Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Eighth Report


ENTRY CLEARANCE

Coping with increasing demand

96. One of the Foreign Office's core functions—and one which brings it into contact with a very large number of people—is its management of the United Kingdom's visa entry clearance system. This year's Annual Report devotes a chapter to the work of UK visa services (UKvisas) and shows that, once again, demand for visas has continued to rise rapidly (see figure 8 below).[153]

Figure 8: UK visa applications 1998-2007[154]


Source: FCO[155]

97. There were also increasing demands placed on the UKvisas correspondence unit, which dealt with complaints and queries from parliamentarians, the press and the public. For example, it dealt with 54,370 e-mails last year, an increase of 177% on the previous twelve months.[156]

98. In his oral evidence to us, Sir Michael Jay commented on this steady rise in demand:

    The increases ... are very considerable. There was a global rise last year of 14 per cent and of course the rises in certain countries—Pakistan, for example, is one—are very considerable. What we are trying to do is to ensure in each individual case that we have the resources which we need. ... It is not going to be easy to achieve that, but we will do our best. Looking further ahead, we have to recognise that there is going to be, I would guess, a strongly increasing trend in the number of visa applications and we are going to have to find some new and imaginative ways of trying to meet these.[157]

The Annual Report described some of these, "new and imaginative," methods to cope with this increasing demand. These included allowing customers to apply by post or, in some cases, over the internet. 70% of all visa applications in New York are now e-applications, for instance.[158]

99. One of the most radical innovations is the outsourcing of certain functions associated with the visa entry clearance process to external contractors. In India, a private company—VFS—now operates 11 offices for the British High Commission, where all the routine processing and checking of applications is carried out.[159] This operation was seen by those Members of the Committee who took part in a joint visit to India in November 2003 with Members of the Constitutional Affairs Committee. They saw for themselves what a positive effect the outsourcing had had for both staff and customers. The latter found the new system much more convenient and easy to understand, while staff at the High Commission were able to concentrate their efforts on identifying cases that required especial attention, rather than routine administration. The Members who visited the VFS offices in New Delhi and Mumbai were also very impressed by the professionalism and dedication of the staff involved. The Annual Report noted that such outsourcing was shortly to be extended to Kenya, Nigeria and Malaysia.[160]

100. We conclude that the steady rise in visa applications at FCO posts across the world presents a continuing and significant challenge. The importance of this work should not be underestimated, not only owing to the increased security concerns arising from global terrorism but also because the visa operation is often the first impression that many people will have of the United Kingdom. We commend the staff who work so hard in this vital field, often in difficult circumstances and with little visible reward for their efforts.

101. We also commend the Foreign Office for its development of new and innovative means of coping with the increase in demand, especially the use of outsourcing in India for the processing of documents. However, we recommend in the strongest possible terms that decision-making on the issuing of visas should always remain with FCO staff. We shall continue to scrutinise this area closely in the future.

NAO Report

102. In June of this year, the National Audit Office (NAO) published a report on Visa Entry to the United Kingdom.[161] It dealt with a number of issues related to the FCO's joint management of UKvisas, with the Home Office, including the use of new technologies and the allegations surrounding the issuing of visas to Romanian and Bulgarian applicants (see paras 117-23 below). Overall the Report concluded that UKvisas was performing well under considerable pressure:

    UKvisas faces a real challenge in managing the competing priorities of service delivery and control. This is inherent in UKvisas' aim, which is to deliver a quality service whilst ensuring that visas are only issued to those people who meet entry clearance requirements. In the large majority of cases, UKvisas is providing a high quality of service to applicants and sponsors. It is also making significant progress in introducing initiatives to improve its efficiency in processing entry clearance applications.[162]

We welcome this recognition of the hard work done by UKvisas' staff. On the whole, we agree with most of the report's findings and comment on some of them specifically in the paragraphs below.

Targets

103. Despite the marked increase in applications, the FCO managed to maintain or improve its performance against its principal Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets in this area, as shown in figure 9.

