House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war against terrorism

124. In past Reports in this series, we have discussed the relationship between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wider war against terrorism.[138] None of our witnesses has seen substantial evidence of links between al Qaeda and Palestinian terrorist organisations,[139] although al Qaeda has sought to link its campaign to the Palestinian cause[140] and the government of Israel has stressed repeatedly that it is fighting the same 'war against terrorism' as is the US.[141]

125. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does, however, affect the wider war against terrorism in important ways. As we stated in July 2003, "the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the relationship between the US and Israel, is one of the causes of resentment of the US in the Arab world—and thus one of the factors contributing to the appeal of organisations such as al Qaeda."[142] Our conclusion in that Report, that "resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be of central importance to the long term stabilisation of the Middle East region", is as valid now as it was then.

Developments since July 2003

126. When we made our Report in July 2003, we noted some signs of progress towards peace between Israelis and Palestinians. In June, a number of rejectionist groups agreed with the Palestinian Authority (PA) to the establishment of a hudna, according to which agreement attacks against Israeli civilians would cease. Many hoped that this would break the cycle of terrorist attack and Israeli retaliation that has resulted in so many civilian casualties since the intifada broke out in September 2000, and would help to build the trust between governments and communities which is essential for the conclusion of a peace agreement.

127. The appointment of a Palestinian Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas, had also increased hopes of political agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. A meeting between then Prime Minister Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at Aqaba in June 2003 had, in the view of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, helped to build a "degree of trust" between the leaders.[143]

128. There was also hope of renewed international engagement: Jane Corbin, a journalist and expert on terrorism, told us that the US-led war in Iraq had increased "the willingness of the Bush administration to now engage with the Peace Process".[144] We also noted the Foreign Secretary's comment in late April that "Removing the [Iraqi] regime has already helped to improve the overall security environment within Israel and the occupied territories. It has also enabled us to begin a more vigorous discussion about the support for such terrorist organisations by other countries in the region." [145]

129. By mid-September, when we visited Israel and Palestine, these positive developments had been superseded by a resumption of terrorist violence, and by a political crisis in the PA. On 19 August, the hudna ended with a Palestinian suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem's Shmuel Hanavi neighbourhood. Twenty-one people were killed and 136 wounded. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. Israel responded with the 'targeted killing' of Hamas leaders. Ismael Abu Shanab, a public spokesman for Hamas who was considered by some to be a moderate and believed to be the architect of the June hudna, was killed when Israeli helicopter gunships opened fire on his car in Gaza on 21 August. Four other Hamas leaders were killed in Gaza the following Sunday.

130. The resumption of terrorism and retaliatory violence was compounded by political crisis when on 6 September, Palestinian President Yasser Arafat accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, having made his role impossible.

131. The Israeli response to a suicide attack in Haifa on 4 October threatened to bring Syria more directly into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The day after the 4 October attack, in which 22 people died, Israel launched an air attack on the Ein Saheb camp in Syria, which is only a few miles northwest of Damascus. Israel claimed that the camp was used by several militant groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. However, the Syrian media described Ein Saheb as a Palestinian refugee camp and the Syrian government denied that Syria has links to terrorist groups or allows them to operate out of Syria. A spokesman for Islamic Jihad denied having training camps or bases in Syria, while a senior commander of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) said the camp was one of its disused bases.[146]

132. The Israeli attack on Syria constituted an important shift in Israeli tactics. Nomi Bar-Yaacov, an expert on the Israel-Palestine conflict at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, explained to us in early November that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon "felt that he had to respond" to the Haifa suicide bomb, but that his options were limited. Ms Bar-Yaacov argued that Mr Sharon's "response would have been to expel Arafat" (three weeks before, the Israeli cabinet had announced its decision in principle to do so[147]) "but the US had quite clearly instructed him not to do so." Mr Sharon "felt that he was running out of potential options and he wanted to send a very strong message to 'terrorist organisations' and states supporting terror." To some extent, Syria is an 'easy target':

it is Israel's neighbour, it harbours a number of terrorist organisations with links to Palestine and he chose a target which was an empty, non-functioning training camp because he wanted on the one hand to send a message that he was serious about combating terror and on the other hand he did not really want to strike Damascus or kill too many people.[148]

