House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

Other threats to security in the Middle East region

Weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism

187. The Government claimed that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was necessary to disarm a dangerous dictator, and to ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of terrorists. Whether or not the Iraq war was justifiable on these or other grounds has been discussed elsewhere.[209] However, a number of other states in the Middle East region also possess WMD, and have links to terrorist organisations. As part of this Inquiry, we visited two such states which are major sources of concern in the US-led war against terrorism: Iran and Syria.

188. Iran was bracketed with Iraq and North Korea in President Bush's "axis of evil", the states which President George W Bush claimed in January 2002 were "arming to threaten the peace of the world." President Bush warned that these states have terrorist allies, and that they could arm terrorists with weapons of mass destruction "giving them the means to match their hatred." These states "could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic."[210]

189. US Under Secretary of State John Bolton has named Syria—along with Libya[211] and Cuba—as states "beyond the axis of evil," against which the United States was prepared to take action if necessary.[212] Syria is accused of supporting terrorist organisations, notably Palestinian rejectionist groups and the Lebanese Hezbollah. Syria is also believed to be seeking to develop WMD, which could be passed to terrorists.

190. In our December 2002 Report, we expressed our anxiety about the US administration's development of "an expanded doctrine of 'pre-emptive self-defence,'" because of the "serious risk that this will be taken as legitimising the aggressive use of force by other, less law-abiding states."[213] In July 2003, we noted the perils inherent in pre-emptive action and regime change: "The military operation in Iraq resulted in the deaths of British service personnel and many Iraqi civilians; and after the conflict, British troops and officials remain engaged in a deeply complex and dangerous operation to stabilise and reconstruct post-war Iraq."[214]

191. A central challenge in the war against terrorism is the development of effective means to control the current and potential threat from states such as Syria and Iran, without the use of military force. Our visits to these states have helped us to understand the extent of these threats, and also to evaluate the Government's efforts to address the threats they present and to move their governments towards greater co-operation in fighting international terrorism.

Iran's nuclear programme and its links to terrorist organisations

192. We visited Iran in October 2003, at a time when British diplomacy was extremely active. Just weeks previously, the Embassy compound in Tehran had been the object of shootings—the evidence of which was still apparent—and our visit coincided with one by the Foreign Secretary, together with his counterparts from France and Germany. This powerful troika had arrived to persuade the Iranians to agree to the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory, but there was also a wider agenda.

193. The visit by the three foreign ministers was part of Europe's policy of critical engagement with Iran, and the deal which was concluded during that visit can be seen as one of the fruits of that policy. However, there remains much on which Europe needs to continue to engage Iran critically, and at the time of our visit there were several complicating factors in the bilateral relationship. As well as the Embassy shootings, there was the Soleimanpour affair. Mr Hade Soleimanpour, a former Iranian diplomat studying at Durham University, had been arrested on application of the Argentine authorities, who were seeking his extradition in connection with the bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires in 1994. The Iranians regarded Mr Soleimanpour's detention as a hostile act, and even indulged in temporary limited trade sanctions as a result, whereas it was a judicial proceeding and he was eventually released. Following his release, Mr Soleimanpour returned to Iran.

194. Our Iranian hosts also made representations to us about two Iranian film-makers, who had been detained by US forces in Iraq. Happily, they have since been released. For our part, we had concerns—as have the British Government and the EU—about aspects of Iran's human rights record, which we raised with those whom we met. We will comment on these aspects of the visit in greater detail in a separate Report on Iran.

195. For the purposes of this Inquiry, the week of our visit was a very interesting week in which to evaluate the United Kingdom's approach to Iran against that of the United States, which still has no diplomatic relations with Tehran.

