House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

Taking forward the war against terrorism

Multilateral institutions and the war against terrorism

284. In all of our Reports in the Inquiry, we have examined in some detail the role that multilateral institutions have played in fighting international terrorism. In July 2003, we noted that "co-operation between members of the United Nations Security Council, NATO and the European Union has contributed greatly to the prosecution of the 'war against terrorism' since its inception in 2001."[304] It was therefore a source of some concern to us that that in early 2003 "sharp divisions emerged between member states of these organisations over how best to address the threat from Iraq."[305]

285. In this Report, we have examined the current and potential role of the European Union in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and assessed the initiative of the European 'troika' of foreign ministers in negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme. We have also discussed the role of the United Nations in post-war Iraq.

286. These multilateral institutions have played an important role in reacting to the challenges presented by international terrorism and associated conflicts. In the past six months, both the European Union and the United Nations have also begun to develop forward-looking strategies, which aim to define their respective institutional approaches to the post-9/11 security environment.

The European Union

287. In September 2002, the US produced its National Security Strategy. We analysed the National Security Strategy in our second Report in this Inquiry, which was published in December 2002.[306]

288. In June 2003, EU High Representative Javier Solana presented a draft Security Strategy for the European Union. According to former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, it had "as usual" taken

a major crisis to move the governments of the European Union forward. It was the profound differences over the conflict in Iraq that convinced at least some governments that one should try to re-establish some sort of consensus in the Union through a more strategic document.[307]

Both the UN and the EU documents are major contributions to an important debate.

289. The EU Security Strategy was revised by the High Representative's Policy Unit in the autumn of 2003, and was adopted formally by EU member states at the Brussels Council on 12-13 December.[308]

290. The two strategies have different tones: the introduction to the US National Security Strategy states that

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically … shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.

The EU Security Strategy is introduced by the assertion that "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history." These introductions echo the 'Mars' and Venus' dichotomy popularised in the important work of Robert Kagan.[309]

291. The EU Security Strategy and the US National Security Strategy are similar in important respects, however. The EU document identifies terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states and organized crime as "three key threats". These threats are "more diverse, less visible and less predictable" than the "now improbable" threat of large scale aggression against any member state.[310]

292. The EU Security Strategy states that "Europe is both a target and a base" for international terrorism. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is, it argues, "the single most important threat to peace and security among nations." The combined effect of "terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction and the failure of state systems" could present European Union states with "a very radical threat indeed."

293. Jonathan Stevenson told the Committee that

It is true that the differing experiences between Europe and the United States with different kinds of terrorist groups may inform their operational prerogatives about how to fight terrorism. The respective threat perceptions, though, are converging. For example, Britain and France are much more alert to the prospect of a WMD terrorist strike.

294. We concluded in July that

the disagreements that surfaced within the EU over Iraq have raised serious questions about EU member states' capacities to resolve differences over matters of foreign policy and of the feasibility of a CFSP on matters of controversy among the members of the EU.[311]

We also concluded that

it is now more important than ever for the United Kingdom to work with partners in the European Union and the United States, and to demonstrate that there is no need to chose between these valued and long-standing partners… the restoration of good relations between allies—both bilaterally and in multilateral organisations—is important for the security of the United Kingdom, and for the success of the war against terrorism.[312]

It is particularly important that we expand the area of co-operation and understanding in the field of security policy with France.

295. We commend the Government for supporting the development, together with its EU partners, of a Security Strategy. We conclude that the EU Security Strategy will help the Union to work more effectively towards the alleviation of common threats to the security of EU member states and their interests.

The United Nations

296. In July 2003, we reported in some detail to the House on the negotiations in the UN Security Council which had preceded the Iraq war. We concluded that "it is in the interests of the United States and the United Kingdom to restore the effective functioning of the UN Security Council." We noted that "the United Kingdom has traditionally played an important role, often working alongside the US, in securing agreement in the Council" and further concluded that "careful and effective use of Security Council membership is especially crucial at this moment in the UN's history."[313]

297. A month after the publication of our Report, the United Nations office in Baghdad was blown apart by a terrorist attack. The organisation's staff were shocked by the violence of this unprecedented attack against the UN, and by the deaths of twenty two of their colleagues, including the Secretary General's representative. The UN pulled its staff out of Iraq. It has since conducted a review of the security of the Iraq operation which revealed serious shortcomings.[314]

298. On 10 December, the Secretary-General announced that, until circumstances permit a full deployment of the UN international staff to Iraq, he will build up the UN Mission incrementally outside Iraq. The bulk of the UN staff for this mission is located in Nicosia, Cyprus, with a small office in Amman, Jordan. UN Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator Ross Mountain was named as the Secretary-General's acting Special Representative for Iraq.[315]

299. Kofi Annan has also established a sixteen member panel to study global security threats and reform of the international system. The panel, which is chaired by former Prime Minister of Thailand Anand Panyarachun and includes Lord Hannay of the United Kingdom was formed in recognition that

The past year has shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on the range and nature of the challenges we face, and are likely to face in the future.

