British-Iranian Relations
1. We conclude that the Government was right to respond
to the Reddaway and Soleimanpour affairs with a mixture of firmness
and tact, in the interests of not allowing short-term difficulties
to jeopardise long-term improvements in the United Kingdom's relations
with Iran. (Paragraph 19)
2. We conclude that the Government has been right
to maintain and develop its critical dialogue with Iran, and we
recommend that it continue this policy, with a view to encouraging
further positive changes in Iranian political and civil society.
(Paragraph 22)
3. We conclude that good cultural and educational
links are especially important with Iran, a country with a strong
cultural inheritance and identity of its own but with many misconceptions,
even among its most educated classes, of life and society in the
United Kingdom. We recommend that the Government give serious
consideration to increasing the resources available for Chevening
scholarships and other cultural and educational initiatives in
Iran, and to ensure that those resources which are available are
used to best effect. (Paragraph 27)
4. We conclude that continued co-operation between
the United Kingdom and Iran in the war against drugs is important
for both countries and we recommend that it remain a priority
objective of the bilateral relationship. (Paragraph 28)
5. We conclude that, whatever the short-term difficulties
which may afflict the United Kingdom's relations with Iran following
the recent flawed elections, the prospects for longer-term improvements
in the relationship remain good. We recommend that the Government
continue to bear firmly in mind the benefits which good relations
between Iran and the United Kingdom can bring to both countries,
and that it work towards realising those benefits. (Paragraph
30)
Multilateral issues
6. We further conclude that a renunciation by Iran
of violence as a means of achieving Palestinian statehood—and
a cessation of all practical and moral support for such violence—could
go a long way towards changing the views of those in the West
who currently regard Iran as a sponsor of terrorism. (Paragraph
36)
7. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government set out what it and its allies are doing to achieve
"a further and more enhanced degree of co-operation with
the Iranian Government" in the war against terrorism. (Paragraph
39)
8. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government tell us what is the current extent of support for
the terrorist organisation MEK in third countries, and what it
is doing to minimise that support. (Paragraph 40)
9. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government inform us of the steps it has taken to encourage
Iran to play a positive role in political, social and economic
reconstruction in Iraq, and with what results. (Paragraph 42)
10. With specific reference to Iran, we conclude
that the lesson to be drawn from the success of the EU troika
initiative is that, by acting together with firm resolve the international
community has been able to persuade Iran to modify its nuclear
policies in ways which will bring benefits to Iran, to its neighbours
and to the international community. However, it is important to
recall that the agreement was only necessary because Iran had
been developing covertly a nuclear threat capability. It is also
clear from Iran's failure to declare some aspects of its nuclear
programme since the Agreement was signed that continued vigilance
will have to be exercised by the IAEA, backed up wherever necessary
by intrusive monitoring and effective verification measures. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set
out what steps it is taking to ensure Iran's full compliance with
the statements issued by the Iranian Government and the Foreign
Ministers of Britain, France and Germany on 21 October 2003 and
with the terms of the Additional Protocol to Iran's NPT safeguards
agreement, signed on 18 December 2003. (Paragraph 58)
Human rights in Iran
11. We conclude that the recent elections in Iran
were a significant and disappointing setback for democracy in
that country and for its international relations, at least in
the short term. We recommend that the Government take every opportunity
through its pronouncements and through its policies to remind
Iran of the benefits to its own people and to its standing in
the world of upholding democratic values. (Paragraph 66)
12. We conclude that the position of women in Iranian
society remains unequal, but that it has been moving in the right
direction. We welcome the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr
Shirin Ebadi. However, we are seriously concerned that Iran has
yet to repeal provisions allowing the stoning of women adulterers
and we conclude that Iran cannot be fully accepted into the international
community while such abhorrent practices remain permitted under
its laws. (Paragraph 74)
13. We respect the pre-eminent position of Islam
in Iran, but we conclude that Iran's interpretation of the tenets
of Islam with regard to those who proselytise or who convert to
other faiths is incompatible with its desire to enjoy normal relations
with other countries. (Paragraph 80)
14. We conclude that Iran's treatment of its Bahá'í
community is not consistent with its human rights obligations
under international law. We recommend that the Government continue
to press the Iranians to treat members of all religious minorities
fairly and equally, while recognising the pre-eminent position
which Islam enjoys in Iranian society. (Paragraph 84)
15. We conclude that Iran will surely complete its
journey towards reform, but at its own pace and in its own way,
having regard to its proud history and strong national identity.
We recommend that the Government act as a good friend to Iran
in that journey, criticising when necessary, but supporting where
it can. (Paragraph 89)
