Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
conclude that the Prime Minister was right to state that the trial
process of Saddam Hussein should be determined by the Iraqi government—when
it has been established—and by the Iraqi people. (Paragraph
17)
2. We conclude that
since the removal of the Iraqi regime, a dangerous alliance of
foreign fighters with terrorist allegiances and elements of the
former Iraqi regime has been forming inside Iraq. It remains to
be seen what effect the capture of Saddam Hussein has on this.
(Paragraph 25)
3. We conclude it
is unacceptable that comprehensive information is not available
about detainees being held by the Occupying Powers in Iraq. We
recommend that the British Government ensures that such information
is provided as a matter of immediacy including the names of all
detainees; their nationalities; where they are held; in what conditions
they are held; what rights they have, including access to lawyers;
the legal basis for their detention; the offences of which they
are suspected or charged; and when and how they will be tried
or released. (Paragraph 27)
4. We conclude that
Iran and Syria have the potential to be destabilising factors
in Iraq, and that maintaining co-operation with both is therefore
essential for the success of Coalition efforts to bring stability
to that country. We further conclude that the United Kingdom,
through its diplomatic relations with Iran and Syria, could play
a crucial role in ensuring this co-operation. (Paragraph 34)
5. We regret that
some members of the Security Council Permanent Five and other
countries with the capacity to assist have decided against contributing
forces to help establish security in post-war Iraq. We conclude
that this failure to share the burden can only have increased
the pressures on US and United Kingdom resources, both civilian
and military, which in turn may have exacerbated the difficulties
encountered by the Coalition in establishing and maintaining
security in Iraq. (Paragraph 37)
6. We conclude that
the early decision to disband the Iraqi armed forces was entirely
understandable in the conditions prevailing at the time, but that
the re-establishment of such forces in an essential component
of creating a new, safe and sovereign Iraq. (Paragraph 40)
7. We recommend that
the Government set out, in its response to this Report, the means
by which Iraqis are currently able to feed information about terrorists
or other criminals into the CPA structures; and whether the CPA
has plans to enhance the links between its own staff and the Iraqi
population to facilitate the transfer of information. (Paragraph
43)
8. We commend the
Government for the energetic measures it has taken to help establish
a new Iraqi police force and recommend that this assistance is
intensified in the critical remaining months before the handing
back of sovereignty to Iraq on 1 July 2004. (Paragraph 45)
9. Subject to the
wishes of the new Iraqi government, we recommend that the Government
and its Coalition partners scale down their armed forces only
as Iraqi forces demonstrate their capacity to establish and maintain
security, and that the terms of any status of forces agreements
reached with the Iraqi authorities should be consistent with this
objective. (Paragraph 48)
10. We conclude that
United Kingdom personnel in Iraq, both military and civilian,
are making a vital contribution to the administration and reconstruction
of the country, despite having to work in the most difficult and
dangerous circumstances. Their performance deserves the highest
praise, and appropriate recognition. (Paragraph 51)
11. We conclude that
the Iraq operation has demonstrated once again the importance
of security for the success of post-conflict peace operations.
Though there was, perhaps understandably, insufficient anticipation
by the British and American governments of the scale and severity
of the security tasks facing the Occupying Powers in the immediate
aftermath of the war, we reject claims that the Coalition's inability
to create a fully secure environment in the immediate post-war
period can be attributed entirely to serious failures either of
policy or of planning. It is unfortunate and regrettable that
the lack of law and order, and interruptions in essential services,
resulted in a loss of goodwill among those worst affected, but
we conclude that important progress is being made in winning this
goodwill back. (Paragraph 57)
12. We conclude that
it is unfortunate that the majority of Iraqis have very limited
access to the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Interim
Governing Council, and probably have little knowledge of their
actions or policies, or receive through their media a distorted
or one-sided view. We further conclude that this isolation may
well have increased Iraqis' sense of alienation from and hostility
to the Occupying Powers and those working closely with them.
This underlines the importance of continuing to move Iraq further
along to road to fully democratic governance as speedily as possible
after the handover of sovereignty on 1 July. (Paragraph 78)
13. We recommend that
the Government, in alliance with its partners in the Coalition,
do its utmost to improve the transparency of the CPA, the Governing
Council and the Iraqi ministries. (Paragraph 83)
14. We conclude that
the complexity of Iraqi society has rendered the development of
broadly representative interim Iraqi structures extremely difficult.