133. Israel's attack on Syrian territory raised international concern that the conflict would take on a new, dangerous regional dimension. The Security Council met in emergency session to consider a resolution introduced by Syria, which called on the Council to condemn "military aggression carried [out] by Israel against the sovereignty and territory" of Syria.[149] The resolution was not adopted by the Council; the United States objected to the resolution on grounds that it did not also condemn the Haifa bombing. However, the UN Secretariat issued a statement that the Secretary-General "strongly deplores the Israeli air strike on Syrian territory" and was "especially concerned that this further escalation of an already tense and difficult situation has the potential to broaden the scope of current conflicts in the Middle East, further threatening regional peace and security."[150] The EU condemned the attack as "unacceptable".[151] A spokesman for the FCO said that "Israel is of course entitled to take steps to protect itself from terrorist attack, but these steps should be within international law."[152]

134. We asked Nomi Bar-Yaacov to assess why the US did not condemn Israel's attack against Syria. She told us that "there is quite an open dialogue between Israel and the US and that the US is dictating to Israel what they can and cannot attack outside the boundaries of the State of Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories." In her view, "Israel would not have attacked this camp in Syria without prior US consent."[153]

135. In light of the evidence available, it is hard to envisage how Israel's attack on Syrian territory has helped it in any practical way to fight terrorism. Furthermore, the attack has further strained Israel's relations with its Arab neighbours,[154] increased tension in the region, and arguably made it easier for Syria to justify to its more moderate regional neighbours any retaliatory cross-border attacks against Israel (although to date these have not materialised). Although we recognise that Israel must protect its citizens from terrorist attack, and that in the absence of terrorist attacks Israel would not launch such strikes, we conclude that punitive strikes such as that which it launched against Syria in October are likely to be counter-productive, and may also constitute a breach of international law. We therefore conclude that the Government was right to join its EU partners in condemnation of the 5 October attack. We recommend that the Government use its influence with Israel, its neighbours, the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian groups, to prevent the further spread of violence in the region.

Progress towards a negotiated peace

136. Violence has repeatedly derailed progress towards a negotiated settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. Since the devastating cycle of terrorist attack and Israeli retaliation resumed in August, prospects for implementation of the Road Map[155]—the Quartet's plan for a two-state solution to the conflict—have appeared remote.

137. Phase I of the Road Map, which was originally scheduled for implementation by May 2003, specifies that Palestinians and Israelis would "resume security co-operation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services." In response to "sustained, targeted and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructures" by the PA,[156] Israel would "take all necessary steps to help normalise Palestinian life" including withdrawal from the Palestinian areas occupied since 28 September 2000, and implementation of measures to improve the humanitarian situation and increase freedom of movement in the territories. Phase I of the Road Map also specifies that Israel must freeze settlement activity, and dismantle all settlements erected since March 2001.[157]

138. Crucially, the Road Map specifies that both parties to the conflict must move simultaneously towards fulfilment of their respective commitments.

139. On 15 September 2003, the UN's Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Terje Roed-Larsen told the Security Council that the peace process has stalled.

The recent cycle of terror attacks and extrajudicial killings has broken the Palestinian ceasefire and brought the process to a standstill. A combination of violence and the too slow implementation of the road map peace plan have brought the region to a potential turning point…. Unfortunately, implementation of the road map never effectively began.[158]

Failures on the part of the Palestinian Authority

140. On the Palestinian side, the PA has failed to stop terrorist violence. This may in part be a consequence of the weakness of the PA which, in Nomi Bar-Yaacov's view, is not currently "capable of ceasing all terror attacks and violence and restructuring their security apparatus and disarming all of their militant groups and collecting all the weapons."[159] If this assessment is correct (and it is certainly true that the PA has suffered a financial crisis, which has limited its ability to take action[160]), then even if the PA acts to reform its security services, this will not result in the immediate and complete cessation of violence by rejectionist groups. While the government of Israel accepts that the PA may not be able to stop all terrorist attacks, it believes that the PA could do much more to reduce the number of such attacks.

