Memorandum from Dr David Morrison
LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE FROM DR MORRISON, 18 NOVEMBER 2003
I write to you as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Select Committee.
Enclosed is a Memorandum on the Committee's
report on The Decision to go to War in Iraq, which concluded
that "Ministers did not mislead Parliament". I submit
that the Committee failed to consider important issues in coming
to that conclusion. These are set out in my memorandum. I pick
out one:
The Prime Minister told the House of Commons
on 18 March 2003 that President Chirac had said in a TV interview
on 10 March that France would veto a second resolution authorising
military action "whatever the circumstances". In fact,
the President said in that interview that war authorised by the
Security Council would be "inevitable" if UN inspectors
reported that they weren't in a position to achieve their goal.
Inexplicably, the Committee's report does not
mention this instance in which, deliberately or otherwise, the
Prime Minister misled Parliament.
Since the Committee wrote its report, a variety
of other matters have come into the public domain, through the
Hutton Inquiry and the ISC report, which in my opinion cast doubt
on your conclusion that "Ministers did not mislead Parliament".
These are also set out in my memorandum. I pick out one here:
The Prime Minister assured the House of Commons
on 4 June 2003 that "there was no attempt, at any time, by
any official, or Minister, or member of No. 10 Downing Street
staff, to override the intelligence judgments of the Joint Intelligence
Committee" in the drawing up of the September dossier. How
can that be reconciled with the fact that, as revealed by the
Hutton Inquiry, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, requested
a redraft of a portion of the dossier on 19 September 2002 because
it backed up the "argument that there is no CBW threat and
we will only create one if we attack him" and was therefore
"a bit of a problem" for the Prime Minister?
The Government justified taking the decision
to go to war on Iraq primarily on the premise that Iraq had functional
chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering them,
a premise that has turned out to be flawed. In those circumstances,
it is imperative, in my view, that the Committee reopen its inquiry
into that decision. What is the point of the Committee if it fails
to shine a bright light on what was the most important foreign
policy decision in a generation?
Dr David Morrison
November 2003
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