Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-79)
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR KIM
DARROCH AND
MR DAVID
FROST
25 MAY 2004
Q60 Sir John Stanley: Do you feel it
satisfactory to continue with this quite difficult split of responsibility
between the Commission and the so-called EU Foreign Minister for
those acting in the name of the EU overseas? Have you given consideration
as to whether it might be better for them all to come under one
or the other, that it would be practicable?
Mr Straw: They will come under
one, they will come under the External Action Service, as I understand
it, run by the European Foreign Minister and therefore responsible
to the Council of Ministers. I think it is a good thing. There
will be individuals within an office—if you take the really
big offices, say Washington—who will be responsible, say,
for trade, and day by day they would report to the Commissioner
for Trade rather than to the European Foreign Minister; but the
overall exercise there would be coordinated by somebody responsible
to the Council of Foreign Ministers through the European Foreign
Minister. I think it is a better way of proceeding. So at the
moment, as I say, you have a lot of these people abroad and it
is not entirely clear what they are doing in every case.
Mr Darroch: I want to add to this
that the point about this process is that you are merging, as
the Foreign Secretary has said, a few representatives of the Council
who work for Solana and all the permanent Commission Offices overseas
at the moment, who will then have a unified service. This gives
the Council much more control than at present over what these
overseas, offices are doing, and they will all be working within
the framework of policy that is set by the Council, which the
European Foreign Minister is there to implement. So the net result
of this is more control for the Council and Member States over
what these offices are doing overseas, than is the case at the
moment.
Q61 Ms Stuart: There was me thinking
that there was not any need for any Treaty base for the External
Action Service whatsoever and we are just putting it in to keep
Joschka Fischer happy. The Declaration, as I understand it, has
not got a legal basis, and there is a really strong argument to
be made that we are going into detail that actually is unconstitutional,
or does not have a proper place in the Constitution and the Foreign
Ministers and the Council of Ministers ought to make up their
minds what is the best thing to do. Can I move on to my favourite
pet hate, and that is the Passerelle clause, 24.4? The House of
Lords report in one of its reports that its strongest criticism
of the Constitution was not so much what is in there but the way
they initiated some processes, and the Passerelle clause has actually
been made by Her Majesty's Official Opposition as one of its "red
lines" or its acceptability of the Constitution or not. As
I understand it, the last debate we had is that that clause has
been removed, as it stands, and from what I understand has actually
been improved in a way that has strengthened tremendously. As
we stand now, is the Naples text still the one which we think
will be accepted?
Mr Straw: Yes, it is now to be
found in document 76 of the Irish Presidency, which is essentially
the Naples text. It completely transforms the Passerelle clauses,
objectionable for the reasons, which you have indeed often rehearsed,
Ms Stuart. It is now strengthened so that if any national parliament,
i.e. just one, "makes known its opposition within six months
of the date of such notification, the European decision referred
to above shall not be adopted." So it gives each national
parliament a veto. I think it is very satisfactory, and as a result
of us arguing our corner.
Q62 Mr Pope: Can I ask briefly about
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and can you say what you believe
the status of the Charter will be? Will it be an integral part
of the Constitution or will it be merely a list of aspirations
appended to it?
Mr Straw: If the Treaty is agreed
it will appear in the Treaty. That is not a problem. We agreed
the Charter of Rights in any event. The issue has always been
its legal status, and it is for that reason that there were negotiated
in the Convention what were called Horizontal Articles, which
were Articles 251 and 252. Its effect was to make absolutely clear—and
I quote from Article 251-2: "The Charter does not extend
the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify
powers or tasks defined in other Parts of the Constitution."
It also makes clear that the provisions of the Charter contain
principles, which are very general, and not just rights, and that
they shall be "judicially cognisable only in the interpretation
of such acts of the Union and in ruling on their legality."
There is then the issue of the explanations. There were explanations
prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium of the Convention,
which drafted the Charter, and the Preamble of Part II says that,
"The Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union
Member States with due regard to the explanations . . ."