Figure 9: Performance of UK visas against PSA targets (2002/03-03/04)
PSA 8
(description)
Target
Performance
  
  
2002/03
2003/04
(i) straightforward non-residence visa applications to be decided within 24 hours
90%
91%
92.14%
(ii) posts to make a decision within ten working days on non-settlement applications requiring an interview
90%
79%
88.79%
(iii) posts to meet target times for settlement interviews
90%
98%
98.31%
(iv) the number of visa holders whose leave to enter the UK is cancelled on arrival
0.04%
0.02%
0.047%

Source: FCO[163]

104. As can be seen, the FCO is generally performing well against its targets, and delivering a good service in the face of rising pressure. We did question the Office further, however, on the range of performances at posts within each target.[164] Its answers revealed considerable variation in the performance of different posts. For example, for target (i) above, Mumbai (India) and Dhaka (Bangladesh) dealt with 100% of straightforward applications within 24 hours, while Rangoon (Burma/Myanmar) only processed 35%.[165] We questioned Mr Dickie Stagg, FCO Director General of Corporate Affairs, on this matter when he gave oral evidence to the Committee. He stated that:

    I think it is a valid point that there is a difference in the management performance of some of these operations compared with others, and one of our jobs is to try to ensure that we maximise the effectiveness and ensure that best practice is widely used, and I think we are making progress.[166]

We welcome this commitment and look forward to seeing a decrease in the size of these variations.

105. One of the issues highlighted by the NAO's recent report on visa entry clearance was that the targets for visa entry clearance workers focused on delivery, and particularly speed, over service delivery and quality of decision making. In any event, targets are by definition somewhat arbitrary. The Report found that:

    Entry clearance officers face conflicting pressures. UKvisas must ensure that the balance between service delivery and control is commensurate with the risks and reflects the Government's increased emphasis on developing effective immigration controls. ... Entry clearance staff in the majority of posts we visited considered that meeting processing targets took priority and they did not always have sufficient time to consider more thoroughly applications that raised doubts.[167]

106. We agree with this observation and discussed this matter with Mr Stagg. He told us that:

    At one stage when I was previously overseeing UKvisas three or four years ago, we were thinking in terms of constantly increasing our PSA targets and being more and more ambitious. I think we are now in a position where we think that these are pretty ambitious as they are and that we should stick with them.[168]

This seems a sensible attitude. While the increasing demand for visas means that speed of processing will always be vital, the public concern about immigration-related matters and national security means that the accuracy of checking is also critical.

107. We conclude that the Foreign Office has performed well against its PSA targets in relation to the processing of visa applications, especially in light of the increasing demand with which it is having to cope. We recommend that the FCO ensure, however, that the quality of decision making is not sacrificed in the drive to meet delivery targets.

Lack of feedback

108. Another issue raised by the NAO report, and linked to the issue of targets, was the lack of feedback available to entry clearance officers (ECOs), who process applications, on the quality of the decisions that they had made. At present, once a visa has been issued, there is practically no way of knowing whether the applicant has abided by the terms of its issue—i.e., in most cases, whether they had returned to their country of origin after a specified time. The report concluded that:

It went on to note that some overseas posts had, with the Intelligence Service of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND), carried out small-scale tracking exercises to establish whether visa entrants had complied with the terms of their visa. A tracking exercise carried out in Accra (Ghana), for example, found that 37 per cent of a sample of students issued with a visa could not subsequently be traced.[170] This raises very serious questions of public concern.

109. This issue was discussed on a number of occasions by interlocutors who met Members of the Committee visiting Turkey and India last year looking at visa entry clearance matters. Many of the ECOs spoken to during that visit said that it would make their job much easier were it possible to track applicants. It would allow them to know which categories of applicants (students, business people, etc.) or nationalities they could afford to be more lenient with and with which ones they needed to be stricter. Resources could be focused more accurately and genuine applicants would have less chance of having their applications refused.

