Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Eighth Report


UK INTERNATIONAL PRIORITIES

Strategy for the FCO

35. On 2 December 2003, the Foreign Office published a White Paper entitled UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO.[50] This document represents a considerable watershed in many respects for the Foreign Office and, indeed, for the world of international diplomacy. For the first time, the FCO has produced a single document that aims to set out clearly and comprehensively its, "policy, public service and organisational priorities," for the next ten years.[51] It describes, in an informative and highly readable manner, how the FCO works at present, the resources it has to draw upon and the challenges the United Kingdom will face in the coming years, such as environmental change, insecurity of energy supplies and global terrorism. It states that the country's key relationships will be with the USA—"the world's single superpower"—and the EU.[52] The Commonwealth will also remain a, "valuable informal group for the promotion of common values and interests across the world."[53]

36. Sir Peter Marshall KCMG CVO, a former diplomat, submitted a very useful memorandum to us on the Strategy document.[54] He noted that it rested on four basic propositions:

    i.  there is an increasing overlap between external and internal affairs (for example, on issues such as migration and asylum);

    ii.  globalisation (not only in economic terms, but with respect to phenomena such as terrorism and weapons proliferation) means that foreign affairs will increasingly matter more than ever before in national concerns and priorities;

    iii.  no government can act alone in international affairs, no matter how powerful it is; it will always have to co-operate and act in alliance with others to achieve its ends; and

    iv.  international affairs are no longer—if they ever were—the sole preserve of governments, with a wide range of non-governmental "actors" taking a key role in foreign affairs.[55]

Based on these assumptions and preconditions, the Strategy sets out the United Kingdom's eight foreign policy priorities for the next five to ten years, which are set out in the box below (figure 2).

Figure 2
Strategic international policy priorities for the United Kingdom:

a)  a world safer from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction;

b)  protection of the United Kingdom from illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other international crime;

c)  an international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts;

d)  an effective EU in a secure neighbourhood;

e)  promotion of United Kingdom economic interests in an open and expanding global economy;

f)  sustainable development, underpinned by democracy, good governance and human rights;

g)  security of United Kingdom and global energy supplies; and

h)  security and good governance of the United Kingdom's Overseas Territories."

Source: FCO[56]

37. Some of the assumptions in the document are open to debate and it will require regular updating. On the whole, however, the paper is a very welcome departure for the Foreign Office. It provides a clear direction and focus to the Office's work, allowing it to prioritise limited resources effectively, and sets out clearly to a wider readership what the FCO is doing for the country.

38. We conclude that the UK International Priorities White Paper provides a welcome insight into how the Foreign Office operates and what its aims and priorities are for the coming years.

Implementation of the strategy

IMPACT ON HOW THE FCO OPERATES

39. The last three chapters of the strategy document deal with how the adoption of the new strategy and priorities will affect the way the FCO works. During the course of our inquiry, Sir Michael Jay also sent the Committee a supplementary memorandum setting out how the structure of the Office will change to reflect the strategy.[57] We comment below on some of the Strategy's implications for personnel matters (see paras 127-30).

40. In relation to how the Foreign Office operates, the Strategy document states that:

    As IT permits greater integration between London and Posts, there will be scope to eliminate duplication. We are piloting new ways of increasing the involvement of Posts in work previously done in London. The aim is to break down the mindset that 'policy is made in London and executed abroad' and to reduce the resources we devote in London to managing routine bilateral diplomatic relations.[58]

This would seem to indicate an end to the traditional function of the 'desk officers' based at the FCO in London, who monitor events in a specific country or part of the world and co-ordinate much of the policy support needed by ministers, such as answering parliamentary questions.