141. Although Palestinian security reform may require some time, the political crisis in September also revealed deep divisions in the PA, particularly concerning progress in this crucial area. In his speech to the Palestinian Legislative Council two days before his resignation, Prime Minister Abbas alluded to serious splits within the PA and between himself and President Arafat. He called for greater support to carry out his mandate, particularly towards consolidation of Palestinian security services, and stated that

Without the Palestinian Authority being the sole authority, in the absence of a single decision-making authority, without supremacy of the law over all, without one legitimate weapon in the hands of one authority, and without political pluralism we will not advance one significant step on the political march.[161]

142. In September 2003, Secretary of State Powell said in an interview with the press that Arafat "did not do what he could to help former Prime Minister Abu Mazen succeed. He should have given him control over all the security forces."[162] Talking about the new Palestinian government, Powell added that

If it is a government that does not have political authority independent from the machinations of Yasser Arafat, and if all the security forces are not consolidated under the new Prime Minister, and if that new Prime Minister is not committed to ending terrorism, stopping the actions of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the others, then we're … not going to be able to move forward on the roadmap.

143. As the Foreign Secretary has made clear, Palestinian terrorists' "planting of terrorist bombs in Jerusalem on 19 August was the single most important cause of the breakdown of progress on the road map."[163] The PA may not be able to control every act of terrorist violence. Nonetheless, for the success of the Road Map it must take steps in this direction in which both the international community and the Israeli government can have confidence. The crisis of September 2003 surrounding the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas suggests that Israeli scepticism about Palestinian security reform has a valid basis.

144. According to Nomi Bar-Yaacov, "there is room for [external] pressure" in pushing the PA towards reform of its security services, and that

there the UK Government can certainly help by ensuring that the [reform] process is transparent and by ensuring that the atmosphere is such that there is some breathing space for the government. That means negotiating with Israel and the Palestinians. It means keeping an open and constant dialogue and not letting it go for even a minute.[164]

145. The Government has played both a positive and a critical role in pushing the PA towards reform. On 8 September, the Foreign Secretary stressed that

Abu Mazen's resignation must not be allowed to send the peace process back to square one. The Palestinian leadership must unite around a clear commitment to road map implementation. It needs to take firm action to stop the terrorists planning and executing attacks—such as the appalling 19 August bus bombing in Jerusalem—from territory under Palestinian Authority control.[165]

In our last Report on this subject, we noted that the Government has made substantial efforts to promote reform of the PA.[166] Since then, we have visited the new Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei and the headquarters of the PA in Ramallah, where we held discussions with the PA's Foreign and Finance Ministers.

146. The PA has apparently taken some steps to educate public opinion. In particular, the PA has introduced a number of new textbooks. Research commissioned by the US Congress, and submitted in March 2003, found that the Palestinian curriculum "does not openly incite against Israel and the Jews. It does … not openly incite hatred and violence. Religious and political tolerance is emphasized in a good number of textbooks."[167] However, there is also evidence to the contrary. We heard from Palestinian Media Watch in its evidence to the Committee in November 2003 that "The PA uses numerous media mediums, including music videos for children, educational programs and religious lessons to inflame the Palestinian population to hatred, violence and terrorist activities." In particular it noted the "Honoring and glorifying [of] terrorist murderers and suicide bombers."[168] Clearly, the PA must do much more to tackle anti-Israel incitement.

