House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Eighth Report

SECURITY

51. The global security situation has been a cause of great concern since the watershed terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001. People in all corners of the world have been affected by subsequent attacks, such as those in Bali (Indonesia) and in Beslan (the Russian Federation). As a Committee, we have been very concerned by this subject and have produced five Reports as part of our long-running inquiry into the Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism.[75]

The Istanbul Consulate-General

52. On 20 September 2003, a car bomb exploded just inside the gates of the British Consulate General in Istanbul. Nine members of staff were killed, including the Consul General, Mr Roger Short, as well as two local policemen and a visitor. This was the first time that a British diplomatic mission abroad had been attacked in this manner and it demonstrated vividly the widespread and indiscriminate nature of global terrorism. The location of the building in a bustling city centre well illustrates the problem of traditional sites in the new era of terrorist threats. Three Members of our Committee had visited the Consulate only a fortnight before the attacks, and had met Mr Short, while looking at the visa entry clearance system there. Our Chairman wrote to Sir Peter Westmacott KCMG LVO, the British Ambassador to Turkey, after the attack and offered our sincerest condolences to those affected by the bombing.

53. In the FCO Annual Report 2003-04, Sir Michael Jay stated that: "the security of our staff has been my greatest single preoccupation since the attack on our Consulate General in Istanbul."[76] Sir Peter Westmacott also wrote a separate section in the Report on the immediate impact of the bomb and the work that has been going on since to help the bereaved families. He praised the speed with which the FCO had responded to the attack, and the help that the Security Strategy Unit, UKvisas and Estates Group had given in getting the Consulate working again within days.[77] The Office relied on the emergency planning it had undertaken post-11 September and had successfully deployed an emergency unit and a rapid response team.[78]In his report, Sir Peter concluded that:

54. Following the bombing, there was a great need for continued after-care for those affected. Mr David Warren, the FCO's Director of Human Resources, assured us in his oral evidence that all staff had had access to, "good quality medical treatment immediately after the incident, including counselling and with trauma risk assessment."[80] Welfare officers continue to run a small office in Istanbul and have been on hand in the United Kingdom to help relatives of those who were killed. A follow-up visit in January 2004 found that: "the majority of staff were dealing very well with the after effects of what was obviously a terrible incident."[81] Each bereaved family has received an ex gratia payment of £5,000, "as an advance towards an eventual final settlement."[82]

55. The Consulate-General, Pera House, was being restored after a fire when the bombing occurred and the restoration has continued. Sir Michael Jay told us that:

At present, the visa-entrance clearance operation in Istanbul, which Members of the Committee went to see, is issuing 75% of its normal number of visas from its temporary base at the Hilton Hotel.[84] It was hoped that the visa system, with help from Ankara, would be fully operational by the end of the year.[85]

56. We conclude that the attack on the Istanbul Consulate General was a barbaric act of terrorism, which we condemn utterly and unreservedly. We again offer our sincerest condolences to all those affected by the terrible tragedy and especially to the families of those who were murdered. We offer our highest praise to those who have worked so hard to cope with the aftermath of the attack and worked in such difficult conditions. We trust that the sacrifice and hard work of those involved will be properly recognised by the Foreign Office.

Security Review

57. After the attack in Istanbul the Foreign Office moved immediately to improve security at its posts.[86] These included measures such as anti-shatter film on windows, strengthened perimeter security, and in Tehran (Iran), where shots had been fired at the embassy, bullet-proof and bomb-blast windows.[87] The Foreign Secretary also announced an, "independent internal review to look into the balance between security and operational effectiveness in the FCO's work overseas."[88] This was undertaken by Mr Stuart Jack CVO, of the Diplomatic Service.

58. On 23 June the Foreign Secretary wrote to us and provided a summary of the review's findings. The principal conclusion was that: "while the FCO's existing security strategy does not need a fundamental overhaul, there is more that could be done to enhance security worldwide."[89] Further conclusions were that:

total risk avoidance was unrealistic;
risk management was fundamental in striking a balance between security and operational effectiveness;
the FCO needed to devote more resources to security;
the FCO should not withdraw into "fortresses" or "bunkers" which would involve operational drawbacks, although there was also a serious risk of, "threat displacement," if British targets were seen as softer than American ones;
all posts should undergo a, "vulnerability audit";
security standards for, "new builds," should be readily understood and enhanced standards applied to higher risk posts; and
more Overseas Security Managers and some armed guards were needed.

59. Sir Michael Jay in his evidence to us commented on the outcomes of the Security Review. He said that, "we cannot eliminate all risk in office but we can try to manage that risk sensibly".[90] He said that the security of every post should be judged separately against both basic standards and the current threat assessment, which was unique to each individual situation.[91] The vulnerability audit recommended in the Jack Review is ongoing. Following the attack in Istanbul, the FCO also re-prioritised its estate budget and expects that in the next few years approximately, "70 percent of [its] investment will be security-driven."[92]The FCO has also told us that: "this has had only a limited effect on our asset recycling programme: but we would clearly only replace an existing building with a new one if the latter were equally or more secure."[93]

60. The FCO currently spends approximately £50-£60 million a year on security, and has calculated that to implement fully the security changes on estates, and in some circumstances move location, another £60 million would need to be provided for the next three to four years, leaving the final figure at approximately £120 million per year.[94]We learnt that the FCO, in bidding for the 2004 Spending Review, made it clear that the increased security issues created by terrorism are outside the normal remit of Foreign Office spending. Sir Michael Jay told us that: "if we do not have the money to make [the overseas network] secure, as it now is, then we will have to think about how we structure our network to ensure that what we do have is secure."[95]

61. We were very pleased to note that the FCO's request for an addition to their baseline of £60 million for each of the three years of the Spending Review specifically for security was met in full by the Chancellor.[96]

62. We commend the Foreign Office for conducting an immediate review of security at posts following the Istanbul bombing and we broadly welcome its findings. We conclude, in particular, that the review was right to warn the FCO against turning its posts into "fortresses" and "bunkers". The FCO's image and operational capability would not benefit if contact with the public were decreased, although the balance it strikes between operational effectiveness and security must be a very careful one.