196. The US State Department describes the Islamic Republic of Iran as the world's "most active state sponsor of terrorism."[215] We noted above that the United Kingdom does not believe that Iran is sponsoring terrorism in Iraq. The Foreign Secretary told us that "in respect of al Qaeda terrorism", Iran "is important and geographically sited in terms of transit." Co-operation with Iran on detention of al Qaeda terrorists and disabling al Qaeda "has been the subject of continuing discussions with the Iranian government. They have now I think detained fifty al Qaeda suspects, and what we look forward to is a further and more enhanced degree of co-operation with the Iranian government."[216] Given the negative US attitude to Iran it is hardly surprising that the Iranian Government fails to co-operate with the United States over those detained. The hard line taken by the United States has almost certainly been counter productive.

197. On a more positive note, relations between the United States and Iran have improved somewhat following the devastating earthquake in Bam on 26 December 2003. As well as providing humanitarian assistance to Iran, which Tehran accepted, Washington ordered a temporary easing of trade restrictions on Iran in order to facilitate the delivery of aid. In addition, the United States offered to send a delegation to Iran led by Senator Elizabeth Dole, although the Iranian authorities declined this offer on the grounds that conditions in the city were too difficult. Speaking on 1 January 2004, President Bush said

The Iranian government must listen to the voices of those who long for freedom, must turn over al Qaeda that are in their custody and must abandon their nuclear weapons program. In the mean time, we appreciate the fact the Iranian government is willing to allow our humanitarian aid flights into their country. And it's a good thing to do. It's right to take care of people when they hurt, and we're doing that.[217]

Although it is too early to draw any real conclusions, there could now be scope for renewed efforts at dialogue between the two countries.

198. The Foreign Secretary also told us that Iran has "signed up to all international instruments against terrorism and they are tough on terrorism,"[218] with the important exception that they retain links to Palestinian rejectionist terrorists: "What Iran says is that they do not regard those organisations whom they support—principally Hezbollah but to a degree one or two others—as terrorist organisations; these are freedom fighter organisations."[219]

199. We outlined in some detail above the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the wider war against terrorism. The extent of Iran's influence over, and support to, Palestinian rejectionist groups is not clear, but "they certainly have a degree of influence through the assistance and training and other sorts of support they provide to Hezbollah, Hamas and perhaps Islamic Jihad".[220] Although similarly unclear, Iran or at least Iranian elements were implicated in the Karine A affair (in January 2002, Israel seized a ship carrying weapons in the Red Sea which it claims were being transported to the Palestinian Authority).[221] Conversely, during our visit to Iran, officials claimed some credit for the brokering of the hudna. Clearly, Iran's withdrawal of assistance to terrorist groups would help to diminish the capacity of terrorists to derail the political process in Israel and Palestine.

200. Edward Chaplin, Director of the Middle East and North Africa at the FCO told us that Iran's links with Palestinian rejectionist groups "is one of the key concerns that not just we but the other EU governments have in the political dialogue we conduct" with Iran: "the EU has made very clear that there will be no progress on the negotiation of a Trade and Co-operation Agreement unless Iran demonstrates progress on those issues of key concern."[222]

201. The Foreign Secretary suggested that bilateral and EU pressure in this area might be achieving results: he had been encouraged that

In informal discussions I have detected a shift by the Iranians. They no longer are saying dogmatically that the only solution right for the Palestinians is a one state solution. The way it has been put to me, but informally, is, 'We have a one state solution as our policy, but we are willing to recognise that if the Palestinians move from a one to two state solution'—which is indeed where they are—'we may have to accept that or will accept that as reality.'[223]

202. The improvement in recent years of relations between Iran and the Arab states is a positive development, ending as it does Iran's isolation in the Middle East. Most recently, Iranian Vice-President Mohammad Ali Abtahi in January announced that Iran and Egypt will restore full diplomatic ties, although the move has not been confirmed by Egypt.[224] In December, President Khatami and his Egyptian counterpart had met; this was the first meeting between Iranian and Egyptian heads of state since the 1979 revolution. A warming of relations between Iran and Egypt would reduce Iran's isolation in the region and can only be positive.