147. We conclude that reform of the Palestinian security sector is central to the success of the Road Map and we commend the Government for its efforts to ensure that the Palestinian Authority carries out these reforms. However, we are concerned at the lack of progress and recommend that the Government redouble its efforts to ensure the success of the reforms. In particular, more should be done by the PA to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for the recruiting, training, equipping and launching of suicide bombers and to prevent the honouring and even encouraging of suicide bombers and their masters by Palestinian media.[169]

148. The United Kingdom has potential to influence this situation, both through its membership of the European Union, and through its bilateral relations with Israel, the PA and regional states. We recommend that the Government, with its European partners, apply further pressure on the Palestinian Authority to stop the terrorist attacks.

Failures on the part of the Israeli Government

149. The Road Map also specifies that the government of Israel "immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001", and "Consistent with the Mitchell Report … freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements)."[170] Since the Road Map was launched at the end of April, the Israeli government has not proceeded with this process. The FCO states that

The area of the West Bank under the jurisdiction of the settlements now accounts for more than 41 percent of the total land area. Settlement activity, including road building, is breaking up Palestinian territorial contiguity throughout the West Bank. The continuing process of establishing settlements is encircling East Jerusalem.[171]

With regard to the situation in the Golan Heights, there is some uncertainty about Israel's settlement plans. In December 2003, Agriculture Minister Yisrael Katz said that the government had decided to double the number of settlers on the Golan Heights. However, in January 2004, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that no such plan had been agreed.[172]

150. In addition to the construction of settlements and connecting roads, which restrict Palestinian freedom of movement, Israel is constructing what it describes as a 'security fence'. This is a barrier intended to prevent suicide bombers from crossing into Israel. The 'security fence' is in some places a high, concrete wall, with watch towers placed so that Israeli armed forces are able to see anyone breaching the barrier. In most other places, the Israeli government has constructed a network of trenches and wire fencing.

151. On 28 November, the UN Secretary General made a report to the UN General Assembly on Israel's construction of this barrier. In his report, the Secretary General noted that in places the barrier deviates more than 7.5 kilometres, and its planned route by up to 22 kilometres, from the pre-1967 'Green Line' to incorporate Israeli settlements while encircling Palestinian areas. If the 'security fence' is built as Israel plans, 975 square kilometres, or 16.6 per cent of the entire West bank, including the homes of some 220,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem and 17,000 elsewhere, would lie between the barrier and the Green Line. A further 160,000 Palestinians would live in almost completely encircled enclaves. The planned route also places 320,000 Israelis between the barrier and the Green Line, including some 178,000 in occupied East Jerusalem.[173]

152. We visited the 'security fence' at Qalqilya, which is a Palestinian town close to the Green Line. Qalqilya is completely surrounded by the 'fence', so that the only way to enter or leave the town is now through a narrow road blocked by Israeli checkpoints, or by a gate, which is usually locked. The closure of the town by the 'security fence'—most of which at this location is a wall—and the check point has made it very difficult for Palestinians living there to cultivate crops on the other side of the barrier, to sustain businesses, or to lead anything approaching normal lives. During our visit to the region, we met a farmer who was separated from his land and sleeping on it because of uncertainties over access. There seem few initiatives more likely to inflame Palestinian opinion.

153. According to the Negotiations Support Unit (NSU),[174] approximately 35 per cent of the agricultural land surrounding Qalqilya has been or will be confiscated with the construction of the wall. An additional 3,500 dunums[175] of agricultural land will be 'isolated' on the Israeli side of the wall; to date, farmers have been denied access to this land by the Israeli army. Approximately 15 of the city's 39 wells will be confiscated. This represents over one-third of the city's water supply.