110. We raised this matter with Mr Stagg, who told us that the Home Office had it "in mind" to re-introduce some form of checking procedure, taking advantage of modern technology. In the meantime:

    What we are doing is working with some consultants to try to identify what they call metrics, which will help us to establish where there are problems. So we look at various issues to do with students, to do with working holiday makers, various categories of visitors to the UK, and establish whether they are fulfilling the conditions of the visa they were issued with. This is at an early stage; it has not proved all that easy to identify good metrics, but we are taking it quite seriously and I am told by UKvisas that they think it will be possible to have a better assessment of the quality of the issuing in future than we have at present.

111. We conclude that the inability to check whether applicants do actually abide by the terms of their visas is a significant problem for the smooth running of the FCO's visa entry clearance system. We recommend that the FCO develop, as a matter of urgency, means of providing effective feedback to visa-issuing posts on the outcome of decisions. We further recommend that, in the longer term, HM Government, taking advantage of developments in information technology, introduce a system that would allow it to check who had entered and left the United Kingdom and when, for the purpose, among others, of running a more effective visa entry clearance regime.

Biometric data

112. A relatively recent development for the FCO is the collection by posts of biometric data. The Annual Report noted that this was necessary to, "fight fraud and document misuse".[171] The post in Colombo (Sri Lanka) started piloting the collection of such data in July last year. Since then, it has been rolled-out to posts in East Africa: Addis Adaba (Ethiopia), Asmara (Eritrea), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Dijibouti, Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda) and Nairobi (Kenya).[172] Mr Stagg told us in his oral evidence that:

    We are doing it very much stage by stage and seeing how each bit works. We did it in Sri Lanka first and found that the basics worked; we are now doing it in a range of posts in East Africa, which are different in size, different in their local experience, including Kampala where we outsource. The idea is gradually to build up knowledge of how this works, where the problems lie and ... to try and do this in a properly organised project manner, so that by the time we get to full roll-out hopefully we will have resolved the issues raised rather than being confronted by disaster caused by a big bang. I would not say that we are over confident but at the moment we feel that the process has been handled in quite a well-organised way.[173]

Once collected, this data may be shared with other Government departments under controlled conditions, governed by the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.[174]

113. We conclude that the collection of biometric data by visa-issuing posts overseas will be an important weapon in the fight against international crime and terrorism, and will help create fairer and more effective immigration controls. We further conclude that the Foreign Office appears to be taking a sensible, gradual approach to the roll out of this new procedure.

Co-operation with other departments

When the Committee met with Entry Clearance Managers (ECMs) and ECOs in India and Turkey, it was clear that the involvement of three departments did not assist the administration of the system. There were complaints that changes in the criteria for visa applications were made by the Home Office with little consideration for the resource implications on visa offices at posts. It was also felt that the appeals procedures lacked consistency and that judges in such cases did not fully understand the entry clearance system, which had a serious impact on the morale of ECOs. These findings were echoed in the NAO's report, which commented in particular on the lack of effective liaison between FCO and Home Office officials.[175]

115. When we raised this matter with the Foreign Office it assured us that co-operation between the three departments was improving:

    Co-ordination between the Home Office [HO] and UKvisas has been greatly strengthened. The UKvisas Joint Ministerial Committee meets quarterly. There are regular bi-laterals between HO senior officials and UKvisas, and Robin Barnett (Head of UKvisas) is a member of the IND Joint Programme Board. The Task Forces established following the No 10 summit earlier this year, have helped to reinforce the channels of communication. In addition, an FCO minister is joining the IND Supervisory Board, of which Des Browne MP [Minister, Home Office] and David Lammy MP [Minister, DCA] are existing members. This will provide a forum for action on issues of concern.[176]

116. We conclude that it is vital for the smooth running of the visa entry clearance system that the three departments involved—the Home Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Constitutional Affairs—work as closely together as possible. We recommend that the FCO continue to encourage greater co-ordination between the three departments at all levels, from united training of personnel to policy co-ordination.