203. We conclude that through its links with Palestinian terrorist organisations, Iran disrupts prospects for peace between the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. We further conclude that the Government, with its partners in the European Union, has a number of incentives—such as the Trade and Co-operation Agreement—which it can employ to help encourage Iran to cease its links with terrorist groups. We conclude that the Iranian authorities value these incentives and that their existence could be used to discourage Iranian support for Palestinian terrorist groups.

204. The United States' second source of major concern with respect to Iran is its nuclear programme.

205. In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), a group which opposes the Iranian regime, held a press conference at which it revealed the existence of two previously secret nuclear facilities in Iran, along with details about the organisational structure and the front companies Iran had established to procure materials and equipment for these facilities.[225]

206. Following these revelations by the NCRI, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began actively investigating Iran's nuclear facilities, and specifically its implementation of the Agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We heard in February 2003 from Dr Gary Samore, Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He told us that for years government experts had been warning that Iran was trying to develop nuclear weapons. He also highlighted the risk that Iran is seeking to build a 'nuclear breakout capability' under the NPT in order to "give three months notice if they decided they needed to acquire nuclear weapons. They could leave the Treaty and those facilities could be converted to produce materials for nuclear weapons."[226]

207. In June, the IAEA made an interim report on implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement. The FCO states that the scale and scope of the nuclear programme revealed by this report "went far beyond that previously admitted by Iran, and is at odds with the requirements of a relatively modest civil nuclear power programme."[227] In the report, the IAEA concluded that

Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed … the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of concern.[228]

208. On 26 August, the IAEA's Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei issued a further report to the IAEA Board of Directors, stating that "Iran has demonstrated an increased degree of co-operation" He also noted that Iran had agreed to start negotiations towards an Additional Protocol to the NPT, which would allow the IAEA to conduct more intrusive inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities. This, he judged, was a "positive step". However, he also said diplomatically that "information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, and … some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran." Dr ElBaradei pointed out that "there remain a number of important outstanding issues, particularly with regard to Iran's enrichment programme, that require urgent resolution." Continued and accelerated co-operation and full transparency on the part of Iran are essential for the Agency to be in a position to provide at an early date the assurances required by Member States."[229]

209. In response to the Director-General's report, the IAEA Board of Directors met in early September, and adopted a resolution calling on Iran to "remedy all failures identified by the Agency and cooperate fully with the Agency to ensure verification of compliance with Iran's safeguards agreement by taking all necessary actions by the end of October 2003", requesting Iran "to work with the Secretariat to promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement [an] additional protocol" to its existing Safeguards Agreement, and requesting the Director General to

continue his efforts to implement the Agency's safeguards agreement with Iran, and to submit a report in November 2003, or earlier if appropriate, on the implementation of this resolution, enabling the Board to draw definitive conclusions.[230]

Iran reacted angrily: On 8 October, President Mohammad Khatami said that the Board of Governors' statement on Iran was "unjust, oppressive and an example of aggression". He nonetheless told reporters that Iran-IAEA cooperation will continue: "we will do what is needed to remove the suspicion about Iranian nuclear program."

210. Over the summer of 2003, the United Kingdom, France and Germany initiated a co-ordinated effort to encourage Iran to agree to the Additional Protocol. This began on 4 August, with a joint letter from the three Governments. On 21October 2003, the Foreign Secretary, together with his French and German counterparts Dominique de Villepin and Joschka Fisher, visited Tehran to negotiate with the Iranian authorities, a joint EU initiative of symbolic and practical importance.

