Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160 - 179)

TUESDAY 29 JUNE 2004

SIR MICHAEL JAY KCMG, MR DICKIE STAGG CMG, MR SIMON GASS CMG CVO AND MR DAVID WARREN

  Q160  Sir John Stanley: Thank you.

  Sir Michael Jay: I have no recollection of seeing it, let me be clear about that.

  Q161  Chairman: Sir Michael, the Priorities document which was published last December, I want to touch on this before turning to security, does have implications not only for the assets in the overseas missions but also the staff. It seems to indicate that increasingly policy making will not be confined simply to London with the implementation at posts, but with the new IT it will be much simpler to have a total network of policy formulation. Can you help on how this will affect the location of staff and the numbers of staff?

  Sir Michael Jay: I think we are clear, Chairman, that we need to ensure that our resources, both in London and overseas, are allocated in accordance with the strategic priorities which ministers have set out in our strategy document. We are also clear that we are going to be operating over the next few years under increasing financial constraints, so the issues which you mention are very central to the departmental change programme. Your premise is right, I believe that with IT we can make more use than we have done in the past of the very considerable expertise we have in overseas posts. Our ambassador in one of our overseas posts, say our ambassador in Burma, is much better able than anybody in London to look at the totality of our relationship with Burma and advise us and advise ministers on how they should be conducted if, say, a senior minister is visiting London. I want to use the technology to make more use of that. I think that the effect of this will be to slim down a little bit some of the geographical directorates in London in order to avoid the duplication that there now is between what is being done by our overseas posts and what is being done by the geographical directorates in London. That will enable them to be focusing on the core functions of servicing ministers, focusing on regional issues, managing the network overseas and, in a sense, empowering our embassies overseas by giving them a more direct input into the policy formulation.

  Q162  Chairman: With overall numbers that are broadly the same?

  Sir Michael Jay: We have not had the result of SR2004 yet but I suspect the combination of the SR2004 outturn and the Gershon efficiency proposals that we put forward will result in some slimming down of our staff over the next two to three years. The question of avoiding duplication, of ensuring that our staff are going where they are really needed, is going to be crucial for us.

  Q163  Chairman: Are you proposing to go further along the road of bringing in specialists? In the old days the criticism of the Foreign Office was the cult of the amateur, what some called the apotheosis of the dilettante[14], that someone who came in with the right intellectual equipment could turn to any job. Is the problem which Mr Maples mentioned for example the mistakes made in terms of the estate, due in part to the assumption that someone with the right intellectual equipment can take key decisions on property management?

  Sir Michael Jay: I think there are two answers to that, Chairman. The first on specialism is that I do not recognise the cult of the dilettante when I travel and see our overseas posts; I see people who are  extraordinarily professional, who have extraordinary language skills and who are trained in two or three core competences during their career which, I believe, makes them exceptionally talented and able representatives of their country. I think that there is specialism even in the traditional Foreign Office make-up. However, I do believe that as the business of managing large complex organisations like ours gets even more difficult we do have to have more professional expertise, more HR expertise, more IT expertise, more estate expertise.

  Q164  Chairman: That is brought in on contract or in-house training?

  Sir Michael Jay: It will depend. We will need to recruit people who have that expertise who will become permanently a part of our operation. I suspect that for some large IT projects we will probably need to have, as we do at the moment, consultants brought in who have the right kind of expertise who work closely with our people. I suspect we shall have some people brought in on short-term assignments. I think there is going to be a mix of this. On the premise of your question, do we need more professional expertise in these areas, the answer is yes.

  Q165  Chairman: Does that include the business community? There were suggestions four or five years ago of business people becoming ambassadors. We have heard rather less of that recently. Is that something that you accept there is a need for, for greater expertise in the commercial world?

  Sir Michael Jay: There is a need for expertise. As far as our ambassadors are concerned, what we need are the right people for the jobs. That could be business people. In the past we have had competitions for some senior commercial jobs overseas, some business people have come . . .

  Q166  Chairman: How many are in post now?

  Sir Michael Jay: I do not think any are in post now.

  Q167  Chairman: It has not been very successful then?

  Sir Michael Jay: No. I think there were two business people who—I think I am right in saying—won competitions. One left the job fairly shortly after starting and one declined to take it up having seen what the terms and conditions were.

  Q168  Chairman: What about relations with the press? Again, it appears to be the assumption that someone in the course of his career can be the press officer or deal with that at the Foreign Office end but many departments now bring in, perhaps on contract, people who know their way around the press world. Have you thought of that as worthwhile?

