Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Dr A M Ansari

INTRODUCTION

  The following comments should be read in conjunction with the oral testimony provided to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in February 2003, and reflect the changes and developments which have occurred over the last 10 months, especially the impact of the war in Iraq and the occupation by Coalition forces. The Memorandum will be divided into four parts:

    I.  Reflections on the War in Iraq.

    II.  Domestic developments in Iran.

    III.  The regional environment.

    IV.  Britain, Iran and Non-Proliferation.

I.   Reflections on the War in Iraq

  As suggested in the run up to the conflict, Iran proved singularly unmoved by the prospect of a war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and among ordinary people, there was considerable sympathy for the Coalition. Anti-war demonstrations were a rarity, if not non-existent in the period leading to March 2003, though once the offensive was launched, a modest demonstration was organised after a Friday Prayers in Tehran, though even on this occasion the estimated 30,000 participants proved well short of what could normally be expected at Tehran rallies. While publicly, officials expressed concern at US intentions in Iraq, even at a governmental level, few expressed regret at the passing of the Ba'athist state. Popular sentiment was altogether more sympathetic to the coalition cause, as could be witnessed by the periodic complaints levelled at the State broadcaster "IRIB", for being too pro-Iraqi in its coverage of the war, and certainly among more idealistic Iranians, there was a feeling that the war marked a new beginning, not only for Iraq, but for the entire region.

  Subsequent developments, and the realisation that the rapidity of the war was unlikely to lead to immediate pacification and regional peace, tempered anxieties at all levels in Iran. Those establishment figures that had become concerned at the prospect of American ire being directed against Iran, relaxed when it became apparent that both Afghanistan and Iraq represented far more profound commitments than American officials had hitherto admitted; while others anxious for rapid change, recognised (albeit reluctantly) that patience may yet be a virtue. It was quite clear that the regional environment had changed, but its implications had yet to be assessed and appreciated. What was increasingly clear, was that with the immediate threat from the United States receding, politics in Iran could begin a tentative return to normal.

II.   Domestic Developments

  There is little doubt that ever since President Bush's "axis of evil" speech, Iranian domestic politics has been gripped, and some would say obsessed, with the issue of the United States. Never far from the background, the problem of what to do about the new American administration, was thrust very firmly into the foreground, such that any political dispute was being increasingly reflected through the prism of a potential US attack. The immediate consequence was to encourage an uncomfortable consensus, certainly among the elites of the Islamic Republic, with those choosing to publicly continue the struggle for democracy, being characterised as "American stooges". For a country driven by an acute sense of nationalism, such an accusation, however preposterous, was political suicide, and therefore, while the hardline elements in the Judiciary exploited this environment to further clamp down on opponents, reformists organisations also reflected that this was not the time to fan the flames of rebellion. This uneasy situation was reflected in the much anticipated "student demonstrations" which were planned for June 2003 to commemorate the major uprising in 1999. It was quite apparent that the students were well organised and angry, and as their own spontaneous demonstration indicated, that tensions between state and society remained remarkably fragile. Yet at the same time, with the sound of President Bush's exhortations ringing in their ears, there was a palpable reluctance to push things further on this particular occasion, partly as a result of their own moral doubts, but also as a result of the realisation that public American support would make their own views less receptive within Iran.

  At the same time, although doubts about the US achievement in Iraq encouraged caution on the side of the agitators for democracy, it tended to embolden their rivals. Much to the shock and consternation of Iranian politicians and society alike, the hardline Judiciary continued in its blatantly oppressive approach to the administration of the law, with the murder of the Canadian-Iranian journalist Zahra Kazemi—herself having arrived in Iran to photograph the plight of the student movement. Kazemi, having been arrested for taking pictures outside Evin prison was reportedly beaten to death by her interrogators, under the watchful eye of the notorious Judge Saeed Mortazavi. The Judiciary quickly sought to blame the Intelligence services, whilst a parliamentary inquiry pointed the finger squarely at the Judiciary. The immediate consequence of these developments has been the Judiciary's arrest of an intelligence officer, who has protested his innocence and whom most people consider to be a scapegoat for the Judiciary's wanton disregard for the law. In few countries in the Middle East would an Intelligence official be generally viewed in such a generous light.