211. The three foreign ministers met President Khatami, Foreign Minister Kharrazi and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Committee Hassan Rouhani. The troika's discussions

were aimed at underlining to the Iranian authorities the concerns of the international community regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the necessity for Iran to comply fully with the requirements of the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) board of governors' resolution adopted on 12 September.[231]

212. At the end of the visit, Iran agreed in a joint statement to comply with the three key elements of the IAEA board resolution:

- to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve, through full transparency, all requirements and outstanding issues of the agency, and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA;

- to sign the IAEA additional protocol, and commence ratification procedures. As a confirmation of its good intentions, the Iranian Government states that it would continue to co-operate with the Agency in accordance with the Protocol in advance of its ratification;

- to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, as defined by the IAEA.

213. This mission was a success. On 10 November, Iran delivered a letter to Dr ElBaradei conveying its Government's acceptance of the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Iran also informed the IAEA that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in Iran—specifically, to suspend all activities on the site of Natanz, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes and not to import enrichment-related items. The term 'suspension' rather than 'cessation' may of course be significant.

214. The IAEA Board of Governors—which includes the United States—has also reached a consensus on how to proceed with the question of Iran's nuclear facilities.[232]

215. The main relevance of the Iran nuclear issue to the wider war against terrorism is that it represents a 'test case' of how the international community can address a state suspected of contravening international arms control agreements and developing weapons of mass destruction without the use—or the threat—of military force. We accept, of course, that only time will tell if the agreement has in fact been successful.

216. The Iranian authorities have stressed throughout the recent nuclear crisis the importance of maintaining Iranian sovereignty and national pride: on 8 October, for example, President Khatami told a press conference that Iran "will never accept a commitment that may jeopardize the security and national sovereignty of the country."[233] Despite the scepticism of parts of the US administration about the effectiveness of multilateral arms control institutions, the United Kingdom and its European allies have, in this case, pushed hard to address this question through the IAEA. Dr Ali Ansari, an expert on Iran at the University of Durham, wrote to us that in the case of Iran, "The internationalisation of the issue" through pursuing negotiations through the IAEA "was essential to ensure that hardliners in Iran were not able to present the pressure to sign the additional protocols as another exercise in American double standards and arrogance."[234]

217. Dr Ansari also argued that the visit of the foreign ministers to Tehran was an important symbolic gesture in respect of Iranian national pride: "it was important that [Iran's] decision was not seen as a humiliating climb down, but as a dignified compromise, and the visit of the three foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and Germany, went a long way to conveying this view."[235]

218. Dr Ansari felt that European 'carrots' also helped to ensure Iran's agreement. The European troika's ability to tie negotiations on the nuclear issue to "better political and economic relations with Europe as well as collaboration on civil nuclear technology" also helped, in his view, to "ensure that Iran was more candid about its previous non-disclosures than many had expected, and more importantly, that henceforth it would fully adhere to its obligations."[236] In his evidence to us on 2 December 2003, the Foreign Secretary stated that if Iran does comply with the agreement it has made, the EU will respond with greater co-operation in the civil nuclear field.[237]

219. In December 2002, we concluded that "Britain can work constructively with European Union partners as a whole on areas of foreign policy—such as development, the ICC and Iran—while aligning itself more closely to the United States and a group of EU partners on policy towards Iraq." We recommended that

in the war against terrorism and elsewhere, the Government continue to judge each of its major partners' policies on their own merits: the experience of the past year has demonstrated the extent to which Britain can work with both the EU and the US, without damaging its relationship with either.[238]

220. In the case of Iraq, the United Kingdom followed a course very close to that of the United States, and eventually chose to go to war to disarm Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction. With Iran, the United Kingdom has chosen a different strategy from that of the US. While the US has bracketed Iran in the "axis of evil" and has no direct relationship with the Iranian authorities, the United Kingdom has pursued a policy of intensive, critical engagement. The United Kingdom has also chosen to distance itself from the most aggressive US statements on Iran,[239] instead choosing to address the question of Iran's nuclear programme in close alignment with two major European partners, France and Germany.

221. We commend the Government's decision to work with France and Germany to help ensure Iran's agreement to the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We conclude that this decision helped to ensure that the IAEA can now conduct intrusive inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities. We further conclude that this episode demonstrates the potential of co-ordinated European action to address common security concerns, and that it demonstrates the continued relevance of multilateral arms control mechanisms.