63. We welcome wholeheartedly the extra money provided in the Spending Review 2004 for security measures. It would have been wholly unacceptable if extra security measures had had to be funded from the existing FCO budget, to the detriment of other activities. We recommend that, in view of the exceptional exposure of FCO staff overseas to terrorist attack, the FCO should make further requests to HM Treasury for additional funding for security measures as are necessary to safeguard its staff during the current three year period, before the next spending review takes place.

Security of the British Council and BBC World Service

64. The deterioration of the global security climate has also affected the work of the British Council and the BBC World Service. The latter has a smaller presence overseas and its premises are generally more secure as they not usually open to the public. When he gave oral evidence to the Committee, however, Mr Nigel Chapman, then Acting Director of the BBC World Service, informed us that the increased threat of global terrorism and especially attacks on Western targets was making it more dangerous for personnel working abroad. This had been especially evident in Iraq, where the number of BBC personnel had had to be "significantly" reduced in the last few months.[97]The same was the case in Saudi Arabia, although Mr Chapman told us that the accuracy of reporting was not being affected. He said that what would suffer instead was the ability, "to gather news on the ground, to interview people, to bring a sense of vividness and texture to the coverage."[98] Extra spending on security was included in the World Service's overall bid for funds in the latest Spending Review.

65. The British Council is more vulnerable in many respects than the World Service as much of its work depends upon having accessible, open premises across the world. In its initial memorandum to us the Council stated that: "difficult security environments are leading us to re-consider the means of delivery in some high-risk countries." In Pakistan, British Council offices had already been forced to close to public access owing to the difficult security environment.[99] There was no prospect of re-opening these offices at present, but the Council's Director-General, Sir David Green, told us that examinations and other activities were still being carried out off-site, and 150,000 students had sat examinations last year—a very significant achievement.[100] Operations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, had also temporarily been closed and the situation there was being closely monitored.[101]

66. Sir David Green told us, in oral evidence, that security of British Council premises abroad was, "the area which keeps me awake at night".[102] He was worried that as embassies and high commissions become more secure, British Council offices could become displacement targets. Security had been reviewed after 11 September and the Istanbul bombing, but while some premises had had security upgrades, Sir David told us that the British Council required another £10 million over the next two years which would be spent on 29 properties that need enhanced security.[103]We were also told that if the British Council were allowed to recycle the savings it made through the Gershon efficiency process then it would not have to make further claims on the Treasury.[104] We were very pleased to note that HM Treasury agreed to both these proposals in the Spending Review 2004.[105]

67. We welcome the recognition by HM Treasury of the need to fund security improvements for the BBC World Service and British Council in full. We recommend that the Foreign Office ensure that adequate resources are available for both bodies to maintain the quality of their services while ensuring the maximum safety of their overseas personnel.

Foreign Office Travel Advice

68. After the terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002, the travel advice issued by the Foreign Office came under heavy scrutiny from Parliament, the media and the travel industry.[106] According to the FCO, this service is designed to:

107

Every week 280,000 pages of the FCO travel advice website are viewed. FCO advice can also be obtained by telephone, fax and on CEEFAX.[108] We have taken a keen interest in the development and change of FCO travel advice, and commented on the first stage of the review process in our Report on the Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism in Session 2002-3.[109]

69. As a follow-up to the first review, on 10 December 2003, the Foreign Secretary announced a further review which published its results in April 2004.[110]The Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House on 1 April 2004 on the results of this review. He declared that travel advice needed to strike a delicate balance: "making public safety its prime concern while minimising the disruption which terrorists want to cause".[111] He went on to say that:

112

In a further written statement to the House, the Foreign Secretary stated that:

113

The Foreign Office will also continue its efforts to make the travel advice web pages clearer and easier to use.[114]

70. On 28 June 2004 the FCO updated its Guidance to Departments and Posts on Travel Advice to incorporate the results of the review. Among other things, this set out advice on the format of travel advice, its content, language, and three reasons why it might need to be updated—changes on the ground, changes in the terrorist threat and a terrorist, or other significant, incident.[115] This document also recommended that travel advice be checked, "at least once a month," and changed, "as circumstances dictate".[116] At the time of writing this Report, the Foreign Office was updating all 217 of its individual travel advice notices in the light of these revised guidelines.[117]

71. We welcome the Foreign Office's thorough review of the travel advice it issues to the public. We recommend that the Foreign Office continue making its web pages as clear and accessible to the general public as possible.

75 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2003-04, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, HC 441; Second Report of Session 2003-04, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, HC 81; Tenth Report of Session 2002-03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, HC 405; Second Report of Session 2002-03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, HC 196; and Seventh Report of Session 2001-02, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, HC 384 Back

76 Departmental Report 2003-04, p 9 Back

77 Ibid., p 40 Back

78 Ibid., p 150 Back

79 Ibid. Back

80 Q 176 Back

81 Ibid. Back

82 Departmental Report 2003-04, p 150 Back

83 Q 173 Back

84 Q 177 Back

85 Ibid. Back

86 Departmental Report 2003-04, p 9 Back