House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

Iraq

4. Public debate about Iraq since we made our Report to the House in July has focused largely on the high levels of violence now prevailing in the country, and on progress towards the handover of power from the Occupying Powers—the US, the United Kingdom and their allies—to a new Iraqi government. These issues are of central importance to the stabilisation of Iraq after regime change. Before discussing them in detail, however, it is important to recall the reasons for the Government's decision to join the US in its military intervention in Iraq.

5. In September 2002, the Government published a dossier setting out its understanding of the threat from Iraq. In his foreword to the dossier, the Prime Minister stated that "the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt … that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme."[3]

6. In our Report of last July, we examined the debate over Iraq in the UN Security Council and in other international organisations which took place during the early months of 2003. The United Kingdom, the United States and their allies argued that the threat that Iraq might use alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or might pass them to terrorists, was so great that they were prepared to use force to disarm the Iraqi dictator. Other member states of the UN Security Council disagreed, as did a number of the United Kingdom's partners in the European Union. In the Report, we also described in detail Iraq's defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions following its ejection from Kuwait.[4]

7. In March, the United States and the United Kingdom decided that Iraqi co-operation with the UN weapons inspections process was insufficient, and that this non-military option for disarming Saddam Hussein would not succeed. President Bush and the Prime Minister then initiated military action against the Iraqi regime. They took this action without the support of a majority of members of the UN Security Council.

8. We recall our July conclusion that

according to the timetable for UN weapons inspections agreed by the United Kingdom and other Security Council members in 1999, it would have taken inspectors longer to build up capacity and make clear judgements about Iraqi prohibited weapons and weapons programmes than they were permitted before the war in Iraq commenced.[5]

The Government has insisted, however, that the weapons inspectors were not detectives. Their key role was to report on the degree of co-operation they received from the Iraqi regime. Whatever the differences on the role of the weapons inspectors, it is true that nine months after the formal end of hostilities the Iraq Survey Group has still not found WMD in Iraq.[6]

9. We have assessed the Government's decision to go to war in Iraq in another Report.[7] In the present Report, we underline that because Saddam Hussein's development of WMD was cited by the Government—though not by the US—as the primary reason for his removal from power, the failure to find such weapons remains an important backdrop to the Coalition's continuing occupation of the country.

Developments in Iraq since July 2003

10. In our last Report on this subject, we described the Coalition's efforts to secure Iraq in the immediate post-war period. Looking forward, we concluded that "the level of resentment of the new US and United Kingdom presence in Iraq may well depend on the success or otherwise of efforts to improve the lives of Iraqi people."[8] In this section, we review those efforts, and we consider other developments since our previous Report.

11. In December, just as Saddam Hussein was detained, three of us visited Baghdad and Basrah.[9] We held discussions with Ambassador Paul Bremer,[10] with General Ricardo Sanchez,[11] with Sir Hilary Synnott,[12] with members of the Iraqi Interim Governing Council and others. The first-hand impression which some of us were thus able to gain of the situation in Iraq has informed the judgments we make in this section of the Report.

The capture of Saddam Hussein

12. On 13 December, US forces captured Saddam Hussein alive in the town of ad-Duar, around 15 kilometres south of his home town of Tikrit. This event was of great significance for the Coalition and for the people of Iraq alike: it removed the threat which Saddam Hussein still represented, not least to ordinary Iraqis; and it amounted to an intelligence and military triumph on the part of those who brought it about. It also carries strong implications for the future course of events in Iraq, which we discuss in paragraphs 24-25 and 54 below.

13. Saddam Hussein's detention also raises questions about his status, his treatment and his future trial. Shortly after the arrest, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that Saddam Hussein would remain in US military custody and that the CIA would oversee his interrogation.[13] He has also said that Saddam Hussein is receiving all protections guaranteed to prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions, although at that time he was not being legally described as a prisoner of war. On 15 December, the Prime Minister reiterated this to the House, announcing that "Saddam Hussein will be treated with all the rights of a prisoner of war."[14] It was not until 10 January that Saddam Hussein was formally accorded prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions.[15]

14. Saddam Hussein's capture also prompted speculation about the nature of his trial and future punishment. Asked what the United States was going to do with Saddam Hussein, President Bush said on 15 December that

We will work with the Iraqis to develop a way to try him that will stand international scrutiny…. the Iraqis need to be very much involved…. And of course we want it to be fair… we want the world to say, well, this—he got a fair trial. Because whatever justice is meted out needs to stand international scrutiny. I've got my own personal views of how he ought to be treated, but that's—I'm not an Iraqi citizen. It's going to be up to the Iraqis to make those decisions.[16]

15. Also in December, the Prime Minister said that

The trial process should be determined by the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people. It should be left to them. Of course we must ensure that the process is proper, independent and fair, but I am sure that the Iraqis have the capability to achieve that. We and other countries will work with them to ensure that that is correct.[17]

Jack Straw added this: "The policy of the United Kingdom, its government and its parliament, is well established. We are against the death penalty. That is our sovereign decision, with which a democratic Iraq may or may not agree."[18]

16. From our own discussions with members of the Iraqi Interim Governing Council, both in London and in Baghdad, following Saddam Hussein's arrest, we believe that there is every prospect that a fair and thorough judicial process can be established for the trial of the former dictator. However, the Coalition retains formal responsibility for Saddam Hussein until Iraq is re-established as a sovereign nation state in July. The US Government has apparently set aside £41million to fund the trial of Saddam Hussein.[19]

17. We conclude that the Prime Minister was right to state that the trial process of Saddam Hussein should be determined by the Iraqi government—when it has been established—and by the Iraqi people.

Security

Acts of violence in post-war Iraq

18. In July 2003, we noted the looting and chaos which in parts of Iraq followed the swift victory of the Coalition. We concluded that while a breakdown of law and order immediately following the fall of the regime was highly probable, "the failure of the coalition to restore order more quickly was deeply regrettable, and hindered progress towards one of the central objectives of the intervention: to improve the lives of ordinary Iraqis." We also noted that "the coalition's failure to re-establish order in the immediate post-conflict period … may have made the task of occupation more difficult in the medium term."[20] The scale of hostile operations by former regime loyalists and others had, apparently, not been anticipated.

19. Since July, security for foreigners working in Iraq has deteriorated sharply. On 7 August, 2003, a car bomb exploded outside the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad. Eleven people were killed. On 19 August, the UN Headquarters at the Canal Hotel was bombed; this attack led to the deaths of 23 people, including UN Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello. On 14 October, the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad was bombed. On 26 October, the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad was hit by rocket-propelled grenades; one US soldier was killed and fifteen other people were wounded. On 27 October, 35 people were killed and more than 200 injured in bombs at the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and three Iraqi police stations. On 12 November, 26 people died when the Italian police headquarters in Nasiriyah was attacked by a suicide bomber. Later that month, the Palestine and Sheraton Hotels—which are in the protected area of Baghdad—were hit by rockets fired from donkey carts. On 29 November, in separate attacks, two Japanese diplomats and seven Spanish intelligence officers were killed. Four weeks later, four Bulgarian and two Thai servicemen were among fifteen killed by a bomb in Karbala. In the New Year, two French civilians working for a US company were killed in an ambush.