Syria

222. When President Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, Hafez al-Assad, as President of Syria in June 2000 there was considerable optimism that he would pursue both political and economic reform. This optimism was based on the new President's relative youth and the fact he was educated in part in the West. He was also known to advocate modernisation and have a strong interest in information technology. A further positive indicator was the fact that he led an anti-corruption drive during the last few years of his father's presidency. However, while there were some tentative moves towards reform in the so-called 'Damascus Spring', with the release of political prisoners and enhanced freedom of political speech, it was not long before these new freedoms were largely reversed. There has been considerable speculation about the role of the country's old guard in this policy reverse and the relative weakness of the President. Whatever the cause of this reverse, the President is now focusing, at least for the time being, on economic rather than political reform (although even this is making slow progress). Nevertheless, despite the setbacks to the reform process, President Assad appears to be personally receptive to the idea of reform.

223. In its response to our July 2003 Report, the Government stated that it has a number of serious concerns about Syria. "In particular its support for those Palestinian rejectionist groups—terrorists—whose actions endanger a comprehensive agreement as set out in the Quartet's Roadmap for peace in the Middle East."[240] A number of terrorist groups have facilities in Syria, although we heard from Nomi Bar-Yaacov that these groups are largely run from within Palestine.[241] Syria also has strong links with Hezbollah and some degree of influence on it.[242]

224. In April 2003, the Foreign Secretary told the Committee that removing the regime in Iraq had "already helped to improve the overall security environment within Israel and the occupied territories" and that it had "enabled us to begin a more vigorous discussion about the support for such terrorist organisations by other countries in the region."[243]

225. Under increased international pressure following the war in Iraq, Syria closed the Damascus offices of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. However, there is scepticism over Syrian moves. On 2 December 2003, the Foreign Secretary told us that

As described to me by a very senior Arab journalist, there is an elaborate but rather transparent pantomime through which people who want to talk to Hamas leaders have to go. They phone up a number in Damascus, they get an answering machine, they are told the Hamas political organisation has cleared off, and then 20 minutes later if they are the right person they are phoned back and told where to go in Damascus to talk to the political leadership. This is all well known to the security authorities in Damascus moreover.[244]

226. In considering the impact of the war in Iraq on Damascus, Jonathan Stevenson wrote to us that "while Syria has appeared intimidated at times, it has not ended its logistical and political support to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad."[245] In addition, Syria has not moved to disarm Hezbollah, although it is reported to have limited arms shipments to the organisation in order to limit its activities.[246] Clearly Syria has a long way to go convincingly to distance itself from terrorist organisations.

227. We conclude that although Syria's closure of the offices of terrorist groups in Damascus is a positive step, it continues to support terrorist organisations and has failed to restrain them beyond temporary efforts to limit their activities.

228. The Government has also expressed concern over persistent reports that Syria is seeking to develop chemical and biological weapons and delivery systems. In its 9 December 2002 discussion paper on missile defence, the Ministry of Defence noted the export of SCUD technology from North Korea to Syria.[247]

229. The US Government has been more vocal in its criticism of Syrian efforts to develop WMD. On 30 October, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton cited Syria's nuclear research and development programme as an area of concern, and in particular its "efforts to acquire dual-use technologies … that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program." He went on to claim that Syria has

one of the most advanced Arab state chemical weapons capabilities … [and] is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons capability… The message that the Bush Administration and the Congress are sending is clear: Syria must immediately change course and change its behaviour on all of these fronts, or face the consequences.[248]

There were also suggestions in the US that Iraqi WMD were transferred to Syria ahead of the war, although John Bolton said that while the United States sees the reports "as cause for concern," it has "thus far been unable to confirm them."[249] There must, therefore, be some scepticism about these claims.