154. The NSU argues that

given that 45 per cent of the city's economy relies on agriculture, land and water, confiscation will coerce migration of Qalqilya's residents eastward. … Already, according to the Qalqilya municipality, 4,000 Qalqilya residents have left the city. An additional 2,000 heads of household have left Qalqilya in order to secure work and support their families who have remained behind in Qalqilya.[176]

155. A central part of Israel's argument regarding the construction of the 'security fence' is that, despite the detrimental effect on Palestinians' lives, it must take these measures to protect its citizens from terrorist attack while the PA fails to do so. The Government has expressed some understanding of this argument: on 14 October, the Foreign Secretary told the House that

it must be understood that the decision to build the wall … arose from a profound sense of fear among people in Israel and from their belief that they have to protect their security. That does not make the decision lawful or justifiable in our view, but it does explain it.[177]

156. However, the Foreign Secretary has also made it clear that the construction of the 'security fence' on Palestinian territory is unacceptable to the United Kingdom:

No one can have any objection to any sovereign state building a wall or fence along its international border, but that is wholly different from building a wall or fence on someone else's territory. It is Palestinian land … We have indeed made our concerns well known, both to the Israeli ambassador and to the Israeli Government.[178]

157. We conclude that the case for building a security fence along the Green Line would be strong and understandable, but to build it within the West Bank is neither justifiable nor acceptable and gives rise to fears that Israel intends to annex this land. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government set out the steps it is taking to dissuade Israel from taking such unilateral measures in the Occupied Territories.

158. In addition, Israel's policies are arguably holding up progress on the Palestinian side by weakening moderate Palestinian leaders as they seek to promote reform. Shashi Tharoor, UN Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information, stated on 21 September 2003 that

Israeli actions—including military strikes using disproportionate force, the construction of a separation fence, house demolitions and the expansion of settlements—serve only to increase the misery of ordinary Palestinians. They also undermine the Palestinian Authority's ability to carry out its responsibilities, including the responsibility to prevent violence.[179]

Israel has also withheld from the PA tax revenues which are due to it.[180] We have seen alarming evidence about the impact on Palestinian communities of the current levels of poverty (which are exacerbated by the high birth rate), the lack of economic opportunities, and the perpetual threat and presence of violence. The radicalisation prompted by poor conditions is reversed when negotiations resume: Nomi Bar-Yaacov told us that "Palestinian public opinion when negotiations take place sways in favour of Fatah, sways in favour of the mainstream party."[181] We conclude that the conditions under which many Palestinians currently live contribute to their radicalisation, and undermine support for moderate Palestinian leaders. We also conclude that Israeli actions within the West Bank are making the Palestinian economy unviable.

159. On 8 September, after the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas and the collapse of the Palestinian government, the Foreign Secretary called for Israel to

create a climate within which moderate Palestinian leaders can prevail: by freezing settlement activity; by removing outposts, which are illegal even under Israeli law; by restoring Palestinian freedom of movement, so allowing economic activity to restart; by ending so-called 'targeted assassinations'; and by ensuring that the security fence does not encroach on Palestinian land.[182]

We recommend that the Government continue to urge Israel to help "create a climate within which moderate Palestinian leaders can prevail." We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government outline the steps it is taking to do this.

160. Throughout this Inquiry, we have made clear our conviction that all action to counter terrorism must be taken in accordance with international law.[183] The 'security fence' being constructed by Israel is on Palestinian land. The International Court of Justice will soon offer an opinion to the UN General Assembly as to whether Israel's construction of the barrier is in breach of international law.[184] Israel's defence of illegal settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and its failure to dismantle them, have already been found to constitute breaches of international law.[185]

161. We are deeply concerned by Israel's maintenance and expansion of illegal settlements in the occupied territories and its construction of a 'security fence' on Palestinian land, and we conclude that these policies constitute a severe impediment to efforts to secure a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and to the creation of a viable Palestinian state. We recommend that the Government make it absolutely clear in its public statements that Israel's fulfilment of commitments set out in the Road Map—including the dismantling of all settlement outposts erected since March 2001, and the freezing of settlement activity consistent with the Mitchell Report—must proceed immediately.

162. We have suggested above that the EU could put pressure on the PA[186], perhaps through its funding to that organisation. Similarly, the EU has a number of specific 'sticks' which it could use to apply pressure to Israel: for example, the EU is Israel's biggest trading partner, so any suggestion that the Union might consider renegotiating its Trade and Co-operation Agreement with Israel might help to put pressure on Israel into fulfilling its Road Map commitments.