20. Iraqis who have been working with the Occupying Powers have also been targeted. Senior public figures as well as translators, drivers and other employees have been affected by this violence. A car bomb exploded in the holy city of Al-Najaf on 29 August, killing Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). On 20 September, Dr Aqila al-Hashimi, a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, was ambushed near her home in Baghdad. Her convoy was attacked with machine guns and a bomb, and Dr al-Hashimi sustained serious injuries. She died five days later. There have been a number of attacks on police stations and other targets, including those on 15 December which killed at least nine people. Many bystanders and other Iraqis with no connection with the occupying powers have also been victims of these attacks.

Who is carrying out the attacks?

21. It is not entirely clear whether the attacks are being perpetrated by Iraqis or by foreign insurgents, or by both. Two analysts from the London School of Economics, Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor, visited Iraq in November 2003, and argue that in the aftermath of the war foreign jihadis and former Baathists have been brought together in alliance against the US-led Coalition:

The Jihadis are enlisting in an insurgency organized and supported by the remnants of the regime. At the same time former Baathists are joining Jihadi organizations … Islamic fighters are attracted to Iraq because it is there they can directly confront the Americans; moreover, regimes like Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran want to make as many difficulties as possible for the Coalition so as to deter any possibility that the United States might attack them in the future.[21]

Jonathan Stevenson, an expert on terrorism at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, was also concerned at the alliance being forged between foreign fighters and Baathists. He felt that the number of attacks against foreign troops and personnel working in Iraq might increase over the next few months because "there appears to be more centralised command and control over the insurgency and [Iraqi insurgents] may also be getting help from foreign Jihadists who have some terrorist experience."[22]

22. These views are consistent with those of the Government. On 28 October, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the United Kingdom's representative for Iraq, said in an interview with the BBC that "There were suicide attackers in most—probably all—the bomb explosions …and that is a sign of foreign terrorist tactics, rather than the Saddam loyalist elements that we're still trying to chase down."[23] The FCO stated in evidence to us on 2 December that "Many attacks in Iraq are likely to be the work of elements of the former regime", and also that "Islamist terrorists, some belonging to al Qaeda associated groups, have been involved in some terrorist attacks in Iraq."[24] John Sawers, Political Director at the FCO, told us that day that "It is impossible to say, … in any given instance which group was responsible for which attack", although "the dominant role has been taken by the groups that were part of the former Iraqi regime which have melted back into [the areas north and west of Baghdad] and are using it as a base for their operations."[25] More recently, Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammell told the House on 5 January that "foreign fighters from a range of countries are present in Iraq."[26]

23. Such developments were not unforeseen. Some weeks before the war in Iraq, on 10 February 2003, the Joint Intelligence Committee produced an intelligence assessment, in which it concluded that the threat from al Qaeda and associated groups would be heightened by military action against Iraq.[27] We reached a similar conclusion in our Report of January 2003, when we called on the Government to "treat seriously the possibility that a war with Iraq could trigger instability in the Arab and Islamic world, and could increase the pool of recruits for al Qaeda and associated terrorist organisations there and in Western Europe."[28] While Arab and Islamic countries and their populations have remained remarkably stable, it does appear that al Qaeda has been able to exploit the situation in Iraq to attract new support.

24. Our discussions with key personnel in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which currently administers Iraq suggest that, following the capture of Saddam Hussein, his supporters will fall into two main groups. Some will abandon their violent opposition to attempts to restore law and order in Iraq; but other, more hardline elements are more likely to throw in their lot with al Qaeda and the Jihadis.

25. We conclude that since the removal of the Iraqi regime, a dangerous alliance of foreign fighters with terrorist allegiances and elements of the former Iraqi regime has been forming inside Iraq. It remains to be seen what effect the capture of Saddam Hussein has on this.

Treatment of detainees in Iraq

26. In September 2003, a US Army spokeswoman confirmed for the first time that US forces in Iraq were holding about 10,000 detainees, most of them at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.[29] More recent estimates have put the number of detainees as high as 13,000.[30] On 7 January, the Coalition authorities announced the release of about 100 of the detainees, all of whom had been accused of relatively minor offences, had renounced violence and were able to provide the name of a "prominent person" in the community who would act as their guarantor.[31] Speaking to the BBC on 9 January, Mr Adnan Pachachi of the Interim Governing Council suggested that "several hundreds, perhaps thousands" more of the detainees could be freed in the next few months.[32]

27. There do not appear to be any published official statistics of the numbers of persons detained in Iraq by the Occupying Powers. We conclude it is unacceptable that comprehensive information is not available about detainees being held by the Occupying Powers in Iraq. We recommend that the British Government ensures that such information is provided as a matter of immediacy including the names of all detainees; their nationalities; where they are held; in what conditions they are held; what rights they have, including access to lawyers; the legal basis for their detention; the offences of which they are suspected or charged; and when and how they will be tried or released.

The role of Iraq's neighbours

28. The flow of foreign fighters into the country may in part be a consequence of the policies of neighbouring countries. The Foreign Secretary told us that "the best evidence we have suggests that the real area of difficulty and concern is the border from Syria, and I make it clear that we look to Syria to do much more in respect of controlling terrorists." He acknowledged that Syria has been co-operative in some areas: "We are grateful to them for what they have done in handing over suspects to the Turkish government in respect of the Istanbul bombings"; however, "we are very clear that Syria has to take far tougher and less ambiguous action in respect of all terrorists and terrorist organisations operating within its borders."[33] During our visit to Syria, we were told how difficult it is to police the lengthy border with Iraq, not least because of the presence of tribal groupings straddling the border in a number of places. This impression was confirmed by briefings during the visit which some of us made to Iraq.

29. We also asked the Foreign Secretary about Iran's role in Iraq, and in particular whether he knew of any links between Iran and those organisations currently attacking Coalition forces in Iraq. He replied that the Government had no evidence that Iran was linked to terrorist organisations in Iraq, and that "in general, we are grateful to the Iranian government for the co-operation we have received in respect of the Iraq situation."[34] The Iranians have in turn requested co-operation by the Americans in disbanding armed groups of Iranian exiles based in Iraq, with some recent signs of success.[35]

30. The Foreign Secretary was also clear that Iran had not been seeking to exert undue influence on Shiite elements in Iraq. The prominent Shia cleric Ayatollah Sistani, who has recently criticised the Coalition's plans for the handover of power, is "very independent".[36] The Foreign Secretary also pointed to the good relations developing between the Governing Council and the Iranian authorities. Jalal Talibani visited Iran in late November, when he was president of the Governing Council, and applauded the level of co-operation which he and colleagues had received in Tehran.[37]

31. The suggestion that Syria and also Iran might wish to make life difficult for the Coalition forces in Iraq is consistent with the sense we gained during our visits to those countries of deep concern that they might be next in line for 'regime change'.[38] The difficulties being experienced by the Coalition make further 'regime change' operations look unlikely, at least in the immediate future,[39] so it would appear to be in the interests of Iran and Syria to keep the US focused on Iraq for some time.

32. However, while both Iran and Syria have been fairly co-operative, they could both be far more disruptive to the US-led operation in Iraq than they have been to date. Sir Jeremy Greenstock said in an interview on 28 October that Syria has not "played completely straight. We asked them to help in closing the border and in handing over the more violent people. To some extent they have done this but there are signs they are keeping their options open in Damascus."[40] Iran, too, might feel its short-term interests are served if the situation in Iraq remains difficult for the Coalition, but without descending into chaos, although in the longer term a stable Iraq should be a good neighbour.