  Sir Michael Jay: At present the Foreign Secretary's Press Secretary is indeed brought in from the world of journalism, and among his staff in our Press Office there is a mixture of people who have experience of the press world, who have come from the Government Communication Service, and also diplomats. What we need to remember is that something that rather distinguishes the Foreign Office from other government departments is that almost all our people are going to have to become involved directly in press work when they are overseas, operating with the local radio, television, media in foreign languages themselves, and for that they need training. That is why we need to ensure that we have Foreign Office people coming steadily through our Press Office getting the training in public diplomacy skills that they are going to need to use when they are in post overseas, as I discovered myself in Paris.

  Q169  Chairman: One final question, before I turn to Mr Chidgey. In your most recent memorandum you said that the Strategy was not a "camouflage for closures and cuts" but that you would not want to "underestimate the pressures the present resource climate places on the FCO."[15] Is this in effect a cry for help or a warning to us of potential closures along the road?

  Sir Michael Jay: I think it is a statement of realism, Mr Chairman. None of us want to close overseas posts; what we want to do is to ensure that we have the network of posts overseas to maintain the global influence which Ministers want us to have, and which I think this Committee wants us to have. What we need to ensure also, however, is that the posts that we do have are properly resourced with people properly trained and paid so that they can do the job they need to do. Whether we are going to be able to maintain the network as it now is, given the resource constraints, I cannot tell you. As I mentioned earlier on, in answer to a question from Mr Mackinlay, there are likely to be some changes over the next few years.

  Q170  Andrew Mackinlay: Just on this narrow point—and I am not talking about the merits of individuals—Alistair Goodlad and now Helen Liddell have now been earmarked for the High Commission in Australia.[16] What is the mechanism? Does the Prime Minister send you a memo saying, "This is something I want to do, so do not appoint on this"? How is that ring fenced or anything like that? It is not a very common thing. We understand that this is clearly a political decision, a political appointment, but do you wake up one day and get a memo from the Prime Minister saying, "This is mine; I am going to make the appointment on this"? How does it work? I am not talking about the individuals now, the individual qualities, but what are the ground rules for that?

  Sir Michael Jay: There are very few such appointments in the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Secretary has made clear that he foresees there continuing to be very few such appointments in the Diplomatic Service. Under all governments, from time to time, Ministers have decided that there should be an appointment of this kind, and, indeed, yes, I am essentially informed that this is what Ministers would like to do with a particular post, and in this particular case I believe that the choice is somebody who is extremely well qualified to be our High Commissioner, as, indeed, is her predecessor.

  Andrew Mackinlay: Absolutely. One would hope for nothing less.

  Q171  Mr Chidgey: Sir Michael, before I go on to security, I have a question on the topic of property sales. Amongst the list of 250 properties you mentioned that either had been sold or were being considered for sale, can you tell me where the residence for the High Commissioner in Trinidad stands on that particular list? Do you have some figures on that?

  Sir Michael Jay: I am afraid I cannot. I have been briefed on a number of properties, but not on Port of Spain.

  Q172  Mr Chidgey: I had the good fortune to visit Trinidad as part of a Committee a little while ago and I had the opportunity to see how effective the residence was in attracting leading dignitaries and leading politicians in the area to the High Commissioner's reception. So I was very impressed. However, I was not impressed to hear that the residence was under review for sale because, as a result of a previous incumbent dividing one of the rooms into two with a partition, it now had one more room than that grade of High Commissioner was entitled to. That was a comment made by a rather junior member of whatever team it is that does these evaluations, and it rather incensed the High Commissioner's wife and himself because it was a way he was not used to being treated, having served many years for the good of his country. To be told that an extra partition in his residence disqualified him from it was something he found rather hard to take. Do you know anything about this and can you tell us what happened to that residence, or whether we still have that bungalow in Trinidad and it is still doing the job that it was designed to do? It does rather reinforce the point about professionalism. I will leave that with you and move on to security, unless you would like to respond?

