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Corrected TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 1172-iii House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
Tuesday 16 November 2004 RT HON MR DENIS MACSHANE MP and MR DOMINICK CHILCOTT Evidence heard in Public Questions 114-224
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday 16 November 2004 Members present Donald Anderson, in the Chair Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr Andrew Mackay Andrew Mackinlay Mr John Maples Mr Bill Olner Mr Greg Pope Sir John Stanley ________________ Memorandum submitted by Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Rt Hon Mr Denis MacShane, a Member of the House, Minister of State and Mr Dominick Chilcott, Director for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined. Q114 Chairman: Mr MacShane, may I welcome you to the Committee for our inquiry in relation to the way forward on Cyprus. I welcome with you Mr Dominick Chilcott who is the Director for Europe of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Minister, as you know, five members of the Committee have but recently returned from Cyprus. The leader then was Mr Maples and I shall be calling on Mr Maples very shortly but, just really to give a platform of introduction, we know that there was a long, long process leading to the Annan Plan and the two referendums in April. We had the Proximity Talks, the face-to-face negotiations and consultations. Would you agree with those who say that the referendums marked the best possibility of uniting the islands since the 1974 Turkish invasion? Mr MacShane: Yes. Q115 Chairman: What about those who argue that, in the past, it had been the Turkish Cypriots with Mr Denktash in the dock of world opinion the main obstacle to progress but, as the former well-known High Commissioner in London Michael Attalides stated and I quote, "The Cyprus Government and the Greek Cypriots have lost the moral high ground and the capital of goodwill accumulated with the international community from repeatedly being the side that has shown political will for solving the Cyprus problem." How do you respond to Mr Attalides's statement? Mr MacShane: Firstly, I do not, as a serving Government Minister, like on the whole to comment about fellow European Union governments and I am very nervous when I hear the adjective "moral" in any question to do with politics. Q116 Chairman: Let us call it the high ground. Mr MacShane: All I would note is that, for many years under Annan one, two, and three and previous attempts by secretary-generals to find a comprehensive settlement to the question of Cyprus, there was a widespread perception that Mr Denktash senior was not making every possible effort to contribute to finding a solution but, in April, we saw that 85 per cent[1] of all Greek Cypriots who voted voted against Annan five including all the young members of the community. We are all elected politicians, we count votes as very precious things and, if 85 per cent1 of the population say "no", I think we have to listen to that voice and it is with deep regret that I record that fact. I am not sure that getting into playing games prior to that vote really is helpful. What we are trying to do as a British Government is move the story forward. Q117 Chairman: You will have heard, having read the evidence, that certainly one of our witnesses claims that that decisive vote by the Greek Cypriot community was the result of a failure to prepare that community for the inevitable compromises. How do you respond to that? Mr MacShane: There have been since the beginning of the 1980s numerous proposals on the table. Annan five was the most comprehensive. It did emerge in its final form after the discussions involved Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the Guarantor Powers in Switzerland. It was rejected but I think it is hard to say that all the Greek Cypriot voters suddenly woke up to the issues and the arguments just in the few weeks of April. Many of them, to my experience, in Cyprus itself and amongst different Greek Cypriot communities outside of Cyprus, have been thinking and worrying about this problem for a long time. Q118 Chairman: Does that mean you expected the result? Mr MacShane: I was very disappointed by the result. I do think, if you look at what was in it-the return of property to Greek Cypriots, the evacuation down to just a token 650 soldiers from Turkish troops, a united island exercising its authority as a member of the European Union-there was a lot that, certainly in my experience in considering the Cyprus problems and visiting there for nearly 30 years, was very, very positive. It is difficult to think of a better deal that could have been agreed by all the different parties involved and then put to the vote of the people. Q119 Chairman: Do you expect an Annan six shortly? Mr MacShane: An Annan five-and-a-half/Annan six, no. I think the Secretary-General has made it very clear that he has had it. He has spent a great deal of his time capital in small parts of the world vital to the people of Cyprus North and South; he has thrown at it the best that international diplomacy and the good offices of the UN has been able to provide and he has been spurned by political leadership and the votes of the people. Were I his advisers, I would say, "no". Q120 Mr Maples: Minister, I was one of the five of us who spent most of last week in Cyprus and I think we came to some pretty clear views about what had happened before the referendum and what I would really like to focus on is some of the ways forward and I think some of my colleagues will pick some of those up. I think we are, speaking for myself, particularly supportive of the stances that the Government and the European Union took after the referendum of trying to open up the economy of the North particularly through trade, not just with the south which they say is not so important but trade with the rest of the European Union. Their biggest industry is tourism and what they are primarily interested in is opening their airport and their ports, possibly incorporating Famagusta into some sort of deal with the South and certainly Kyrenia. Those measures were largely agreed upon by the European Union before 1 May but seemed to have stalled and I wonder if you could explain to us why they are stalled and how you think that process is going particularly in relation to the airport and ports issue of those being opened up to foreign trade. Mr MacShane: There were no specific measures as such agreed by the European Union. What there was was a statement from the European Council of Ministers on 26 April which talked about opening trade with the North and making clear that the Turkish Cypriot community who had voted for the international plan which was endorsed by the EU should not, as it were, be punished because, in the South, the vote had been no. Since then, the EU has put forward two measures: one to spend 259 million euros developing the north and the second to seek improved trade contacts directly between the businessmen and the tourist centres of the northern part of the island with the rest of Europe. Those at the moment are under discussion in Brussels because there is a difference of view amongst Council members on how to take those forward. Q121 Mr Maples: Let us go specifically into the ports and airport issue which the Turkish Cypriots we met made clear to us are much more important than cross-border trade. They are very grateful for the 259 million euros but they felt that trade was potentially far more valuable than that. Is it within the European Union's competence to resolve this issue or does it require the Republic of Cyprus to designate specific ports? Their argument is that this is a matter for their sovereignty. Is that a view that the British Government take or do we think that is something that the European Union could resolve and, if so, is it a majority voting matter because the Republic of Cyprus have a veto? Mr MacShane: We obviously are not going to go down the road of being in contravention of international law. We are exploring the possibility of direct flights to the North with our lawyers but, you are quite right, we hear a lot of language in this country about the necessity of obtaining vetoes and not having Brussels tell us what to do, but I am afraid that what is sauce for the British goose is sauce for the Greek Cypriot gander. That is to say that, as a sovereign UN recognised state, Cyprus controls its aerospace and it has the veto on matters of foreign policy. These are all issues which many people in this country insisted should be the basis on which the European Union operates. Q122 Mr Maples: I follow that but, on the specific question of the two ports and the airport, are those matters over which it is our view of the law that the Republic of Cyprus can effectively veto or are they matters on which either there could be a majority vote or alternatively that are within the European Union's competence to say, "We are designating such-and-such a port because you are depriving a free trade of a chunk of the European Union whether it is in or not" and I agree that it is in with the acquis suspended. I am just interested in the procedure. I am interested to know whether this is something that the other members of the European Union can insist on and make happen or whether we believe that the Republic of Cyprus has a veto because obviously depending on which of those views is correct dictates one's tactics in trying to resolve it. Mr MacShane: The EU cannot tell a Member State, "You must open your airports" to flights you do not want to receive." Were that to be dictated to London, I am sure there are colleagues in this room who would be the first to be jumping up and down about it. That is the price of veto power. Any question of flights is a matter for another international treaty known loosely as the Chicago Convention, it is not an EU competence. That is based on the authority of sovereign governments which, in the case of Cyprus, resides in the Republic of Cyprus, the one recognised UN state. That being said, we are working actively with officials in the Commission and let me say with colleagues and friends in the Cypriot Government to see what possibilities there are to allow trade 360 degrees around the compass in Cyprus to take place. It is self-evident that the most important part of the Cypriot economy in terms of the island as a whole is tourism. It is self-evident in my judgment therefore that the more internationally viable the recognised airports there are in Cyprus to take tourist passengers the better but, no, to revert to your original