33. The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Iran or Syria. Indeed, there are elements in the US administration that are strongly hostile to both countries and President Bush in December approved the Syria Accountability Act, which provides for a range of sanctions against the country. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has good links with both countries, which we believe have been of some use to the Coalition by enabling it to maintain direct lines of communication, for example when Sir Jeremy Greenstock visited Tehran in January 2004.

34. We conclude that Iran and Syria have the potential to be destabilising factors in Iraq, and that maintaining co-operation with both is therefore essential for the success of Coalition efforts to bring stability to that country. We further conclude that the United Kingdom, through its diplomatic relations with Iran and Syria, could play a crucial role in ensuring this co-operation.

Coalition force levels and composition

35. The difficulties experienced in attempting to prevent foreign fighters from entering Iraq are likely also to be a consequence of the level of instability prevailing inside the country since the overthrow of the regime. Jonathan Stevenson argued that there are not enough troops in Iraq to secure the borders. Furthermore,

the priorities or the responsibilities of the troops on the ground have now made it impossible to guard all of the ammunition dumps which are in Iraq, which have proven to be sources of weapons for a number of these insurgents … It is going to take time both to reallocate intelligence assets and troops to pursue these terrorists and make a substantial dent in the number of operations which they pull off.[41]

He was "doubtful" that Iraq could now be secured "with the present number of forces. It seems to me that more are required because there is simply a multiplicity of tasks … it is a difficult challenge, given the disinclination of other countries to contribute forces."[42]

36. Some countries which have contributed substantial numbers of well-trained troops to peacekeeping operations in the past have been unwilling to assist in Iraq. France, which opposed military action in Iraq, has refused to provide forces until sovereignty has been transferred to Iraqis; Germany and Russia have also failed to send troops. The US-led Coalition made it very clear in advance of the war, and since the end of formal hostilities, that it was prepared to take on the regime change operation without the support of traditional major partners such as France and Germany.[43] On 10 November, however, the Prime Minister stated that

Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Bosnia and Kosovo, illustrate another lesson. One supremely powerful nation or a small group in concert, can win a war. But it takes many nations to win the peace. And in such an enterprise, there is no sane alternative to America and Europe working together.[44]

From initial reluctance to engage in nation building, the US administration has learned that it cannot abandon the project or delegate it, and that it needs allies to assist it.

37. We regret that some members of the Security Council Permanent Five and other countries with the capacity to assist have decided against contributing forces to help establish security in post-war Iraq. We conclude that this failure to share the burden can only have increased the pressures on US and United Kingdom resources, both civilian and military, which in turn may have exacerbated the difficulties encountered by the Coalition in establishing and maintaining security in Iraq.

Iraq's security forces

38. Some witnesses were also concerned about the effects of the Coalition's decision to disband the Iraqi armed forces. Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor describe this as "One of the biggest mistakes of the CPA … the decision has added to the sense of humiliation felt by Iraqis, and left many frustrated and angry ex-military personnel."[45] Nick Pelham, the Economist correspondent in Baghdad, explained that

there is little doubt amongst the Iraqis that the armed forces could have played a positive role in maintaining law and order in the country, or security forces per se. There was a wholesale disbandment of all the law enforcing functions the services were carrying out right down to traffic wardens and it was a population which had grown very used to a dependence on the state for security and for welfare and for every aspect of society and when you suddenly take that away, it leads to the chaos and to the breakdown of society.[46]

Iraq's currently "porous borders, for instance, or … the lack of defence around ammunition dumps would be attributed entirely to America's decision to disband the armed forces."[47] However, there was also good reason to think that the continued use of Saddam Hussein's police and armed forces to maintain order would not be acceptable to the Iraqi people.

39. This concern was also expressed by the UN Secretary-General in a report to the Security Council of 17 July 2003. Citing his Special Representative's "concern … at the potentially serious implications of the recent dissolution of the Iraqi Army, which numbers half a million personnel", the Secretary-General offered to make available to the CPA the UN's "considerable experience and body of best practice in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration."[48] The UN was forced to pull its staff out of Iraq a month later, so this proposal was never implemented. The Coalition has since taken steps to create a new Iraqi army, but on 11 December a CPA representative announced that around 300 of 700 new recruits had already left, citing "unhappiness with terms, conditions and pay and with instructions of commanding officers."[49] When he met members of the Committee in December, General Ricardo Sanchez told us that he had just authorised a substantial increase in Army pay.

40. We conclude that the early decision to disband the Iraqi armed forces was entirely understandable in the conditions prevailing at the time, but that the re-establishment of such forces in an essential component of creating a new, safe and sovereign Iraq.

41. The huge problems with policing in the early stages of occupation were partly a consequence of the virtual absence of "interface between Iraqis and Americans" carrying out policing duties. The

American soldiers you see on the streets are often very jumpy, they feel very nervous … When they are caught in traffic jams you see instances where they get nervous and try to force themselves out of a traffic jam; they bump cars, they knock over the jerry cans of the black marketeers selling petrol on the streets.[50]

This can only partly be explained by the number of attacks on US forces.

42. This lack of "interface" between Iraqis and occupying forces also led to "an intelligence problem": according to Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor, the "disconnectedness of the CPA and the occupying forces from Iraqi society" means that "information passed on by Iraqis does not appear to be taken into account or acted upon."[51] If the situation were as bad as our witnesses have claimed, it would be likely seriously to impede Coalition efforts to capture former Baathists and foreign fighters in Iraq. However, the success of the Coalition in capturing Saddam Hussein and all but a handful of the 'deck of cards' most-wanted members of the former regime suggests otherwise.

43. We recommend that the Government set out, in its response to this Report, the means by which Iraqis are currently able to feed information about terrorists or other criminals into the CPA structures; and whether the CPA has plans to enhance the links between its own staff and the Iraqi population to facilitate the transfer of information.

44. Security and policing problems are being addressed through Coalition efforts to try to return security to Iraqis, and these have been "by and large welcomed by the population."[52] The Foreign Secretary told us that "a lot of work is being put in to build up the Iraqi security forces, including the police civil defence force and paramilitary operation, static guarding and the beginnings of an Iraqi Army."[53] The United Kingdom is providing trainers from the British police force to go into southern Iraq to work in a police training school, which it has helped to establish. Another police training facility has been established in Jordan, with the capacity to train thousands of recruits.

45. The policing sector appears to be developing well, in spite of repeated attacks. Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor describe the establishment of a new Iraqi police force as "much faster" than that of a new Iraqi army, and "one of the most hopeful developments in Iraq today."[54] Nick Pelham similarly informed us that after a period of chaos after the war, security for ordinary Iraqis was beginning to improve:

As far as Iraqis are concerned, there is a greater sense of order than existed two or three months ago. That is largely due to the fact that they have handed over a lot of the security and policing work to Iraqis and Iraqis can feel that there is a degree to which there is a system of law and order which they can be in touch with, that they communicate with, that there are Iraqis doing the policing.[55]

While some significant problems remain in this sector,[56] recent developments are likely to result in increased security for ordinary Iraqis. We commend the Government for the energetic measures it has taken to help establish a new Iraqi police force and recommend that this assistance is intensified in the critical remaining months before the handing back of sovereignty to Iraq on 1 July 2004.

