Progress in dismantling al Qaeda
271. In our last Report we noted the capture of a
number of senior al Qaeda figures. However, we concluded that
those that remain at large retain the capacity to lead and guide
the organisation towards further atrocities and that al Qaeda
has demonstrated an alarming capacity to regenerate itself.[292]
We also concluded that, in spite of some notable progress, al
Qaeda continues to pose a substantial threat to British citizens
in the United Kingdom and abroad."[293]
272. In its response, the FCO said that
We agree that al Qa'ida had demonstrated resilience
and, to some extent, an ability to adapt. But we judge that this
capacity will continue to be limited by the persistent pressure
of the international effort which has inter alia led to the capture
of a significant number of senior al Qa'ida figures and the disruption
of terrorist operations, planning, financing and support. This
has had, and continues to have, a substantial negative impact
on the organisation.[294]
273. There have been further arrests of key al Qaeda
figures (notably Riduan Isamuddin, known as Hambali, al Qaeda's
liaison with Jemaah Islamiah of Indonesia). Jonathan Stevenson
wrote to us that "As a result, al-Qaeda's operations have
probably been compromised, and some valuable intelligence about
al-Qaeda's global operations may have been gleaned through interrogation"[295]
However, he added that the war against terrorism has forced al
Qaeda to
relinquish greater operational initiative to local
affiliates, and to concentrate temporarily on targets of opportunity
(e.g., in Tunisia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia and
Morocco) rather than the preferred target of the US (and, secondarily,
Europe). But the number of al-Qaeda members or affiliates, killed,
captured or detained is only a small percentage of the number
of those who passed though al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan,
and recruiting has continued.[296]
This development has been accompanied by a shift
in focus towards soft targets. The threat remains great. Al Qaeda
is not a tightly-controlled organisation but a diverse and de-centralised
group.
274. In its memorandum of 2 December 2003, the FCO
conceded that although "Counter-terrorism operations are
making it much harder for terrorists to operate and avoid capture
the determination of terrorists remains strong, and, as the attacks
in Istanbul demonstrate, the threat remains significant and global."[297]
275. The second report of the monitoring group of
the UN Taleban and al Qaeda Sanctions Committee, published on
1 December 2003, went further, saying that "The al-Qaida
ideology has continued to spread, raising the spectre of further
terrorist attacks and further threats to international peace and
security."[298]
276. We conclude that al Qaeda remains a substantial
threat to the United Kingdom and to British citizens and facilities
overseas, and that addressing the threat from al Qaeda and associated
networks must remain a key priority in the United Kingdom's foreign
policy.
Afghanistan and the war against
terrorism
277. In our last Report we noted the importance of
stabilising Afghanistan to the success of the war against terrorism.
Our witnesses were concerned that the measures taken since the
end of the war in Afghanistan to remove the conditions in which
terrorists thrive were insufficient. In particular, they were
concerned at the lack of successful nation-building and the failure
to extend security.[299]
We also detailed the Government's decision to deploy a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Mazar-e Sharif with the aim of helping
to extend the capacity of the Afghan Transitional Administration,
the development of a stable and secure environment and reconstruction.[300]
278. In its response to our Report, the FCO outlined
recent developments. The PRT
is already making an impact.
While not designed
to impose stability, the PRT is beginning to have a positive effect
upon security. The PRT has supported local disarmament initiatives
brokered by UNAMA,[301]
such as that around the Sholgareh valley. This demonstrated the
value of the PRT's co-ordinated approach. The PRT was able to
assist in arranging ceasefire negotiations between the factions
and in monitoring agreements to withdraw forces or to disarm them,
while the Department for International Development representative
has been able to help cement this progress through instigating
a number of small aid projects in the valley.[302]
The Government plans to develop this by encouraging
multinational contributions to the PRT. A joint MoD, FCO and DfID
conference was held in London on 11 September, which invited interested
nations to provide assistance. We understand that the PRT in Mazar-e
Sharif is considered a model for further PRTs.