point, it is the Chicago Convention, it is not an EU competence and, no, the EU has always insisted in this country very, very rigorously on veto rights which means that we do not have the competence to impose what I think a number of Member States would wish to be a different arrangement. Q123 Mr Maples: I want to make sure that I understand this. So, it is our view of the European Union law that this remains within the right of the Republic of Cyprus to say, "We are not opening Ercan Airport" or "we are not opening Kyrenia or Famagusta to international trade" and there is nothing in the treaties or the law that we can invoke against that. Is that our view? Mr MacShane: On airports, yes. On ports, there is not a Chicago Convention. That, to some extent, is more fluid. Yes, the Chicago Convention, as I understand it, does give the UN recognised authority over Cyprus, namely the Republic of Cyprus Government, the power to withhold permission to designate Ercan in particular as an international flight designated airport. Q124 Mr Maples: For my final question, I would like to come back to this issue of time. Is the reason that this is held up in the Council because the Republic of Cyprus is refusing for the time being to agree? Mr MacShane: I would say that it would be fair to say that the Republic of Cyprus is not facilitating the search, certainly by my officials, to find a solution that would increase trade and direct flights to all parts of the island. We actually want to depoliticise this and simply make it a commercial question. If there are good commercial reasons to land at any airport in Cyprus-and I am not naming any particular one-then we think it is in the interests of all Cypriot people so to do. Q125 Mr Maples: I understand that but my question was, in that package that the European Council agreed on 25 or 26 April was very specifically opening up these ports and airports. That has been under discussion for six or seven months and has not happened. The Greek Cypriots made clear to us that they have no problem at all with the 259 million euros of aid but they do have a problem with the ports and airports issue. So, am I to understand that the reason that the opening up of, let us just say specifically, Ercan Airport is not happening is because, as of now and so far, the Republic of Cyprus Government has held that up using a perfectly legitimate power to do so? Mr MacShane: We have not found a solution and it would be perfectly fair to say that, in my judgment, the officials of the Republic of Cyprus are not working with us to find a solution. Chairman: I did not quite understand your reply to Mr Maples in respect of the ports. Mr Maples: I asked him specifically on the airport and he said that the officials of the Republic were not working with us to find a solution. Q126 Chairman: But, on the ports, you said that the position was more fluid. Did you say that in effect there was also a veto power on the part of the Republic of Cyprus in respect of ports? Mr MacShane: No. There is not an international treaty governing port operations but the trades that logically flows from Cyprus are not container ships from the UK pitching up in the North of Cyprus, it is actually between Cyprus and its closest neighbours Turkey and there you have the problem of the relationship between Turkey and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus which is a blockage to the trade. Q127 Mr Olner: I was one of the members of the Committee who were out in Cyprus last week and, as Mr Maples has said, there were press reports over there last week speaking of direct flights between the USA and Northern Cyprus which might start as early as the New Year. I do not think the Americans will be happy to do it if we cannot do it. Mr MacShane: There is talk about this, endless talk. I read telegrams from Cyprus every day and try and follow the reports in the papers that are published in Cyprus. The United States has of course a direct bilateral relationship. It may involve touching down in Turkey and then coming on into Ercan. That is one way of doing it but it is not direct flights in the European sense. We will have to wait and see. That has always been possible, as I understand it. Mr Chilcott: What the Americans are looking at is whether their bilateral air service agreement with Turkey would allow them to have organised scheduled flights from airports in Turkey that touch down in Northern Cyprus on their way to the United States because the only requirement, I understand, of American law for the last airport used before a flight lands in the United States is that it should meet the security standard set by the US authorities. So, provided there is a route available, they understand that, under their bilateral agreement with Turkey, they could fly from Turkey via an airport in the North, presumably Ercan, directly to an airport in the United States. Q128 Mr Olner: Can I assume that we have a bilateral agreement with Turkey as well? Mr MacShane: As I understand, it has always been possible to fly to Ercan via Turkey. That is not what the Turkish Cypriots want; they want direct flights; they want scheduled flights; they do not want a disguised landing and I think their demand is perfectly reasonable. Q129 Mr Olner: I know these are early days since the referendum but I have read what you have said and I know that you were in Cyprus the week before ourselves and you are absolutely right that there is no point in anointing one and rewarding another. That is extremely wrong language. Talking to people, I felt that there was a need in their minds from both sides in Cyprus that something needed to be seen to be being done and the weapon for the achievements of Cyprus is trade and industry and cross-border trade and industry. When do you think we will be able to see mechanisms, either the growth through the EU or whether they are able to achieve that in order that ordinary people, ordinary traders, can actually see that there is another dimension out of Cyprus because of the European Union? Mr MacShane: I think that is a very important point and what we do want to see is the material existence of all the people resident in the island improve and we need to bridge the prosperity gap between the North and the South which, as I am sure you saw with your own eyes, is significant. That is why the aid and trade regulations are being discussed. I wish I could inform the Committee that they have been agreed but I cannot and we will keep pushing as the British Government both for the aid disbursement and for trade regulation that will allow full trading relationships between them. As I say, I try to stop using the words "North" and "South", the "Turkish Cypriot" and the "Greek Cypriot" communities, it is simply between businessmen and individuals and students and people who want to get on with their business as we do in the rest of Europe. We will have, after 17 December, assuming, as I strongly do, that there is a clear and unambiguous "yes" to the start of negotiations with Turkey, a new context. We will have Cyprus as a member of the EU and we will have Turkey knocking on the door to become a member of the EU. That has to inject certain new dynamics. We are putting to work our best lawyers, our trade lawyers, our international aviation lawyers, and we are discussing this completely transparently with all concerned to see if solutions can be found. Q130 Mr Olner: I think it is a very big turning point for the accession in the roadmap, if you like, for Turkey to become a member of the European Union family but that is going to take some time. I hope we are not thinking of putting everything in Cyprus on the back burner until Turkey actually joins the European Union. Mr MacShane: No. On the contrary, when I was in Cyprus-and I repeated these points in an adjournment debate with the Member for Tooting (Tom Cox) the other week-we say as a government, "The sooner the better." We should not leave this for some final settlement at the end of negotiation with Turkey. Turkey herself has turned out very positive and powerful signals in this area. So, too, can the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. I urged President Papadopoulos and Mr Talat to talk directly. Mr Talat of course is no longer heading the Government; we are moving towards new elections we think early next year. If they cannot directly meet, they have some very brilliant and able advisers who can meet if not in the island then somewhere else. That was my personal plea, to talk, talk/jaw, jaw, better than taking up positions and staying in their respective trenches. Q131 Mr Mackay: I want to just underline what Mr Olner has just said, that there is an awful danger of lethargy, is there not, if we allow the Turkish application to get too mixed up with the Cypriot settlement because we all know that everyone in this Parliament welcomes the Turkish application and shares your view that we hope will be a positive mood on 17 December but we all know that that application is going to take a very long time inevitably and it would not be fair to allow that to start a settlement and you can underline that, I hope. Mr MacShane: I have just done an interview on Turkish CNN making almost exactly the point I have been making now, that Ankara should seek to solve or to make its contribution to solving the Cyprus problem earlier rather than later and send out the positive signals that would be very well received in the rest of Europe because, while certainly British political opinion is united on the question of Turkish application, the Committee will know full well from other Member States, not at the level of heads of government but there are powerful political forces opposing Turkey's bid to become an EU Member State. So, I think it behoves Turkey, though it is not for me to give advice, to show that in the Eastern Mediterranean it can find ways to solve the Cyprus problem as soon as possible. Equally, I have to say that the same message is true for everybody in Cyprus to drop entrenched positions and find ways of moving forward. The only losers remain the people of Cyprus. Q132 Mr Mackay: You rightly said a few moments back that a settlement can only happen if there is some economic convergence and you will be aware, as we are, having just returned from Cyprus that there is a major gap between the North and South and presumably you can see that this can only realistically happen if there is much freer trading law and Mr Maples has already mentioned the opening up of the ports and hopefully the airport as well. In answer to Mr Maples-and I think I am quoting you correctly-you said there were differences of view within the European Union