Visa applicants in Romania and Bulgaria, and Mr James Cameron

117. The NAO Report also examined in detail the issue surrounding the issuing of visas to Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. The Report provides a summary of events:

The official in question was Mr James Cameron, then Second Secretary and Consul at the Embassy in Bucharest. Following the publication of Mr Cameron's concern, there was considerable discussion in Parliament, the media and elsewhere about what had been happening in Bulgaria and Romania, and when individual Ministers had been informed of the situation there. Subsequently Rt Hon Beverley Hughes MP, Minister of State for Citizenship, Immigration and Community at the Home Office, resigned.[178]

118. Following these events, the NAO commissioned a report into this area, to which we have already referred (see para 102). It found that there had been poor communication between ECOs in Bulgaria/Romania and the Home Office, with different rules being applied by both groups. The Home Office had provided little feedback to ECOs about why decisions were over-turned, nor did they inform them about applicants 'switching' visas—for example, from tourist to working visa—once they were in the United Kingdom.[179]

119. In addition, Mr Ken Sutton, a Home Office official, led an internal investigation into what had ensued at both posts. He reported earlier this year, and the Foreign Office has assured us that it plans to implement his findings fully.[180]

120. We conclude that the problems encountered by the visa-issuing sections of the posts in Romania and Bulgaria were very unfortunate; action should undoubtedly have been taken earlier both by senior FCO and Home Office officials. We regret that it took a crisis of this nature for the wider problem of Home Office-Foreign Office co-operation to be brought to light. We recommend that the Foreign Office act, in collaboration with the Home Office, to ensure that the findings of the Sutton Review are implemented fully and quickly.

121. Mr Cameron was suspended in March in relation to two allegations of misconduct: one apparently relating to his e-mail to Mr Davies and another to the handling of certain visa applications.[181] On 14 June he had a disciplinary meeting at the FCO, which gave him, according to media reports, a "final warning".[182] It was also reported that he would not be promoted for three years nor receive a pay rise this year.

122. It has always been the practice of this Committee to refrain from inquiring into the cases of individual departmental employees, who in any event have their own remedies. Where a case raises wider questions pertaining to the department's administration, expenditure or policy, however, different considerations apply. We believe that this case raises such wider issues, in particular the treatment of 'whistle-blowers' by the Office. We questioned Sir Michael Jay on this matter when he gave oral evidence, but he declined to provide any further information on Mr Cameron's case until all proceedings against him had been completed.[183]

123. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Foreign Office set out its general policy in relation to 'whistle-blowers', and provide the Committee with any written material regarding relevant procedures.


153   Departmental Report 2003-04, pp 124-131 Back

154   Ibid., p 125 Back

155   FCO Departmental Report 2003-04, p 125 Back

156   Ibid., p 128 Back

157   Q 210 Back

158   Ev 44, para 16 Back

159   Departmental Report 2003-04, p 126 Back

160   Ibid., p 125 Back

161   National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Visa Entry to the United Kingdom, HC 367 (2003-04) (hereafter referred to as: Visa Entry to the United Kingdom). Back

162   Ibid., p 4, para 7 Back

163   FCO Departmental Report 2003, p 124, and FCO Departmental Report 2003-04, p 122 Back

164   Ev 43, para 15 Back

165   Also see: Visa Entry to the United Kingdom, p 17 Back

166   Q 210 Back

167   Visa Entry to the United Kingdom, p 7 Back

168   Q 210 Back

169   Visa Entry to the United Kingdom, pp 8-9 Back

170   Ibid. Back

171   Departmental Report 2003-04, p 127 Back

172   Ev 44, para 19 [FCO] Back

173   Q 213 Back

174   Ev 61, para 17 [FCO] Back

175   Visa Entry to the United Kingdom, p 6 Back

176   Ev 62, para 18 Back

177   Visa Entry to the United Kingdom, para 2.36, p 29 Back

178   HC Deb, 1 April 2004, col 1753 ff. Back

179   Visa Entry to the United Kingdom, p 29 Back

180   Ev 101 Back

181   Ev 101; "Migrant leak diplomat 'framed'", Sunday Times, 13 June 2004, and "UK diplomat in Romania punished for leak", The Guardian, 15 June 2004 Back

182   Ibid. Back

183   Q 216 ff., Ev 101 and Ev 102 Back


 
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