Future status of the coalition forces

46. Despite these signs of progress, it is clear that improving the security situation in Iraq will depend for some time on the continued—and possibly increased—presence of US, United Kingdom and other armed forces. Dana Allin, an analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, discussed the possible impact of the impending US Presidential election on the willingness of the US administration to maintain current troop levels in Iraq. Although it appears that the American public is prepared to tolerate losses at the current average rate of one or two a day, he argued that US public opinion is in fact concerned at the level of US casualties being sustained in Iraq, and that now Americans are "obviously much less supportive of the administration's war plans and post-war plans in particular." According to Mr Allin, this "pressure on the Bush administration to get this issue off the front pages" could result in"ill-advised moves on the part of the Bush administration to do things for political reasons which are not best on the ground in Iraq."[57] Dana Allin was not clear what the operational ramifications of this were likely to be: "Probably the most disturbing possibility is an excessive haste towards 'Iraqification' [i.e.] a hasty handover of security to Iraq."[58]

47. In order for coalition forces to remain in Iraq after the transfer of power in July, it will be necessary for each country participating to draw up Status of Forces Agreements with the new Iraqi government. Under these Agreements, Iraq will permit the continued presence on its soil of foreign (coalition) forces, operating through their own chains of command, but without compromising the host country's sovereignty. As the Foreign Secretary acknowledged to us, there is a tension between these requirements:

I do not believe this is an insoluble problem by any means; I think that any Iraqi government—interim or otherwise—will recognise that getting on top of security is in their profound interests and that it will require the US to be there in large numbers (also us to be there in pretty substantial numbers) and for there to be a unified command of this, and know that if they are US forces then, simply, their Commander-in-Chief has to be the President and if they are UK forces their Commander-in-Chief has to be Her Majesty acting through the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary—that is just reality. We can, and have done before, square these apparent circles.[59]

48. Subject to the wishes of the new Iraqi government, we recommend that the Government and its Coalition partners scale down their armed forces only as Iraqi forces demonstrate their capacity to establish and maintain security, and that the terms of any status of forces agreements reached with the Iraqi authorities should be consistent with this objective.

Safety of United Kingdom personnel in Iraq

49. Insecurity also makes life for those working in the CPA, and for coalition troops, highly stressful and dangerous. CPA and other staff are confined largely to the "Green Zone"—an area in the middle of Baghdad that includes the Rashid Hotel and the Presidential Palace. The Green Zone is heavily protected by concrete walls, barbed wire, and US armed forces. When they visited Baghdad, Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor found that

"Morale is low among both military and civilians both because of the way staff are confined to the green zone and because they are the primary targets of terrorist attacks. Because of the rocket attack on the Al-Rashid Hotel, many officials were sleeping in dormitories in the palace or in military barracks."[60]

50. Those of us who visited Iraq can certainly vouch for the difficult conditions under which CPA and other officials are working in Baghdad. However, neither there nor in Basrah did we encounter the low morale which our witnesses described. On the contrary, the British officials whom we met in Iraq—all of them volunteers, and most of them from the FCO—impressed us greatly by their commitment and their professionalism; so did the military. Steps are being taken to improve the living and working conditions of both.

51. We conclude that United Kingdom personnel in Iraq, both military and civilian, are making a vital contribution to the administration and reconstruction of the country, despite having to work in the most difficult and dangerous circumstances. Their performance deserves the highest praise, and appropriate recognition.

The importance of security to post-conflict peace operations

52. In January 2003, we concluded that "the establishment of the rule of law and functioning representative government in Iraq after a war would pose formidable challenges."[61] A year later, security is, according to the Foreign Secretary, "at the top of everybody's agenda."[62] The process of securing Iraq nonetheless remains difficult, and—as the Foreign Secretary told us—it is "taking time, it is frustrating, it is taking more time than we anticipated, but everybody is very clear that getting the security right is an imperative precondition to the restoration of basic services."[63] However, the lack of security has made life for Iraqis extremely difficult. Nick Pelham told us that while "after the war … many Iraqis were on the whole favourably disposed to the American presence there, there had been very little resistance to the war itself, to the United States invasion, the bulk of the army had melted away" there had been "over the past six or seven months … an ebbing away of the enthusiasm of the trust which many Iraqis had placed in the United States."[64]

53. In March 2003—as the Iraq war began—the International Policy Institute at King's College, London published a major review of recent post-conflict peace operations in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. The study was funded by the governments of Canada, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Its authors noted that many of the findings "are unfortunately not new … the failure to address lessons previously drawn but effectively ignored [so] that wheels are reinvented constantly." One of their central conclusions was that "security is the sine qua non of any post conflict reconstruction".[65] This has been borne out by the inability of the UN's principal agencies and some NGOs to function effectively in Iraq in the face of the very real threat to their personnel and assets.

54. While being justifiably upbeat about the capture of Saddam Hussein, both the United Kingdom and United States have been cautious about the impact it will have on the security situation. In his address to the American nation on 14 December, President Bush said: "The capture of Saddam Hussein does not mean the end of violence in Iraq. We still face terrorists who would rather go on killing the innocent than accept the rise of liberty in the heart of the Middle East."[66] Similarly, on 15 December, the Prime Minister told the House that "the terrorists and Saddam's sympathisers will continue and, though small in number and in support, their terrorist tactics will still require vigilance, dedication and determination."[67]

55. In our view, some of the criticism of the Coalition's acknowledged inability to establish a secure peace in post-conflict Iraq has been constructed on the shaky foundations of unrealistic expectations, and with the benefit of hindsight. In relation to the Summer's riots in Basrah, for example, a fairer assessment would concede that temperatures of over 50 degrees centigrade in Basrah are unusual, even in August. It would also note that no-one outside Iraq could have known that such temperatures would cause the electricity generation and distribution infrastructure to collapse, with a consequent failure of the water supply. The riots which inevitably and understandably followed were extensively reported, but we believe that too few commentators then recognised the extraordinary speed with which British administrators in Basrah and the Government in London acted to recover the situation, and the extent to which those efforts have been successful.

56. We recall our conclusion of last July that "the level of resentment of the new US and United Kingdom presence in Iraq may well depend on the success or otherwise of efforts to improve the lives of Iraqi people."[68] However, we recognise that that success depends not only on the actions and inactions of the Occupying Powers, but also on factors outside their control. Those of us who visited Iraq in December learnt that long years of neglect had left the country's infrastructure highly vulnerable to deterioration. In our view, it is nothing short of remarkable that, within months, electricity generation was at a level comparable to that achieved prior to the war, and in the face of rising demand. We believe that most Iraqis understand and appreciate this.

57. We conclude that the Iraq operation has demonstrated once again the importance of security for the success of post-conflict peace operations. Though there was, perhaps understandably, insufficient anticipation by the British and American governments of the scale and severity of the security tasks facing the Occupying Powers in the immediate aftermath of the war, we reject claims that the Coalition's inability to create a fully secure environment in the immediate post-war period can be attributed entirely to serious failures either of policy or of planning. It is unfortunate and regrettable that the lack of law and order, and interruptions in essential services, resulted in a loss of goodwill among those worst affected, but we conclude that important progress is being made in winning this goodwill back.

