Memorandum submitted by Dr A M Ansari
INTRODUCTION
The following comments should be read in conjunction
with the oral testimony provided to the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee in February 2003, and reflect the changes and developments
which have occurred over the last 10 months, especially the impact
of the war in Iraq and the occupation by Coalition forces. The
Memorandum will be divided into four parts:
I. Reflections on the War in Iraq.
II. Domestic developments in Iran.
III. The regional environment.
IV. Britain, Iran and Non-Proliferation.
I. Reflections on the War in Iraq
As suggested in the run up to the conflict,
Iran proved singularly unmoved by the prospect of a war against
Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and among ordinary people, there was considerable
sympathy for the Coalition. Anti-war demonstrations were a rarity,
if not non-existent in the period leading to March 2003, though
once the offensive was launched, a modest demonstration was organised
after a Friday Prayers in Tehran, though even on this occasion
the estimated 30,000 participants proved well short of what could
normally be expected at Tehran rallies. While publicly, officials
expressed concern at US intentions in Iraq, even at a governmental
level, few expressed regret at the passing of the Ba'athist state.
Popular sentiment was altogether more sympathetic to the coalition
cause, as could be witnessed by the periodic complaints levelled
at the State broadcaster "IRIB", for being too pro-Iraqi
in its coverage of the war, and certainly among more idealistic
Iranians, there was a feeling that the war marked a new beginning,
not only for Iraq, but for the entire region.
Subsequent developments, and the realisation
that the rapidity of the war was unlikely to lead to immediate
pacification and regional peace, tempered anxieties at all levels
in Iran. Those establishment figures that had become concerned
at the prospect of American ire being directed against Iran, relaxed
when it became apparent that both Afghanistan and Iraq represented
far more profound commitments than American officials had hitherto
admitted; while others anxious for rapid change, recognised (albeit
reluctantly) that patience may yet be a virtue. It was quite clear
that the regional environment had changed, but its implications
had yet to be assessed and appreciated. What was increasingly
clear, was that with the immediate threat from the United States
receding, politics in Iran could begin a tentative return to normal.
II. Domestic Developments
There is little doubt that ever since President
Bush's "axis of evil" speech, Iranian domestic politics
has been gripped, and some would say obsessed, with the issue
of the United States. Never far from the background, the problem
of what to do about the new American administration, was thrust
very firmly into the foreground, such that any political dispute
was being increasingly reflected through the prism of a potential
US attack. The immediate consequence was to encourage an uncomfortable
consensus, certainly among the elites of the Islamic Republic,
with those choosing to publicly continue the struggle for democracy,
being characterised as "American stooges". For a country
driven by an acute sense of nationalism, such an accusation, however
preposterous, was political suicide, and therefore, while the
hardline elements in the Judiciary exploited this environment
to further clamp down on opponents, reformists organisations also
reflected that this was not the time to fan the flames of rebellion.
This uneasy situation was reflected in the much anticipated "student
demonstrations" which were planned for June 2003 to commemorate
the major uprising in 1999. It was quite apparent that the students
were well organised and angry, and as their own spontaneous demonstration
indicated, that tensions between state and society remained remarkably
fragile. Yet at the same time, with the sound of President Bush's
exhortations ringing in their ears, there was a palpable reluctance
to push things further on this particular occasion, partly as
a result of their own moral doubts, but also as a result of the
realisation that public American support would make their own
views less receptive within Iran.
At the same time, although doubts about the
US achievement in Iraq encouraged caution on the side of the agitators
for democracy, it tended to embolden their rivals. Much to the
shock and consternation of Iranian politicians and society alike,
the hardline Judiciary continued in its blatantly oppressive approach
to the administration of the law, with the murder of the Canadian-Iranian
journalist Zahra Kazemiherself having arrived in Iran to
photograph the plight of the student movement. Kazemi, having
been arrested for taking pictures outside Evin prison was reportedly
beaten to death by her interrogators, under the watchful eye of
the notorious Judge Saeed Mortazavi. The Judiciary quickly sought
to blame the Intelligence services, whilst a parliamentary inquiry
pointed the finger squarely at the Judiciary. The immediate consequence
of these developments has been the Judiciary's arrest of an intelligence
officer, who has protested his innocence and whom most people
consider to be a scapegoat for the Judiciary's wanton disregard
for the law. In few countries in the Middle East would an Intelligence
official be generally viewed in such a generous light.
