Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
Foreign and Commonwealth Office's response
to questions (in italics) from the Chairman of the Committee,
2 December 2003
FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM
1. In its response to recommendation 14,
the Government informed the Committee that it was "carefully
assessing all lessons learned from the post-conflict period in
Iraq and especially those concerned with security and policing
matters." The Committee wishes to receive a memorandum detailing
which lessons the Government has learned so far—especially
in relation to its planning of the political and governance aspects
of post-war Iraq. It also wishes to receive an outline of the
project on "failed states" currently being undertaken
by the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, and the FCO's contribution
to this project.
We attach at Annex A a Memorandum on
how we are assessing the lessons to be learnt from the post-conflict
period in Iraq. We also attach at Annex B an Executive Summary
prepared by the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit on the project on
"failed states". The Strategy Unit is working closely
with Government Departments on the project.
2. With respect to the Government's response
to recommendation 15, the Committee wishes to know what additional
measures have been taken since late July to increase the transparency
of the CPA, the Interim Governing Council and the Iraqi ministries.
What is the process by which ministers and officials are appointed
to the ministries? How have Iraqis been informed of changes to
the proposed timetable of drawing up the constitution?
Since late July the CPA has strengthened its
resources and improved the visibility of its work. The CPA now
publicises more of its work through its website, although a full
flow of information is limited by security constraints.
The CPA is determined to help the Iraqi administration
improve the transparency of the Governing Council and Iraqi Ministries
and improve understanding among Iraqis of their aims, role and
operations. The Governing Council is looking at measures to improve
transparency consistent with its authorities and powers and its
own security procedures. DFID is making preparations to send a
governance team to Iraq to work with the Iraqi administration
to look at a range of governance issues including transparency.
Iraqi Ministers are nominated by the Governing
Council and in turn are responsible for appointing Ministry staff.
The new transitional timetable was publicly
announced by Jalal Talabani, President of the Governing Council,
on 15 November. Iraqi, regional and international media coverage
of the announcement will have reached the vast majority of the
Iraqi population soon after. The Governing Council is following
up the announcement with a further public outreach explanation
of the plan with provincial and local assemblies in all of Iraq's
18 Governorates.
3. The Committee wishes to know what role
the United Nations will play in the revised political process
in Iraq, and in drawing up a new constitution. The Committee also
wishes to know what proportion of UN staff present in Iraq before
19 August have now been able to return to the country, and what
security arrangements exist to protect them as they carry out
their work there.
UN Security Resolution 1511 requests the Special
Representative of the Secretary General, as circumstances permit,
to lend the unique expertise of the UN to the Iraqi people in
the process of political transition, including the establishment
of electoral processes. This mandate builds on the vital role
for the UN foreseen in resolution 1483.
The UN's ability to carry out its mandate has
inevitably been affected by the decision to relocate international
staff temporarily following the 19 August terrorist attack on
the UN Headquarters in Baghdad. All UN international staff other
than a small number in the north of the country, have been relocated
for the time being in Cyprus, Jordan or Kuwait from where they
are overseeing programmes. Several thousand UN staff continue
to carry out work, particularly on humanitarian programmes. The
support for political process envisaged in resolution 1511 will
not necessarily require UN staff to be permanently based in Iraq.
The Secretary General commissioned an independent
review following the 19 August bombing which identified serious
shortcomings in the UN's security arrangements. The Secretary
General is currently considering the implications of the report
and reviewing the UN presence in Iraq. We have offered the UN
assistance, including financial support, to put the security measures
in place to allow them to return to Iraq and fulfil their mandate.
4. With respect to the Government's response
to recommendation 21, the Committee wishes to receive a progress
report on international efforts to disrupt al-Qaeda's terrorist
operations, planning, financing and support, including details
of the recent work of the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism
Committee.