Political developments

58. When we made our last Report to the House on this subject, we noted that in early 2003 US plans for the post-war governance of Iraq had been alarmingly vague.[69] The Coalition was also unrealistically optimistic about the likely reception of its forces. We described the setbacks and policy changes of the immediate post-war period. We also described the establishment in July of an Interim Governing Council for Iraq, which was intended to "represent the interests of the Iraqi people to the CPA, and to the international community, during Iraq's transition to a sovereign, democratic, and representative government."

59. Since we made our Report in July, the Occupying Powers have taken significant steps towards the handover of power to a new Iraqi government. On 8 September, the Foreign Secretary announced that the Iraqi Interim Governing Council had appointed 25 Ministers. These Iraqi politicians are "responsible for implementing policy and for managing their budgets." With the Governing Council and the CPA, the new Ministers "enjoy full rights to initiate policy. The overall effect of those important changes has been a significant transfer of responsibility from the CPA to the Iraqis, a process that should accelerate from now on."[70]

60. The Coalition has faced a number of difficulties in transferring power to new Iraqi authorities, however. On 2 December, John Sawers, Director-General Political at the FCO, told us that the CPA had been "wrestling" since the early summer with the dilemma of how soon to hold elections in Iraq, and whether it was necessary first to establish functioning Iraqi institutions of governance.[71]

61. This process of 'wrestling' has been part of a series of policy oscillations. When he arrived in Iraq in late April, the first leader of the US authority in Iraq, retired General Jay Garner, announced that "The majority of [Iraqi] people realize we are only going to stay here long enough to start a democratic government for them."[72] US officials proposed putting Iraqis in charge of the governance of the country in an interim authority by mid-May 2003.

62. On 13 May, Ambassador Paul Bremer replaced Jay Garner as head of the US authority in Iraq. Ambassador Bremer then proposed "seven steps" according to which Iraqi political and administrative institutions would be built gradually before the full handover of power to a new Iraqi government through free, direct elections.[73] John Sawers explained to us that in the early summer of 2003—when he was the British representative in Iraq—the "goal … was always to try to create the circumstances where the occupation could come to an end during the course of 2004 (and as close to the middle rather than the end of 2004 as possible)". The coalition had planned "to develop a constitution, have it ratified and have elections on the basis of that new constitution in the second half or the third quarter … of 2004".[74]

63. The plans of the early summer have since been revised again. This is partly a consequence of the fact that the programme was

pushed backwards by … the fatwa by Ayatollah Sistani calling for the representatives at the constitutional convention to be directly elected in an environment which … could well have led to an outcome which we in the coalition were concerned could be illiberal and play into the hands of the extremists.[75]

Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's most influential Shiite Muslim cleric, had called in June for general elections to select the drafters of a new constitution. He dismissed US plans to appoint the authors of the constitution as "fundamentally unacceptable."

64. The second reason for delay in the Bremer programme for transition was "the effect of the terrorist action [which] clearly made it more difficult to move ahead in a consensual way when leading figures in Iraq, such as Muhammed Baqir al-Hakim and the UN Special Representative, were killed by Iraqi terrorist action."[76]

65. On 16 October 2003, the UN Security Council adopted a further Resolution on Iraq. The Council resolved that the United Nations,

acting through the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, should strengthen its vital role in Iraq, including by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative government.[77]

This was followed by a further report on the UN's role in Iraq, which was issued by the UN Secretary-General on 5 December. We consider this in paragraph 69 below.

The timetable for handing over sovereignty

66. A new plan for the handover of power from the CPA to an Iraqi Government was announced in Iraq on 15 November by Jalal Talabani, then President of the Interim Governing Council. This appears to have broken a somewhat deadlocked situation. The Foreign Secretary explained the plan to the House on 20 November. It specifies that the Governing Council will draft a "Fundamental Law" by February 2004. The Fundamental Law will apply for the transitional period until full national elections. The plan states that a Transitional National Assembly will be established by June 2004, through "transparent and democratic caucuses at provincial and local level, facilitated by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority."

67. This Transitional National Assembly "will elect an executive and ministers as the Iraqi Transitional Government by July 2004." On 1 July,

the progressive handover of executive and legal authority from the CPA will be complete, and the Coalition's legal occupation will come to an end. The Transitional Government will oversee elections to a Constitutional Convention by March 2005 which will promulgate a new permanent constitution for Iraq. A referendum on the new constitution will take place before full elections of a new representative Iraqi government at the end of 2005.[78]

68. John Sawers told us that the arrangement announced on 15 November

brings to an end the occupation in the middle of 2004, it provides for a constitutional convention that will be elected in the early months of 2005, thus meeting the concerns of Ayatollah Sistani … it provides for the constitution to be completed by the end of 2005 and for the direct elections to choose a new government based on that constitution to take place then in two years' time.[79]

69. Will this process succeed in bringing a stable, representative government to Iraq? We note that the UN Secretary-General argued on 5 December that the steps announced by the Coalition and the Governing Council in November "would make it clearer that the foreign occupation of Iraq is to be short-lived—and that it will soon give way to a fully fledged Iraqi Government empowered to implement an Iraqi agenda", and that this would make it "more difficult for insurgents to rally support." The clear timetable set out on 15 November is, in the Secretary-General's view, "an important step in the right direction."[80]

70. Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor similarly argue that the swift handover of sovereignty is a "key political priority." They argue, however, that "the current political vacuum will not be filled until there are democratic political forces who can win the trust of Iraqis."[81] A number of difficulties which have developed since the end of formal hostilities in April have affected the development of political forces in Iraq, and also the trust which Iraqis place in the US-led transition. These difficulties are likely to influence the extent to which this new plan will ensure transition to a stable Iraqi government.

Challenges facing the Interim Governing Council

71. One problem that our witnesses identified is the distance that currently exists between those governing Iraq—the CPA, the Governing Council, and the ministries—and the population. Nick Pelham described the lack of contact between the CPA and Iraqis as "an enormous problem": the CPA is "virtually inaccessible behind their barricades and if you want to petition an American in Iraq there are very, very few facilities for doing that."[82]

72. The Interim Governing Council, too, has faced major difficulties in establishing links with the Iraqi population. This is partly a consequence of the insecurity described above: Nick Pelham told us that "Since the assassination of one of its members [the Governing Council] has had severe problems operating inside Iraq. It is not going out to meet its own people. When members of the Governing Council try to plan visits around Iraq, they are often cancelled for security reasons."[83] Our own meeting with members of the IGC in Baghdad had to take place at its secure building, inside the heavily protected Green Zone.

73. A further problem for the Council has been its close association with the Occupying Powers. Certain members of the Council—notably Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress—have been linked to US efforts to change the Iraqi regime for some time; but they have not lived in Iraq and they have limited constituencies there.[84]In discussing the new timetable for the handover of power, the Foreign Secretary outlined a number of "concerns expressed by some members of the Governing Council about the process between now and the end of June"; one particular concern was that the Governing Council seeks to ensure that the Transitional Legislative Assembly "should not in any way be appointed by the coalition."[85]This concern may reflect the Council's own sense that its legitimacy as a genuinely Iraqi institution has been diminished by its close association with the CPA.