41. We asked for clarification of this matter, following Sir Michael Jay's oral evidence session. In reply, we were told that:

    We will remain a matrix organisation, using functional, thematic and geographic expertise, at home and overseas, to deliver our priorities. But we must ensure our work in London does not duplicate work in the overseas network but really adds value. In many cases Posts are best placed to provide country specific expertise and we need to make better use of advice from Post in policy formulation. But geographical directorates will continue to have a key role in providing expertise and advice on regional issues and on the most sensitive countries, as well as serving Ministers and Parliament and managing the network overseas.[59]

The memorandum goes on to note, though, that any such move would be dependent on the successful introduction of the Office's Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Strategy, which aims to allow the Office to operate as a, "single global online organisation", linking the entire FCO network of offices and posts together.[60]

42. We conclude that the FCO is right to seek to make the most efficient use of its valuable personnel resources and to reap the greatest efficiencies from advances in modern information and communications technology. We recommend, however, that the Foreign Office ensure that, as a result of the changes made following the adoption of the new Strategy White Paper, there is no diminution in the level of service provided by the FCO to Parliament and the public.

IMPACT ON NETWORK OF OVERSEAS POSTS

43. The FCO's Departmental Report 2003-04 notes that, at present, the United Kingdom has:

This gives a total of 233 posts. In addition, there are 229 honorary consuls and resident governors in nine of the fourteen Overseas Territories.

44. Throughout the report, great stress is laid upon the importance of the Office's extensive network of overseas posts. The Foreign Secretary, for example, is quoted as saying:

    As I travel around the world, I have seen for myself the value we gain from having professional diplomatic staff on the ground in over 200 posts.[62]

We agree with this statement, and have monitored changes in the United Kingdom's representation overseas closely for some time. Our overall impressions of the quality of the FCO's diplomatic staff has been most positive. Generally, as can be seen from the table below (figure 3), the number of FCO posts has expanded in recent years—often responding to changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. However, there have been a number of significant cases where British representation has been reduced dramatically. In our Report last year, we registered our strong disapproval of the decision to close the British posts in three Central American states—San Salvador, Nicaragua[63] and Honduras—and in Mali, West Africa. We concluded that such closures were a, "deeply regrettable, retrograde step in promoting and protecting British interests overseas."[64]

45. Given this interest, we were concerned to read in the UK International Priorities White Paper that one of the most significant effects of the adoption of the new priorities by the FCO may be upon the overseas network:

    Demands are growing, while resources are finite. We are now running some twenty five more Posts than in 1990. The shape of our network should be driven by our future priorities. ... having a Post on the ground is the most effective form of diplomatic representation in a country. Posts give us people on the spot who know local leaders, speak the language, and can lobby, influence and appear in the media. We will continue to have Posts of this sort in many countries.

    But some will be more important than others. We are using new methods for assessing the potential of each Post to contribute to our objectives.[65]

Figure 3: Changes made in the FCO's network of overseas posts 1998-2003
19981999 20002001 20022003
Opened
(UK-based staff)
  Chongqing
(PR China)
Bangalore (India)
Nagoya
(Japan)
Gothenburg (Sweden)
Dili
(East Timor)
Tripoli (Libya)
Monterrey (Mexico)
Denver (USA)
Pristina (Kosovo)
Asmara (Eritrea)
Pyongyang (DPRK)
Dushanbe (Tajikistan)
Kabul (Afghanistan)
Bamako (Mali)
Lahore (Pakistan)
Conakry (Guinea)
Chisinau (Moldova)
Baghdad (Iraq)
(Local staff)
Lome (Togo) Calgary (Canada)
Fukuoka (Japan)
Conakry
(Guinea)
Port-au-Prince (Haiti)
Ahmedabad (India)
Bhopal (India)
Goa (India)
Hyderabad (India)
Pune (India)
Bamako (Mali)
Tarawa (Kiribati)
Sylhet (Bangladesh)
  Atyrau (Kazakhstan)
Closed
(UK-based staff)
Kuching (Malaysia)

Chiang Mai (Thailand)

Naples (Italy)

Cleveland (USA)      Lahore
(Pakistan)
Bamako

(Mali)

San Salvador

(El Salvador)

Tegucigalpa (Honduras)

(Local staff)
     Seville (Spain)      Kaduna (Nigeria)

Source: FCO[66]