230. In the past, Syria has categorically denied accusations that it is developing WMD. However, in January 2004, President Bashar al-Assad came close to admitting that Syria has WMD when he said in a press interview that Syria is entitled to defend itself by acquiring a chemical and biological deterrent, "We are a country which is [partly] occupied and from time to time we are exposed to Israeli aggression … It is natural for us to look for means to defend ourselves."[250]

231. This is not wholly new. In response to accusations that it is developing WMD, Syria has often drawn attention to Israel's nuclear capability. In a move seeking to highlight Israel's nuclear capability and in an attempt to gain US recognition of capability, Syria on 16 April 2003 introduced a draft Resolution in the UN Security Council calling for countries in the Middle East to ratify a series of arms control treaties, including the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria's Ambassador to the UN, Mikhail Wehbe, said that Damascus would ratify it if all other governments in the region also did so.[251] Similarly, in January 2004, President Assad said that any deal to destroy Syria's WMD would require Israel to abandon its undeclared nuclear arsenal. He also called on the international community to support Syria's proposal to remove all WMD from the region.[252]

232. We are concerned about the pursuit of WMD by Syria. However, we conclude that pressure alone is unlikely to succeed in gaining Syrian co-operation on WMD, and recommend that the Government pursue dialogue with Damascus in order to address this threat.

233. We also recognise Syria's concerns about Israel's nuclear capability and recommend that the Government pursue this issue with the Israeli Government. We conclude that ultimately, a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Arab States will be required to address the issue of WMD and arms proliferation in the region, and we recommend that the Government seek to encourage Syria and Israel to return to the negotiating table.

234. Syria has been co-operative in some ways. Syria robustly condemned the attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequently provided valuable co-operation on intelligence sharing. Most recently, Syria provided valuable co-operation following the bombings in Istanbul on 20 November 2003, handing over a number of suspects to the Turkish government.[253] We outlined above Syria's role in post-war Iraq and the fact that although its co-operation has been limited, Damascus, as indeed Tehran, could have been far more disruptive to Coalition efforts there. We also noted the importance of the United Kingdom with regard to Syria given its diplomatic relations with Damascus and role in the coalition in neighbouring Iraq. We also outlined above the benefits of engagement.

235. Since 11 September 2001, the United States has put increasing pressure on Syria. In contrast with the Clinton administration, which sought to gain Syrian co-operation by promoting progress on peace between Syria and Israel, the Bush administration has taken a more confrontational position. In March 2003, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld warned Syria against supplying Iraq with military equipment, saying that the US "consider such trafficking as hostile acts and will hold the Syrian government accountable for such shipments." When asked if the United States was threatening military action against Syria, he replied: "I'm saying exactly what I'm saying. It was carefully phrased."[254]

236. Israel's 5 October attack on the Ein Saheb camp near Damascus was, as we note in paragraph 132 above, widely believed to have had prior US consent. We heard from Nomi Bar-Yaacov that this was an effort on the part of Israel to "send a very strong message to "terrorist organisations" and states supporting terror."[255] In considering how this message was received in Damascus, Nomi Bar-Yaacov told us that to a certain extent a strong message was received, but that "the official response has always been that they are not harbouring terrorists and that Palestinian terrorist groups do not operate out of Damascus."[256]

237. Most recently, in November 2003 the US Congress approved the Syria Accountability Act, which imposes various sanctions on Syria, after President George W Bush ended his opposition to the move. It was signed into law by President Bush on 12 December.