300. The Secretary-General's panel will

recommend clear and practical measures for ensuring effective collective action, based upon a rigorous analysis of future threats to peace and security, an appraisal of the contribution collective action can make, and a thorough assessment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the principal organs of the United Nations.[316]

The panel will report its conclusions to the Secretary-General in mid-2004.

301. The Secretary-General has also started a debate on the rules of intervention and the question of pre-emption. He has made clear his concerns with pre-emption and has repeatedly emphasised the importance of continued multilateralism. However, he has also highlighted the need to address the concerns prompting states to take pre-emptive action. In September 2003, he told the General Assembly

My concern is that, if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without justification. But it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can, and will, be addressed effectively through collective action… The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual States may use force 'pre-emptively' against perceived threats. Its members may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorisation of coercive measures to address certain types of threats - for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction.[317]

302. We were shocked by the attack on the United Nations mission in Iraq, and the devastating impact which it had on UN operations there. We would welcome the return of the United Nations to Iraq in 2004, and we recommend that the Government do its utmost to work towards a new Security Council Resolution setting out the UN's role in the period of transition to a new Iraqi government.

303. We conclude that the United Nations has an extremely important role to play in the global campaign against terrorism, through provision of assistance through its specialised agencies, through establishing the legitimacy of interventions, and through providing the forum for dialogue between member states over the conduct of the campaign. We welcome the Secretary-General's decision to establish a panel to study global security threats and reform of the international system, and we recommend that the Government study its conclusions carefully when it makes its Report to the Secretary-General.

NATO and the war against terrorism

304. NATO members have also been reassessing the Alliance's role in the war against terrorism—and, in particular, its role in peace keeping or peace enforcement.

305. We have described above the persistent security problems in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The US appears increasingly interested in extending NATO's role in both these situations. At the NATO summit of 4 December, member states debated the extension of the International Security Assistance Force's role in Afghanistan beyond the capital, Kabul. US Secretary of State, Colin Powell said that Afghanistan was NATO's priority and that "Our principal focus right now has to be Afghanistan." He went on to say: "We must... consider the possibility of NATO taking over all military operations in Afghanistan at some point in the future."[318]

306. The US also called for greater NATO involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq. Secretary Powell said in an address to NATO foreign ministers: "We urge the Alliance to examine how it might do more to support peace and stability in Iraq."[319] He suggested that NATO might take on the peacekeeping responsibilities currently undertaken by the Polish contingent, which already has some support from the Alliance. Sixteen of NATO's 19 members were part of the US-led coalition against Iraq, and 18 present or candidate members have forces there now.[320]

307. The official NATO communiqué said: "The issue of possible wider NATO role in Iraq was also discussed… The option of expanding NATO's role next year was not ruled out and could be discussed at the Istanbul Summit [in December 2004]."[321] The then Secretary General Lord Robertson said that expansion into Iraq was "not beyond the realms of possibility... but not until we've got Afghanistan right."[322]

308. Effective peace keeping and peace enforcement are currently essential to the successful pursuit of the war against terrorism. We recommend that the Government continue to work with its partners in NATO towards building the Alliance's capabilities in this area.

The Proliferation Security Initiative: an alternative approach to multilateralism?

309. The Bush administration has frequently voiced scepticism about the value of some traditional arms control mechanisms. The administration argues that a number of existing treaty-based mechanisms for the control of weapons of mass destruction are "worse than nothing", because states are able to sign such agreements and then flout them with impunity. In the view of the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, John Bolton, traditional non-proliferation measures such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention give an illusion of security but are in fact ineffective.[323]

310. The Bush administration has stated its preference for working with "like-minded states" in the control of weapons of mass destruction.[324] In May 2003, it institutionalised this approach in establishing the 'Proliferation Security Initiative' (PSI). The PSI "is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide." The initiative "builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes" and is

consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security… with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.[325]

311. The PSI was initially taken forward by eleven countries: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the US. Participation is open to "any state or international body that accepts the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles… and is willing to make an effective contribution to the Initiative's goals."[326] The Statement of Interdiction Principles specifies that

PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that [WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials] could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.[327]

312. The FCO informed us that the PSI participants are currently working on joint policy; on understanding the operational mechanics of interdiction work; and on establishing mechanisms to share actionable intelligence and analysis. Clearly, the core group needs to be extended and PSI cannot be allowed to develop into a means of by-passing or undermining existing international arms treaties.