There continues to be an effective level of
international and bilateral police, security and intelligence
co-operation against al-Qaeda and associated terrorist groups,
although we and our partners are constantly exploring new ways
of increasing that effectiveness. G8 partners and others are helping
to build counter-terrorism capacity in vulnerable countries, and
are co-ordinating such efforts locally. Through training and assistance
we have for example reduced the risk to aviation in Kenya and
are increasing police capacity there to investigate and prosecute
terrorist suspects within the rule of law; we are helping Yemen
to build their counter-terrorism capacity, including through training
security forces and coastguard; co-operation with Saudi Arabia,
including encouraging better use of police forensics techniques,
has increased substantially. The Saudi security forces intercepted
a major attack in Riyadh this week. We and our international partners
are also pressing individual states to take more effective action
where there is a lack of political will to do so.
The CTC has continued its efforts to ensure
that all countries implement Resolution 1373 and the 12 UN Counter-Terrorism
Conventions. The Security Council has also begun to look at how
the CTC might further develop its work in improving counter-terrorism
standards. But much of this work is of a long-term nature. The
immediate more operational work is carried out by the Taleban
and Al Qai'da Sanctions Committee. This Committee maintains a
list of individuals and organisations linked to the Taleban or
Al Qai'da, all of whom should then be subject to an asset-freeze,
travel ban and arms embargo in every UN member state. The latest
report of the Monitoring Group for this sanctions regime highlighted
failure to implement fully these measures on the part of many
States. We, along with the rest of the Security Council, are looking
urgently at how these gaps can be filled.
Counter-terrorism operations are making it much
harder for terrorists to operate and avoid capture. Significant
arrests and disruptions continue to be made. But the determination
of terrorists remains strong, and, as the attacks in Istanbul
demonstrate, the threat remains significant and global. We have
always taken the view that there is no quick fix and that we are
in for the long haul. We will continue to be at the forefront
of ensuring that the international community maintains a comprehensive
and effective approach to tackling international terrorism. We
are vigorously pursuing the perpetrators of the Istanbul attacks
through political, police and intelligence co-operation with the
Turkish authorities and internationally.
5. The Committee notes the Government's view,
stated in its response to recommendation 22, that as a consequence
of the Iraq war it "is likely that some groups and individuals
have been encouraged to commit terrorist acts, or to support more
indirectly al-Qaeda's aims and objectives [and] Within Iraq it
is clear that some groups and individuals have taken advantage
of the post-conflict situation to commit abhorrent terrorist acts."
The Committee wishes to receive the Government's assessment, eight
months after the war, of the impact of the military campaign on
recruitment for al-Qaeda inside Iraq, and in the wider Middle
East region.
Many attacks in Iraq are likely to be the work
of elements of the former regime. We believe that Islamist terrorists,
some belonging to al-Qaeda associated groups, have been involved
in some terrorist attacks in Iraq. We cannot discount the possibility
that some individuals may have been motivated to join these terrorist
networks as a result of coalition action in Iraq. In the wider
region, extremist propaganda including from bin Laden has sought
to exploit coalition action, using this as a context for encouraging
Muslims to engage in violence. But although coalition action in
Iraq, and other regional issues, has sustained and may have increased
terrorist motivation, we have no direct evidence that it has increased
al-Qaeda recruitment.
There is however no basis for suggesting that
coalition action in Iraq has caused the recent terrorism we have
seen. The risk from terrorism, including to the UK, has been high
for a long time and remains so, quite independently of Iraq. But
I repeat my previous observation that the establishment of a stable,
democratic Iraq enjoying the proper rule of law will be Iraq's
best defence against terrorism and will more widely undermine
Al Qa'ida's cause. I would add that the recent al-Qa'ida or al-Qa'ida
associated attacks in Saudi Arabia and Istanbul have killed more
Muslims, including children, than others, and have caused widespread
revulsion including in the Muslim world. The fact that these terrorist
groups are showing themselves in their true, indiscriminate, colours
undermines their profoundly dishonest attempts to claim legitimacy
for their actions from the Muslim world.
6. The Committee also wishes to know what
evidence exists to indicate that links exist between al-Qaeda
and the terrorist groups operating inside Iraq, and whether there
is evidence that these groups have backing from foreign governments.
Al-Qaeda associated terrorists, for example
the group Ansar al Islam, are active in Iraq and are planning
attacks. We do not believe that any state has a policy of supporting
these international terrorist groups, but it is possible that
individual elements within countries in the region may on occasion
have provided limited assistance to some of them.