74. Outside Iraq, the Interim Governing Council appears to be representing Iraqi interests quite effectively. The United Kingdom's Special Representative for Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, argued in early October that the Council could already claim some significant achievements:

The Governing Council have been received by the Arab League, they're going to speak, and have already spoken, in OPEC, they're going to the Organisation of Islamic Conference meeting. And at the United Nations, Ahmad Chalabi as spokesman for the Governing Council, made an extraordinary speech on behalf of Iraq to the United Nations General Assembly.[86]

Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor also suggest that the Governing Council "is beginning to act autonomously" from the CPA inside Iraq; "for example, it rejected the Turkish offer of troops and is opposing rapid privatisation of state enterprises."[87]

75. However, popular trust in—or knowledge about—the new institutions of government appears to be low. In an opinion poll conducted in seven major cities last October, Iraqis were asked to volunteer the name of a leader they trust most. Two thirds could not name anyone. The majority has "not heard enough to evaluate most members of the Governing Council, and religious leaders have better name recognition and ratings."[88] A survey conducted by Oxford Research International similarly found that most Iraqis trusted religious leaders more than anyone else, although only 12 percent of them favoured living in an Islamic state.[89] It remains to be seen to what extent these perceptions will be altered by the transfer of sovereignty in mid-2004 and the emergence of an Iraqi political class.

76. Those of us who visited Iraq were told that most Iraqis use their new satellite television dishes to tune in to broadcasts which are hostile to the Coalition, such as al-Jazeera TV. On the other hand, we also learned that the most listened-to radio station is the BBC's Arabic Service. Coalition authorities need to bear in mind that the battle of the airwaves is also the battle for hearts and minds, and that openness, transparency and communication can be important weapons in that battle.

77. It is reasonable to suppose that, with the arrest of Saddam Hussein, the "shadow of the former regime" will fade and that, if the security situation can be improved, the members of the Governing Council will be able to venture outside the Green Zone and have more contact with those whom they govern. Those of us who visited Baghdad and met members of the IGC and deputy Foreign Minister Bassam Qubba, as well of those of us who met members of the IGC in London, were impressed by what we heard. The IGC and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are comprised of some very good and able people, who appear to have Iraq's best interests at heart. However, the IGC lacks any democratic legitimacy. It also lacks a leader of the stature of Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai.

78. We conclude that it is unfortunate that the majority of Iraqis have very limited access to the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Interim Governing Council, and probably have little knowledge of their actions or policies, or receive through their media a distorted or one-sided view. We further conclude that this isolation may well have increased Iraqis' sense of alienation from and hostility to the Occupying Powers and those working closely with them. This underlines the importance of continuing to move Iraq further along to road to fully democratic governance as speedily as possible after the handover of sovereignty on 1 July.

The need for transparency in the CPA

79. In our last Report on this subject, we expressed concern about the "apparent confusion and instability of the US-led Authority in the immediate post-war period", and recommended that the Government "do its utmost, together with its partners in the Coalition, to ensure that the Coalition Provisional Authority maintains consistent policies and establishes transparent measures for the governance of Iraq, until more permanent Iraqi structures are created".[90]

80. The Government replied that the CPA has sought to carry out its responsibilities "in a transparent manner." In September, it stated that "The Regulations and Orders of the Coalition Provisional Authority have been made public within Iraq and placed on the CPA website."[91] On 19 November we asked the FCO to explain which measures had been taken since July to increase the transparency of the CPA, the Governing Council and the Ministries. It replied that "the CPA now publicises more of its work through its website, although a full flow of information is limited by security constraints." The FCO also explained that the CPA

is determined to help the Iraqi administration improve the transparency of the Governing Council and the Iraqi ministries … The Governing Council is looking at measures to improve transparency consistent with its authorities and power and its own security procedures. DFID is making preparations to send a governance team to work with the Iraqi administration to look at a range of governance issues including transparency.[92]

81. We note that before the explosion at its Baghdad headquarters on 19 August, the United Nations had been making substantial efforts to improve links between the international organisations operating in Iraq and the wider population. In his Report to the Security Council of 17 July, the Secretary General stated that

my Special Representative and members of his Office, in the first few weeks, have met people representing a large and diverse spectrum of Iraqi society. Meetings have been held with political groups; religious leaders; tribal leaders; senior civil servants in the ministries; and members of civil society, including nascent Iraqi human rights and non-governmental organizations, women's associations, journalists and independent professionals and business leaders, both in Baghdad and in the regions.

The UN Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, had also "facilitated communication between his Iraqi interlocutors and the Authority" regarding the establishment of a political process for the handover of power.[93] This ended with destruction of the UN's headquarters and the death of de Mello.

82. Security constraints have clearly had a substantial limiting effect on the work of the CPA and the Governing Council, as well as effectively ending the UN role in the political process. These constraints have surely contributed to the CPA's inability to establish effective links with much of the Iraqi population.

83. We recommend that the Government, in alliance with its partners in the Coalition, do its utmost to improve the transparency of the CPA, the Governing Council and the Iraqi ministries.

Creating a genuinely representative government in Iraq

84. The question of how Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious society should be represented in government has been discussed by commentators and by the US and British governments since long before the war.[94] Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor outlined the difficulties inherent in trying to achieve this in post-war Iraq:

Iraqi society is composed of overlapping ethnic, religious, tribal cleavages with crosscutting political tendencies—this complexity is both divisive and potentially stabilising. There are plenty of possible causes of conflict but there are also plenty of counter-balancing forces. In addition, the combination of state-building, post-totalitarian transition, post-war reconstruction, and foreign occupation represents uncharted territory.[95]

85. When it created the Iraqi Interim Governing Council in July 2003, the CPA intended to establish a body capable of representing all sections of Iraqi society.[96] However, there is concern that some constituencies—in particular, the Sunni and Kurd populations—are inadequately represented.[97] According to Nick Pelham, this is a serious problem: "If the United States is not able to include them and to bring them on board, then you are going to have increasing dissociation between the United States and politics in Iraq. The insurgency would spread."[98]

86. The Governing Council has also recognised this as a potential problem in implementation of the new plan for the transfer of power, which was launched on 15 November. The Foreign Secretary told us that the Council has voiced concern that the membership of the Transitional Legislative Assembly "should reflect the make-up of Iraqi society."[99]

87. We conclude that the complexity of Iraqi society has rendered the development of broadly representative interim Iraqi structures extremely difficult. We recommend that the Government, through work with its partners in the Coalition and through greater engagement with Iraqi society, seek to ensure that currently marginalised groups are identified and, where possible, included in Iraq's new government structures.

Role of the United Nations

88. In his Report to the Security Council on 17 July, the UN Secretary-General set out his concerns about a number of the problems which we have described. He conveyed to the Council "the need to ensure Iraqi ownership of the political process," and stressed that "While opinions have varied among Iraqis on the transitional formula, all emphasized the importance of a swift establishment, by Iraqis, of a provisional Iraqi government, with real authority for its interim ministers."

89. The Secretary-General also conveyed to the Council that within Iraq, "there is a widely held perception that the forthcoming constitutional and electoral processes will be of fundamental importance to the political transition." He felt that the United Nations should be able to make "a significant contribution" to the transition process:

Not only can United Nations involvement confer legitimacy on the process, it can also put at the disposal of the Iraqi people the wealth of experience and expertise accrued by the United Nations in these fields over the years, including advice on meaningful human rights provisions and protection mechanisms.[100]

90. The attack of August 2003 on the UN headquarters in Iraq killed 23 UN personnel—including the Secretary General's Special Representative—and led to the withdrawal of the remainder. UN operations in Iraq are now being run from abroad, mainly from Cyprus, and the impact of this bombing on those operations has been considerable. Consistently higher levels of security will be required in Iraq before the UN and other civilian agencies are able to operate freely there; meanwhile, it is the Iraqi people who suffer from their absence.