We carry on looking at this carefully to ensure that we pin this
down but there is already a very, very significant amount of protection
here. May I give you one last example, which is about the rights
of collective bargaining and action? This is Article II-28. which
says that, "Workers and employers, or their respective organisations,
have . . ." and it adopts the "right to negotiate and
conclude collective agreements at appropriate levels and, in cases
of conflict of interest, to take collective action to defend their
interests, including strike action." But this is subject
to very important saving, where the dots were, "in accordance
with Union law and national laws and practices". So this
does not add to any of the rights which people currently have,
either under domestic law or, for example, under the ILO Convention
or various Articles of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Q63 Mr Pope: There are a lot of serious
concerns about this, are there not, Foreign Secretary, as we appear
to be facing a Spring of discontent, as a variety of sectors are
looking at strike action—thinking of the railways and the
London Underground. There will be real public concern if it was
felt that this Charter extended the right to strike. Could you
give us a categorical assurance that that is not the case; furthermore,
that you will not sign up to if it it does?
Mr Straw: I can give you that
categorical assurance. Neither does it detract from the right
to strike. The point is, it leaves the right to strikes within
the purview of domestic parliaments—that is exactly where
it should be. That is why there is this very important wording
in II-28, people have these rights, "in accordance with Union
law and national laws and practices", not just national laws
but national laws and practices.
Q64 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary, can
I ask a few questions on European Security and Defence Policy?
The first of which is that last year, last November, at the so-called
Naples conclave, the Foreign Ministers agreed a test for the so-called
mutual defence clause. Are we happy with that or is there a risk
that the current text could jeopardise our standing within NATO?
Is there any possibility that the text for that clause will be
opened up for further discussion?
Mr Straw: We are happy about the
draft changes in the text. As I say, they were to I-40 and to
later parts of the text. There has been no suggestion that this
should be reopened—although they could be—and I do
not recall a single occasion since Christmas when it has been
reopened because there was overall agreement in both the Foreign
Ministers at Naples and by Heads of Government. This was an issue
on which people predicted there would be a great argument; there
was a great debate and a very satisfactory conclusion was arrived
at.
Q65 Mr Illsley: Moving on to Structured
Cooperation, I think we as a government proposed the original
proposal for a small group of Member States to move ahead in terms
of defence cooperation. The Irish have now amended that to include
any Member State within that group. Does that meet our fears for
the original draft? Are we happy with the latest proposals?
Mr Straw: Mr Darroch indicates
assent, and I agree with him.
Q66 Ms Stuart: Does that mean that you
can no longer have the system where you set up the inner core
by unanimity and then the core can move on by QMV? The core has
to require validity on unanimity, that was the real objection?
Mr Darroch: In relation to Structured
Cooperation or in relation to Enhanced Cooperation?
Q67 Ms Stuart: Enhanced Cooperation?
Mr Darroch: There is still a debate
about that provision under Enhanced Cooperation, on whether the
decision had been taken by unanimity.
Q68 Ms Stuart: That was the real problem.
Mr Darroch: There is still a debate
on that so that clause is still important.
Q69 Mr Illsley: If the Irish have opened
a proposal whereby any Member State can be included within a small
group, that could still produce a small group in the way that
it was as originally envisaged and we objected to it. In other
words, although we could all, say, as a group be involved in Structured
Cooperation, it still might lead to a small group of States acting
on their own. Even though the facility or the mechanism is there
for any country to be involved, they might just choose not to,
leaving a group of countries who are interested in being involved.
Is there a danger of that?
Mr Darroch: I am not sure if I
have quite followed the question. The point about Structured Cooperation
as opposed to Enhanced Cooperation is the provision is designed
essentially to allow small groups to move ahead, especially with
defence cooperation matters, and that could be developing particular
defence systems or whatever. I think the text does have some sort
of entry criteria for joining that small group that is taking
the Structured Cooperation forward, so you have to meet certain
levels or have a certain commitment about the contribution you
are going to make to the Structured Cooperation.
Q70 Ms Stuart: The real question is:
if you have a mechanism that allows a small group to move ahead
and then the process is so open that late comers may join as they
choose, that is fine; but there is a flaw at the moment that it
could actually allow the small group to form and that small group
in itself becomes more exclusive by moving on QMV and not allow
outsiders to come in.