  Mr Gass: I cannot tell you specifically about Port of Spain, but what I would challenge a little is the idea that a partition in two rooms would have been the difference between keeping and selling a property, Mr Chidgey; that really is not the policy, although that may be how a junior member of staff may have perceived it. In fact we have performance indicators by which we judge our property. They are actually quite sophisticated; they consider rental values, sizes certainly, whether the buildings are in good condition, whether they are fit for purpose. We have a range of criteria and I would guess that if Port of Spain were to be sold it would have been judged against those criteria. We can certainly give you a note on that specific residence.[17]


  Q173  Mr Chidgey: You might like to revisit that and look at the notes of the visit and the report made by the relatively junior member of staff on their return to England because that was not the impression that they left with the residents of that property at the time, who, quite understandably, in my view, were somewhat incensed by the way they were treated. Security: may I start with Istanbul? I was one of the Members of this Committee who were in Istanbul only a fortnight before the bombing took place and obviously very distressed at the loss of life, particularly of Roger Short, and we have already passed our condolences to the staff about that. We recognise, as we all do, that this was the first time that a British Consulate-General or embassy had suffered such an attack, and as such was a terrible shock to the Service. Nevertheless, it is important to know what progress has been made and, Sir Michael, in your foreword to the Report you stress that the security of your staff is your greatest single preoccupation since the attack in Istanbul, and we obviously understand that. Can you provide us with an update on the current situation at the Consulate-General in Istanbul?

  Sir Michael Jay: Yes, I can, Mr Chidgey. The works are continuing to restore Pera House. As you know, it was in the process of being restored after a fire when the attack happened, and we made the decision that we should continue with the restoration. Clearly, in the process of restoring it we are also strengthening the security so that it will be less vulnerable to any future attack. For example, the perimeter wall of the Consulate-General has been rebuilt to a standard which will enable it to withstand a significant bomb blast in the future, and there is a new blast-resistant gatehouse and entrance to the Consulate. In fact Pera House itself, as you have seen it, is well inside the perimeter and has the sort of standoff which makes it in theory quite secure. What we need to ensure is that the perimeter walls and the defences are strong enough to withstand an attack of the kind that it suffered last November, and that is what we are doing as an essential part of the restoration of the building.

  Q174  Mr Chidgey:  I understand that the local police force and security forces had discussed with ourselves whether or not the approach roads and the roads close by the Consulate-General should be closed to general traffic. I understand that was the case, but there was a question of whether that gave the wrong impression.

  Sir Michael Jay: Do you mean before the attack?

  Q175  Mr Chidgey: Before the attack. Again, as part of the review of the situation of security, have there been any measures taken in that regard?

  Sir Michael Jay: I am afraid I do not know exactly where discussions stand with the local authorities on the closure of roads around Pera House. I would have to look into that. Certainly there were constant discussions immediately before the attack in Istanbul with the local authorities, particularly after the earlier attacks on the synagogue in Istanbul, which led to stronger security measures being taken, more guards being put in place. Indeed, there was a security team in place in Istanbul at the time of the attack, which was putting up CCTV surveillance systems around the walls.

  Q176  Mr Chidgey: It is interesting in this context of security that the Committee, I think a little while before, visited Tehran and obviously met with your staff in the embassy in Iran.[18] Just after somebody fired some shots at the embassy, if I remember. The reason I mention that is because it was quite clear, talking to the staff there, that they were quite shocked by this attack, and I wondered, within the context of Istanbul, bearing in mind the severity of the attack that then occurred there, what sort of long-term support those members of staff in Istanbul have been given—those who were injured, those who were traumatised, because these things seem to disappear and what we are interested to know is how the staff were being cared for?

  Sir Michael Jay: Let me assure you that they do not disappear and we do take our duty of care to our staff extremely seriously, and that is the thing which concerns me more than anything else in the job I have at the moment. That duty of care does not stop on the immediate aftermath of an attack—it continues afterwards—and there are lessons we have learnt from this about the sorts of ways in which we need to protect our staff. Perhaps I could ask the Human Resources Director, David Warren, to say something in a little more detail about the measures that we have taken with our staff in Istanbul as a result of the attack there?

  Mr Warren: Mr Chidgey, I can reassure the Committee that all staff in Istanbul had access to good quality medical treatment immediately after the incident, including counselling and with trauma risk assessment. Our welfare officers have been in close touch, not only with the staff in Istanbul but also with relatives in the UK of those who were killed, to offer all support. The Consulate-General initially set up a welfare office, which was staffed mainly by volunteers, to give support to staff and family members, and a small support office continues to operate in Istanbul. Trained staff, as the Committee may know, were sent to Istanbul within 24 hours to carry out the trauma risk assessments. It was not possible to cover everybody immediately because of local security constraints, but a follow-up visit in January of this year found that the majority of staff were dealing very well with the after effects of what was obviously a terrible incident. If I might offer a general comment at this point on this area of Foreign Office activity to provide welfare support for staff? It is a matter of great importance to us that we increase the training of our assessors of the trauma risk to staff and dependents of incidents of this kind, incidents which are traumatic, by which I mean primarily terrorist incidents, but not limited to terrorist incidents—any incident which is likely to traumatise staff—and we aim to have 60 such assessors trained by next year to be able to deal with the after effects of incidents of this kind.