91. If they are to succeed, the new arrangements for the government of Iraq and the continued presence there of foreign forces will require the sanction of the United Nations Security Council. We believe that a strong international consensus achieved through the UN would confer much-needed legitimacy on these arrangements.

92. We conclude that the United Nations still has the potential to play an important role in facilitating political transition in Iraq, and in conferring legitimacy on the process. We further conclude that the attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad and the subsequent withdrawal of UN staff has had a serious—but, it is to be hoped, temporary—detrimental effect on the process of transition to a new Iraqi government. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out what it is doing to promote, restore and strengthen the role of the UN in Iraq.

Post-war rebuilding and economic reconstruction

93. In our July 2003 Report, we noted that the widespread looting and destruction that followed the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime had left large sections of the population without access to water, electricity and other basic utilities.[101] In that Report, we concluded that the "failure of the coalition to restore order more quickly was deeply regrettable, and hindered progress towards one of the central objectives of the intervention: to improve the lives of ordinary Iraqis."[102]

94. The supply of water and electricity in Iraq has now reached, and in some places exceeded, pre-war levels,[103] although those levels were in some cases already at historic lows. However, this resumption of service delivery has taken longer than had been anticipated, and we were told that the "six months it took to do so have shaken Iraqi's confidence in the CPA's ability to keep its promises."[104] Neither is the situation yet entirely satisfactory. According to the Department for International Development "In the second half of December [2003], scheduled and unscheduled servicing of generation plants reduced electricity production more then anticipated. Output fell below 3,500 MW, against an estimated demand of about 5,700 MW."[105]

95. We were heartened to hear that Iraq's economy is showing "unmistakable signs of economic life"; this is desperately needed after a long period of wars, sanctions, economic mismanagement and under-investment.[106] The main drivers of this economic activity are an influx of previously-frozen assets; oil revenues; and foreign aid.[107]A large proportion of foreign aid money is being used to pay public sector employees, including security personnel: "There have been some significant improvements in salary payments to government employees; a dramatic increase in their pay from a handful of dollars a month to $200 a month."[108]Nick Pelham described these salary payments as "sweeteners to the Iraqis";[109] but we also heard that this increase in salary payments is "creating a new social and economic dynamic by empowering the very sectors of Iraqi society, which suffered the most in the past ten years."[110]In addition, the Government played a key role in the introduction in October of a new currency.

96. We commend the Coalition's provision of substantially increased salaries to Iraq's public sector workers, and conclude that this has contributed to the social stability and economic revival of Iraq in the immediate post-war period. However, we also recommend that the CPA urgently address the unemployment issues evident in the Basrah region.

Restoring Iraq's infrastructure and essential services

97. Movement towards reconstruction of Iraq's physical infrastructure has been encouraging, if slow. There has been progress in the rehabilitation of some public buildings, such as schools and hospitals, much of it carried out by international aid from countries such as Japan. There has also been progress on publishing new textbooks. However, the reconstruction process will take some time: "There are 13,000 schools in Iraq, of which somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500 have been refitted to varying degrees of professionalism. Some of the Iraqi companies which were used have been very slapdash at repairing the schools." Furthermore, and as some of us have seen for ourselves, "many of the buildings which were looted, many of the ministries which were gutted, are still gutted."[111]

98. Those of us who visited Iraq also learned that there had been chronic under-investment in and poor maintenance of the country's infrastructure during the last ten years. Thus, several power stations which had been working but were judged to be unsafe or unreliable have had to be taken out of commission for urgent repairs.[112] As these repairs are completed over the coming months, the situation should improve markedly. Meanwhile, the Coalition has been attempting to quell the disappointment that Iraqis feel at the slow progress with reconstruction and the persistent insecurity that we describe above. Nick Pelham told us that "The mistrust is certainly increasing. The doubt about Britain's ability to succeed is also increasing."[113]The recent disturbances in Amarah may be one symptom of this.

99. According to Yahia Said and Mary Kaldor,

The war is referred to as 'liberation/occupation'. Many people, especially men, hate Saddam Hussein and the Americans in equal measure. They are angry at the ever-growing list of Iraqi casualties both civilian and military. They feel humiliated by the rapid American victory, their failure to liberate themselves, and by the patronising and sometimes insensitive behaviour of the occupiers.[114]

However, it should be noted that the more positive impression gained by those of us who visited Iraq included a perception of greater goodwill towards the United Kingdom than towards the US.

100. Dana Allin argued that the changes in policy that characterised the first eight months of the occupation may have been a consequence of unrealistic assessments of the post-war situation.

Apparently there really was a very strong conviction on the part of many of the architects of this war that there would not be a big nation building job in Iraq because there would be a successful Iraqi state and society which could be decapitated and then handed over to the good guys more or less intact.[115]

101. Dana Allin's assessment is supported by John Sawers' comments, upon his return from Iraq in July, that "London as much as Washington had under-estimated the scale of the effort required to rebuild Iraq after the conflict. We had sent just five civilians, as the British contribution to the civilian side of reconstruction."[116] The Coalition's lack of preparedness for the post-war period may also have contributed to what Dana Allin described as a "somewhat shocking" lack of expertise in the CPA in Iraq, "at least on the American side."[117]

102. We conclude that the lack of information available to the Coalition when assessing the scale of the reconstruction effort needed in post-war Iraq contributed to the problems that it has faced in establishing credibility and maintaining the confidence of the Iraqi people.

103. Although the US Corps of Engineers and the British military have issued "millions of dollars worth of contracts to repair schools, hospitals and vital infrastructure"[118] we were concerned to be told in November 2003 that

not many Iraqis have felt that there is much sign of money going into reconstruction. Bridges which were down as a result of the war are still down and there are very few cranes on the horizon. There are fewer cranes on the horizon in cities than there were prior to the war, less large-scale construction activity than there was before the war.[119]

104. It was suggested to us that the reasons for the delay in starting large infrastructure projects are the Coalition's "cautious awarding procedures aimed at limiting politically costly accusations of corruption", and also contractors' security concerns.[120]In addition, there has been controversy over US restrictions on tenders by firms from countries that were not supportive of the war, although these restrictions do not apply to sub-contracts, many of which are very large.

105. One positive sign is that Iraqi contractors are benefiting from Western firms' reluctance to work in the current security environment,[121]which suggests that a greater proportion of aid money may stay in Iraq, and will help to provide jobs for Iraqis. However, we are concerned that Iraqi companies' capacity to win reconstruction contracts may be inhibited by the isolation of the CPA.

106. We conclude that despite some signs of economic revival since the war, Iraqis have been disappointed by the slow pace of reconstruction, although their expectations were probably unrealistic. We recommend that measures to increase the accessibility and transparency of the CPA, the Governing Council and Iraqi ministries are also used to ensure that Iraqi contractors are able to bid for reconstruction contracts.