7. The Committee seeks a note on the extent
to which Syria and Iran are co-operating with the United Kingdom
and its allies towards apprehending al-Qaeda operatives and dismantling
the network.
Both Syria and Iran have strongly and publicly
condemned international terrorism, including Al-Qa'ida's attacks
on 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks, including the Istanbul
bombings. We have had a dialogue with both countries on terrorism.
However we remain concerned over whether Syria and Iran are sufficiently
addressing other issues in countering the threat from Al Qa'ida
and other international terrorist groups. We have urged both Syria
and Iran to do more to stop infiltration of terrorists into Iraq
across their borders, and to prevent terrorist facilitators from
using their territory to organise such infiltration and plan attacks.
Iran has said that it has detained a number of senior Al Qa'ida
figures and has undertaken to deport these to their countries
of origin. We have urged the Iranians to live up to this undertaking.
8. The Committee wants further information
on the FCO's work to promote the rule of law, increased participation
of women in public life, economic reform and good governance in
the Arab world under the FCO's Global Opportunities Fund—with
a particular focus on its work in Syria and Palestine.
The FCO has established a Partnerships with
the Arab World Unit to take forward our strategy for encouraging
reform in Arab countries.
It has the traditional range of diplomatic tools
at its disposal. In addition this year we have established a Global
Opportunities Fund "Engaging the Islamic World". Funding
has already been allocated for this financial year to support
efforts in the Middle East and North Africa region to support
Good Governance, the Rule of Law and Participation of Women. This
year £1.5 million were allocated to 26 projects.
We are now considering strategic priorities
for the next financial year when the allocation will rise to £3
million and expand geographically with the potential to address
Islamic countries beyond the Middle East and North Africa.
Two projects are focussed exclusively on Syria.
One is helping to develop the Syrian money market in collaboration
with experts. The other is a high level conference to promote
UK-Syria Dialogue. Three other projects are regional in nature
and include Syria. They include journalism skills training to
help promote good governance, an anti-money laundering video as
part of the rule of law work and a project to air the views of
young Arab women to support a discussion about their futures.
At this stage no Palestinian projects have been funded through
this programme. Further information is provided at Annex C.[1]
9. The Committee
wishes to receive a memorandum detailing progress in negotiations
with the United States towards ensuring the fair trial of British
nationals held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The Committee knows that we have strong reservations
about the proposed Military Commissions. Following the Prime Minster's
meeting with President Bush on 17 July, the legal proceedings
against the two UK detainees designated as eligible for trial
by Military Commission were suspended.
Since then, the Attorney General, on the Government's
behalf, has held extensive talks with the US Administration about
the Commissions and the future of all of the UK detainees. His
objectives have been to ensure that the British detainees, if
prosecuted, would receive fair trials that meet generally recognised
principles and to make clear our opposition to the death penalty.
The Attorney General received assurances from the US that the
prosecution would not seek the death penalty in the cases of the
two British nationals (Mr Begg and Mr Abbasi).
He has also received a number of other assurances.
They include:
— agreement that Mr Begg and Mr Abbasi
could be represented by US civilian counsel of their choice supported
by a UK lawyers as well the military counsel provided by the US
Government;
— agreement to unmonitored communication
between the defendants and their counsel;
— open trials which the defendant's
family and media could attend.
Our exchanges with the US on the Commissions
and the future of the other 7 UK detainees continue. The Prime
Minister discussed the matter with President Bush during his visit
to the UK. The position remains as the Prime Minister explained
to the House and during the President's visit. There are two alternatives.
The detainees will either be tried by Military Commission which
is fair and consistent with international norms or they will be
returned to the UK. I expect this to be resolved soon. If the
detainees do return to the UK it will be a matter of the police
and Crown Prosecution Service as to whether they are tried. This
is the normal and correct procedure.
It is important, however, that we remind ourselves
of the context in which those concerned were detained. The detentions
arouse out of the attacks of September 11 and subsequent action
against international terrorism, in particular in Afghanistan.
So it is right that we take full account of our national security
as well as safeguarding justice when we consider how to resolve
this particular issue.
I know of the agreement between the US and Australian
Governments announced on 25 November by which the latter's detainees
might be tried by Military Commission. I do not think it my place
to comment on arrangements agreed between the two governments
or on the particular circumstances of the individuals concerned.