163. We recommend that the Government, with its European Union partners, apply further pressure to Israel to implement the commitments it has made in the Road Map.

The urgent need for a breakthrough

164. Prospects for implementation of the Road Map look bleak. However, prospects for the region look far bleaker if the impasse between Israel and the PA is not broken. There is also some urgency because the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories is not static: the continuing construction of settlements and of the 'security fence' is carving up the territory, and together with the roadblocks, curfews and general harassment are further curtailing freedom of movement.[187] We conclude that conditions in the occupied West Bank are changing rapidly, and that the continuation of Israel's current settlement policies, and its construction of the 'security fence', will make the eventual establishment of a contiguous and economically viable Palestinian state increasingly difficult, if not impossible.

165. A further factor bringing urgency to the situation is the fact that Ahmed Qurei (also known as Abu Ala), whom we met during our visit to Jerusalem in September, has now formed a new Palestinian government. This has averted the acute crisis that appeared to face the PA in early September; but we were warned that "Abu Ala is really the last chance for Palestine and peace prospects will very much depend on the success of his government in carrying out the reforms that the Road Map calls for."[188]

166. We conclude that if, over the next year to eighteen months, progress towards implementation of the Road Map is further delayed, the two-state solution which is the current objective of international efforts to resolve the conflict will become increasingly difficult to achieve.

167. We conclude that early progress towards a negotiated settlement between the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority is a necessary component in the Government's efforts to promote stability and security in the wider Middle East region.

Prospects for restarting the Road Map

168. Of the four parties to the Quartet,[189] the United States has by far the greatest influence. In December 2003, the Foreign Secretary agreed that "the more intensively the international community and particularly the US engages the more likely there is to be a positive result" in resolution of the conflict.[190]

169. However, while the US "has taken the lead on the implementation on the Road Map", in the view of Nomi Bar-Yaacov it

frankly has not really done anything. It sent Ambassador John Wolf to the region as the special representative. He came in with a team of very young and not sufficiently experienced monitors and insufficient numbers—only 12 of them. Their work was not public and the parties were not happy with it and quite frankly they failed in the implementation thus far.[191]

Similar views were expressed to us during our visits in Jerusalem and Ramallah in September. Furthermore, Wolf has been absent from the region since the Autumn.

170. On 29 December, Secretary Powell reaffirmed US commitment to the Road Map.

It still remains the President's vision and his goal to achieve a Palestine state living side by side … with the state of Israel. So we remain totally committed to the vision that the President laid out on 24 June of 2002 and totally committed to the roadmap as the way to get to that vision.[192]

However, he went on to say that

We will be reviewing the bidding in the early part of the year as to whether or not it would be appropriate for Ambassador Wolf to go back in, but he has to have two people ready to talk to one another. We will be encouraging … the conversations to begin between the two sides….Until there is a beginning conversation between the two sides, I think it's difficult to do much more right now and we're anxious to see that conversation begin, and we're in touch with both sides to encourage that conversation.

171. This lack of engagement is, in Nomi Bar-Yaacov's view, attributable to two considerations: first, "the US being so involved in Iraq now, they do not really have the time, the energy and the resources to engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." Second, the US administration does not

really have the interest to take any risks at the moment, especially since they are running into an election year. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an extremely difficult issue to deal with and it is a no-win situation or it is perceived as such at this time in the US.[193]

172. While the Foreign Secretary would not accept that the US was "disengaged" but "simply frustrated in the way that we are",[194] he was prepared to admit that the US Presidential elections might have an impact on the engagement of the US in the coming year.[195]

173. In November and December 2003, the US Administration took steps which indicate that it might now increase its engagement in the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In November, the United States announced that it was reducing its loan guarantee package to Israel in response to its settlement activities, including the construction of the 'security fence'.[196] Then on 5 December, US Secretary of State Colin Powell met with former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo to discuss the "Geneva Accords"—an unofficial, alternative peace plan for Israel and Palestine.[197] On 12 December, Secretary Powell also met Ami Ayalon, a former head of Shin Bet, the Israeli security service, and Palestinian professor Sari Nusseibeh, who have collected thousands of signatures to support a plan for the complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank.