which are delaying this procedure and, as you know, it is six, nearly seven months since talks started. What are those differences of view and who are they with? Mr MacShane: When you operate the European Union on the basis of vetoes, that gives one country tremendous authority to block anything it does not want to see happen. Q133 Mr Mackay: So, your real answer to Mr Maples's earlier questions was that there is the threat of the Republic of Cyprus veto which is delaying progress which everybody believes should happen and we found many people in the South who also felt this was important economic convergence. Mr MacShane: It is clear from my conversations with friends in the Government of Cyprus that they do not attach the same importance to open free trade 360 degrees around the compass from the island that the British Government do and I imagine that their representatives in Brussels will reflect that point of view. Q134 Mr Mackay: Just to press you a little further on the ports and the airport, I think I have interpreted you correctly, although you may put me right, when you said there was a difference between the ports and the airport and you referred to the Chicago Convention on the airport-and we might want to come back to that in a minute-and that there is no such Chicago Convention on ports. So, that means that there is a way for the European Union, if it so wants, to ensure free trade through the ports of Kyrenia and Famagusta. Can we have it quite clear as to whether there is that veto that the Republic --- Mr MacShane: No. Q135 Mr Mackay: There is no veto, so it could be done under European Union by what, qualified majority voting? Mr MacShane: No. Q136 Mr Mackay: Or by the Commission proceeding? Mr MacShane: To agree a common trade regulation vis-à-vis Cyprus requires unanimity. Obviously, any Member State if it so chooses, any individual ship owner if he so chooses, can sail into any port in Northern Cyprus. What we would prefer and what we are arguing for very strongly is a new trade regulation that allows the normal trading rules of the EU to be extended to the northern part of the island. Q137 Mr Mackay: So, if that cannot be achieved, clearly you want it to be achieved, the United Kingdom and other individual Member States would go it alone. Mr MacShane: As I said, we do not want to make this a question of political confrontation, we want to make this purely commercial and that is how the European Union as a whole works, does it not? It creates so-called level playing fields, to use that cliché. There is nothing today to stop any ship owner or any ship docking and unloading in Northern Cyprus. We would not know about it. Q138 Mr Mackay: Let us just move to the problem of delay. I am sure that you, like me, are more worried about voids and there is now a void developing as the six becomes seven months and you will run into a year and the situation will rapidly deteriorate. There does need to be movement, does there not? If there is no movement, there will be very serious political consequences. I am not quite clear from what you have said so far how you are going to achieve that movement. Mr MacShane: We are arguing for the moment and officials are arguing for it and I am arguing for it publicly on the record in Cyprus, European Capitals and obviously here in the House of Commons but we are one voice. Q139 Mr Mackay: If, by definition, you say there is an argument which is legitimate, there must be two sides to the argument. Somebody must be arguing against it, otherwise we would not resolve the problem. Mr MacShane: The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has not so far seen its way to agree to a comprehensive trade regulation to be adopted by the European Council. That is in the hands of intense high-level discussion amongst officials. I would hope that it could be resolved before 17 December, though I cannot guarantee to the Committee that that will be the case, and then your point is a very valid one, which is a point which I stressed in my visit down there and, as I say, it is nearly 30 years since I have been visiting Cyprus, you could feel that width of stagnation/stalemate in the air. As I say, I hope to goodness that there is not a Europe Minister for Britain in 30 years coming down and still sadly crossing the buffer zone, talking to the British soldiers on the toll there and talking to the successors of President Papadopoulos and Mr Talat, but it has gone on for 30 years. Q140 Mr Mackay: Finally, if I could just press you on the question of the international direct flights into Ercan which would obviously immensely help the tourist industry, as has already been mentioned, and the economy in general. The Minister is an expert on the Chicago Agreement, I am not, and certainly Mr Chilcott will be an expert and perhaps one of you could help me here. You suggested to us earlier that it was in the remit of the Republic of Cyprus who flew into airports on the island and we all know that there are Turkish flights into Ercan and we all know that, if British tourists wish at the moment to fly to the North, they either fly to Larnaca or they fly to a Turkish airport and then through. Does this mean that Turkey is acting illegally by flying into Ercan or are they getting the permission of the Republic? Mr MacShane: I will pass that question to Mr Chilcott. I have an idea but he is perhaps more technically qualified. Mr Chilcott: The position of course is that the Government in Ankara do not recognise the Republic of Cyprus Government. Under the terms of the Chicago Convention, the key provision in the convention is that an airport should be designated as an airport suitable for receiving international flights by the government of the territory in which the airport is found. For the Turks in Ankara, the government that administers the area in the north is the Government for the North of Cyprus, so for them there is no contradiction in allowing flights airtime, but then that would be their interpretation of the Chicago Convention. That is not our position, as you know. Q141 Mr Pope: I have just a brief question about the EU aid to Northern Cyprus which I think is supposed to be in the region of 259 million euros. What we know is that per capita GDP in the North is about one third of that of the Republic. We have just heard in this lengthy exchange about the difficulties of trade, the very least that the EU should be doing is over an aid programme but the aid programme also appears to be stalled. Could you explain to us if it is stalled and what we are doing to take it forward. Mr MacShane We have agreed the amount of money. There is some discussion on exactly how it is dispersed. The government of the EU Member State concerned, namely the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, is arguing that it should have a particular interest in how it is dispersed just as other Member States like to ensure that money from Brussels does not flow to areas and projects over which it has no say. We believe that it should be dispersed directly in the North. This is an area of continuing discussion. Q142 Mr Pope: I am not sure that I was greatly enlightened by that. Mr MacShane: This is, "Welcome to the EU." We have insisted throughout that Brussels actually has far fewer, far more limiting and far more hemmed-in competences and, above all, sovereign states and their elected governments can exercise vetoes limiting control, as done by Brussels, and therefore the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has the same footing as a British Government or any other EU Member State government in telling or in seeking to tell Brussels how its money should be dispersed. I regret that. Q143 Mr Pope: So, it is being vetoed, essentially? Mr MacShane: No, it has not been vetoed because it has not yet happened. Mr Pope: It has not yet been agreed. Q144 Andrew Mackinlay You seem to be like a rabbit trapped in the headlights! Listening to my colleagues' questions, you do not seem to know the way forward, do you? I have been listening with bated breath. Mr MacShane: I am delighted by the metaphor but I do not feel like a rabbit at all. I have been in Cyprus and worrying about Cyprus for some time and, if there were a way forward on direct flights, on aid and on finding a solution, believe me, nothing would give me greater pleasure than to bring these instant solutions which are acceptable to everybody in Cyprus to the Committee. If any colleague has a way forward to show to me, nobody would be more pleased than I and my officials who receive the wisdom of any colleague in telling us how we can solve the problems we have been discussing so far. Q145 Mr Hamilton: You will know that this Committee visited Cyprus two-and-a-half years ago and, on this visit just last week, we saw a very, very different picture. Things have changed quite dramatically. By the way, we did see some of the money that has been spent by the EU in Famagusta old port and there were blue flags being flown thanks to EU money having been spent there but clearly it is not enough. You mentioned earlier in the discussion we were having about the disparity between the incomes in Northern Cyprus and in the South and the rest of the Republic. I understand the disparity is about four-to-one, if I am not mistaken. In other words, the North has about one quarter income per capita of the South on average and that is clearly something that is a bar to integration and to economic convergence. It is obvious that we have to see the standard of living of the North increase fairly substantially before there can be any economic convergence. We mentioned also the ports and you kindly enlightened us on the Chicago Treaty and you said that any ship could dock in any port. One of the biggest problems we were told was that, yes, a container ship could come into Kyrenia or into Famagusta, but it is several times more expensive to unload containers in those ports and therefore it is a lot cheaper to go to the ports in the South and to Larnaca and ship the goods into the North which is something that does not please many Turkish Cypriots. I wondered what we were doing or what the European Union could do to make sure that those ports were brought up to scratch, or is that something again that the Republic of Cyprus Government, as a member of the European Union, has a veto over? Mr MacShane: I am not an expert in shipping trade and ports and, if the prices charged in a port is to high, then I understand why ships may want to go and unload elsewhere. That is partly a commercial decision. Our view, to get away from the port question specifically is, that any form of trade directly from any part of the island