10. In its last Report on this subject, the
Committee asked that the Government set out in detail the lessons
that can be learnt from the experience of UN weapons inspections
in Iraq for the future monitoring of BW programmes. The Committee
now requests a memorandum setting out the lessons learnt from
the Iraq Survey Group. It also wishes to learn how the past year's
weapons inspections process will contribute to developing policy
towards monitoring and addressing the threat of WMD from Iran,
Syria and other states of concern.
The Iraq Survey Group is part of an ongoing
operation. I do not believe it would be appropriate at this stage
to divert resources away from the ISG's operational role or to
attempt to present lessons learnt from an incomplete process.
Her Majesty's Government, in common with other
national Governments, has not been given access to UNMOVIC's records
of its inspection activities in Iraq. It is not, therefore, possible
to carry out any full analysis of what lessons have been learned.
The UK has, both in the Security Council and through its UNMOVIC
Commissioner, encouraged UNMOVIC to carry out such an exercise.
If UNMOVIC does conduct an analysis, it is by no means certain
that we would have access to the results.
What has become clear from the experience of
weapons inspections in Iraq since 1991 is the need for intrusive
inspection regimes to generate confidence that no illegal activities
are taking place. Dr El Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA,
noted in his recent report on the implementation of safeguards
in Iran that, if the Agency was to be able to conclude that Iran's
nuclear programme "is exclusively for peaceful purposes",
"the Agency must have a particularly robust verification
system in place. An Additional Protocol, coupled with a policy
of full transparency and openness on the part of Iran, is indispensable
for such a system." This is why the Government is committed
to supporting the universalisation of the Additional Protocol.
11. The Committee requests a memorandum on
the Proliferation Security Initiative, detailing how it relates
to existing international arms control and non-proliferation measures.
A further memorandum is attached, at Annex
D.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
December 2003
Annex A
Memorandum on lessons to be learnt from
the post-conflict period in Iraq
The conflict in Iraq came to end only a few
months ago and we are still engaged in the post-conflict period.
As an occupying power, the UK's contribution to the reconstruction
of Iraq has been considerable and multi-faceted. Our efforts have
been principally channelled through our contribution to the Coalition
Provisional Authority. They include the maintenance of security
through our armed forces, the provision of experts to advise on
infrastructure reconstruction and administration and related issues,
and our involvement in assisting the Iraqis to develop the political
process which is now well underway. As we mentioned in our reply
to the Committee of September 2003, we are still assessing the
lessons to be learnt from this extensive and wide-ranging exercise.
As a result of a meeting on 16 September between
the Secretary of State and his counterparts from MoD and DFID,
officials from the three departments are looking closely at policy
and planning for post conflict situations. It is clear that:
— We need to look at lessons learnt
from Iraq and situations wider than Iraq to avoid the danger of
planning for the next crisis based solely on the last.
— There are a number of generic issues
(security, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation,
economic and social) which arise in most post conflict situations,
irrespective of the regional background to the crisis. These can
be further broken down into specific tasks that need to be tackled
in establishing an effective administration governing a stable,
secure state.
We have to be realistic. We cannot guarantee
success however much the UK reorganises structures, planning procedures
and deployment of resources. Much will depend on the environment
in which we are working. We should be looking at the art of the
possible: an integrated international response, the rapid deployment
of appropriately skilled and trained personnel, backed up by adequate
resources, planned well in advance to deliver rapid and sustainable
improvements to the quality of life of those we are seeking to
help.
To this end officials are looking at the creation
of a pan Whitehall mechanism that can:
— Decide where the UK's priorities
for intervention lie;
— Engage with the international community
and within the multilateral fora to ensure maximum support and
resources for an integrated post conflict reconstruction effort;
— Bring together the right resources
from across Departments;
— Plan well in advance for the appropriate
time and extent of our intervention;
— Meet the possible training needs
of those who may be deployed in the field.
Officials are also talking to other government
departments that are likely to be involved, as well as the private
sector and NGOs. As part of the process DFID, supported by the
FCO and MoD, are sponsoring a conference at Wilton Park in early
December on Managing the Transition from International Military
Intervention to Civilian Rule.