  Q177  Mr Chidgey: Thank you very much. May I ask another question on Istanbul before I go further on security? The reason that we were there in Istanbul was to look at the entry clearance situation, mainly the issue was the queuing outside of the Consulate-General. Clearly with the effect of the terrorist act there this must have been completely stopped. So where are we now? Have we restored the services?

  Sir Michael Jay: Could I ask Dickie Stagg to answer that question, Chairman?

  Mr Stagg: The position at the moment is that the entry clearance operation is operating from the Hilton Hotel, from four rooms. They are issuing about 75% of the normal number of visas, which obviously is a drop on the rate before last November. We are planning to move back into Pera House in August or September and that, combined with some strengthening of the Ankara operation, we believe will get us back to full operation by the end of the year.

  Q178  Mr Chidgey: Thank you. Coming back to security, Sir Michael, following the attack in Istanbul, of course, the Foreign Secretary announced an internal review.[19] He has contacted us this month setting out the results of the review, which was undertaken by Stuart Jack. You will be familiar with the findings, I am sure, and I do not intend to re-rehearse them here, but I would like to know, now that Stuart Jack has presented his final report on the Foreign Office's Security Strategy, whether you think his findings strike the right balance between the need to protect staff whilst maintaining access to the post for the general public?

  Sir Michael Jay: I think they do, Mr Chidgey; I think that is the fundamental issue for us, how we do get that balance right between the need to ensure the security of our staff and the need to be open enough to carry out our business. This is essentially a question of managing the risk. We cannot eliminate all risk in the Office but we can try to manage that risk sensibly, and that is what we are trying to do, and those are the principles which underlay Stuart Jack's report. I think the basic philosophy that comes out of that report is the need to ensure that there are certain basic standards which we expect to observe in our overseas posts; that we judge those standards against the vulnerability of the post and, for example, the extent to which the host government can be expected to ensure the security of our posts. So in a sense you are making a judgement in each individual case. What are the standards which are there now? Are those standards acceptable given the vulnerability of the post? If they are not we need to strengthen the post in order to ensure it is properly secure. If we cannot do that we need to consider moving somewhere else where it will be more secure. Secondly, of course, if we are building new buildings we need to make certain that we construct buildings, which also are going to meet the standards which we are setting ourselves. So it is essentially a risk management approach.

  Q179  Mr Chidgey: That is very interesting, and it is interesting because one of the things which we are able to do as a Committee is to draw comparisons between the way that our own embassies are protected and the way that our colleagues, allies, whatever, from the United States treat the same problem in the same location. Of course it is quite clear to us that in many cases there is a fortress or even bunker mentality in the approach to security from our American allies in the same location as an embassy of the United Kingdom, which is clearly not so well protected. I would be interested to know how those decisions are made and what sort of co-operation there might be in sharing security information as to lead to the Americans seeing a risk at one level and of us seeing it at a somewhat different level.

  Sir Michael Jay: We do share information constantly with the Americans and, indeed, with other allies on the security of individual posts, but we have to make our own decisions on the basis of our own philosophy, on the basis of our own resource of locations as to how we maintain that balance ourselves. On resources, perhaps I may add one point, if I may, which is that we have, as part of our bid to the Treasury SR2004 included, as you would expect, quite a big element for security to ensure the security of our overseas posts. That is not a figure that we have pulled out of the air, it is based on an assessment of how secure our posts are around the world, how vulnerable they are and what we need to invest in them to ensure that they reach the standard of security which we believe necessary to fulfil our duty of care. So it is quite a sophisticated approach to risk management and we hope very much that the Treasury will accept the arguments.


14   T. Balogh, "The apotheosis of the dilettante", H. Thomas, The Establishment (London, 1959), pp 83-126 Back

15   Please refer to the letter from Sir Michael Jay, dated 22 June 2004, providing an update on FCO strategy, Ev 76 Back

16   "Helen Liddell to be appointed as the next British High Commissioner to Australia", FCO press release, 2 April 2004 Back

17   Ev 64 Back

18   For details, see: Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2003-04, Iran, HC 80. Back

19   HC Deb, 10 December 2003, column 84-86WS Back


 
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