Further memorandum from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 28 JULY
2003, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE CHAIRMAN (IN ITALICS)
FAC QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
ON 15 JULY
1. In your public oral evidence of June
27[21]you
said that you would get to the Committee "as quickly as possible"
the answer to the question "When did the CIA report to the
British intelligence community the result of the former US ambassador's
visit to Niger?" Why was this answer not provided to the
Committee before it published its report rather than appearing
in your letter of 11 July?
We answered the question as soon as we had ensured
the accuracy of the information in our reply. The FCO Memorandum
submitted to the Committee and included in its report (Evidence
page 74) stated that our information on Iraqi attempts to procure
uranium post-dated the visit of a former US diplomat to Niger
("reported in the media"). However, the Foreign Secretary's
letter of 11 July made clear that the first UK officials knew
of Ambassador Wilson's visit was when it appeared in the press.
(It should also be borne in mind that between 27 June and 11 July
the Foreign Secretary was abroad in Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq
for four days (30 June-3 July) with an intensive programme. On
this trip he contracted a severe bout of food poisoning and was
unable to resume work full time until 9 July by which time he
had a large backlog.)
2. Following your oral statement in
the House today, you undertook to place a copy of your answer
to Andrew Mackinlay in the Library. Would you also include that
answer in your reply to this letter?
THE INFORMATION IS AS FOLLOWS:
"We first had indications that the IAEA
had suspicions about the authenticity of some of the documents
in late February but no confirmation of that until the IAEA gave
its report to the Security Council on 7 March. Ministers were
then informed."
3. Please will you provide the Committee
with a copy of the "detailed account of Ambassador Wilson's
report" that you have now seen.
This is an intelligence document. It is summarised
in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 11 July[22]
4. What were the terms in which the
CIA expressed its reservations to the British Government about
the uranium from Africa element of the September 2002 dossier,
and on what date or dates were those reservations expressed?
Just before the dossier was finalised, the CIA
offered a comment noting that they did not regard the reference
to the supply of uranium from Africa as credible. But the CIA
provided no explanation for their concerns. UK officials were
confident that the dossier's statement was based on reliable intelligence.
A judgement was therefore made by the JIC Chairman to retain the
reference.
5. Why did neither you nor your officials
disclose to the Committee, in either your written or oral evidence,
before the Committee published its recent report that the CIA
had expressed reservations to the British Government on the uranium
from Africa element in the September dossier—particularly
when you were specifically asked by a member of the Committee
in your public evidence on 27 June why the British Government
did "at least not put some degree of health warning"
over the uranium from Africa statements in the September 2002
dossier?
British officials saw no need to put a health
warning on the claim, because they were confident in the intelligence
underlying it. The reference in the dossier was based on intelligence
from more than one source. We had not shared this intelligence
with the CIA, nor were we in a position to do so, for reasons
explained during the private evidence session.
6. On receipt of the CIA's reservations,
which you say in your letter were "unsupported by explanations",
about the uranium from Africa element in the September 2002 dossier,
did any British official ask for an explanation of the CIA's reservations?
If not, why not? If so, what was the CIA's response?
UK intelligence officials have regular exchanges
with their counterparts in the CIA. We note that the October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment, parts of which
were published on 18 July 2003, supports our view that Iraq had
sought to acquire yellowcake from Africa. The relevant part of
the NIE reads:
QUOTE
A foreign government service reported that as
of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of "pure
uranium" (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001
Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements
for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake.
We do not know the status of the arrangement.
UNQUOTE
7. On what date was the CIA first informed
of the contents of the September 2002 dossier, which draft or
drafts were shown to the CIA, and were the CIA shown the contents
of the draft dossier in its entirety?
The CIA were consulted throughout the drafting
process and were passed a draft of the WMD section on 11 September.
8. What reservations and comments did
the CIA express about any other elements in the September 2002
dossier in addition to its reservations about uranium from Africa?
The CIA made a number of comments. The JIC chairman
incorporated or rejected them as he judged fit.
9. At the end of your letter you refer
to "The recent discovery of technical documentation and centrifuge
parts—necessary for the enrichment of uranium—buried
at the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist in Baghdad." Is
it correct, as has been reported in The Independent of
15 July, that these centrifuge parts were buried some 12 years
ago? If so, why was this not disclosed in your letter to the Committee?
