Written evidence submitted by Dr Stephen
Pullinger
Tackling the threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction and their proliferation is a key strategic objective
of HMG, the G8 and the EU. In January 2005 the UK will assume
the chair of the G8; in April the NPT Review Conference will take
place; and in July the UK will assume the EU Presidency. Generally,
HMG will want to take a lead in developing counter-proliferation
policy, and in building wider domestic and international support
for it. Specifically, HMG will want a successful outcome to the
NPT Review Conference. At some stage in the next Parliament it
will need to handle the issue of Trident replacement.
In both 1995 and 2000 the Foreign Affairs Committee
conducted an inquiry into Weapons of Mass Destruction—particularly
international efforts to control their number and proliferation—to
coincide with the quinquennial review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
I would like to suggest that the Committee seriously
consider conducting another inquiry along similar lines to coincide
with the NPT's next Review Conference in Spring 2005. I do so
for the following reasons.
The failure to make any significant progress in meeting
the 13 main steps to disarmament agreed by the States Parties,
including the UK, at the 2000 NPT Conference, deserves examination.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not entered into
force; the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
have stalled; far from reducing the salience of their nuclear
weapons some nuclear powers are actually adopting new doctrines
for their use; and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is defunct.
Negotiations towards a verification protocol
for the Biological Weapons Convention collapsed in acrimony. Questions
continue to surround the adequacy of funding for Co-operative
Threat Reduction programmes in the former Soviet Union.
There have been significant political developments
in relation to each of the states of concern and their WMD programmes
and ambitions: the EU/IAEA's ongoing engagement with Iran; Iraq's
disarmament; Libya's abandonment of WMD; North Korea's sabre rattling
and six-power talks; and the developing deterrence relationship
between India and Pakistan.
Of most significance though has been the dramatic
change in the US approach to multilateral arms control, along
with its preparedness to take pre-emptive action in relation to
WMD. I believe that HMG's approach to tackling the threat from
WMD may also be changing quite significantly and that there is
a consequent desire to adopt more pro-active counter-proliferation
policies. This shift is prompted largely as a result of fears-often
alluded to by the Prime Minister—of the nexus between states
of concern, terrorists and WMD. Unlike during the Cold War, the
new thinking is that we cannot afford to wait for the threat posed
by this nexus to materialise because: The threat will be neither
containable nor deterrable; WMD developed in rogue states are
far more likely to be used, perhaps by the host regime, or certainly
if they fall into fundamentalist terrorist hands; and the consequences
of such use could be catastrophic.
If we are in a new paradigm this will have major
consequences for arms control and security policy.
Moreover, I would suggest that this issue of immense
national importance therefore deserves proper parliamentary scrutiny.
I very much hope that the FAC will consider providing that critical
oversight.
Dr Stephen Pullinger
Senior Adviser to Saferworld
Former Specialist Adviser to the Committee on its
inquiry into WMD, 2000
9 July 2004
| 