174. These initiatives are not supported by the Israeli government. Secretary Powell's meetings may indicate that the US is growing more willing to criticise the Sharon government, and to seek alternatives to the current deadlock. Then on 18 December, the White House responded to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's announcement of a possible disengagement plan in the West Bank by warning Israel not to abandon the Road Map. In a press briefing, the White House spokesman said that "we would oppose any unilateral steps that block the road toward negotiations under the road map that lead to this two-state vision."[198] However, while these actions may amount to signals of disapproval, they do not amount to sufficient engagement.

175. We conclude that the speech made by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on 18 December stating that Israel may "initiate the unilateral security step of disengagement from the Palestinians"[199] and that this disengagement plan "will include redeployment of IDF forces along new security lines", coupled with the statement that "Israel will greatly accelerate the construction of the security fence" is a mater of deep concern. We recommend that the Government, in its response to this Report, set out what steps it is taking to dissuade the Israeli government from taking such unilateral action.

176. We conclude that the US is by far the strongest external influence on the parties to the conflict and that the Road Map can only be restarted by the presence in the region of a very senior US representative willing and able to pressurise both sides into taking the necessary actions to make progress. We fear that forthcoming US elections are likely to diminish US commitment and action.

177. The European Union is another party to the Quartet, but its capacity to put pressure on the parties to implement their Road Map commitments is, in the view of our witnesses, limited. Nomi Bar-Yaacov argued that "The EU is also problematic because they are not seen necessarily as particularly credible … The EU has just come out with a poll that Israel is the greatest threat to world peace and Israel is not a great fan of the EU."[200] The Foreign Secretary was also pessimistic about the capacity of the EU to assist in reviving the peace process. Although the

EU wants to play a more active part and Javier Solana the EU High Representative has been very active there … there have been times when the EU has almost been persona non grata in the eyes of the government of Israel … the problem about the EU's active involvement is not a lack of will by the EU it is … a lack of confidence by the government of Israel in the EU.[201]

178. We conclude that, regardless of its willingness to engage in resolution of the conflict, the European Union's capacity to apply effective pressure to the Israeli government is very limited in comparison to that of the United States. We further conclude that without sustained enhanced and effective external pressure, which at least in the short term appears unlikely, there are no prospects of an early settlement.

A role for the United Kingdom

179. We were encouraged that in April 2003, during the Iraq war, the United Kingdom Government appeared to have

pushed the Bush administration towards more active engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Prime Minister is considered by many to have encouraged President Bush to promise, at the Hillsborough summit, that he would 'expend the same amount of energy on the Middle East' peace process as Tony Blair had on Northern Ireland.[202]

However, this effort has so far yielded limited results on the ground.

180. The United States is undoubtedly grateful for British support in Iraq, and undoubtedly needs the United Kingdom to maintain this level of support until Iraq has been stabilised.[203]

181. We recommend that the Government do its utmost to promote greater US engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by stressing publicly that resolution of this conflict is an essential component in the wider US-led campaign to defeat Islamist terrorism and to promote reform in the Middle East region. In particular, we recommend that the Government seek to convince the US of the importance of sending a high-level emissary to the region.

182. There are concerns that the Road Map cannot succeed in its present format. There is little pressure on the parties to comply and no effective dispute resolution procedures. Nomi Bar-Yaacov said to the Committee in her evidence:

What is needed in order to make the Road Map work is a very serious third party intervention, which is exactly where this government can contribute to it. It is very important to have enhanced monitoring at the initial stage, verification and compliance and to build up towards a multinational peacekeeping force. The parties alone clearly cannot implement the Road Map. The Israeli Government does not have any interest in doing so at present. They have made it very, very clear, that they will not move on the Road Map, they will not implement their obligations under the Road Map until the Palestinians cease all violence and all terror attacks. The Palestinians are not capable of ceasing all terror attacks and violence and restructuring their security apparatus and disarming all of their militant groups and collecting all the weapons. It is very important to carry out all those activities, but I do not think the Palestinians alone can carry out those activities and the international community, including this government, can help them carry out those activities.[204]