107. A further obstacle to the start of major reconstruction projects may be the ambiguity of the legal framework: "According to some the occupying authority does not have the right to enter into any contractual arrangements beyond whatever is necessary for continued operation at any given enterprise."[122]

108. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out its understanding of the extent to which the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions constrain the Occupying Powers' capacity to carry out economic reform, and how these constraints have affected the Coalition's operations in Iraq.

Iraq's oil-dependent economy

109. Another crucial factor in the medium to long term is the management of the Development Fund for Iraq[123] and oil revenues in general. When in Baghdad, members of the Committee were told that Iraq's oil must not be allowed to become part of the political process—it should be exploited in Iraq's national interest. Also, it is not in Iraq's interests to remain an oil-dependent economy; its manufacturing and agricultural sectors require investment and expansion. Among the early successes of the British-led CPA in southern Iraq were the provision of plastic sheeting to enable production of a tomato crop, along with the supply of seed corn, in both cases without distorting local markets.[124]

110. We conclude that sustainable economic development and diversification will be essential for the long term stabilisation of Iraq. We recommend that the Government do its utmost to ensure that the CPA and Iraqi ministries are staffed with experienced personnel, who are capable of drawing up and implementing plans for Iraq's economic development, including detailed and politically sensitive options for the distribution of Iraq's oil revenues.

Prospects for Iraq, and implications for the wider war against terrorism

111. On 1 May, in a speech delivered on board USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq were over. "In the images of celebrating Iraqis," he said,

we have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom. Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire their own enslavement. Men and women in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices; and everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear.[125]

112. The Government now appears eager to manage the expectations that had been inflated by such statements. On 2 December, Jack Straw told us that a group of Iraqis with whom he had met that morning had

the impression … that we were extremely efficient, all-powerful and could deliver things rapidly and on time". The Iraqis had also been expecting "that the moment their country was liberated from the grip of Saddam by the US and the UK, then … with one bound they would be free.[126]

113. The Foreign Secretary had tried to explain to his Iraqi visitors that "Of course, it is a lot more complicated than that" and "that other countries have their problems with efficiency as well."[127] He also distanced the Government's position from US pronouncements about Iraq developing into a "beacon for democracy" in the Middle East, reminding us that "my declarations were always fairly careful."[128]

114. Even before Saddam Hussein had been captured, none of our witnesses thought that the Baathist regime could return. Peter David, foreign editor at the Economist, told us that "In conversations on the street one heard a fear that Saddam might come back, but very seldom, and only in a few geographical pockets would one hear an aspiration that he should come back … The regime is by and large reviled by most Iraqis."[129]His colleague Nick Pelham said that "almost everybody—apart from former regime elements—says that they are grateful for the fact that the old regime has gone. They then go on, understandably, to express concerns about the security situation today and impatience with rebuilding."[130]

A continuing role for the United Kingdom

115. On 2 December, the Foreign Secretary told us that in Iraq "what we have had to be doing all the time is not make the best of the enemy of the good, and that is a big challenge."[131] Few aspects of the current situation in Iraq could yet be considered "good". However, we are convinced that the Coalition will not lose sight of one of the central objectives of the intervention: the establishment of a sound, stable and democratic government for Iraq. Speaking in Basrah on 4 January, the Prime Minister referred to the Coalition's actions in Iraq as representing a "test case" for dealing with "brutal and repressive states". He went on to say that the role of UK forces in Iraq is to

help this country on its feet as a stable and prosperous democracy, to show in the manner by which we do it, that there is a better way forward for Iraq, that countries like this whose people have never enjoyed the freedoms we have taken for granted, actually can exist side by side with each other, with democracy, with the rule of law, with basic canons of respect for other people and respect for themselves.[132]

116. As the Foreign Secretary recognised on 5 January, this process will not be completed quickly, and United Kingdom forces could—subject to the agreement of the Iraqi authorities—remain in Iraq for some considerable time to come.[133] A continuing aid commitment will also be necessary. However, the requirement is not just for military support and humanitarian aid—vital though those are—but also for political capacity-building, help in the international arena, and the establishment of a durable, bilateral relationship. In this connection, the FCO is considering the future of the old British Embassy site in central Baghdad and it is likely for security reasons that alternative accommodation for United Kingdom diplomats will have to be found.

117. We conclude that a continued United Kingdom military and civilian presence in Iraq is likely to be necessary for some time to come, possibly for several years. We conclude that this presence must include a significant FCO component if it is to succeed, and we therefore recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out its plans for establishing full diplomatic and consular service in Iraq, including what services it intends to provide, who will provide them, where they will be provided, and over what timescale they will be introduced.

Iraq and the war against terrorism

118. The Government's primary stated objective of the Iraq war was to disarm the Iraqi regime of its weapons of mass destruction. In his 1 May speech to announce the end of hostilities in Iraq, President Bush stated that "The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more."[134]

119. We welcome the capture of Saddam Hussein, but conclude that the continued failure of the Coalition to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has damaged the credibility of the US and the United Kingdom in their conduct of the war against terrorism.

120. The current instability in Iraq has wider implications for the war against terrorism. In Jonathan Stevenson's view,

at least in the short term [the war] probably increased the terrorist threat in so far as it made more people inclined to join al-Qaeda by enlarging the US military footprint in the Gulf and increased al-Qaeda's recruiting power and its ability to incite terrorism by confirming a number of Arab preconceptions, including the idea that the United States wanted to increase its political and military influence in the Arab world and the view that it wanted to hijack, to commandeer Arab oil.

He told us that "In Europe alone there are reports by a number of European intelligence agencies that increasing numbers of European Moslems are seeking to go and perhaps even entering Iraq to fight as Jihadists in aid of the insurgencies there."[135]

121. We have noted above[136] the suggestion that, in the short term at least, the capture of Saddam Hussein may have driven some of his hard-line supporters into an alliance with al Qaeda or other groups of foreign insurgents. But there is also concern that the threat may extend beyond Iraq's borders.

122. The Foreign Secretary does not "subscribe to … the view that somehow, outside Iraq, one is at greater risk from al Qaeda elements because of the war against Iraq."[137]However, we recall the Government's response to our last Report on this subject, which states that "the establishment of a stable, democratic Iraq enjoying the proper rule of law will be Iraq's best defence against terrorism and will more widely undermine al Qa'ida's cause." The continuation of the process of 'Iraqiisation' and the smooth transition of sovereignty in July are therefore vital.

123. We conclude that the war in Iraq has possibly made terrorist attacks against British nationals and British interests more likely in the short term. A successful transfer of power to an internationally-recognised Iraqi government, which has the support of the Iraqi people and which is recognised by Arab and muslim states generally, offers an important opportunity to reduce that threat and to assist the process of reform and stabilisation in the region.

3 'Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government', September 2002. Back

4 HC (2002-03) 405, paras 11-14. Back

5 HC (2002-03) 405, para 55. Back

6 For a recent US study of this issue see 'WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004. Back

7 Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-03, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 813-I. Back

8 HC (2002-03) 405, para 164. Back

9 The three members were Donald Anderson (Chairman), Greg Pope and Sir John Stanley. Back

10 Head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Back

11 Senior US military commander in Iraq. Back

12 Head of the CPA (Southern), based in Basrah. Back

13 Remarks by Donald Rumsfeld, 16 December 2003, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news Back

14 HC Deb, 15 December 2003, col 1323. Back