We recommend that the Government, through work with its partners
in the Coalition and through greater engagement with Iraqi society,
seek to ensure that currently marginalised groups are identified
and, where possible, included in Iraq's new government structures.
(Paragraph 87)
15. We conclude that
the United Nations still has the potential to play an important
role in facilitating political transition in Iraq, and in conferring
legitimacy on the process. We further conclude that the attack
on the UN headquarters in Baghdad and the subsequent withdrawal
of UN staff has had a serious—but, it is to be hoped, temporary—detrimental
effect on the process of transition to a new Iraqi government.
We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
set out what it is doing to promote, restore and strengthen the
role of the UN in Iraq. (Paragraph 92)
16. We commend the
Coalition's provision of substantially increased salaries to Iraq's
public sector workers, and conclude that this has contributed
to the social stability and economic revival of Iraq in the immediate
post-war period. However, we also recommend that the CPA urgently
address the unemployment issues evident in the Basrah region.
(Paragraph 96)
17. We conclude that
the lack of information available to the Coalition when assessing
the scale of the reconstruction effort needed in post-war Iraq
contributed to the problems that it has faced in establishing
credibility and maintaining the confidence of the Iraqi people.
(Paragraph 102)
18. We conclude that
despite some signs of economic revival since the war, Iraqis have
been disappointed by the slow pace of reconstruction, although
their expectations were probably unrealistic. We recommend that
measures to increase the accessibility and transparency of the
CPA, the Governing Council and Iraqi ministries are also used
to ensure that Iraqi contractors are able to bid for reconstruction
contracts. (Paragraph 106)
19. We recommend that
in its response to this Report the Government set out its understanding
of the extent to which the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions
constrain the Occupying Powers' capacity to carry out economic
reform, and how these constraints have affected the Coalition's
operations in Iraq. (Paragraph 108)
20. We conclude that
sustainable economic development and diversification will be essential
for the long term stabilisation of Iraq. We recommend that the
Government do its utmost to ensure that the CPA and Iraqi ministries
are staffed with experienced personnel, who are capable of drawing
up and implementing plans for Iraq's economic development, including
detailed and politically sensitive options for the distribution
of Iraq's oil revenues. (Paragraph 110)
21. We conclude that
a continued United Kingdom military and civilian presence in Iraq
is likely to be necessary for some time to come, possibly for
several years. We conclude that this presence must include a
significant FCO component if it is to succeed, and we therefore
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set
out its plans for establishing full diplomatic and consular service
in Iraq, including what services it intends to provide, who will
provide them, where they will be provided, and over what timescale
they will be introduced. (Paragraph 117)
22. We welcome the
capture of Saddam Hussein, but conclude that the continued failure
of the Coalition to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has
damaged the credibility of the US and the United Kingdom in their
conduct of the war against terrorism. (Paragraph 119)
23. We conclude that
the war in Iraq has possibly made terrorist attacks against British
nationals and British interests more likely in the short term.
A successful transfer of power to an internationally-recognised
Iraqi government, which has the support of the Iraqi people and
which is recognised by Arab and muslim states generally, offers
an important opportunity to reduce that threat and to assist the
process of reform and stabilisation in the region. (Paragraph
123)
24. Although we recognise
that Israel must protect its citizens from terrorist attack, and
that in the absence of terrorist attacks Israel would not launch
such strikes, we conclude that punitive strikes such as that which
it launched against Syria in October are likely to be counter-productive,
and may also constitute a breach of international law. We therefore
conclude that the Government was right to join its EU partners
in condemnation of the 5 October attack. We recommend that the
Government use its influence with Israel, its neighbours, the
Palestinian Authority and Palestinian groups, to prevent the further
spread of violence in the region (Paragraph 135)
25. We conclude that
reform of the Palestinian security sector is central to the success
of the Road Map and we commend the Government for its efforts
to ensure that the Palestinian Authority carries out these reforms.