Within the FCO we are also reviewing the need
to adjust structures and working methods to improve response and
performance on post conflict issues. This may include setting
up of databases of staff with the appropriate skills, background
and experience of working in difficult conditions.
We shall be happy to make the outline conclusions
of these reviews, as they relate to lessons learnt from Iraq,
available to the Committee when they have been completed.
Annex B
Weak and Failing States—Scoping
Note
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The scoping note sets out the rationale for
the Strategy Unit-led project on weak and failing states (Section
I); its proposed aim and objectives (Section II); and its methodology
and possible outputs (Section III).
The rationale for the project:
— Areas of instability have long been
a concern of British foreign policy. International trends such
as globalisation, new security threats and a greater emphasis
on sustainable development have increased both the importance
and complexity of their impact on the UK. The expression "weak
and failing states" tends to be modern shorthand for those
parts of the world that lack strong and legitimate governance—but
there are multiple and contradictory definitions of the term.
The problems usually associated with weak and failing states,
including the operation of criminal and terrorist networks, are
a common risk factor across a range of UK international and domestic
objectives—from counter-proliferation to the achievement
of the Millennium Development Goals, from drugs trafficking to
asylum seekers and refugees.
— Key allies and international institutions
(US, UN, World Bank, European Union) are increasingly concerned
with the problems of weak and failing states—but there is
little international consensus on the effectiveness and legitimacy
of external interventions at each stage of the "cycle of
failure". The international community often struggles to
agree on when and how to intervene, and often lacks the capacity
to implement agreed policy. The division of responsibilities between
states, institutions and others is unclear. And we are insufficiently
aware of the extent to which gaps in the governance of the developed
world—or deliberate policy choices by developed nations—can
exacerbate weakness and failure elsewhere.
— The Strategic Audit suggested that
the UK would benefit from a strategic overview of weak and failing
states. Policies and resources across Government are not yet coordinated
to best effect. Beyond the Conflict Prevention Pools, there are
few ringfenced resources. Departments have different priorities
and criteria for intervention, and interventions are not often
based on rigorous analysis of best practice and UK comparative
advantage. There is an artificial divide between "international"
and "domestic" policy-making.
Government Departments are increasingly conscious
of these weaknesses as a hindrance to effective policies, and
are experimenting with methods of joint working. But no single
Government Department has overall strategic responsibility for
addressing the "cycle of failure". The aim of
the Strategy Unit-led project will be to answer the question:
"How can the UK improve its strategic response to the challenges
of weak and failing states?"
The objectives of the project will be to address
some key issues:
— Developing a common language.
Every Department and international organisation has its own subjective
definition of "weak and failing", and makes its own
assumptions about risk. We need to consider the relative impact
on the UK as a whole of various forms of weakness and failure
in territories, states, regions and in systems of policing and
broader governance. To set common priorities, the UK needs a common
language to describe the problem.
— Mapping the problem. What
are the geographical and systemic threats around the globe? What
relationship do weak and failing states have with international
criminal networks? To what extent are the values and policies
of the developed world contributing to the problem? Looking across
the range of UK domestic and international objectives—from
security and sustainable prosperity to global development—which
threats should be prioritised?
— Interventions. What evidence
is there for the relative effectiveness of interventions at each
point of the cycle of failure? What are the resource requirements
for each intervention? Is there any evidence that we can "spend
to save"? Where are there problems of capacity and legitimacy—and
what can the UK do about them?
— Whitehall co-ordination and collaboration.
How can we best combine UK and global analysis in support of our
policies? How can we achieve better policy coherence, and how
do we deal with tensions as they arise? How do we create and embed
robust mechanisms across Whitehall to allow common language and
shared priorities to emerge? What types of national co-ordination
and inter-Departmental collaboration have been shown to work at
each stage of the cycle? What can we learn from experiences of
the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools? What kind of
new mechanisms can best support post-conflict interventions? Which
will be needed to support the UK's efforts to improve national
and international capacity to tackle weak and failing states and
criminal networks?
— The role of the UK within the
international community (including bilaterals and international
institutions such as EU/UN/G8/World Bank/IMF). The UK will
seldom act alone to tackle the problems of weak and failing states.