with the rest of European Union has to benefit all of the island. Flights are a rather more obvious example. The 259 million euros is an important contribution but, spread over the entire population of Northern Cyprus, it is not that much per capita. The question of developing all the different ports in the northern part of the island to the full international ports is a commercial consideration rather than one of the EU to solve. Q146 Mr Hamilton: You must agree it is ironic that, in the poorest part of the island, it is the most expensive place to unload goods in the ports. I am accepting that this is a commercial issue but the fact is that the goods become much more expensive and trade becomes more expensive in the northern part of the island in those ports that desperately need upgrading, but I accept the answer you have given. Mr MacShane: It is often the case. It is the poor who often pay the price for the success of the rich. Q147 Mr Hamilton: Can I move on to one of the reasons that I think was made clear to us that most Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan which was their sense that the security question was not being answered by the Annan plan in that it is was going to take so many years for the 40,000/45,000 Turkish troops to be removed from the island. Would you accept that we have a very important opportunity with the discussions on Turkey's possible accession/the discussions on Turkey joining the European Union which I think will take place on 17 December and I am glad to hear that our Government support Turkey's proposed accession in the future, but is it not inconceivable that Turkish troops should be allowed to remain in Cyprus should Turkey eventually join the European Union? That must be a condition of Turkey joining to see those troops removed from Cyprus sooner rather than later, I would have thought. Do you agree? Mr MacShane: I know that the Committee will be aware of Article 8, paragraph (b) of the Annan Plan which sets out very clearly the demilitarisation of the island saying that each contingent, that is to say Turkish side and the Greek side, will be down to 6,000 troops in the years up to 2011 and then down to 3,000 troops all ranks up to the year 2018 or the accession of Turkey to the EU and thereafter we will be back with the Treaty of Guarantee, the 1960 Treaty, of 950 troops for the Greek contingent and 650 for the Turkish contingent. I do not really think that 650 troops is an enormous presence and that was one of the victims, if you like, of the rejection of the Annan Plan, a very clear timetable I agree. From now until 2011 is six years, a little longer than the life of an English Parliament, and 2018 is 13 years but, compared to the 30 years where there has been no movement, that seems to me to be a gnat's eye blink and, for me, a good reason to vote "yes". Q148 Mr Hamilton: But that seems to be one of the reasons that a lot of the Greeks had reservations. Mr MacShane: I do understand that because it changed slightly from Annans one and two. What is clear is that, under any settlement, we should need to move back to the original UN calls for a de facto demilitarised island. Do not forget, the Greek Cypriots themselves, the military service going up to 26 months and Mr Iacovou, the Foreign Minister, told me that the cost to the Greek Cypriot budget was about 100 million of their pounds. So, again, in Greek Cypriot terms, they are having to maintain an excessive military burden which would have been literally overnight solved for them had they accepted the Annan Plan. We can come back to this question later on. The Committee suspended from 3.46 pm to 3.59 pm for a division in the House Q149 Mr Hamilton: Minister, we went, as you have heard, to Famagusta and, while we were there, we managed to have a look at the deserted and ghost town of Varosha which obviously is something of deep concern to Greek Cypriots and deep anger and, as you know, Varosha is completely sealed off and looks like something out of a Hollywood movie after a nuclear explosion. It is absolutely horrifying; we were told that there were rats the size of cats there and of course we were not allowed in. It is not very nice for the troops that are garrisoned there; it is used as a Turkish Army garrison. My question really relates to the differences between Annan three and Annan five and, as I understand it, Annan three proposed that all Turkish troops be removed from the Island of Cyprus after Turkey's accession to the European Union or within a certain limited period of years. Yet, that plan changed between Annan three and Annan five and I wondered whether you could explain the reasons for that change. What was it that prompted that change? Surely Annan three would have been quite saleable to the Greek Cypriots and yet Annan five clearly was not. Mr MacShane: I think that is a question you would have to put to the leaders of the two communities at the time that Annan three was discussed. As I said, Annan five was rejected in the referendum in April but the previous Annan four plan had not been agreed or supported by the Turkish Cypriot political leadership or arrived at the moment where they might have put to the test of a joint referendum. So, we are now back in Annan five at the status quo of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of London technically of 1960. I personally-and it is a personal point of view-cannot get hugely worked up about 650 troops. I just do not see that as a sticking point. I understand why two divisions of more than 30,000 troops are there today from the Turkish Army, it is obviously a problem, but, if I can express a personal point of view, the difference between 650 under the Treaty of Guarantee which was not contested as such by previous political leadership generations. Q150 Mr Hamilton: I can understand your personal view but, with respect, you did not have to live with the invasion in 1974 and that is what informed so many Greek Cypriots today. Mr MacShane: Yes but it is said in Cyprus that no Greek Cypriot can remember what happened before 1974 and no Turkish Cypriot can forget what happened before 1974. So, the pre-1974 stories, as I am sure you found out in discussions with friends in Northern Cyprus, are vividly different from some of the perceptions that are offered from the Southern part of the island. Q151 Mr Mackay: Minister, I would like to take you back to the answers which you gave to Mr Pope a minute ago about this very welcome EU aid package which amounts to the sum total of 259 million euros. As you will be painfully aware, this money is not coming through at the moment and I think you said to Mr Pope that you were using your best endeavours to ensure that it did come through and then, under further examination by Mr Pope, you explained that it was the Republic of Cyprus that would wish to ensure-I think I quote you correctly-that the aid only came if it was going to projects over which it had control. You and I know that it has no control over any projects in the North for reasons that are self-evident. So, if they stick to that point, they have a veto and the aid will not come; is that correct? Mr MacShane: Yes. Q152 Mr Mackay: The EU cannot be relaxed about that state of affairs. Mr MacShane: No, of course not. Q153 Mr Mackay: Because you have already agreed with me that the economic well being of the North and the bringing of it more into line with the South is essential to any settlement and here is an EU aid project to the North which is being blocked and no doubt the Commission could ensure that the money was put to correct use. There is not the suggestion that it would be fraudulently used, it is just merely that the Republic of Cyprus does not have control over the project. Mr MacShane: We are at the moment in discussions between the 25 Member States of the European Union. At the Committee of all the chief government representatives in Brussels that was held on 6 October, the presidency of the European Union currently held by the Netherlands said that there should be an effort to get a set of conclusions for the General Affairs External Relations Council of November which would include the aid regulations and it is intended by the Council to adopt the trade regulation by a specific date. Discussions to find the exact language that will give effect to that wish of the presidency at the beginning of October are still continuing. I do not want to characterise one particular government as being responsible because I think it is unhelpful in what are continuing negotiations but I will not hide from the Committee my view that the British Government feels there has not been enough operational support from the Government of Cyprus to give effect to the clear wish of the European Union as a whole. Q154 Mr Mackay: Mr Pope suggested to you that the Republic of Cyprus was vetoing. I am inclined to agree with that suggestion and you said, "No, merely delaying." When does delay become a veto? Mr MacShane: The processes of the European Union are long and tortuous. At what point putting up objections that one government considers legitimate constitutes a veto is not always clear. We have not reached that stage yet. Q155 Mr Mackay: But we are going to avoid what you and I earlier agreed would be highly dangerous? Mr MacShane: We are not yet able to discharge the obligations set out in the Council decision of 26 April which was before the ten new Member States joined which was to open up particularly trade relationships with the North of Cyprus and to disperse the 259 million Euros of aid, but I stress again that that is the nature of the European Union because it is not a super state and it is not a federal structure. Brussels has very limited power. It is 25 governments having to agree and, if one of them will not agree, that blocks what 24 others may wish to do and, as soon as everybody in Britain understands that point and stops propagating myths, the better. Q156 Mr Mackay: You would agree that it is important for this Committee, in reaching its conclusions, to know just where that block is coming from? Mr MacShane: I think I can only report to the Committee that at the moment in the discussion between the permanent representatives and the 25 Member States in Brussels, no agreement has been reached and, in my conversation with the Greek Government representations on and off since April, it has been put forcibly to me that they are not content with the proposals for direct trade to the north and not yet content with language on how the trade should be dispersed. Q157 Mr Mackay: Direct aid as well, it is not just trade. You are saying they are not content with direct aid. Mr MacShane: They