However, we are concerned at the lack of progress and recommend
that the Government redouble its efforts to ensure the success
of the reforms. In particular, more should be done by the PA to
arrest and bring to justice those responsible for the recruiting,
training, equipping and launching of suicide bombers and to prevent
the honouring and even encouraging of suicide bombers and their
masters by Palestinian media. (Paragraph 147)
26. We recommend that
the Government, with its European partners, apply further pressure
on the Palestinian Authority to stop the terrorist attacks. (Paragraph
148)
27. We conclude that
the case for building a security fence along the Green Line would
be strong and understandable, but to build it within the West
Bank is neither justifiable nor acceptable and gives rise to fears
that Israel intends to annex this land. We recommend that in its
response to this Report, the Government set out the steps it is
taking to dissuade Israel from taking such unilateral measures
in the Occupied Territories. (Paragraph 157)
28. We conclude that
the conditions under which many Palestinians currently live contribute
to their radicalisation, and undermine support for moderate Palestinian
leaders. We also conclude that Israeli actions within the West
Bank are making the Palestinian economy unviable. (Paragraph 158)
29. We recommend that
the Government continue to urge Israel to help "create a
climate within which moderate Palestinian leaders can prevail."
We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the
Government outline the steps it is taking to do this. (Paragraph
159)
30. We are deeply
concerned by Israel's maintenance and expansion of illegal settlements
in the occupied territories and its construction of a 'security
fence' on Palestinian land, and we conclude that these policies
constitute a severe impediment to efforts to secure a peace agreement
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and to the creation
of a viable Palestinian state. We recommend that the Government
make it absolutely clear in its public statements that Israel's
fulfilment of commitments set out in the Road Map—including
the dismantling of all settlement outposts erected since March
2001, and the freezing of settlement activity consistent with
the Mitchell Report—must proceed immediately. (Paragraph
161)
31. We recommend that
the Government, with its European Union partners, apply further
pressure to Israel to implement the commitments it has made in
the Road Map. (Paragraph 163)
32. We conclude that
conditions in the occupied West Bank are changing rapidly, and
that the continuation of Israel's current settlement policies,
and its construction of the 'security fence', will make the eventual
establishment of a contiguous and economically viable Palestinian
state increasingly difficult, if not impossible. (Paragraph 164)
33. We conclude that
if, over the next year to eighteen months, progress towards implementation
of the Road Map is further delayed, the two-state solution which
is the current objective of international efforts to resolve the
conflict will become increasingly difficult to achieve. (Paragraph
166)
34. We conclude that
early progress towards a negotiated settlement between the government
of Israel and the Palestinian Authority is a necessary component
in the Government's efforts to promote stability and security
in the wider Middle East region (Paragraph 167)
35. We conclude that
the speech made by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on 18 December
stating that Israel may "initiate the unilateral security
step of disengagement from the Palestinians" and that this
disengagement plan "will include redeployment of IDF forces
along new security lines", coupled with the statement that
"Israel will greatly accelerate the construction of the security
fence" is a mater of deep concern. We recommend that the
Government, in its response to this Report, set out what steps
it is taking to dissuade the Israeli government from taking such
unilateral action. (Paragraph 175)
36. We conclude that
the US is by far the strongest external influence on the parties
to the conflict and that the Road Map can only be restarted by
the presence in the region of a very senior US representative
willing and able to pressurise both sides into taking the necessary
actions to make progress. We fear that forthcoming US elections
are likely to diminish US commitment and action. (Paragraph 176)
37. We conclude that,
regardless of its willingness to engage in resolution of the conflict,
the European Union's capacity to apply effective pressure to the
Israeli government is very limited in comparison to that of the
United States. We further conclude that without sustained enhanced
and effective external pressure, which at least in the short term
appears unlikely, there are no prospects of an early settlement.
(Paragraph 178)
38. We recommend that
the Government do its utmost to promote greater US engagement
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by stressing publicly that
resolution of this conflict is an essential component in the wider
US-led campaign to defeat Islamist terrorism and to promote reform
in the Middle East region. In particular, we recommend that the
Government seek to convince the US of the importance of sending
a high-level emissary to the region. (Paragraph 181)
39. We conclude that
the prospects for a diplomatic implementation of the Road Map
are slight. To make the Road Map more efficacious, we recommend
that its ambiguities should be clarified and its monitoring facilities
strengthened to include a conflict-resolution mechanism. (Paragraph
183)
40. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, the Government state its policy
on a Chapter VII UN Security Council Resolution imposing a settlement
along the Taba lines. (Paragraph 186)
41. We conclude that
through its links with Palestinian terrorist organisations, Iran
disrupts prospects for peace between the government of Israel
and the Palestinian Authority. We further conclude that the Government,
with its partners in the European Union, has a number of incentives—such
as the Trade and Co-operation Agreement—which it can employ
to help encourage Iran to cease its links with terrorist groups.