She has previously made clear that what she has in mind is a "sustained and more robust international military intervention"[205] and considers this may involve the "hitherto unthinkable insertion of a US-led peacekeeping force". Drawing attention to the inadequacy of the dispute resolution procedures she said "there should be no room for haggling over the plan, and a third party arbiter is required to ensure there is not."

183. We are disappointed by the progress made so far in advancing the peace process through the timetable of the Road Map. We not believe that this will be achieved by 2005 as envisaged or for some considerable time thereafter. There is clearly little enthusiasm for the plan in the United States. Reversing this has to be a high priority in Anglo-US relations. We conclude that the prospects for a diplomatic implementation of the Road Map are slight. To make the Road Map more efficacious, we recommend that its ambiguities should be clarified and its monitoring facilities strengthened to include a conflict-resolution mechanism.

184. Asked about the need for international intervention to overcome the inability of the parties themselves to make progress, the Foreign Secretary told us on 2 December 2003 that he accepted the idea that "the more intensively the international community and particularly the US engages the more likely there is to be a positive result."[206] Certainly, it is difficult to see the parties reaching a peace settlement under their present leaderships and in circumstances where the extremists on both sides effectively have vetoes on progress. However, agreement was very nearly reached at Taba in early 2001 and the shape of an eventual agreement is clear.[207]

185. One possible approach, therefore, would be for the Government to work with the other members of the Quartet group to achieve a mandatory Chapter VII UN Security Council Resolution imposing a settlement along the Taba lines. The Resolution would call for referenda in Israel and the new Palestinian state to give it added legitimacy. When asked about the possibility of such a mandatory Resolution, the Foreign Secretary responded "It is an attractive idea. I do not rule it out … but it does require there to be a UN Security Council Resolution with no vetoes. I do not think we are quite in a position to achieve that just yet."[208]

186. It is arguable that if a draft UN Resolution had the support of the permanent members of the Security Council and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it would have a good chance of being passed. If a mandatory Resolution were adopted, the parties would thereafter no longer be able to use details of issues to frustrate progress; they would simply have to decide whether or not to implement the UN solution. Several people whom we met in the region said they thought this idea was worth serious consideration. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government state its policy on a Chapter VII UN Security Council Resolution imposing a settlement along the Taba lines.

138 HC (2002-03) 405, paras 210-216; HC (2002-03) 196, paras 211-220; HC (2001-02) 384, para 161. Back

139 HC (2002-03) 405, para 211; HC (2001-02) 384, para 155-56; Q 56. Back

140 In his 'Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders', published in the London-based newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi on 23 February 1998, Osama bin Laden wrote that "While the purposes of the Americans [in the Middle East] are religious and economic, they also serve the petty state of the Jews, to divert attention from their occupation of Jerusalem and their killing of Muslims in it." Cit. Bernard Lewis, 'License to Kill', Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998. Back

141 HC (2001-02) 384, para 158. Back

142 HC (2002-03) 405, para 211. In July 2002, we also stated that "a linkage between the [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict … and the war against terrorism is widely perceived among populations and governments in the region … While the conflict in the Middle East requires swift and fair resolution on its own merits, this perceived linkage lends added urgency to the search for peace.." HC (2001-02) 384, para 161. Back

143 HC (2002-03) 405, para 213. Back

144 HC (2002-03) 405, Q 365. Back

145 HC (2002-03) 405, Ev 278. Back

146 'Israel hits Palestinian 'camp' in Syria', BBC, 5 October 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk Back

147 'Israel decides to expel Arafat', BBC, 11 September 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk Back

148 Q 2 Back

149 4836^th meeting of the Security Council, 5 October 2003, available at: http://www.un.org/english Back