are not content yet with the language on aspects of the disbursement of the use of the 259 million Euros of aid. I should point out that it may be of interest to the Committee that, as important as they say it is, it has not been raised as a major issue with me by friends in Northern Cyprus. The Turkish Government itself gives about 300 million euros worth of aid to Northern Cyprus every year. So, the European Union packet of money would certainly be welcomed but, by far --- Q158 Mr Mackay: It would double it. Mr MacShane: It would double it for one year. We, as a government, believe we should focus much, much more on trade and, as I said, trade 360 degrees around the compass, north and south from the island, east and west from the island, and from all parts of the island. Q159 Chairman: Since that agreement on 28 April, have any tangible benefits accrued to the Turkish Cypriot community? Mr MacShane: There has been a Green Line Regulation which allows passage between the North and South. Q160 Chairman: That was before. Mr MacShane: It existed before. It is now, as it were, under a formal regulation. Q161 Chairman: Anything tangible? Mr MacShane: That is the only tangible result that I can put to you. Q162 Chairman: But that existed before. Mr MacShane: There was not a regulation before. There was certainly, after the barriers were removed in 2003, passage across the border, but I was very much struck when I was there-and I do not know if colleagues who were there will confirm this-that in fact this is still a very divided island with two communities having very little cross-Green Line contact. Q163 Sir John Stanley: On the mechanics of trying to get process towards settlement of the Cyprus issue, is the Government's view that this is now essentially within the European countries a matter for the EU and an EU responsibility and that the British Government's input should be through the EU or is the British Government's view that there is also some room for a bilateral contribution by the British Government directly with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus? Mr MacShane: Let me stress, Chairman and Sir John, that, to the contrary, it is firmly our view and I think the European Union's view, that we should not seek to usurp or replace United Nations and in particular the role of the United Nations Secretary-General as the broker of the settlement. It has been a sensible tradition on the part of the EU not to step in and seek to resolve either, I put it as it were between inverted commas, "internal or bilateral disputes". What the EU does is support, as it did, it offered as part of the Annan Plan and you will have seen the annex stipulating that Turkish would be an official language which the united Cyprus enjoyed and lots of other advantages which would have accrued had the vote been "yes". We tried to provide a positive context for the settlement. Britain has some expertise and history on Cyprus on so a lot of my time is explaining the problems of Cyprus to colleagues in other governments of whom it is not part of their political furniture, as I think it is for everybody in this room. We also obviously provide a huge incentive to Turkey by saying yes to the accession talks beginning 17 December for Turkey to look to see what contribution it can make, but I do stress this is an international problem brought about as a result of the events of 1974 which are under the aegis of the UN, which are subject to various UN Security Councils, where the hard work lies here in the Annan plan, and it is definitely not for the EU to replace the United Nations. Britain is there as one of the guarantor powers; it is there because of our incredible affinity of friendship with both communities of Cyprus, the very large Greek and Turkish Cypriot diasporas in our own country, but again and again we have said we are there to help, to encourage, to provide technical diplomatic toolkits, those that can be used, but we are not in a position to impose, cajole or oblige a solution to be found if principally the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots are not willing to agree to a UN proposals. Q164 Sir John Stanley: So the short answer to my question as to whether there is a bilateral role that the British government sees for the United Kingdom in this is "no", is that right? Mr MacShane: There is no direct unilateral bilateral role in the sense that it is an exclusive property of the United Kingdom. I followed the Cyprus question closely as an MP and PPS before becoming a minister, and there are many, many colleagues who visit there regularly who have a lot of detailed knowledge and I have listened to all the Cypriot debates in my ten years as an MP, and I have never felt that Britain by herself was to produce a kind of Harry Potter solution and solve the Cypriot conundrum. As I said to President Papadopoulos and to Mr Talat and their colleagues, "You are the cleverest people in Cyprus, you can do it by yourselves if you are willing to break out of old entrenched positions".
Q165 Mr Maples: Do you think in retrospect it is a pity that we let Cyprus into the European Union without resolving this problem first? Mr MacShane: I do not think that we could be where we are today on Turkey had we, as it were, sought to recuse the right of Cyprus to join the European Union. In other words, there was, as I understand it, well before my ministerial time, a quid pro quo that if Turkey was to be allowed to become a candidate member or seek to move to the point of becoming a candidate member, then Cyprus would be allowed to join. Q166 Mr Maples: We understand the history but, given where we are now, it surely is a complete and I would suggest to you unacceptable anomaly in anything other than the very short term that we should have a situation where part of the European Union is occupied by foreign troops, is fenced off where free trade is denied and where its neighbour is pursuing a sort of beggar‑my‑neighbour towards it. We have to resolve it. Surely it is not acceptable within the European Union that this situation continues for very much longer? Mr MacShane: That is precisely why beginning accession talks with Turkey, which I hope will be the European Union Council's decision next month, does allow a new opening, because I think I in earlier evidence, Mr Chairman, stressed the point that it will be an anomaly of increasing magnitude that Turkey is seeking to negotiate with a union of 25 Member States, one of which it does not recognise, for example, and it would be an increasing anomaly that Turkey is seeking to negotiate with 25 Member States on the territory of which as recognised by the UN it stations two divisions. Q167 Mr Maples: But it is not just the Turkish involvement in Cyprus, is it, that is an anomaly? The anomaly is we are a free trade zone. You can go and trade anywhere, work anywhere, invest your money anywhere, start a business anywhere except with one little fenced‑off piece, and that seems to me to be, without doubt, an anomaly, and I believe it would have been better if we had not brought this particular cuckoo into our nest but having done so and having I think been comprehensively out‑manoeuvred by the Greek Cypriot government we, I suggest to you, cannot allow this to continue and simply fall into the timetable of Turkish accession because that may be 15 years. We have to do something about this before then. Mr MacShane: I am always a little bit nervous of signing off on the "something must be done" argument but you are, I think ‑‑ Q168 Mr Maples: I think you are in sympathy. Mr MacShane: ‑‑ repeating with much more vigorous force than the Foreign Office is allowed to points I was making when I was in Cyprus and I have made today on Turkish television, and I think I am probably the first minister so to do, that yes, I think ‑‑ Q169 Mr Maples: You see, I would suggest to you that this Cyprus veto is a paper tiger. We found as one of the major countries in the European Union that if you are outnumbered and in a minority of one, as we have been on several occasions and more so under the previous Conservative government than this one, even so it is almost impossible to sustain a minority of one for very long. The pressure is huge; the other things you are trying to negotiate all get blocked as well. I hope that the Foreign Office is being much more robust in these negotiations than you give the impression of. Maybe you want to put a diplomatic licence on this but I really do hope we are being robust about this because I think the Greek Cypriots can exercise this veto once. It is like owning one nuclear weapon and firing it. When you have done it you have completely wrecked your goodwill, you have wrecked everybody's trust in you-they cannot do it any more than they can veto the Turkish application on 17 December. Now, it may be sensible to wait until 17 December but I hope on 18 December we will pursue a really robust attitude with the Greek Cypriots and if we cannot get them to agree say, "Okay, we will have a meeting. You exercise your veto. Go on. You do it. You show the world that that is your policy to try and ruin the Northern Cyprus economy", and I would suggest to you we need more robustness in these negotiations. Mr MacShane: I hear what you say and this is on the record and I hope others hear what you say. I have, though, to make the point that were I to use that language about Britain, that we cannot use our veto and our veto is a paper tiger and it is only a one use nuclear weapon-an interesting concept in itself-I think, if not my ministerial life, the high reputation I have in our anti European press might go down very fast indeed ‑‑ Q170 Mr Maples: I think you take my point. Mr MacShane: ‑‑ but you are right. I am astonished at the sound of my own diplomatic weasely voice, but yes, I prefer not to go down the rip roaring road of upping the ante that you are taking the Committee down, Mr Maples, but I do assure you that there is very considerable feeling out in the European Union park, if I can use that expression, that we need to move forward with Cyprus and many people in other countries want to do trade with Cyprus-not just Britain; there are other people who want to open tourism in Northern Cyprus in particular ‑‑ Q171 Mr Maples: I am going to interpret your response as encouraging to the view I have taken, but I want to pursue my reasoning a little bit further with you, because I think there is very good evidence that the strategy which Mr Papadopoulos and his government are pursuing is to hold out, and the longer they can hold out the more they will wreck the Turkish Cypriot economy; the more people will leave and the better