Written evidence submitted by Dr Rosemary
Hollis
ISRAEL-PALESTINE AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Dr Rosemary Hollis is Head of the Middle East
Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London,
and is responsible for formulating and directing research projects
and analysis on political, economic and security issues in the
Middle East and North Africa. The focus of her own research and
writing is foreign policy and security issues in the Middle East,
particularly in the Gulf and Arab-Israeli sectors and relations
between the Western powers and the region. From 1990-95, Dr Hollis
headed the Middle East Programme at the Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies. From 1980-89 she was a lecturer
in Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington
University in Washington, DC, where she also gained a PhD in Political
Science. Prior to that she held a variety of research posts in
the media and commerce in London, having graduated from King's
College, London with a BA in History (1974) and MA in War Studies
(1975).
1. The assumption behind European (and British)
policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that only the United
States can exert significant influence on Israel and that therefore
European (and British) policy can achieve little unless they can
galvanise Washington to follow through on its commitment to a
"two-state" solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict
and bring the Israelis to the table. This means the Europeans
may be under-estimating their power to influence the actual parties
to the conflict.
2. The Quartet "road map" was
designed to identify a process by which a two-state solution could
be reached. The problem with the road map is that it requires
the parties to the conflict to engage with each other, and absent
such engagement Israeli unilateral initiatives will prevail.
3. Given the distrust of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) that pervades in Israel and conviction that there
is no Palestinian "partner" for peace, the mood there
is for unilateralist measures pending a change in the Palestinian
leadership and/or attitude. In the circumstances, Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon has embarked on a unilateralist initiative
for "disengagement" from Gaza and some sectors/settlements
in the West Bank. This would appear a positive development, but
US President George Bush has endorsed Sharon's idea that his initiative
involve a simultaneous consolidation of Israeli settlement blocs
to the east of the "Green Line" that marks the pre-1967
border between Israel and the West Bank. If Sharon has his way,
the area remaining to the Palestinians in the West Bank will not
make for a viable, contiguous, independent Palestinian state that
any Palestinian leadership could agree to.
4. The task therefore is to raise with Israelis
the logic of Sharon's initiative and promote a debate among Israelis
about whether they can look forward to real peace in the absence
of a viable Palestinian state. If the goal of a two-state solution
is to be realised, Israel cannot keep as much of the West Bank
(and East Jerusalem) as it would like to keep, designating to
the Palestinians only their population centres in the heart of
the West Bank (ie about 40-50% of the West Bank—itself only
20% of historical Palestine).
5. Policy should therefore be directed at
persuading the Israelis of this reality. In order to engage Israelis,
however, Europe needs to gain some leverage with them. Relying
on Washington will not be enough absent US engagement or willingness
to pressure Israel.
6. Europe (including Britain) could gain
some leverage by confronting the prevailing Israeli suspicion
that Europe is congenitally biased in favour of the Palestinians
and prone to anti-Semitism. The Israeli government is also complacent
that Europe (including Britain) cannot significantly influence
Washington in this matter. Thus far, the Europeans have devoted
some thought to how they could assist Palestinian state-building
and are engaged in promoting internal reform in the Palestinian
polity. What is missing is a parallel vision for how Europe could
assist Israel to accommodate to the "two-state" solution.
7. The suggestion here therefore is that
European (and British) policy makers visualise how Israeli security
and economic development can be enhanced under the envisaged two-state
solution. Simply demanding that the Israelis understand the European
logic (that a viable Palestinian state is in their long-term interests)
is not enough, because of the distrust, not to say hatred, that
prevails in the two communities and suspicions of European motives.
What would potentially change the Israeli thinking would be a
set of proposals from Europe that capitalises on the Israeli preference
for disengagement and separation from the Palestinians manifest
in the Israeli construction of the barrier between them and Palestinian
population centres in the West Bank.
8. Framed within the context of the EU's
new Neighbourhood Policy this set of proposals could re-orientate
Israeli thinking to view Europe rather than the Arab world as
their strategic depth and economic space. Europe already is their
economic space, not the Arab world. Yet European (and British)
policy has tended to emphasise the need for Israel and the Arabs
to get along and find a common future. A re-orientation would
enable Israel to spend the coming decade or so, concentrating
on developing closer links to Europe and literally putting its
relations with the Arab world, including the Palestinians, in
cold storage, until tempers cool. However . . .
9. The quid pro quo has to be that
Israel abandons its quest to retain as much as possible of the
West Bank. Israeli disengagement from the Palestinians must enable
the construction of a viable Palestinian state to take place.
This means moving the barrier currently under construction to
the Green Line or providing land swaps (as envisaged in the unofficial
Geneva Accord) to compensate the Palestinians for lands appropriated
to Israel from the West Bank. Palestinians and their homes, left
in limbo on the western side of the barrier, cannot remain in
their current stateless condition and they and their land need
to be re-attached to the rest of the West Bank and the Palestinian
state in the making
10. The job of helping the Palestinians
rebuild their state in the West Bank and Gaza can be shouldered
by the Europeans. If the Israelis want a US presence, so be it,
along the Green Line. At present no international forces can be
inserted between the Israelis and Palestinians because the former
are intermixed with the latter. They need to be induced to withdraw
and desist from interference, then security along the dividing
line (and future international border) can be managed.
11. Having said all this, the real worry
now is that the moment for exercising European (and British) leverage
on Israel has probably already passed because of President Bush's
undertakings to Sharon. Israeli policy and facts on the ground
are fast eroding any prospect of a Palestinian state in anything
other than a virtual sense.
12. Repeated endorsements of and commitments
to the road map are no more than pious words that avoid recognition
that the two-state solution is fast disappearing as a realistic
prospect. If not addressed, the consequences of this trend will
be further radicalisation of Palestinian and Arab opinion and
Europe will not escape the violent consequences.
13. Supposing Europe ends up considering
sanctions on Israel to demonstrate disapproval of actions that
flout and erode Palestinian rights—the effect will be to
alienate the Israelis rather than persuade them to change course.
However, if the stick is to be used or threatened, Europe's case
for resorting to pressure would be much improved if the carrot
has been tried first.
14. In sum, the suggestion here is that
instead of calling constantly for implementation of the road map
and urging the parties accordingly, but to no avail, policy should
be directed at capitalising on the Israeli (and Palestinian) preference
for separation. Expect no resumption of direct Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations, but don't leave it to the Americans to negotiate
away Palestinian rights with the Israelis, while the prospect
of a two-state solution disappears from the map.
Dr Rosemary Hollis
10 June 2004
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