238. The Syrian response to this pressure has been limited. We outlined in paragraph 225 Syria's closure of the offices of terrorist groups and its continued support for them. Despite initial optimism following his visit to Syria in May 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell in June said that "They took some limited steps, those limited steps are totally inadequate. We have gone back to the Syrians to let them know that we find their actions inadequate."[257] We also heard from Jonathan Stevenson that while Syria is "intimidated by the intervention in Iraq, which probably means that it is even less inclined, if it ever was inclined, to help al-Qaeda and thereby become a bigger enemy of the United States … it will continue to do what it did before and that is to provide support for Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad." In fact, Jonathan Stevenson told us, "the intervention in Iraq and the sabre rattling that followed it, has probably made Syria, on balance, less inclined to extend the kind of grudging co-operation that it provided right after 9/11."[258]

239. Responding to a question about what 'carrots' could be offered to Syria to encourage greater co-operation, the Foreign Secretary told the Committee that

What we have to say to Syria, as we say to any other country, is that they are under very clear obligations in respect of United Nations Security Council mandatory obligations in respect of the fight against terrorism, which we want to make sure they are meeting. It goes without saying that countries which are compliant with their international obligations find the environment in which they have to work internationally is a better one. I think, bluntly, Syria has to understand that the onus is on them to meet its very clear obligations more effectively to deal with terrorism.[259]

While we agree that Syria must offer greater co-operation with regard to terrorism, we believe that carrots are also needed; Syria should be rewarded for its assistance against al Qaeda and offered the prospect of further gain if it continues to co-operate.

240. In addition, we note Syria's dissatisfaction with its exclusion from the Middle East Road Map and the ultimate need for a resumption of negotiations between Israel and Syria. In December, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said that Turkey would help to mediate peace talks between Syria and Israel. This initiative may gain momentum following the January visit by President Assad to Turkey[260] (the first such visit by a Syrian head of state) and his subsequent offer (made in his interview with the Daily Telegraph) to restart peace negotiations with Israel.[261]

241. We note the improvements in bilateral relations with Syria. We also note with approval the formation of the British-Syria Society and urge HM's Government's encouragement of such initiatives to increase mutual understanding.

242. We conclude that, at this stage, it is better to foster gradual reform and co-operation with Syria than to push for unachievable objectives. Syrian co-operation is important for success in Iraq and the Middle East peace process. Given the failure of pressure alone to gain Syrian co-operation, we recommend that the Government continue to pursue constructive engagement and dialogue as the best way to foster co-operation. In particular, we recommend that the Government work to encourage Israel and Syria to resume peace negotiations, including giving its support to any regional efforts at mediation in the conflict, and generally to improve bilateral relations. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government set out its position on the Golan Heights and the Israeli settlements there.

Libya

243. On 19 December 2003, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi confirmed that Libya had been seeking to develop WMD and longer range missiles to deliver them. In a statement delivered by Libyan Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgam, Libya committed itself to abandon these programmes and limit itself to missiles with a range of no more than 300 kilometres, in compliance with the parameters set by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Mr Shalgam announced that this would be done in a transparent and verifiable manner, and invited immediate international inspection.[262] In addition, he committed Libya to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (including the Additional Protocol) and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

244. On 28-29 December, IAEA Director-General Dr Mohammed ElBaradei led a two-day visit to Libya during which four nuclear sites were inspected. Dr ElBaradei will present his report to the next meeting of the IAEA board of governors, which is scheduled for March 2004. However, ahead of this, he has said that the Libyan programme was "in the very initial stages of development" and that it had not produced any uranium and was still several years away from developing a nuclear weapon.[263] With regard to Libyan assistance, he said: "What I've seen the last couple of days is full co-operation, full transparency on the part of Libya. I was assured by all levels of the Libyan Government that they are ready to answer any questions, that they have people available for interviews."[264]

245. The Libyan announcement of 19 December followed nine months of secret talks with the United Kingdom and United States. In his 22 December letter, the Foreign Secretary told us that: "Following the Lockerbie settlement, Libya came to us in March … to see if it could resolve its WMD issue in a similarly cooperative manner. Nine months of work followed with experts from the US and UK, during which the Libyans discussed their programmes with us."[265] Commenting on the importance of the relationship with Libya to producing these talks and ultimately the 19 December announcement, the Foreign Secretary on 5 January 2004 told the House that:

