Memorandum from Professor Jonathan Stevenson,
Senior Fellow for Counter-Terrorism, International Institute for
Strategic Studies
US AND COALITION
PROGRESS IN
REDUCING AL-QAEDA'S
THREAT
1. The global counter-terrorism mobilisation
(by making the US and Europe less vulnerable and rolling up some
terrorist cells) and the US-led intervention in Afghanistan (by
depriving al-Qaeda of a comfortable physical base and training
facilities) hobbled the transnational Islamic terrorist network's
offensive capabilities. Yet by forcing the organisation to disperse
even more widely—and thus to become more atomised, more
protean and more invisible—the elimination of Afghan base
actually made the network better off in defensive terms. The net
effect was that al-Qaeda was forced to relinquish greater operational
initiative to local affiliates, and to concentrate temporarily
on targets of opportunity (eg, in Tunisia, Pakistan, Indonesia,
Kenya, Saudi Arabia and Morocco) rather than the preferred target
of the US (and, secondarily, Europe). But the number of al-Qaeda
members or affiliates, killed, captured or detained is only a
small percentage of the number of those who passed though al-Qaeda
training camps in Afghanistan, and recruiting has continued. Against
this background, over the past six months or so, al-Qaeda's threat
has been contained but probably not substantially reduced.
2. On one hand, there have been at least
two major arrests: those of al-Qaeda third-in-command Khaled Sheikh
Mohammed in March and Riduan Isamuddin (known as Hambali), al-Qaeda's
liaison with Jemaah Islamiah, in August. As a result, al-Qaeda's
operations have probably been compromised, and some valuable intelligence
about al-Qaeda's global operations may have been gleaned through
interrogation. On the other hand, al-Qaeda appears to have added
the Iraq intervention to its list of grievances and refocused
terrorist efforts on the Arab world. The tape broadcast by al-Jazeera
on 21 May 2003, apparently recorded by second-in-command Ayman
al-Zawahiri, branded several Arab states—including Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan—as
collaborators in the war against Iraq. The Riyadh and Casablanca
attacks also suggested al-Qaeda's renewed operational preoccupation
with "apostate" Arab countries. More broadly, the enlarged
US military footprint in the Gulf should be expected to increase
the inclination of Muslims to turn towards radical Islam and potentially
terrorism, more than offsetting any calming effect of the prospective
US military withdrawal from Saudi Arabia. So will continued violence
and the political impasse in Israel and the Palestinian territories.
Al-Qaeda's recruitment therefore should increase.
3. Finally, from a strictly operational
point of view, the substantial exposure of US troops in Iraq is
an enormous temptation. The persistence and daring of the relatively
small attacks that have plagued US forces for months constitute
the standing concern, in that they indicate commitment, courage,
the efficient use of resources and consequently staying power.
But al-Qaeda and its sympathisers, a number of whom are present
in Iraq (see below), would likely regard a spectacular attack
on US personnel in Iraq—like Hizbullah's 1983 suicide-bombing
of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, which killed 241—as a
feasible consolation until they are ready to attempt another mass-casualty
attack on American soil.
EFFECT OF
THE IRAQ
WAR ON
COUNTER-TERRORISM
4. Clearly al-Qaeda remains unamenable to
political suasion, and maintains a violent global pan-Islamic
agenda. On the plus side, however, war in Iraq has denied al-Qaeda
a potential supplier of WMD. It may also have discouraged state
sponsors of terrorism from continuing to support it, though this
remains unclear. While Syria has appeared intimidated at times,
it has not ended its logistical and political support to Hamas
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The same goes for Iran. Hizbullah,
also supported by Iran and Syria, does not appear to seek direct
involvement in a wider war, and the fact that the Iraq war liberated
Hizbullah's fellow Shi'ites would tend to discourage attacks on
US occupying forces. Hizbullah was also comparatively quiescent
before and during the Iraq war, though it may yet become more
provocative in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In opening the
way to demonstrating the merits of political pluralism and participation
in a reconstructed Iraq, the Iraq war may also have improved the
West's ability to address the root causes of Islamic terrorism
through democratisation—though any such gains are as yet
unrealised and by no means assured.