279. However, overall the security situation remains
poor outside Kabul. In his 8 December report to the UN General
Assembly on the situation in Afghanistan, Secretary-General Kofi
Annan highlighted the deteriorating security situation as a major
concern.
Unchecked criminality, outbreaks of factional fighting
and activities surrounding the illegal narcotics trade have all
had a negative impact on the Bonn process. During the reporting
period, attacks on international and national staff of the assistance
community have intensified. The main security threats continue
to be terrorist attacks by suspected Al-Qaida, Taliban and supporters
of Hekmatyar against Government forces, the United Nations and
the humanitarian community.[303]
280. The report concludes that
the international community must decide whether to
increase its level of involvement in Afghanistan or risk failure.
The mandate set by Bonn can be accomplished only if the present
deterioration in security is halted and reversed, and the programmes
and staff of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations
and others assisting the Afghans are provided adequate protection.
281. We commend the Government for the success
of its Provincial Reconstruction Team in improving security in
northern Afghanistan, and in particular in brokering a ceasefire
between rival warlords.
282. There has been great concern about the poor
security environment in the country as a whole, with some indications
of resurgent Taliban activity, although we understand that the
Taliban's efforts to re-group have been thwarted. Continued security
in Afghanistan is crucial to prevent the country from once again
providing a safe haven for terrorists.
283. We recommend that in its response to this
Report the Government set out its plans to improve the security
situation in Afghanistan, including through extending the provision
of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
271 'Yemen foils embassy terror plot', BBC,
13 December 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk Back
272
Q 93 Back
273
Q 94 Back
274
HC Deb, 10 December 2003, Col 87WS. Back
275
HC (2002-03) 405, para 190. Back
276
HC (2002-03) 405, paras 185-190. Back
277
HC (2002-03) 405, para 228; HC (2002-03) 196, paras 23-43; and
HC (2001-02) 384, paras 47-60. Back
278
HC (2002-03) 405, paras 187-190; HC (2002-03) 196, paras 16-17;
and HC (2001-02) 384, para 69. Back
279
Government Response to HC (2002-03) 405, Cm5968. Back
280
Government Response to HC (2002-03) 405, Cm5968. Back
281
Government Response to HC (2002-03) 405, Cm5968. Back
282
Ev 24 Back
283
Q 49 Back
284
Strikes by missiles launched from Predator drones. Back
285
Ev 1 Back
286
'Second Report of the Monitoring Group, pursuant to resolution
1363 (2001) and as extended by resolutions 1390(2002) and 1455(2003)
on Sanctions against al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates
and associated entities', The Monitoring Group, 2 December 2003,
p.4, available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/mainbodies.htm Back
287
'Second Report of the Monitoring Group, pursuant to resolution
1363 (2001) and as extended by resolutions 1390(2002) and 1455(2003)
on Sanctions against al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates
and associated entities', The Monitoring Group, 2 December 2003,
p.40, available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/mainbodies.htm Back
288
HC (2002-03) 405, paras 191-195. Back
289
Q 36 Back
290
Ev 1 Back
291
Government Response to HC (2002-03) 405, Cm5968. Back
292
HC (2002-03) 405, paras 168-172. Back
293
HC (2002-03) 405, paras 197. Back
294
Government Response to HC (2002-03) 405, Cm5968. Back
295
Ev 1 Back
296
Ev 1 Back
297
Ev 24 Back
298
'Second Report of the Monitoring Group, pursuant to resolution
1363 (2001) and as extended by resolutions 1390(2002) and 1455(2003)
on Sanctions against al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates
and associated entities', The Monitoring Group, 2 December 2003,
p.1, available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/mainbodies.htm Back
299
HC (2002-03) 405, paras 181-184. Back
300
HC (2002-03) 405, para 182. Back
301
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Back
302
Government Response to HC (2002-03) 405, Cm5968. Back
303
Remarks by Kofi Annan to the UN General Assembly, 8 December 2003,
New York, available at: http://www.un.org/english Back