III. The Regional Environment
The gradual return to "politics as normal"
reflects a general realisation that the threat from the United
States, in the immediate term, is receding, and that in geo-political
terms, Iran may prove to be the single most important regional
benefactor of the invasion of Iraq. Iranian leaders were anxious
that a rapid US victory would lead to the immediate establishment
of a pro-US government in Baghdad along with a series of US bases
on the Western border. This prospect at present, would appear
to be some way off, and instead Iranian leaders face the reality
of an unstable, weakened Iraq. Instability, in both Afghanistan
and Iraq, are not outcomes that the Islamic Republic looks to
with any enthusiasm. But weakened, demilitarised states, on its
borders which would pose no military threat but instead provide
markets for potential exports are to be welcomed. More immediately,
it is increasingly apparent that until a political settlement
can be reached in both these states, Iran will be an important
"player" for the coalition. Indeed, for all the rhetoric
on either side of the international divide, politicians in both
the West and Iran recognise the considerable dividends to be gained
through a tacit co-operation. Not only is a full military assault
on Iran no longer a possibility, but it is quite clear that US
hawks are being encouraged to resist the temptation of an opportunistic
military strike, which would make the regional environment considerably
more unstable than it already is.
IV. Britain, Iran and Non-Proliferation
Recent efforts to ensure full Iranian compliance
with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) would appear to vindicate the European Union approach of
critical engagement, combining as it did robust pressure along
with an element of compromise and collaboration. The internationalisation
of the issue was essential to ensure that hardliners in Iran were
not able to present the pressure to sign the additional protocols
as another exercise in American double standards and arrogance.
Indeed in internationalising the demands for Iran to be more transparent,
presenting a united European front and tying the agreement to
better political and economic relations with Europe as well as
collaboration on civil nuclear technology, Britain helped ensure
that Iran was more candid about its previous non-disclosures than
many had expected, and more importantly, that henceforth it would
fully adhere to its obligations. From the Iranian perspective
it was important that its decision was not seen as a humiliating
climb down, but as a dignified compromise, and the visit of the
three foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and Germany,
went a long way to conveying this view. Furthermore, it was also
apparent that the Europeans recognised Iran's security concerns,
its distinctly nationalistic perspective on nuclear development
(the ability to development nuclear technology, civil or military,
has more to do with a sense of national pride that military aggrandisement),
and its objections that it was being unfairly targeted by the
United States, who Iranians argued should be doing more to encourage
regional nuclear disarmament. At the same time, Iran's stated
intention to sign the Additional Protocol should not be taken
at face value, and any engagement should be both critical and
continuously monitored. Only in this way, will trust be built
on both sides.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Britain's decision to pursue a European strategy
with respect to Iran was vitally important in securing the agreement,
for only in acting together were the Europeans able to impress
the seriousness of the situation upon the Iranians, and convince
them that agreement would forestall any American action. For on
this point, the Europeans and Iranians of moderate political hues
are in agreement; that any limited military strike by the United
States on selected sites in Iran, while possibly playing well
to an American domestic audience exhausted and disenchanted by
the continuing occupation in Iraq, would be disastrous for regional
stability as a whole. Still worse would be a strike sanctioned
by the United States but conducted by Israel. While potentially
boosting President Bush's poll ratings in the run up to the 2004
election, the political ramifications in the region would be profound,
especially when one accepts that Iran would most likely change
its approach to both Afghanistan and Iraq. Far more effective
as been the Nobel Committee's decision to award the Nobel Peace
Prize to the human rights lawyer Shireen Ebadi. With a stroke
of the pen, human rights in Iran became a genuinely international
concern, and indicated to a cynical Iranian public that the West
was not only concerned about oil and its own security. The long-term
consequences of this decision are likely to be far more profound
than any amount of confrontational rhetoric from Washington.
Dr A M Ansari
University of Durham
December 2003
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