Mr Straw: Have QMV within the
small group and it becomes less exclusive in terms of who else
can join, and that has been quite an important part of this. If
you have unanimity that means that any member of the core group
can veto the joining of others. This is an area where QMV works
to the advantage of the greater number. So you have QMV in it
so that one individual country could not veto another nation seeking
to join, and that has been one of the things we have been arguing
for. Sometimes QMV works in a counter intuitive way, just as one
example; the Zimbabwe sanctions is another. Can I also say, Mr
Illsley, there never has been anything to stop Member States of
the EU from cooperating bilaterally, trilaterally, quadrilaterally
outside the Treaties, and plenty of that goes on at the moment,
and long may it continue.
Mr Darroch: Just on the Structured
Cooperation point, because there is a difference here between
Structured Cooperation and Enhanced Cooperation. The text that
we have arrived at, which is no longer under debate, it is more
or less agreed, makes it clear that structured cooperation is
about capability commitments, and it is pen to any Member State
that wishes to join. The provisions on the Structured Cooperation
mean it has to be agreed by all 25, as a whole, not just by prospective
participants, before it can be launched.
Q71 Mr Illsley: I think I have it now.
Mr Straw: You are the only one
who is confused, by the way! They have Enhanced Cooperation in
Afghanistan, by the way!
Q72 Mr Illsley: Et tu, Brute! Turning
to the European Armaments Agency, what is the progress on the
European Armaments Agency, and can you say a little bit more about
this conflict between ourselves and the French in terms of this
suggestion that it should have a bi-Europe policy, rather than
look outside of Europe, or perhaps leasing equipment, purchasing
of equipment?
Mr Straw: I think it is working
all right, actually. The French Defence Minister said in Le
Figaro on 20 May, "There is no French-UK divergence on
the role of the Agency. This will in a balanced way cover four
areas: future military capabilities, harmonising operational needs,
new armaments programmes and research. The British, like the French,
believe that Ministers of Defence should take on the primary responsibility
within the Agency. This now seems to be agreed by everyone else.
On finance and decision making there is no difference between
the UK and France." The Committee may know that Nick Whitney,
who is an official in the Ministry of Defence, has been appointed
to head the Agency Establishment Team. I think it will work out
fine, and it is to the advantage of the UK's defence capabilities;
it is also, in my judgment, to the advantage of the UK's defence
industry.
Q73 Chairman: You are convinced that
there is no divergence on a more protectionist little European
defence procurement policy by the French and ourselves looking
more flexibly and more widely?
Mr Straw: I am quite sure of that.
In any event, defence exports will remain a matter for each individual
state, and that is very clear. As you know, we have a co-operative
arrangement on defence exports within Europe with the common criteria
for export controls but what we export is a matter for us.
Q74 Mr Illsley: Finally, Foreign Secretary,
could you tell us a little bit more about the EU planning cell
within NATO? How is that developing and is there any danger of
it duplicating existing NATO structures?
Mr Straw: Yes. A lot of work has
been going on on this, both about where it should be housed, how
it should be housed, who should be alongside it and its numbers.
There has been a debate among the partners over this. We have
been concerned to ensure—and I personally have taken a lot
of interest in this—that it does work as efficiently as
possible and with as light a touch as possible, and that is where
we have got to.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, I would
like to turn now to broad questions of enlargement, the next stages
of enlargement, the new neighbours and so on. Mr Olner will begin.
Q75 Mr Olner: Foreign Secretary, before
we get on to enlargement, one of the difficulties that has been
faced is one of the 25, of course, is Cyprus and Cyprus still
sadly—and I am sure you share that sadness—is divided.
I know you said in a letter to us on 17 May I believe that as
a country we are going to work to encourage tourism to Northern
Cyprus and to have political contacts with Turkish Cypriot leaders.
Can I ask how far down the road are we on that? I think it is
tremendously important, seeing as the Committee has just announced
it is going to do a new inquiry into Cyprus and the situation.