We conclude that the Iranian authorities value these incentives
and that their existence could be used to discourage Iranian support
for Palestinian terrorist groups. (Paragraph 203)
42. We commend the
Government's decision to work with France and Germany to help
ensure Iran's agreement to the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. We conclude that this decision helped
to ensure that the IAEA can now conduct intrusive inspections
of Iranian nuclear facilities. We further conclude that this
episode demonstrates the potential of co-ordinated European action
to address common security concerns, and that it demonstrates
the continued relevance of multilateral arms control mechanisms.
(Paragraph 221)
43. We conclude that
although Syria's closure of the offices of terrorist groups in
Damascus is a positive step, it continues to support terrorist
organisations and has failed to restrain them beyond temporary
efforts to limit their activities. (Paragraph 227)
44. We are concerned
about the pursuit of WMD by Syria. However, we conclude that pressure
alone is unlikely to succeed in gaining Syrian co-operation on
WMD, and recommend that the Government pursue dialogue with Damascus
in order to address this threat. (Paragraph 232)
45. We also recognise
Syria's concerns about Israel's nuclear capability and recommend
that the Government pursue this issue with the Israeli Government.
We conclude that ultimately, a comprehensive peace agreement between
Israel and the Arab States will be required to address the issue
of WMD and arms proliferation in the region, and we recommend
that the Government seek to encourage Syria and Israel to return
to the negotiating table. (Paragraph 233)
46. We conclude that,
at this stage, it is better to foster gradual reform and co-operation
with Syria than to push for unachievable objectives. Syrian co-operation
is important for success in Iraq and the Middle East peace process.
Given the failure of pressure alone to gain Syrian co-operation,
we recommend that the Government continue to pursue constructive
engagement and dialogue as the best way to foster co-operation.
In particular, we recommend that the Government work to encourage
Israel and Syria to resume peace negotiations, including giving
its support to any regional efforts at mediation in the conflict,
and generally to improve bilateral relations. We further recommend
that in its response to this Report, the Government set out its
position on the Golan Heights and the Israeli settlements there.
(Paragraph 242)
47. We welcome Libya's
decision to relinquish its WMD programmes and we commend the Government
for its role in bringing this about. We also commend the Government's
policy of engagement with Libya and note that it was essential
to creating the environment that facilitated the secret talks
that ultimately resulted in Libya's decision to end its pursuit
of WMD. We further commend the co-operation between United Kingdom
officials and their US counterparts during these secret talks.
(Paragraph 249)
48. We conclude that
the Libyan announcement sets a precedent for how to deal with
'rogue states' and could encourage other countries to improve
their co-operation with the West. While we accept what the Foreign
Secretary has said about the need for "a partner with whom
to negotiate" for diplomacy to reap rewards, we recommend
that the Government seriously consider the implications of events
in Libya for relations with both Iran and Syria. (Paragraph 250)
49. We further recommend
that the Government ensure that it does its utmost to fulfil its
"responsibilities" to help Libya fully to enter the
international community and derive the benefits of its co-operation,
and that it work closely with the IAEA and OPCW to do this. We
also recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
inform us of what steps it is taking to monitor closely Libyan
compliance and to ensure that it does not lift the restrictions
that remain on Libya too quickly. (Paragraph 251)
50. While Syria and
Iran have not taken as many steps forward as they might, for example
in taking a more constructive approach to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, we conclude that the United Kingdom's approach to these
two countries has already yielded some positive results. (Paragraph
252)
51. We further conclude
that establishing and maintaining Iranian and Syrian co-operation
in efforts to fight international terrorism, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and to stabilise Iraq, will greatly increase the likelihood
of success in the war against terrorism. We commend the Government's
decision to engage actively with these countries. (Paragraph 253)
52. We commend the
Government for its swift action in response to the Istanbul attack,
and for the setting up of the FCO 24-hour response centre. However,
we conclude that security measures at the Istanbul Consulate were
clearly insufficient. We welcome the Government's review of the
security of all overseas posts, which was announced by the Foreign
Secretary on 2 December 2003, as well as the decision to review
the FCO's security strategy. We look forward to being informed
of the results of the review by the Foreign Secretary. (Paragraph
257)
53. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, the Government set out its plans
for the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and what bilateral assistance
it is giving, for example to Commonwealth countries. (Paragraph
261)
54. We conclude that
although international co-operation on the war against terrorism
has continued, there continue to be problems with regard to international
co-operation on the measures against al Qaeda and the Taliban.
