Annex 1
REVIEW OF
FCO SECURITY OVERSEAS
INTRODUCTION
1. The review was set up following the attack
on the British Consulate General in Istanbul in November 2003.
The terms of reference were: "To review the basis for the
FCO's Security Strategy. In particular to re-examine the balance
between security and operational effectiveness". The review
looked at the range of. security threats facing the FCO's Posts
over the next five to 10 years but focussed mainly on terrorism.
The aim is to ensure that the FCO's security strategy is on a
consistently sound long term basis that minimizes the risks, while
enabling Posts to function effectively in line with Government
policies.
METHODOLOGY
2. The reviewer, Stuart Jack, consulted
widely in the FCO and Whitehall, including with the Trade Union
Side; visited several overseas Posts; met with a number of companies;
and looked at the practice of some other governments, in particular
the United States.
BACKGROUND
3. The FCO's security measures are designed
to protect most importantly its staff and their families, and
also information, the integrity of IT systems, buildings, operations,
and reputation. The FCO owes a legal duty of care to all its staff,
UK-based and locally-engaged.
4. The policy framework and therefore the
operating context within which the FCO must seek to secure its
security overseas is set out in the FCO Strategy ("UK International
Priorities. A Strategy for the FCO", published on 2 December
2003). British foreign policy is to be "active and engaged
around the world", with eight strategic policy priorities,
including efforts against terrorism. Importance is attached to
providing high quality public services, including consular and
visa.
5. For the foreseeable future the greatest
threat will be from terrorism, particularly but not exclusively
from Al Qaeda and like-minded groups, The threat is global and
dynamic. The vehicle-borne bomb will-continue to be a weapon of
choice for many terrorists. But the FCO must be prepared for other
methods of attack, other locations and sources. There is a serious
risk of threat displacement to British targets if they appear
much softer targets than the Americans in particular.
6. There also remains a serious espionage
threat. Particular care is needed over IT security. Crime is the
most immediate threat for most staff overseas.
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
7. The review's main conclusion is that,
while the FCO's existing security strategy does not need a fundamental
overhaul, there is more that could be done to enhance security
worldwide. The security strategy needs to be forward-looking,
flexible, professional; with clear criteria and consistent standards,
robust decision-making, audit trails, and good communication with
staff; and adequately resourced.
8. The safety of staff and families comes
first. Security should continue to be a factor when deciding what
Posts are tasked to do, and how and where.
9. Total risk avoidance-absolute security-is
unrealistic. Overseas Posts have an important job to do in protecting
and furthering British interests, including in insecure countries.
Risk management is fundamental to striking a balance between security
and operational effectiveness and to the prioritisation of security
resources. Better methods are needed to assess the vulnerabilities
and threats facing each Post. The FCO's Security Strategy Unit
(SSU) have been developing a risk management matrix to inform
security decisions along the lines suggested in the review.
10. The security awareness of FCO staff
is generally good. The culture and resources dedicated to security
understandably adapted to the lessening of some threats since
the end of the Cold War and the easing of the IRA threat. There
is strong commitment from FCO senior management to security, and
since Istanbul security efforts have been accelerated. But, in
the light of the new and ever-changing threats, the FCO needs
to devote more resources to security.
11. Final responsibility for security lies
with the centre: the FCO Board and Ministers must remain regularly
apprised of security issues. Heads of Post and geographical Directors
in the FCO are responsible for individual Posts, working closely
with the Security Strategy Unit (SSU). All staff share responsibility
for their own and others' security.
12. All Posts already have Post Security
Committees and designated Post Security Officers. Lines of responsibility
at each Post, including Heads of Post, must be clear and well
understood. There should be more formal mechanisms for resolving
any conflicts between professional security advice and operational
or other requirements.
13. Security needs to be factored into decisions
on the estate in an effective and consistent way: The review does
not recommend a wholesale shift to "fortresses" or "bunkers",
which would involve operational drawbacks, considerable resources
and many years. Physical defences need to be considered within
a more robust and objective framework, and all Posts should undergo
a "vulnerability audit". In some cases, this might result
in a decision to relocate a Post. Standards (for stand-off, glazing,
etc) for new builds and acquisitions of offices and other accommodation
should be readily understood. Enhanced standards should be applied
to the highest risk Posts. Decisions should be based on risk management.
14. The human dimension is as important
as physical measures. The FCO needs more Overseas Security Managers
or locally-engaged equivalents, in some cases possibly more armed
guards. There should also be a small increase in the numbers of
Overseas Security Advisors and SSU staff and more done to plug
into outside expertise.
15. The FCO has already increased its capacity
to deliver security training and awareness to its staff. Formal
security training should be mandatory. New staff at Post should
always be given a local security briefing on arrival in the job.
Some staff with security responsibilities, such as Management
Officers, need more comprehensive training before taking up their
jobs and more time to carry out their security responsibilities
when overseas.
16. The review makes almost 50 recommendations
covering the areas mentioned above, many of them procedural or
organisational and some related to resources, including buildings,
security staff and training.
CONCLUSION
17. As the UK remains engaged across an
uncertain world we must be prepared for considerable security
challenges. On terrorism we are in for the long haul. To meet
these challenges the FCO will need to continue to put a strong
emphasis on security and ensure that the current efforts to enhance
security can be fully implemented.
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