313. We commend the Government's decision to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and we are pleased that the initiative "builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes".[328]

Co-operative threat reduction programmes

314. In previous Reports in this series, we have commented on US and United-Kingdom-funded programmes to reduce stockpiles of weapons and associated delivery systems held in countries of the former Soviet Union and to counter WMD proliferation as part of the Co-operative Threat Reduction initiative.[329] These are continuing programmes, which assume ever greater importance as the dangers of proliferation increase through the activities of North Korea and other unscrupulous exporters of WMD and missile technology. We recommend that in its response to this report the Government set out the steps it is currently taking to help prevent proliferation of WMD, together with their components and technologies, from the stockpile of the former Soviet Union, from North Korea and from other WMD proliferating states and groups.

Helping weak and threatened states towards reform

315. In past Reports, we have expressed concern at the lack of socio-economic opportunities and political freedom in the Arab world, and have argued that reform in the Arab world is crucial for the long term stabilisation of the Middle East region.[330]

316. The FCO has expressed its eagerness "to see in the Arab world, as elsewhere, the application of democratic values and good governance, in particular the rule of law, transparency and accountability,"[331] and we have asked it to supply us with regular updates of its work in this crucial area. This was the theme of President Bush's speech to the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003.[332]

317. In its response to our July 2003 Report, the FCO informed us that its "new Global Opportunities Fund is funding a programme designed to promote the rule of law, the increased participation of women, economic reform and good governance initiatives in the Arab world." The programme will aim to establish partnerships for reform across the region and build on work already underway. It will also take into account the conclusions of the Arab Human Development Report.[333] In December 2003, the FCO informed us that it had established a Partnerships with the Arab World Unit, which would take forward the United Kingdom's strategy for promoting reform in Arab countries. We also note the very important work that the British Council, the BBC World Service and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy do in this field.[334]

318. The FCO told us of some specific reform projects already under way, including regional schemes to develop journalists' skills and to enable young women to "support a discussion about their futures". The United Kingdom is also promoting technical assistance projects to counter money laundering and to develop the Syrian money market,[335] which we understand from our visit to Damascus are priorities for the Syrian government.

319. We commend the Government for its efforts to promote democratic reform and to provide technical assistance in the Arab world. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government provide us with updated progress reports in this crucial area.

Guantánamo Bay

320. In our previous Reports we have discussed the detention of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay and expressed concern that the US government continues to detain many of these prisoners without trial. We have also recommended that the Government continue to press the US government to move rapidly towards the trial of these alleged terrorists, in accordance with international law. In addition, we concluded that in a number of areas—including ensuring the fair trial of prisoners detained at Guantánamo Bay—the Government must ensure that its close relationship with the US administration brings clear, substantive benefits to the United Kingdom and its citizens.[336]

321. In his press conference with President George W Bush on 20 November 2003, the Prime Minister said that the issue of British detainees at Guantánamo Bay "will be resolved at some point or other." The Prime Minister also highlighted the fact that the UK will "make sure that justice is done for people." On 2 December the Foreign Secretary told us that

we are reaching, or near, a conclusion on this. If we are not able to achieve a satisfactory outcome in terms of the conditions which we would find acceptable, then we will ask for the UK detainees to be returned to the United Kingdom. That is where we are. I want it to be resolved as soon as possible. It is not satisfactory.[337]

322. More recently, on 8 January 2003, Pierre-Richard Prosper, the US Ambassador for war crimes issues, told a briefing that United Kingdom detainees could be repatriated if the United Kingdom "managed" them.[338] However, neither the FCO nor the US State Department have clarified Mr Prosper's comments.

323. We remain concerned at the Government's lack of progress in ensuring the fair trial of British citizens currently detained at Guantánamo Bay. We note that the current situation of uncertainty surrounding the fate of the United Kingdom detainees is unsatisfactory. We recommend that the Government continue to press the US towards trial of all the detainees in accordance with international law.

304 HC (2002-03) 405, para 228. Back

305 HC (2002-03) 405, para 228. Back

306 HC (2002-03) 196. Back

307 'We have crossed the Rubicon-but where are we heading next?', remarks by Carl Bildt, 17 November 2003, available at: http://www.cer.org.uk Back

308 'Presidency Conclusions', Brussels European Council, 12 December 2003, available at: http://europa.eu.int Back

309 'Power and weakness', Robert Kagan, Policy Review, June/July 2002. Back

310 'A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy', drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana and approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003, available at: http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm Back

311 HC (2002-03) 405, para 105. Back

312 HC (2002-03) 405, paras 106, 234. Back

313 HC (2002-03) 405, para 235. Back

314 'Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq', 20 October 2003, available at: http://www.un.org/english Back

315 'Ross Mountain Named Acting Special Representative for Iraq', UN Press release SG/A/860 BIO/3545, 10 December 2003, available at: http://www.un.org/english Back