Further supplementary memorandum from
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE, 29
OCTOBER 2003
Thank you for your letter of 8 September[31],
in reply to mine of 21 August[32].
I am disappointed that you feel unable to supply
further information on the CIA's reservations on the uranium from
Africa claim. The extract from the NIE on Iraq's WMD, quoted in
your original response of 29 July, appears simply to report, rather
than—as you suggest—to "support", the UK
view that Iraq had sought to procure yellowcake from Niger. I
believe that this interpretation was confirmed by George Tenet
on 11 July, when he stated that:
"Portions of the State of the Union speech
draft came to the CIA for comment shortly before the speech was
given. Various parts were shared with cognizant elements of the
Agency for review. Although the documents related to the alleged
Niger-Iraqi uranium deal had not yet been determined to be forgeries,
officials who were reviewing the draft remarks on uranium raised
several concerns about the fragmentary nature of the intelligence
with National Security Council colleagues. Some of the language
was changed. From what we know now, Agency officials in the end
concurred that the text in the speech was factually correct—ie
that the British government report said that Iraq sought uranium
from Africa. This should not have been the test for clearing a
Presidential address. This did not rise to the level of certainty
which should be required for Presidential speeches, and CIA should
have ensured that it was removed."
Also in his statement of 11 July, George Tenet
said:
"in the fall of 2002, our British colleagues
told us they were planning to publish an unclassified dossier
that mentioned reports of Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium in
Africa. Because we viewed the reporting on such acquisition attempts
to be inconclusive, we expressed reservations about its inclusion
but our colleagues said they were confident in their reports and
left it in their document."
If the Director of the CIA is prepared to describe
the contacts between his service and the UK, I do not see why
you have felt so constrained in your replies to the Committee's
questions. Will you now seek the agreement of the CIA to make
a full disclosure to the Committee of the exchanges which took
place last year about the uranium from Africa claim?
So far as I have been able to determine, those
parts of the NIE which have been declassified make no mention
at all of the possibility that Iraqi WMD were capable of deployment
within 45 minutes of an order to do so. However, because I do
not have access to the full, still classified Estimate, I am unable
to assure myself or my colleagues on the Committee that none of
the "drafting points" to which you refer in your letter
of 8 September related to the 45 minutes claim, or indeed to form
my own judgment as to whether any of these points might have been
points of substance.
May I therefore ask you to seek the agreement
of the CIA to supplying the Committee with a full list of their
comments on the September dossier? We will of course treat all
such material in complete confidence.
Finally, I wish to raise a further point, pursuant
to your letter of 28 July[33].
In that letter, you informed the Committee that the UK first had
indications that the IAEA had suspicions about the authenticity
of some of the documents supplied by a third party on the uranium
from Africa claim in late February, but that Ministers were not
informed until after the IAEA had presented its report to the
Security Council on 7 March. Why were Ministers not informed earlier?
I understand that it might take some time to
gain the agreement of the CIA to the requests made above and,
in the circumstances, hope that you will use your best endeavours
to send us a reply not later than 1 December so that we can incorporate
it in our report.
Chairman of the Committee
October 2003
LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 27 NOVEMBER
2003
Thank you for your letter of 29 October.
As I said in my letter of 8 September, it would
not be appropriate to provide details of intelligence exchanges
with CIA. You will be aware that the Intelligence and Security
Committee have inquired into the assessment that Iraq had sought
to acquire uranium from Africa and stated in its report on Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction that they had questioned 515 about
the basis of its judgement and concluded that it was reasonable.
The ISC also reviewed the intelligence and assessments relating
to the 45 minutes claim.
You asked why Ministers were not informed before
7 March of doubts within the IAEA about the authenticity of some
of the documents relating to uranium from Africa. As you will
now be aware from the Government's reply to the FAC's Report on
"The Decision to go to War in Iraq"[34]
(Part 7), we had no confirmation of IAEA suspicions before Dr
El Baradei's report of 7 March.
Rt Hon Jack Straw MP,
Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
November 2003
LETTER TO THE SECRETARY Of STATE, FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE (DATED
8 DECEMBER 2003)
The Foreign Affairs Committee wishes to receive
answers to the following questions arising from the evidence session
on 2 December 2003 and the November bombings in Istanbul:
1. The Committee notes your comments on
2 December about the review of security following the synagogue
bombings, and wishes to know what additional security measures
were taken at the Istanbul Consulate.
2. The Committee wishes to know what advice
the Turkish security agencies gave about security in and around
the Consulate and what measures were taken as a result of this
advice. To the extent that Turkish security advice was not implemented,
what were the reasons for its non-implementation?
3. The Committee notes your comments about
why staff and the Consul were working in temporary buildings at
the entrance to the Consulate and wishes to know what consideration
was given to their security. When were the security implications
of this decision last reviewed; and what were the conclusions
reached by that review?
4. The Committee wishes to receive in confidence
a list of which Posts are now considered to be the most vulnerable
to attack, detailing what steps are being taken to protect the
Posts and the cost of these measures.
5. The Committee also wishes to know what
degree of priority the FCO attaches to its duty to protect personnel.
How does it balance this duty against other considerations?
I hope you will be able to reply before the
House rises for the Christmas recess.
LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE 20 NOVEMBER BOMBING OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL
IN ISTANBUL (DATED 18 DECEMBER)
Thank you for your letter of 8 December setting
out a number of questions following the 20 November bombing of
the Consulate General in Istanbul.
As I said at the evidence session on 2 December,
we kept the security of our staff at the Consulate General under
continuous review. Our security experts from London had visited
the Post and the implementation of their recommendations was underway.
The Post's Security Committee met frequently and the UK-based
Security Manager closely supervised the day-to-day running of
the security arrangements. These arrangements were reviewed following
the synagogue bombings and additional security measures were put
in place. The Post also requested additional security from the
Turkish police and a meeting was due to take place with them on
the morning of the bombing.
You asked about the advice the Turkish Security
Agencies gave the Consulate on security. I am afraid that we never
discuss the details of contacts with overseas Security Agencies
and cannot therefore provide this information.
Nor I am afraid can I send you a list of vulnerable
posts and details of additional measures. This information draws
on highly classified information relating to intelligence on threats
and details of the physical vulnerabilities of individual Posts.
You also asked about the FCO's duty of care
to its staff. I can assure the Committee that the security of
our staff is paramount. Our security strategy is to enable the
FCO to operate world-wide by protecting staff, families, information
and other assets. As Istanbul showed, total security cannot be
assured. We need to make difficult judgments balancing the risk
against our operational requirements and ensuring that we have
the necessary security measures and procedures in place to protect
our employees. This balance is the subject of the review I announced
to the House in Written Statement on 10 December, copy attached.
Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP
Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
18 December 2003
MINISTERIAL STATEMENT FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
AFFAIRS[35]
31 Ev 49. Back
32
Ev 48. Back
33
Ev 47. Back
34
Government's Response to the Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, Session 2002-03, The Decision to go War in Iraq,
CM 6062. Back
35
HC Debates, 10 December 2003, column 87WS. Back
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