5. On the minus side, war in Iraq has inflamed
radical passions among Muslims worldwide and thus increased al-Qaeda's
recruiting power and morale and, at least marginally, its operational
capability. British intelligence has reported that most of the
foreigners captured in Iraq have been from the Middle East/Gulf
region—in particular, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen—and
from North Africa. Jean-Louis Bruguie"re, the top French
judge investigating terrorism, has indicated that dozens of young
Muslim men have left France to fight in Iraq since the summer.
European intelligence sources believe that most of the European
recruits have little or no training. Despite jihadist terrorism
having hit home in Saudi Arabia, Saudis are still contributing
money to terrorist organizations, and still supply 50-60% of Hamas'
funding. On balance, therefore, the short-term effect of the war
may have been to further isolate al-Qaeda from any potential state
supporters while also increasing its ranks and galvanising its
will.
6. The Iraq war has only marginally drawn
material resources from counter-terrorism. Following the Afghanistan
intervention, al-Qaeda fully dispersed and clandestinely infiltrated
society in up to 90 countries, becoming more difficult to detect
and largely unaddressable by military power. While the opportunity
for a Predator strike may occasionally arise, military
counter-terrorism is generally limited to technical intelligence
gathering; precautionary special-operations deployments; first
response and civil defence; and, exceptionally, counter-insurgency
in Iraq. Counter-terrorism has become primarily a function of
non-military efforts comprising homeland security and law-enforcement
and intelligence co-operation. Given that the Iraq war was a military
one, it did not compete sharply for existing government assets
with post-Afghanistan counter-terrorism. Furthermore, in spite
of the acute transatlantic political differences that arose over
Iraq, bilateral counter-terrorism co-operation was not compromised
before, during or after the war, on account of the US' nor Europe's
mutual self-interest in co-operating.
7. Nevertheless, the war may have more substantially
hijacked the attention of some governments from homeland
security. In particular, the Bush administration's preoccupation
with Iraq appears to have distracted the US from robustly implementing
ambitious homeland-security plans, and has absorbed funding that
might otherwise have gone for homeland security. A July 2003 Council
on Foreign Relations study found that the five-year funding shortfall
for first-response, for example, came to about 20% of the total
required, but this of course cannot be attributed entirely to
the Iraq war. Generally, however, as time has passed without a
major attack on US soil, the Bush administration seems to have
placed a premium on overseas operations over homeland security
in the overall counter-terrorism equation. European capitals do
not fully embrace the United States post-9/l 1 vulnerability-,
or capabilities-based approach to homeland security, instead favouring
a threat-based approach that relies more on current intelligence.
This is because their experience with more traditional ethno-nationalist
and ideological terrorist threats makes them sceptical about anticipating
unspecified attacks and because they lack the United States' resources.
At the same time, perhaps owing to their proportionally larger
and more restive Muslim populations, they have seemed more concerned
than Washington that intervention in Iraq would provoke jihadist
attacks on home soil. The series of arrests in France, Britain,
Italy and Spain in late 2002 and early 2003 reflected this concern.
So did the UK's deployment of troops at Heathrow Airport in response
to a surface-to-air missile threat in February and its drill simulating
first response to a chemical attack in London last September.
AL -QAEDA/JIHADIST
ACTIVITY IN
IRAQ
8. The US is still al-Qaeda's prime enemy,
and the detection and apprehension of terrorist cells in the US—and
Khaled Sheikh Mohammed's revelation of a committed al-Qaeda recruitment
strategy in the US—demonstrates the network's active intent
to kill Americans on US soil. The group also remains keen on recruiting
and targeting in Europe—probably especially in the UK, given
its strategic alignment with the US. As noted, however, the effectiveness
of the counter-terrorism campaign has forced al-Qaeda and its
sympathisers to find other targets for the time being. Before
the Iraq war, its area of operation included South Asia, Central
Asia, Southeast Asia and East Africa. While Islamic terrorists
will certainly still exploit vulnerabilities in those locales
as they present themselves, the Riyadh and Casablanca bombings
last May suggested that the Iraq war had broadly refocused the
Islamic terrorist efforts on the Arab world. Moreover, jihadists
(ie, members of al-Qaeda or linked groups or those sympathetic
with al-Qaeda's violent pan-Islamic agenda) appear to be infiltrating
Iraq. These developments are unsurprising and make perfect sense.