It is well known that the documents and components
hidden by the Iraqi nuclear scientist, Ubaidi, had been hidden
for 12 years. The Foreign Secretary referred to this in his statement
in the House on 15 July. The key point is not when the documents
and components were hidden, but when they were discovered—ie
in June 2003, over 12 years after they should have been surrendered
to UN inspectors. As reported by CNN, Ubaidi has said that he
was ordered to hide these things "so as to be able to rebuild
the bomb programme at some time in the future". The discovery
was significant both in terms of Iraq retaining components for
a nuclear programme, and as an example of successful concealment
from UN inspectors.
Rt Hon Jack Straw MP,
Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
July 2003
LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE, 21
AUGUST 2003
Thank you for your helpful responses to the
Committee's nine questions of 15 July. I wish to follow up just
two of the responses which in my view could have been more helpful.
In Question 6, I asked whether, on receipt of
the CIA's reservations about the uranium from Africa claim, any
British official asked for an explanation; and if not, why not.
You replied that "UK intelligence officials have regular
exchanges with their counterparts in the CIA." May I have
a more complete and informative answer to the question?
I also asked, in Question 8, what reservations
and comments the CIA expressed about any other elements in the
September 2002 dossier in addition to its reservations about uranium
from Africa. Your reply was that "The CIA made a number of
comments." You have already (in answer to Question 4) described
a comment made by the CIA about the credibility of the uranium
claim. What were their comments about the other aspects of the
dossier?
I would be grateful to receive full answers
to these questions on or before 1 September.
Chairman of the Committee
August 2003
LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 8 SEPTEMBER
2003
Thank you for your letter of 21 August seeking
more information on two of my responses to the Committee's nine
questions.
I regret that I cannot provide more information
on question 6 because exchanges between UK intelligence officials
and their opposite numbers in the US are confidential and it would
not therefore be appropriate to provide further details.
On question 8, I can confirm that comments from
the CIA on the September dossier were on drafting points and not
on the substance. The October 2002 NIE Assessment to which I referred
in my earlier reply sets out the US position on WMD in Iraq.
Rt Hon Jack Straw MP,
Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
September 2003
Annex A
LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 11 JULY
2003
I am writing to deal with two points relating
to the statement in the Government's September Iraq dossier that
"Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of
uranium from Africa".
First, press reporting has claimed that this
statement is contradicted by the report of a US envoy, Ambassador
Joseph Wilson, who visited Niger in early 2002 to investigate
the subject on behalf of the CIA. I want to make clear that neither
I nor, to the best of my knowledge, any UK officials were aware
of Ambassador Wilson's visit until reference first appeared in
the press, shortly before your hearings last month. In response
to our questions, the US authorities have confirmed that Ambassador
Wilson's report was not shared with the UK.
We have now seen a detailed account of Ambassador
Wilson's report. It does indeed describe the denials of Niger
Government officials in early 2002 that a contract had been concluded
for the sale of yellowcake to Iraq. But, as CNN have reported,
Ambassador Wilson's report also noted that in 1999 an Iraqi delegation
sought the expansion of trade links with Niger—and that
former Niger government officials believed that this was in connection
with the procurement of yellowcake. Uranium is Niger's main export
(Statesmen's Year Book 2002 p12223). In other words, this element
of Ambassador Wilson's report supports the statement in the Government's
dossier.
Second, the media have reported that the CIA
expressed reservations to us about this element of the September
dossier. This is correct. However, the US comment was unsupported
by explanation and UK officials were confident that the dossier's
statement was based on reliable intelligence which we had not
shared with the US (for good reasons, which I have given your
Committee in private session). A judgement was therefore made
to retain it.
Finally, may I underline that the JIC's assessment
of Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its nuclear programme did not
rest on the attempted acquisition of yellowcake alone. The Government's
dossier catalogued a range of other procurement activities, and
referred to intelligence that scientists had been recalled to
the programme in 1998. You will be aware of the recent discovery
of technical documentation and centrifuge parts—necessary
for the enrichment of uranium—buried at the home of an Iraqi
nuclear scientist in Baghdad.
I hope this is helpful.
Rt Hon Jack Straw MP,
Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
July 2003
21 Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Session 2002-03, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC813-III,
Ev 166, Q1263. Back
22
See Annex A, Ev 49. Back
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