We recommend that the Government encourage greater international
co-operation on the UN mandated measures against al Qaeda and
the Taliban. We further recommend that it consider how best to
strengthen the UN Security Council resolutions relating to international
terrorism. (Paragraph 266)
55. We remain concerned
that al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations retain access
to significant levels of funds. We commend the Government's efforts
to tackle sources of terrorist funding and in particular its projects
to tighten charity regulation. We recommend that the Government
expand its programme of assistance in this field. We further recommend
that the Government, in its response to this Report, provide us
with a further update of its action in this area. (Paragraph 270)
56. We conclude that
al Qaeda remains a substantial threat to the United Kingdom and
to British citizens and facilities overseas, and that addressing
the threat from al Qaeda and associated networks must remain a
key priority in the United Kingdom's foreign policy. (Paragraph
276)
57. We commend the
Government for the success of its Provincial Reconstruction Team
in improving security in northern Afghanistan, and in particular
in brokering a ceasefire between rival warlords. (Paragraph 281)
58. We recommend that
in its response to this Report the Government set out its plans
to improve the security situation in Afghanistan, including through
extending the provision of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. (Paragraph
283)
59. We commend the
Government for supporting the development, together with its EU
partners, of a Security Strategy. We conclude that the EU Security
Strategy will help the Union to work more effectively towards
the alleviation of common threats to the security of EU member
states and their interests. (Paragraph 295)
60. We would welcome
the return of the United Nations to Iraq in 2004, and we recommend
that the Government do its utmost to work towards a new Security
Council Resolution setting out the UN's role in the period of
transition to a new Iraqi government (Paragraph 302)
61. We conclude that
the United Nations has an extremely important role to play in
the global campaign against terrorism, through provision of assistance
through its specialised agencies, through establishing the legitimacy
of interventions, and through providing the forum for dialogue
between member states over the conduct of the campaign. We welcome
the Secretary-General's decision to establish a panel to study
global security threats and reform of the international system,
and we recommend that the Government study its conclusions carefully
when it makes its Report to the Secretary-General. (Paragraph
303)
62. Effective peace
keeping and peace enforcement are currently essential to the successful
pursuit of the war against terrorism. We recommend that the Government
continue to work with its partners in NATO towards building the
Alliance's capabilities in this area. (Paragraph 308)
63. We commend the
Government's decision to participate in the Proliferation Security
Initiative, and we are pleased that the initiative "builds
on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation
of such items, including existing treaties and regimes".
(Paragraph 313)
64. We recommend that
in its response to this report the Government set out the steps
it is currently taking to help prevent proliferation of WMD, together
with their components and technologies, from the stockpile of
the former Soviet Union, from North Korea and from other WMD proliferating
states and groups. (Paragraph 314)
65. We commend the
Government for its efforts to promote democratic reform and to
provide technical assistance in the Arab world. We recommend that,
in its response to this Report, the Government provide us with
updated progress reports in this crucial area. (Paragraph 319)
66. We remain concerned
at the Government's lack of progress in ensuring the fair trial
of British citizens currently detained at Guantánamo Bay.
We note that the current situation of uncertainty surrounding
the fate of the United Kingdom detainees is unsatisfactory. We
recommend that the Government continue to press the US towards
trial of all the detainees in accordance with international law.
(Paragraph 323)
67. We conclude that
the threats facing the United Kingdom, both at home and overseas,
in the war against terrorism have not diminished. We are encouraged,
though, that the Government is working with partners in the European
Union, the United Nations and NATO to reassess the respective
roles of these multilateral institutions in tackling new security
threats; and we commend the Government for its role in fostering
this trend. (Paragraph 329)
68. Those who predicted
the destabilisation of moderate regimes and the strengthening
of extremist regimes in the Middle East following the invasion
of Iraq have not been proved correct. There are now enhanced prospects
for stability and democratic reforms in Iraq's neighbours, as
well as a more favourable context for peace between Iraq and her
neighbours than there has been for many decades. (Paragraph 330)
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