US-led intervention confirms central themes of the group's ideology:
that America has predatory designs on Arab wealth and is broadly
hostile to Islam. al-Qaeda doctrine also dictates that it draw
the blood of any "Crusaders" in a historically important
caliphate, which would include Iraqi territory. Its performance
in this effort will determine its continued credibility as Islam's
prime defender, and thus its recruiting power. In sum, Iraq is,
as Lieutentant-General Ricardo Sanchez, the senior US military
officer in Iraq, has put it, a "terrorist magnet", a
new field of jihad. In an audiotape broadcast on al-Jazeera in
October, Osama bin Laden said that Iraq was the newest front in
al-Qaeda's international jihad. American intelligence analysts
believe that up to 1,000 foreign jihadists are now present in
Iraq.
9. Since President Bush officially declared
the large-scale military campaign over on 1 May 2003, an insurgency
has taken hold in Iraq. The summer witnessed 10-15 attacks per
day. The insurgency has since gained momentum, as there are now
20-35 daily, and they are becoming better organized and more sophisticated—as
demonstrated last week by the rocket attack on a hotel in Baghdad
and co-ordinated and nearly simultaneous suicide attacks on the
Red Cross and two police stations the following day. US intelligence
analysts believe that the insurgency was initiated by disparate
local groups of Baath Party loyalists, ex-army personnel and ex-intelligence
officers loyal to Saddam Hussein. The timing of the jihadists'
main push into Iraq—as the indigenous insurgency started
to build strength—is consistent with the jihadists tactical
need to establish themselves with their Iraqi hosts, plug into
the terrorist infrastructure and then go operational. American
intelligence analysts now perceive a slow shift in the likely
primary perpetrators from Baathist holdouts to al-Qaeda connected
foreigners in league with local volunteers. US forces have detained
about 250 foreigners, 19 of whom are reported to be probable al-Qaeda
members.
10. At this moment, US authorities are not
sure who is responsible for the attacks. It is a difficult determination
to make inferentially. The main victims have been Iraqis. About
140 American soldiers have also been killed since 1 May as a result
of hostile operations. (British forces have also died, though
in what have appeared to be spontaneous outbursts rather than
planned guerrilla attacks.) Non-American foreigners, as in the
devastating attack on the UN on 19 August, have also been hit.
The Jordanian and Turkish embassies have been bombed. Although
most attacks have occurred inside the "Sunni triangle"
of Baghdad, Tikrit and al-Ramadi, almost 30% have occurred outside
that region, in Kurd and Shi'ite areas. These target choices and
locations are consistent with both insurgent and al-Qaeda objectives.
The attacks against Iraqis are intended to intimidate the local
population and discourage co-operation with the US and its partners,
and, by their indiscriminate character, to lay the blame on the
occupation for the loss of Iraqis, reinforcing resentment among
indigenous survivors. The UN is part of the foreign occupation.
Jordan and Turkey are Muslim nations that have actively supported
US military operations. While the co-ordinated onslaught on the
Red Cross and the police stations occurred on the first day of
Ramadan, suggesting a distinctly jihadist cast, the timing could
also have been intended to evoke the Tet Offensive in Vietnam—a
tactical victory for the US but a strategic defeat. There has
also been terrorist violence against Shi'ites. The perpetrators
could equally be radically anti-American Shi'ites, al-Qaeda-affiliated
Sunnis or Baathists fearful of Shi'ite domination in a reconstructed
Iraq. Some analysts suggest that the increasing sophistication
of the attacks may be due to the rising involvement of trained
or seasoned foreign terrorists, but this remains speculative.
TERRORIST SPONSORSHIP
BY ARAB
AND OTHER
MUSLIM STATES
11. Syria appears to be a key supporter
of jihadists in Iraq. Syrian nationals have a heavy presence there.
Of the 248 currently in US custody, 123 are reportedly Syrians.
One of the "Ramadan Offensive" terrorists has been identified
as Syrian on the basis of documents found on his body. Furthermore,
most foreign jihadists currently in Iraq are believed to have
received substantial logistical assistance once inside the country
from several hundred remnants of Ansar al-Islam, a fundamentalist
group with ties to al-Qaeda that was based in Kurdish-controlled
northern Iraq but dismantled by US troops. Most of the jihadists
have reportedly entered Iraq from Syria. This implies tactical
assistance from Syrian officials.