This agreement represents a successful outcome for the engagement by the United States and the United Kingdom with Libya over a long period. We have, I believe, established a relationship of trust, which has enabled Libya first to renounce terrorism and now to renounce the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.[266]

246. While welcoming the Libyan move as "an important and welcome step toward addressing the concerns of the world community", President Bush has said that US sanctions on Libya will remain in place for the time being.[267] However, the President also said that

As Libya takes tangible steps to address those concerns, the United States will in turn take reciprocal tangible steps to recognize Libya's progress. Libya's agreement marks the beginning of a process of rejoining the community of nations, but its declaration of December 19, 2003, must be followed by verification of concrete steps.

247. For the Government's part, the Foreign Secretary told the House that he had invited his Libyan counterpart to visit London as

part of the process of implementing Libya's decision to dismantle its weapons programmes. Britain and the United States will now make progress with the practical issues of verification and of the dismantling of the weapons, in partnership with Libya and with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We have committed ourselves to helping with the preparation of Libya's return to those two international organisations, and to helping to dismantle the programmes that Libya has agreed to destroy[268]

The Foreign Secretary also stated that: "For our part, we have recognised that we now have corresponding responsibilities to enable Libya to come fully into the mainstream of the international community".

248. A disturbing aspect of this affair has been the allegations that Pakistan supplied Libya—and other countries—with nuclear technology, knowing that it had a military application. Pakistan has strongly denied these allegations.[269]

249. We welcome Libya's decision to relinquish its WMD programmes and we commend the Government for its role in bringing this about. We also commend the Government's policy of engagement with Libya and note that it was essential to creating the environment that facilitated the secret talks that ultimately resulted in Libya's decision to end its pursuit of WMD. We further commend the co-operation between United Kingdom officials and their US counterparts during these secret talks.

250. We conclude that the Libyan announcement sets a precedent for how to deal with 'rogue states' and could encourage other countries to improve their co-operation with the West. While we accept what the Foreign Secretary has said about the need for "a partner with whom to negotiate" for diplomacy to reap rewards, we recommend that the Government seriously consider the implications of events in Libya for relations with both Iran and Syria.

251. We further recommend that the Government ensure that it does its utmost to fulfil its "responsibilities" to help Libya fully to enter the international community and derive the benefits of its co-operation, and that it work closely with the IAEA and OPCW to do this. We also recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government inform us of what steps it is taking to monitor closely Libyan compliance and to ensure that it does not lift the restrictions that remain on Libya too quickly.

Conclusions

252. The United Kingdom has taken a different approach from the US towards Iraq's most problematic regional neighbours. While Syria and Iran have not taken as many steps forward as they might, for example in taking a more constructive approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we conclude that the United Kingdom's approach to these two countries has already yielded some positive results.

253. Both Iran and Syria have potential to be far more disruptive than they are at present in Iraq, and they could also cease their current "grudging"[270] co-operation over the capture of al Qaeda suspects. We further conclude that establishing and maintaining Iranian and Syrian co-operation in efforts to fight international terrorism, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to stabilise Iraq, will greatly increase the likelihood of success in the war against terrorism. We commend the Government's decision to engage actively with these countries.

209 HC (2002-03) 813-I. Back

210 State of the Union address, 29 January 2002, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news Back

211 See paras 243-251 below. Back

212 Remarks by John Bolton at the Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, 6 May 2002, available at http://www.heritage.org Back

213 HC (2002-03) 196, para 141. Back

214 HC (2002-03) 405, para 251. Back

215 'Iranian WMD and Support of Terrorism', Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance Testimony Before the U.S.-Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee, Washington, DC, September 17, 2003. Back

216 Q 11 Back

217 Remarks by President Bush, 1 January 2004, available at: http://usinfo.state.gov Back

218 Q 8 Back

219 Q 9 Back

220 Q 10 Back