We need to ask:
— What are the UK's comparative advantages/niche
roles, and should we develop them further?
— What are the priorities for improving
the capacity of the international system?
— How can HMG work more effectively
to achieve needed reforms and initiatives?
— What are the implications for UK
resource allocation?
— Can the "Responsibility to Protect"
agenda be taken further?
The first two of these issues have been identified
as key priorities. Work will begun on these issues with the aim
of feeding into the 2004 Spending Review process. The project
methodology will be based on close cooperation with Government
Departments. The aim will be to add value to existing work, and
to facilitate shared language and priorities across Government.
The project will be broken down into workstreams, each of which
will consult and involve relevant Departments and other stakeholders.
Departments will have an important role in shaping the project
towards specific outputs.
Proposed outputs of the project include recommendations
on:
— an integrated Whitehall system of
analysis and prioritisation, based on a robust risk assessment
methodology;
— structures of Whitehall coordination
and collaboration;
— pooled targets and coordinated resources;
— knowledge management tools such as
a shared intranet site and skills database;
— improved policy coherence across
Whitehall;
— capacity-building and policy initiatives
at UK, European and international level, including recommendations
for the UK's agenda during its presidency of the G8;
— taking forward the "Responsibility
to Protect" agenda.
Timescale
The scoping note for the project will be finalised
in November. Recommendations on pooled targets and resources will
be made in close consultation with departments concerned and in
time to inform work on SR2004. The key milestones will be:
— January: circulation of "emerging
findings" in those workstreams given priority for Spending
Review reasons.
— April: circulation of full
Interim Report including detailed work for Spending Review.
— Summer: final Spending Review
work.
— Autumn: circulation of Final
Report. The timing will depend on the nature of the follow-up
and implementation work agreed at the Interim Report stage.
At each milestone the project team will take
stock with the Advisory Group and other Whitehall stakeholders
to agree the detailed content of the next phase of work.
Annex D
Memorandum on the Proliferation Security
Initiative
1. In their letter to the Foreign Secretary
of 19 November, the Committee requested a memorandum on the Proliferation
Security Initiative, detailing how it relates to existing international
arms control and non-proliferation measures.
2. The Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) was launched by President Bush during a speech in Krakow,
Poland, on 31 May 2003. It aims to help prevent trafficking in
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and related material, through
enhanced interdiction efforts.
3. The initiative was originally taken forward
by 11 countries: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK and US. However, participation
is open to any state or international body that accepts the PSI
Statement of Interdiction Principles (agreed at a PSI meeting
in Paris at the beginning of September), and is willing to make
an effective contribution to the Initiative's goals.
4. The Statement of Interdiction Principles
sets out the aims and scope of the Initiative. In particular,
the Statement underlines that the PSI will be "consistent
with national legal authorities and relevant international law
and frameworks, including the UN Security Council". It also
makes clear that the PSI aims to build on and reinforce the existing
tools to prevent the proliferation of WMD, such as the existing
international arms control and non-proliferation measures, not
in any way to supplant them. Following the Paris meeting, over
50 countries from around the world have expressed political support
for the Statement of Principles.
5. The subsequent meeting of the PSI, 9-10
October in London, agreed that participation would vary according
to the activity taking place, and the contribution participants
could provide. Some countries had particular experience, assets
or expertise relevant to all PSI activities; other countries or
organisations could be expected to contribute according to their
particular capabilities. All relevant fora and international organisations
should be kept informed of significant developments under the
Initiative.
6. There are currently three main strands
of ongoing work:
— Policy, outlining the broad
direction of the Initiative.
— Operational, focussing on
the practical mechanics of interdiction operations. At the end
of July the UK hosted an operational experts' meeting which agreed
a programme of interdiction exercises. The first maritime exercise
was led by Australia, and took place in the Coral Sea (12-14 September).
The UK hosted the first air interception (tabletop) exercise on
8 October, to prepare the ground for a live exercise (led by Italy)
in November.
— Intelligence, establishing
a mechanism to share timely and actionable information, and sharing
analysis.
7. The next PSI meeting will be in mid December,
and will focus on operational issues. The next Plenary meeting
will be in Lisbon, in early Spring.
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