12. Saudi Arabia is also a player. Its state-supported
clergy—in particular, Sheikh Nasser Al Omar and Sheikh Safar
Al Hawali—have publicly exhorted Saudi nationals to fight
in Iraq against the US. US intelligence agencies believe that
Saudis are leading financiers of Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Some
Saudi jihadists have apparently entered Iraq. The opposition Washington-based
Saudi Information Agency reported two of them killed by American
troops in May 2003.
13. Members of Iran's powerful and virulently
anti-American Revolutionary Guard Corps have also been identified
in Iraq. They are believed to be building terrorist networks that
would be activated for action against the US and its allies should
they support any political configuration that marginalises the
interests of the Shi'ite majority for the sake of Sunni pacification
and co-operation.
APPROPRIATE FOCUS
OF UK, US AND
ALLIED COUNTER-TERRORISM
EFFORTS
14. In the two years following September
11, the first priority was understandably and correctly self-protection
via improved homeland security and enhanced law-enforcement and
intelligence co-operation. Advances have occurred, particularly
transatlantically, since 9/11. Given the continued viability of
al-Qaeda, none of the many potential targets can afford to relent,
and these two areas must continue to receive primary attention.
Money-laundering has also received close attention, and mainstream
banking is now subject to substantial vigilance. Big strides in
financial surveillance, however, will now be difficult to make.
Informal hawala remittance systems involve transactions
based on trust rather than a paper trail, and therefore are very
difficult to regulate. Al-Qaeda's post-Afghanistan decentralisation
also means that the transnational terrorist network is increasingly
reliant on atomised local sources that are harder to monitor.
Muslim banks and their regulators tend to be averse to the application
of heavy scrutiny, though some Arab governments have shown grudging
co-operation. Private citizens, particularly Saudis, continue
to contribute to charities that serve as fronts for and conduits
to terrorist organisations. Perhaps the most important measure
that Western governments and regulators can yet take is to further
tighten controls on such charities by adding them to official
lists of terrorist organisations and, correspondingly, freezing
their assets.
15. Because the US and Europe have a better
grip on the transatlantic terrorism than they did before 9/11,
they may now have the opportunity to devote greater efforts to
the medium- and long-term challenges of eliminating the root causes
of such terrorism. Perhaps the most urgent needs in this area
involve conflict resolution. While al-Qaeda itself is not amenable
to political negotiation or compromise, unresolved conflicts that
are nonetheless susceptible to resolution upset and anger Muslims
on a daily basis and provide al-Qaeda with eager recruits. The
most potent of these conflicts is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
After Iraq, of course, it has clearly been a priority of the US
as well as the rest of the "quartet". Despite the recent
frustrations of implementing the "Road Map", major powers
need to resist any temptation to disengage from efforts to advance
peace process. In addition, the Kashmir problem, insofar as it
can be portrayed as a manifestation of repression against Muslims,
gives radical Islam substantial traction in South and Central
Asia. Despite India's inhibiting disinclination to internationalise
the problem, it may be a propitious moment for outside powers
to move beyond hard counter-terrorism and crisis management in
the region and attempt to facilitate conflict resolution.
16. Appropriate new priorities could also
include: (1) social reforms in European nations- especially those,
like the UK, with large Muslim populations—designed to better
assimilate and integrate those populations into the mainstream
and thus reduce the impulse towards radicalisation; (2) more robust
and considered efforts to improve the image of Western countries
in the Islamic world; and (3) greater attention on saving failed
states and strengthening weak ones that might otherwise be co-opted
or "hijacked" by terrorists (as Afghanistan was) and/or
become sources of terrorist recruits.
17. Finally, the clear and emphatically
mandatory new priority is counter-insurgency in Iraq. Success—or
failure—in this endeavour has serious implications not only
for the nation-building effort in Iraq and regional stability
but also for the global campaign against al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
If the insurgents in Iraq—which will likely include foreign
jihadists if they do not already—continue to bleed US forces
and other components of the occupation, al-Qaeda recruitment will
increase and its resolve will be galvanised. In the area of counter-insurgency,
tactics for thwarting "new" and "old" terrorist
threats converge. For this reason, the UK's substantial and largely
successful experience in joining up military and civilian counter-terrorism
elements in Northern Ireland could be of considerable assistance
to the United States. The US may also need to re-allocate intelligence
resources in Iraq towards counter-insurgency and away from uncovering
weapons of mass destruction, which is currently absorbing a disproportionate
share of collection capability.
Professor Jonathan Stevenson
International Institute for Strategic Studies
3 November 2003
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