Mr Straw: You will be familiar
with the fact of the referendum and its outcome. We discussed
the matter at the end of April EU General Affairs and External
Relations Council. We invited the Commission to bring forward
comprehensive proposals to seek to end the isolation of Turkish
Cypriots in the mainstream of the European Union, with particular
emphasis on economic integration. I think my letter to you, which
I have somewhere here, which was subsequent to that meeting, spelt
out what the EU had agreed in that respect. We met on the Monday
26th, there was a regulation passed on the Wednesday which governed
the green line to provide a model on which to base the new trading
regime. The EU regulation established special rules concerning
the crossing of goods, services and persons to take account of
the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not
exercise effective control over the whole of the island. There
are also proposals, which we await, from the Commission for spending
the 259 million euro structural funds earmarked for helping the
north ". . . catch up" with the EU acquis. Mr
Olner, you will be aware that although the Government of Cyprus
in practice represents only the Greek Cypriot side of the green
line all citizens of Cyprus, north and south of the green line,
are EU citizens and the territory as a whole is now part of the
territory which has accepted its membership of the EU. That was
the basis on which in the EU we accepted Cyprus's application.
It is a complicated situation but what our policy was, is and
will remain is for a Government of Cyprus representing a unified
island being able to represent all Cypriots within the Council
of the European Union.
Q76 Mr Olner: On that basis it may well
take, sadly, a time to achieve, will Northern Cyprus have access
to all of the EU institutions and will they be able to play, as
part of the island of Cyprus, a role in the European Union?
Mr Straw: We do not recognise
the so-called TNRC as a state in international law. We do not
as a nation and neither does the European Union. Indeed in my
letter to you I say we shall not recognise the north as a separate
independent state. There is no question of any so-called government
from a separate independent state of Northern Cyprus sitting around
the table in the European Union. What we want to see is all the
citizens of Cyprus, north and south, effectively represented in
the European Union by a Government which represents north and
south, that was the purpose of the Kofi Annan plan.
Q77 Mr Olner: I accept that but how do
the citizens of Northern Cyprus make their voice known in the
European Union?
Mr Straw: First of all, by easing
the restrictions on movement both in terms of trade and of people,
by contact with them and by encouraging a process of political
dialogue. There was a unanimity in the meeting that the people
of Northern Cyprus should not be penalised for the fact that they
voted in favour of the unification plan, far from it. We have
obligations to them and we should follow those through, obviously
in a manner consistent with our overall view about Cyprus which
is that we are seeking a unification of the island not a division
of it.
Q78 Mr Mackay: Continuing on Cyprus,
Foreign Secretary, I think we all fully understand why it would
be wrong to recognise Northern Cyprus. Having said that, do you
agree with the Commission for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen,
when he attacked Tassos Papadopoulos, and I quote ". . .
for misleading the European Union by pretending to support the
Annan plan but campaigning against it". Those are strong
words but they look to many of us to be accurate. Would you support
the Commissioner?
Mr Straw: Can I just put it this
way. Hard things were said at the time of the campaign for the
referendum. I think we want to put all that behind us and look
forward to constructive relationships and to a bridging of these
problems. Anybody who knows the history of Cyprus, north or south,
knows that it arouses strong passions, particularly among the
residents north and south about what they perceive to have happened.
In this respect it is not that different from the kind of passions
that we all know in respect of Northern Ireland. We also know
from Northern Ireland that the best way to try and help resolve
these is to look forward rather than keep raking over the coals
so that is what we are trying to do.
Q79 Mr Mackay: You said, rightly, a moment
ago that the people who live in the north of Cyprus should not
be penalised for voting for the Annan plan, in fact the opposite.
Is not the most practical way to ensure that we allow international
flights into the north which would be the single best gesture
to improve not just tourism but the whole economy of the north?
Mr Straw: The issues of trade,
which obviously include transportation both in terms of the opening
of the sea ports and the opening of the airports, are on the agenda.
I cannot say exactly when firm decisions will be made. In my letter
to you, I talked about a balance to establish a clear legal framework
and to facilitate trade and other links between the two parts
of the island. A regime to allow direct trade with the north would
need to strike the same balance. That is on the agenda.
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