settlement they will get. They think if they hold this out for five, seven, eight years they will get a much better deal than they have under Annan Five, and we must not allow that to happen because the price of that is the ruination of the Turkish Cypriot economy. I do not accept you publicly to accept my analysis of their strategy is right but the evidence of what I am saying is absolutely overwhelming, and if we allow them to get away with that the price will be paid by 200,000 Turkish Cypriots. Mr MacShane: I am not sure. We can all suck our thumbs this afternoon and say what will be happening in two or three or four years' time and we clearly have to go back two or three or four years' time to President Clerides, and it was not he who principally was the main barrier to moving to considering Annan One or Two or Three. The bleak picture you paint, however, has to take into consideration demographic changes. There are maybe 200,000 Turkish Cypriot citizens who are eligible for a Republic of Cyprus passport. They could get that and relocate tomorrow to anywhere in Europe, to London, to Frankfurt, Paris ‑‑ Q172 Mr Maples: Many of them have done so. Mr MacShane: ‑‑ and who would come in and take their place? People from the mainland of Turkey who then might make a new and different obstacle to what the Republic of Cyprus government want. So all actions have consequences and ‑‑ Q173 Mr Maples: I follow all that. Can I finish my questioning to you with what I hope is a constructive suggestion and I think it will flush out whether or not my analysis of Mr Papadopoulos' strategy is correct or not. This has become an all or nothing negotiation; either you sign the Annan Plan or you do not get any of it, but there are huge chunks of Annan which are agreed by both sides and I would suggest to you that we ought to be working for, and so ought any other agencies involved and particularly the European Union, for partial implementations of the Annan Plan. Now, Mr Hamilton or Mr Pope mentioned Famagusta, Varosha. That is a self‑contained settlement that can pretty easily be made and it would give Varosha back to the Greek Cypriots, open up Famagusta to more international trade and be beneficial to the whole island. If these partial trade‑offs are vetoed by the Republic of Cyprus then it seems to bear out what I am saying and their logic, if you put this to them, and their argument is, and both sides say the same thing: if they get part of what they want without having to agree the whole deal it will weaken the pressure on them to settle, but it seems to me that if every international negotiation were conducted on that basis we would never reach agreement on anything because what you do by moving towards a settlement is you change the atmosphere on both sides. You change the environment in which you are negotiating, and I think that is what the Republic of Cyprus government is missing on this. I would like suggest to you that moves perhaps initiated by us through the European Union to have some partial implementation of little packages of the Annan Plan will go a long way towards improving the atmosphere in which you might eventually reach a settlement. Mr MacShane: I do not disagree. This was debated in the House in Mr Cox's Adjournment motion a couple of weeks ago where the points you made were echoed probably more clumsily and long‑windedly in my own speech, but let us not forget that the principal objections to the Famagusta Varosha trade is Mr Talat and Northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots, because they say, "We had all of this in the Annan Plan plus a bit more; the Greek Cypriots have vetoed the Annan Plan; why on earth should we settle for a lot less?" Now this is a discussion that you or I have to have then perhaps with Mr Talat if we think this is the right way to go down. I have said on record talking about anything before 17 December and I have said to Turkish officer numbers, that the site of a division or so of Turkish troops getting on to their transports and leaving the island would send a marvellous symbolic signal around the world that Turkey was thinking afresh while still maintaining security for the Turkish Cypriots and security concerns in the region. So those are two tiny proposals which the British government will have no problems with. I think we would prefer a comprehensive settlement but in essence direct flights to the north are a partial settlement and that is what the EU is calling for, so I have no problems with that at all but believe me, I did not feel a great echo when I put some of these ideas informally in very friendly talks with both Mr Talat and his colleagues and President Papadopoulos and his colleagues. Q174 Mr Maples: If I can just finish my thoughts, if we all come to the conclusion, which I have, that this is an intolerable problem to continue in the European Union for more than a year or two then it does seem to me there are various lines we can pursue, some of which we have talked about through trade and opening up ports and they are part, I would have thought, of partial implementation. I agree, there are lots of trade‑offs unless they happen to be made by both parties, but I think we ought to be gently and diplomatically banging people's heads together behind the scenes to see if we cannot get that process started. Mr MacShane: I do not bang heads together ‑‑ Q175 Mr Maples: I said "diplomatically". Mr MacShane: ‑‑ but I have said this in public rather than private and earned a reproach from the senior Turkish diplomatic representative-no names-and it struck me probably I was just about half doing my job, but yes, I do want to see movement: I would like it to be on the basis of Annan Five and a half or Annan Five minus three quarters. Were that not possible then, if there are partial measures that can be undertaken, we will press for that very strongly internationally in the EU context and in all of our bilateral discussions, and we will continue to press along the lines that you are talking about, and I am certainly very much looking forward to the Committee's report and recommendations because I value enormously in the time I have been a Foreign Office minister all of your investigations ‑‑ Q176 Chairman: That is fine but ‑‑ Mr MacShane: Sorry, I thought I was on a winner! Q177 Chairman: Yes, but we want to know what it means. You have told Mr Maples that you want to continue along these lines. What other candidates do you have for partial implementation of the Annan Plan as confidence‑building measures, which is what Mr Maples is suggesting? Mr MacShane: This may sound a silly one but I remember a discussion with Mr Talat on the terrace here in the summer. It was a question whether Turkish Cypriots would take part in the Olympic Games. No, he said, because they could not march under the Republic of Cyprus flag. I said, "Are you quite sure? I can think of nothing better if there is a great Turkish Cypriot weight lifter or runner or marathon runner or whatever than to be up there winning a prize. You will have all of Turkey and all of Turkish Cyprus cheering for you and actually all of Cyprus, just as we have the most awful anti Europeans in our press but they are damned happy ‑‑ Q178 Chairman: But, with respect, that is four years' time? Mr MacShane: No. In the Ryder Cup when we beat the Americans as a European team. Mr Talat seemed to think this was inconceivable. Well, I just thought to myself then that the problem may be deeper and more entrenched on both sides than we realise. Q179 Chairman: Do you have any other matters which are part of the Annan agreement which could be agreed as partial implementation within the next year or so? Mr MacShane: No, because I do not want to cherry pick. I really think that is not helpful. I have said to President Papadopoulos and Mr Talat-Mr Talat, of course, now no longer having the majority in his Assembly-"Can you not go away and talk yourselves informally, privately between officials?" Q180 Chairman: And the answer? Mr MacShane: Well, they said there are difficulties. Both sides said there were difficulties. Nobody ever excludes anything in Cyprus but there are difficulties. Q181 Chairman: Do you fear that if both sides say there are difficulties to any movement the division of the island will become more entrenched with the danger of partition? Mr MacShane: I do not see how partition is possible simply because there are UN Security Council resolutions, there is a treaty of guarantee, and the whole of the island of Cyprus has entered the EU even if the acquis is suspended in the north. I do not see how Turkey can join the EU on the basis of a partitioned island. Q182 Chairman: Understandably in the current context you have been hesitant, but is that hesitation based on a reluctance to rock the boat before December 17 and the decision on Turkey's candidate status? Mr MacShane: No, it genuinely is not. I think if this hearing was taking place on December 18 or January 18 I would be saying much the same. I am conscious that almost anything a British minister says is echoed very loudly back in the island on both sides of the Green Line so I am cautious in a responsible way in what I say. I think there are opportunities now once Turkey starts EU membership negotiations, but I really do think it needs a change of attitude on all sides and I do fear, yes, that positions are very deeply entrenched. Each side is absolutely convinced it has 90 per cent of right on its side and if only the others would see its point of view everything would be solved, and the plain fact is that you have in Annan the political outline, Annan One‑Five of the future for Cyprus in the EU, the future of Cyprus, a successful democracy of two communities in the eastern Mediterranean, and my fervent wish and that of the Government is that there was sufficient statesmanship to seize that. Q183 Chairman: The Americans took a unilateral decision earlier this month in relation to the naming of the Republic of Macedonia. Do you feel that there would be a unilateral decision by the US in respect of flights to the north? Mr MacShane: We discussed that earlier, as was explained ‑‑ Q184 Chairman: But of its special relationship, what is your understanding? Mr MacShane: As the Committee was informed earlier, the Americans have got the right to land in Turkey, come on to Ercan and then fly straight back to the United States, so would airlines in the United Kingdom. I am not sure if they can fly straight back to the United Kingdom or whether they have to touch down again in Turkey? Mr Chilcott: We have a different legal interpretation than the Americans on how this can be done. Mr MacShane: I would not forget that