA's integrity and
effectiveness, and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations
comply with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements, we
will work together to establish a new Special Committee of the
IAEA Board of Governors. This committee would be responsible for
preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and
verification. We believe this committee should be made up of member
states in compliance with their NPT and IAEA commitments.
— Likewise, we believe that countries
under investigation for non-technical violations of their nuclear
nonproliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not to
participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors or the
Special Committee regarding their own cases.
2. PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE
We reiterate our strong commitment to and support
for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Statement
of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global
problem. We will continue our efforts to build effective PSI partnerships
to interdict trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their
delivery systems, and related materials. We also will prevent
those that facilitate proliferation from engaging in such trafficking
and work to broaden and strengthen domestic and international
laws supporting PSI. We welcome the increasing level of support
worldwide for PSI, which now includes all G-8 members. The Krakow
meeting commemorating PSI's first anniversary, attended by 62
countries, evidences growing global support.
We will further co-operate to defeat proliferation
networks and co-ordinate, where appropriate, enforcement efforts,
including by stopping illicit financial flows and shutting down
illicit plants, laboratories, and brokers, in accordance with
national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law. Several of us are already developing mechanisms
to deny access to our ports and airports for companies and impose
visa bans on individuals involved in illicit trade.
We encourage all states to strengthen and expand
national and international measures to respond to clandestine
procurement activities. Directly, and through the relevant international
mechanisms, we will work actively with states requiring assistance
in improving their national capabilities to meet international
norms.
3. THE GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP AGAINST
WEAPONS AND
MATERIALS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
Since its launch by G8 leaders two years ago
at Kananaskis, the Global Partnership has become a significant
force worldwide to enhance international safety and security.
Global Partnership member states, including the six new donors
that joined at Evian, have in the past year launched new co-operative
projects in Russia and accelerated progress on those already underway.
While much has been accomplished, significant challenges remain.
We recommit ourselves to our Kananaskis Statement, Principles,
and Guidelines as the basis for Global Partnership cooperation.
— We recommit ourselves to raising
up to $20 billion for the Global Partnership through 2012.
— Expanding the Partnership to include
additional donor countries is essential to raise the necessary
resources and to ensure the effort is truly global. Today we welcome
the decisions of Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand to join.
— We will continue to work with other
former Soviet states to discuss their participation in the Partnership.
We reaffirm that Partnership states will participate in projects
according to their national interests and resources.
— We reaffirm that we will address
proliferation challenges worldwide. We will, for example, pursue
the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan scientists involved in past
WMD programmes. We also support projects to eliminate over time
the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors worldwide,
secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel, control and secure
radiation sources, strengthen export control and border security,
and reinforce biosecurity. We will use the Global Partnership
to co-ordinate our efforts in these areas.
4. NONPROLIFERATION
CHALLENGES
The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT,
which is unprecedented; its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons,
including through both its plutonium reprocessing and its uranium
enrichment programmes, in violation of its international obligations;
and its established history of missile proliferation are serious
concerns to us all. We strongly support the Six-Party Process,
and strongly urge the DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons-related
programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner,
a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful
solution.
We remain united in our determination to see
the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear programme
resolved. Iran must be in full compliance with its NPT obligations
and safeguards agreement. To this end, we reaffirm our support
for the IAEA Board of Governors' three Iran resolutions. We note
that since Evian, Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and
has committed itself to co-operate with the Agency, and to suspend
its enrichment and reprocessing related activities. While we acknowledge
the areas of progress reported by the Director General, we are,
however, deeply concerned that Iran `s suspension of enrichment-related
activity is not yet comprehensive. We deplore Iran's delays, deficiencies
in co-operation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA
Director General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and
fully to comply with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements,
including ratification and full implementation of the Additional
Protocol, leading to resolution of all outstanding issues related
to its nuclear programme.
We welcome Libya's strategic decision to rid
itself of its weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles,
to fully comply with the NPT, the Additional Protocol, the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), and to commit not to possess missiles subject to the Missile
Technology Control Regime. We note Libya has co-operated in the
removal of nuclear equipment and materials and taken steps to
eliminate chemical weapons. We call on Libya to continue to co-operate
fully with the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons.
5. DEFENDING
AGAINST BIOTERRORISM
Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to
the security of all nations, and could endanger public health
and disrupt economies. We commit to concrete national and international
steps to expand or, where necessary, initiate new biosurveillance
capabilities to detect bioterror attacks against humans, animals,
and crops; improve our prevention and response capabilities; increase
protection of the global food supply; and respond to, investigate,
and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons
or suspicious outbreaks of disease. In this context, we seek concrete
realisation of our commitments at the fifth Review Conference
of the BWC. The BWC is a critical foundation against biological
weapons' proliferation, including to terrorists. Its prohibitions
should be fully implemented, including enactment of penal legislation.
We strongly urge all non-parties to join the BWC promptly.
6. CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
We support full implementation of the CWC, including
its nonproliferation aspects. We strongly urge all non-parties
to join the CWC promptly, and will work with them to this end.
We also urge CWC States Parties to undertake national legislative
and administrative measures for its full implementation. We support
the use of all fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures,
including, if necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in
the CWC.
7. IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE
EVIAN INITIATIVE
ON RADIOACTIVE
SOURCE SECURITY
At Evian we agreed to improve controls on radioactive
sources to prevent their use by terrorists, and we have made substantial
progress toward that goal. We are pleased that the IAEA approved
a revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources in September 2003. We urge all states to implement the
Code and recognise it as a global standard.
We have agreed to export and import control
guidance for high-risk radioactive sources, which should only
be supplied to authorised end-users in states that can control
them. States should ensure that no sources are diverted for illicit
use. We seek prompt IAEA approval of this guidance to ensure that
effective controls are operational by the end of 2005 and applied
in a harmonised and consistent manner. We support the IAEA's programme
for assistance to ensure that all countries can meet the new standards.
8. NUCLEAR SAFETY
AND SECURITY
Since the horrific 1986 accident at Chernobyl,
we have worked with Ukraine to improve the safety and security
of the site. We have already made a large financial contribution
to build a safe confinement over the remnants of the Chernobyl
reactor. We are grateful for the participation and contributions
made by 21 other states in this effort. Today, we endorse international
efforts to raise the remaining funds necessary to complete the
project. We urge Ukraine to support and work closely with us to
complete the confinement's construction by 2008 in a way that
contributes to radiological safety, in particular in Ukraine and
neighbouring regions.
An effective, efficient nuclear regulatory system
is essential for our safety and security. We affirm the importance
for national regulators to have sufficient authority, independence,
and competence.
|