46. The White Paper goes on to say that responding to the changing world scene will require the FCO to be far more flexible and responsive to emerging priorities. At present, this is difficult owing to the large fixed costs involved in maintaining the network of posts. It suggested that one way to achieve this would be to consider, "alternative forms of representation," taking advantage of new technology.[67] Consideration would also have to be given to whether full representation was required in a country that, "has little impact on the achievement of our priorities, and where demand for our services is low."[68]

47. The possibilities for such alternative representation identified by the White Paper include:

  • greater use in some areas of "hub and spoke" arrangements;
  • closer co-operation with DfID on the roles of senior personnel abroad;
  • representation by local staff only;
  • accreditation to some countries of staff who work primarily from London;
  • better mobile IT capabilities, video and telephone conferencing to allow more flexible working abroad while staying plugged in to London;
  • wider use of special envoys on particular policy issues; and
  • closer co-operation with EU and Commonwealth partners.[69]

Many of these ideas are not new, and our predecessor Committee discussed some of them in its Report on the FCO's 2001 Annual Report.[70]

48. In a memorandum to the Committee on how the Office planned to implement the Strategy, Sir Michael Jay stated that:

    This is about organising ourselves so that we are better able to deliver the agreed international priorities of the Government. It is not, as some have suggested, camouflage for closures and cuts. That said I would not want to underestimate the pressures the present resource climate places on the FCO.[71]

When we took oral evidence from Sir Michael, we asked him whether this was, in effect, a cry for help. He replied:

    None of us want to close overseas posts; what we want to do is to ensure that we have the network of posts overseas to maintain the global influence which Ministers want us to have ... What we need to ensure also, however, is that the posts that we do have are properly resourced with people properly trained and paid so that they can do the job they need to do. Whether we are going to be able to maintain the network as it now is, given the resource constraints, I cannot tell you. ... there are likely to be some changes over the next few years.[72]

49. While we would always encourage the FCO to be as innovative as possible in getting the best value for money from the resources voted it by Parliament, we are concerned by the implication of Sir Michael's answers to us. While some form of representation—be it by an honorary consul, a DfID official or whomever—is better than none at all, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the interests of the United Kingdom are best served by having an extensive network of overseas posts, operated full-time by Foreign Office personnel. Where posts have had to close, as in Central America,[73] or where the FCO is unable to open one owing to financial constraints, as in Kyrgyzstan for example,[74] this country is inevitably likely to suffer a diminution of trade, influence and first-hand information.

50. We conclude that the potential closure of significant numbers of overseas posts implicit in the UK International Priorities document is a source of grave concern. We recommend that wherever possible the FCO seek to maintain as effective and as wide-reaching a network of posts as possible, in order to protect and promote British interests around the globe.


50   FCO, UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO, Cm 6052, December 2003 (hereafter referred to as: UK International PrioritiesBack

51   Ibid., p 4 Back

52   Ibid., p 25 Back

53   Ibid. Back

54   Ev 70 Back

55   Ibid. Back

56   UK International Priorities, p 30 Back

57   Ev 76 Back

58   UK International Priorities, p 56 Back

59   Ev 59 Back

60   For further details of the FCO's ICT Strategy, see: Departmental Report 2003-04, p 168. Back

61   Departmental Report 2003-04, p 18 Back

62   Ibid., p 13 Back

63   The post in Nicaragua does not appear in figure 3 as it closed on 31 March, 2004. Back

64   Foreign Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2002-03, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003, HC 859, para 38 Back

65   UK International Priorities, p 54 Back

66   Ev 47. The FCO also noted that: "During 2003 Gothenburg became a localised post-that is operated by locally-employed staff. Although the office in Seville closed in 2000, UKTI maintained a trade team of two locally-employed staff who work from home. There was an erratum in the FCO 2003 Departmental Report which stated that Seville closed in 1998. In addition, the Secretary of State opened the British Embassy Office in Astana in Kazakhstan in February 2004." Back

67   Ibid., p 55 Back

68   Ibid. Back

69   Ibid., pp 55-56 Back

70   Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2000-01, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2001, HC 428, para 37 ff. Back

71   Ev 76 Back

72   Q 169 Back

73   Foreign Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2002-03, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003, HC 859, para 35 ff. Back

74   Ibid., para 39 ff. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004
Prepared 23 September 2004