the Greek Cypriot diaspora in the United States is very influential ‑‑ Q185 Chairman: What is the "different legal interpretation" which allows the US to believe they have the right to land directly in the way you have suggested, and which prevents us? Mr Chilcott: US national legislation governing rules about international flights will allow them to use their bilateral air services agreement with Turkey to enable an airport in the north of Cyprus to be the last port of call between flights scheduled to go from Turkey to the US provided that airport met the minimum safety standards that the United States sets. Now, clearly that interpretation of their bilateral agreement for them overrides, or is compatible, with their implementation of the Chicago Convention. The way the Chicago Convention is implemented under British law rather constrains our ability to authorise flights to or from directly an airport that has not been designated as an international airport by the government of the territory for which it is responsible. Q186 Chairman: Given that US interpretation, have we any reason to believe that they might in the near future act unilaterally? Mr MacShane: I do not know. It is a simple answer. We are obviously in talks with Washington on this; I have not seen any paper that suggests this is likely to be initiated: I am not sure what direct flights will be commercially viable between all the way from the United States and Northern Cyprus or whether they are a realistic proposition, but I can assure you that this is all a debate in the semi public arena and if Washington takes the decisions so be it. I certainly would not protest if there are direct commercial flights with Northern Cyprus, providing it does not involve any recognition of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. Q187 Mr Maples: The original phrase was I think there was a different "interpretation" of the law. What I understand Mr Chilcott to be saying was that the United States would regard their domestic law as in this respect overriding the provisions of the Chicago Treaty, whereas we are stuck with the Chicago Treaty on its own, so it is not a different interpretation of the Chicago Treaty; it is that American domestic law is different from ours in this respect. Is that correct? Mr Chilcott: I think it is to do with the implementation of the legislation they have in the United States that gives effect to the Chicago Convention and governs international flights, and they way they have implemented the Convention is different from the way we have implemented it. On the question of whether it gives them more leeway, you would have a get a lawyer's view of their national legislation but the view they take is that it does give them this leeway. Q188 Mr Maples: But the thing that gives them the extra leeway is the domestic legislation with which they implemented the Chicago Treaty, so in that respect their law on this is different from ours? Mr Chilcott: Yes. Mr MacShane: If it is of help to the Committee I will ask the aviation legal experts that we have and in the DTI to let you have a note because I think it would be helpful for all of us.[2] Mr Maples: And how EU law fits into that or whether it has any relevance at all. That would be very helpful. Q189 Mr Hamilton: When we were in Cyprus we obviously met a great number of interesting people, as you will have done when you were there just a few days before us, and one of the people we met was former President George Vassiliou-indeed, he was one of our first interlocutors on the day we arrived. What I found very interesting though about our questioning of former President Vassiliou who, even though he was President quite a long time ago is not such an old man today, was that he claimed that under different leadership the Greek Cypriot community in Cyprus would have voted for the Annan Plan, for Annan Five. Do you believe him? Mr MacShane: You are asking me to be a Greek Cypriot or a cephalogical expert in Greek Cypriot voting patterns. I genuinely do not know. I have to say, though, that the 85 per cent vote is quite a strong statement- Q190 Mr Hamilton: I think it was 76 per cent. Mr MacShane: Sorry, forgive me, a three quarters vote in a particular direction, the idea that different political positions and expressions of leadership might have changed that dramatically-I do not know. I wish obviously that everybody campaigned enthusiastically for the Annan Five Plan but that was not the case. Q191 Mr Hamilton: It was interesting that the political party AKEL, which is quite influential in Cyprus, decided ultimately to recommend a "no" vote and a lot of people told us that more influential than President Papadopoulos or any other individual would have been the decision by AKEL to vote in favour of the Annan Plan. Have you any comment on that? Mr MacShane: Not really. I read the report in telegrams on the debate inside AKEL which, as you rightly say, is a very powerful political force representing a great number of Cypriots and discharges its political responsibilities in a very serious, responsible and mature way and there were people listening perhaps to the tom-toms in the undergrowth and no political party necessarily wants to be on the wrong side of a referendum vote. Q192 Mr Hamilton: I think what you are saying seems to be that there was an underlying wish amongst Greek Cypriots to vote against Annan Five and that the leadership of the political parties and of the country pushed it further in that direction, rather than the opposite? Mr MacShane: I genuinely do not know. You are asking me to be a Greek Cypriot voter or a Greek Cypriot political scientist. I am not. I would wish consistently that certainly, as Europe has changed in the last few years and as Turkey has, we could have had over the last few years language saying yes to a settlement, yes to a Europe, yes to both communities joining, but as you know it is quite common in politics, people get very excited by the idea of saying no to Europe, no to partnership, no to being fully part of the European Union. It is an infectious disease that is not contained simply in Cyprus. Q193 Mr Hamilton: Just to conclude, not particularly for answer but just to comment, that we heard from a Turkish Cypriot leader who I think is a member of Mr Talat's party and who was very dismissive of the continuation of the presence of Turkish troops. He said we would be a lot better off, if I am interpreting him correctly, without Turkish troops on Cypriot soil. I thought that was very encouraging. You do not have to comment. Mr MacShane: I cannot find in my heart massively to disagree with all of what he said. Q194 Mr Pope: Is not this the key to it, following on from that? You said at the beginning that if you were an adviser to Kofi Annan you would say, "Walk away from this, no point sending another special envoy, no point having another referendum, no point having further negotiations", and surely it is worthwhile having another go at this because maybe the gap is not so great. One of the things that seemed to us when we visited to be a big concern of the Greek Cypriot community was Turkish troops on the island. Now, the Annan Plan says that over a period of I think 19 years there will be a phased withdrawal. Well, that is a great deal of time. Why can we not go back and suggest to Turkey that a faster withdrawal of Turkish troops would be a really good idea? You said yourself that a division seen going back to mainland Turkey would send the right signal. Why can we not make a suggestion that a more rapid withdrawal of Turkish troops would be a good idea? It could be replaced perhaps by an EU or a NATO force if people felt they needed that for security. You could then talk around the edges-I certainly do not think that the Annan Plan should be ripped up and we could start again-just around the edges about settlers, right of return, not greatly altering the Annan Plan but round the edges, and with some goodwill it may just be worthwhile putting this back to another referendum in 2005. Is that not worth a go? Mr MacShane: If there was the slightest evidence from either side that some alteration in Annan Five would do the trick I would agree with you, Mr Pope, but I just have to report honestly to the Committee-it is not simply my visit to Cyprus, it is regular contacts with both sides-that I do detect any willingness to get close to reversing the April decision in the immediate future. Under the Annan Plan by the year 2011, that is barely one British Parliament away, there would be just be 3,000 Turkish troops left, a tenth of the existing number. Seven years later, again compared with the thirty years since 1974, or 44 years since 1960, that will be down to 650, so I am not really sure what could be on offer that would improve what was indicated in the plan. Q195 Mr Pope: But is not Mr Maples right in this: that the alternative to that, which is essentially to do nothing, that yes, we have the EU summit coming up on 17 December and we can talk about an accession date for Turkey, but in terms of Cyprus just doing nothing is a recipe for a de facto partition of the island? Mr MacShane: We are not doing nothing. We are visiting; EU officials are visiting; there are constant talks around this in the EU Council; Cyprus is getting more collective EU attention from the 24 than perhaps it has ever done in the past. The House of Commons is well seized of it, your Committee is evidence to that, so there is a lot of nudging and pushing but I still respectfully have to say that the people who need to move are the two sides on the island and there is not a lot of evidence at the moment that they are moving out of their position of saying "We are right and the other side is wrong". Q196 Mr Pope: Could I respectfully suggest that there is not anywhere near enough nudging and pushing going on? You have already said that it is not really a matter for the EU any more than resolving Northern Ireland or Gibraltar is a matter for the European Union. These are rightly jobs for the United Nations but the United Nations is showing precious little interest in reviving a modified version of the Annan Plan, nor is the United Kingdom government, and, frankly, what pressure is there being brought to bear on the government of Cyprus? At the moment they have everything they want. They are in the European Union. They can veto trade with Northern Cyprus. They can veto aid to Northern Cyprus and they are not under any pressure from anybody? Mr MacShane: On the contrary the government of Cyprus feels under immense pressure because Turkey is vetoing the government of Cyprus joining international organisations where Turkey has veto