III.   The Regional Environment

  The gradual return to "politics as normal" reflects a general realisation that the threat from the United States, in the immediate term, is receding, and that in geo-political terms, Iran may prove to be the single most important regional benefactor of the invasion of Iraq. Iranian leaders were anxious that a rapid US victory would lead to the immediate establishment of a pro-US government in Baghdad along with a series of US bases on the Western border. This prospect at present, would appear to be some way off, and instead Iranian leaders face the reality of an unstable, weakened Iraq. Instability, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, are not outcomes that the Islamic Republic looks to with any enthusiasm. But weakened, demilitarised states, on its borders which would pose no military threat but instead provide markets for potential exports are to be welcomed. More immediately, it is increasingly apparent that until a political settlement can be reached in both these states, Iran will be an important "player" for the coalition. Indeed, for all the rhetoric on either side of the international divide, politicians in both the West and Iran recognise the considerable dividends to be gained through a tacit co-operation. Not only is a full military assault on Iran no longer a possibility, but it is quite clear that US hawks are being encouraged to resist the temptation of an opportunistic military strike, which would make the regional environment considerably more unstable than it already is.

IV.   Britain, Iran and Non-Proliferation

  Recent efforts to ensure full Iranian compliance with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would appear to vindicate the European Union approach of critical engagement, combining as it did robust pressure along with an element of compromise and collaboration. The internationalisation of the issue was essential to ensure that hardliners in Iran were not able to present the pressure to sign the additional protocols as another exercise in American double standards and arrogance. Indeed in internationalising the demands for Iran to be more transparent, presenting a united European front and tying the agreement to better political and economic relations with Europe as well as collaboration on civil nuclear technology, Britain helped ensure that Iran was more candid about its previous non-disclosures than many had expected, and more importantly, that henceforth it would fully adhere to its obligations. From the Iranian perspective it was important that its decision was not seen as a humiliating climb down, but as a dignified compromise, and the visit of the three foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and Germany, went a long way to conveying this view. Furthermore, it was also apparent that the Europeans recognised Iran's security concerns, its distinctly nationalistic perspective on nuclear development (the ability to development nuclear technology, civil or military, has more to do with a sense of national pride that military aggrandisement), and its objections that it was being unfairly targeted by the United States, who Iranians argued should be doing more to encourage regional nuclear disarmament. At the same time, Iran's stated intention to sign the Additional Protocol should not be taken at face value, and any engagement should be both critical and continuously monitored. Only in this way, will trust be built on both sides.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

  Britain's decision to pursue a European strategy with respect to Iran was vitally important in securing the agreement, for only in acting together were the Europeans able to impress the seriousness of the situation upon the Iranians, and convince them that agreement would forestall any American action. For on this point, the Europeans and Iranians of moderate political hues are in agreement; that any limited military strike by the United States on selected sites in Iran, while possibly playing well to an American domestic audience exhausted and disenchanted by the continuing occupation in Iraq, would be disastrous for regional stability as a whole. Still worse would be a strike sanctioned by the United States but conducted by Israel. While potentially boosting President Bush's poll ratings in the run up to the 2004 election, the political ramifications in the region would be profound, especially when one accepts that Iran would most likely change its approach to both Afghanistan and Iraq. Far more effective as been the Nobel Committee's decision to award the Nobel Peace Prize to the human rights lawyer Shireen Ebadi. With a stroke of the pen, human rights in Iran became a genuinely international concern, and indicated to a cynical Iranian public that the West was not only concerned about oil and its own security. The long-term consequences of this decision are likely to be far more profound than any amount of confrontational rhetoric from Washington.

Dr A M Ansari

University of Durham

December 2003


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004
Prepared 19 March 2004