rights, so the government of Cyprus feels it is not getting fair treatment from Turkey in terms of international treaty organisations it would like to join. It does not have normal trade; ships with wonderful goods to sell cannot land in their immediate market, so everybody is under pressure. Believe me, and I confess perhaps a failure as a Europe minister, I have not been able to come up with the mechanism that can take this forward at this point in time. All I can tell the Committee is that the British government takes it very seriously. We feel that we have a mandate from the European Council meeting at the end of April to improve the lot of the people of Northern Cyprus who are EU citizens. We think that is a duty that should be discharged and that, if you like, is where we are putting on a lot of pressure and doing more than nudging, as I tried to report to the Committee, and that is the important way forward. We have made clear to all concerned "Here is Annan, come back to it. If you can find partial proposals on the way forward, good, we will welcome then". Q197 Mr Pope: I am grateful for you saying that people who live in Northern Cyprus are citizens of the EU. I think that is an important point to make, and we have some responsibility there ‑‑ Mr MacShane: May I just make a point through the Committee? I remember when I lived and worked in Switzerland that as the European Union gradually surrounded Switzerland on all sides-Italy, Austria, Germany, France-suddenly Swiss citizens desperately proud of their Swiss passports and Swiss nationality, found that they had grandparents or great uncles who were Frenchmen or Italians and applied for French passports so they could go and buy property, work, live, travel, without having to go through all the visa and passport controls they had to because they were without the EU. I certainly think that every Turkish Cypriot should go tomorrow and get a Republic of Cyprus passport even if they feel that is something being issued by a Greek Cypriot government. It belongs to them as European Union citizens which they then can use to travel freely to trade, to work inside the whole of the European Union, and they can carry whatever other papers they want like the Swiss carries a Swiss passport and a French passport to go about his business, but there are many more what you might call individual citizen's actions that could be taken, as we saw last year with the marvellous demonstrations going across the border, and perhaps it is a bit more of that and a bit less of the hope that it is the super top down diplomacy that would solve the problem that we need to encourage. Q198 Mr Pope: I certainly agree with most of that but I think there is possibly a case for one more heave with what you refer to as "top down diplomacy". There were plenty of rumours a few weeks ago that Kofi Annan was considering appointing another special envoy to see if there was some small alteration to the Annan Plan, and there were even names mentioned as to who that may be. Could I urge the Minister, after we have gone through the next EU Summit in the new year, to at least explore that with the United Nations? Mr MacShane: I can give you that assurance. Q199 Sir John Stanley: Just following on from the comment you made a few moments ago, can you identify for us the international organisations that the Republic of Cyprus wishes to join where entry is by unanimity and where the government of Turkey has exercised its vetoes? Mr MacShane: One that has much exercised them recently is the Turkish veto on them joining the Missile Technology Control Regime which the government of the Republic of Cyprus wanted to join and Turkey vetoed. I can provide a list of other organisations. Chairman: Would you please provide a list to the Committee? I think that is the best way to forward on that, Minister.[3] Q200 Sir John Stanley: Could I just for the record ask you to confirm that it is the case that the unilateral offer to surrender significant amounts of land in Sovereign Base areas to the Republic of Cyprus government, that that offer in the context of Annan Five has been withdrawn and is now off the table? Mr MacShane: It is null and void now because it is part of the Annan Plan to surrender that land to what would have been the unified government of the unified island of Cyprus. It is there in Annan Five; Annan Five is dead for the time being-it has been rejected thanks to the Greek Cypriot referendum, so it does not exist as an offer. Q201 Sir John Stanley: Are there any circumstances in which that offer could be put back on the table by the British government? Mr MacShane: I think in the context of a comprehensive settlement, but I have to say I have not been asked or invited to discuss that by anybody on the island as an issue in and of itself. I think the Sovereign base areas they are that; they are not part of the Cypriot territory prior to 1974; I understand the Committee drove through the eastern Sovereign Base Area near Famagusta, as we all do, and we can see it was just huge tracts of sheep grazing land and no problem in handing some of it back, but in the context of an agreement there is not any pressure that I know of on HMG to make that a bilateral question with the government of the Republic of Cyprus. Q202 Sir John Stanley: But the formal position of the British government as stated by you, and it is an important point so I just want to get the wording right for the record, is that in the context of a comprehensive settlement, the unilateral offer by the British government to transfer some of the land in Sovereign Base Areas to the government of Cyprus might be put back on the table? Mr MacShane: "Might"; it is conditional in that sense. It was made in good faith to help move the process along. I would assume, I cannot bind successors of course, that if we felt that that would be a dealbreaker then, of course, we would not want to stand in the way of agreement. Q203 Mr Maples: On the question of the Sovereign Base Areas, what I have to confess I had not realised until I visited them was that there were actually villages within the Sovereign Base Areas and in one case half the village was in the Sovereign Base Area and half was outside. It seemed to us that there perhaps some unilateral interests in the United Kingdom in giving up little bits of this because it would have solved or at least ameliorated a lot of the administrative problems, and a good deal of smuggling was thought to go on through the Sovereign Base Area from the north to the south which necessitated the presence of quite a lot of British Customs officers there, but we were told that the reason for not being able to do anything outside the context of an overall settlement was that Sovereign Base Areas were part of the treaties establishing Cyprus in 1960 and that any change to that would require the consent of both Turkey and Greece, and that this was a complication. However, in the context we talked about of maybe piecemeal moves towards the Annan Plan I hope that the government would keep in mind the possibility of any bits of Sovereign Base Areas that would have been surrendered under Annan Five, if bits of those could be as part of a piecemeal implementation of Annan, I hope we would look on any such proposal constructively as long as Turkey and Greece were both prepared to support it. Mr MacShane: It is that, is it not? The relationship with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities is very good on the policing and the transit and yes, the smuggling problems. There has to my knowledge, in my two years plus as a European minister, never been the slightest suggestion or demand from anybody on the island that the land should be due, some of it handed back. It was put there into the Annan deal as a gesture of goodwill by HMG, certainly since the rejection in the referendums. Again, I only report what has come across my desk. I have not seen a bit of paper or had raised with me in any way, shape or form any suggestion that the Sovereign base areas were particularly relevant. They are very useful and important to the British defence facility and in the context of NATO and the stability in the eastern Mediterranean and transit ports for humanitarian aid and so forth; we know all that. Q204 Chairman: We have heard varying estimates of the number of mainland Turks living in North Cyprus. Would the Government favour a census under international law auspices to determine the status of those living in the north? Mr MacShane: I would not have any problems with it. There is movement, as you know. Just as it is sometimes difficult now in the modern European Union to establish all the number of people who cross freely between one country and another, there are different estimates made. I certainly think just from the pure requirements of administration it should make sense ‑‑ Q205 Chairman: It would make sense and we would favour it? Mr MacShane: I certainly would favour the Turkish Cypriot authorities being able to announce clearly the number of people and where they came and where they were born and to put that in the public domain. Q206 Chairman: With respect, it is not a matter of the Turkish Cypriot authorities announcing clearly; it is a matter of having some census which has international credentials and there has to be some form of international supervision for credibility purposes? Mr MacShane: No, I am sorry. All authorities, whether it is a local council or a national government have to know the number of people living under their administration in order to decide allocation of schools, housing, land, water, electricity. This is just a norm for any sensible administration. Q207 Chairman: But surely this is different? This is such a politically‑charged question it would have to be done in an objective way? Mr MacShane: I will certainly look into that. I do not really think it makes a huge difference to deciding whether the fairly overwhelming votes by the Turkish Cypriot voters was valid or not. Estimates do have value. I am happy to consider this as a possibility. I have to say it has not been raised and put to me as a particular issue, but I am happy to look into it and write to the Committee.[4] Q208 Mr Maples: When we were there there was clearly a big dispute between the two sides as to how many Turkish settlers there were. The Greek Cypriots said there were 119,000 and the Turkish Cypriots said-I have forgotten the number but it started with eight I think, and it was simply the suggestion that this was going to have to be resolved. It was clearly a big problem in the negotiations how many of the settlers would stay, and I think the suggestion was that maybe one of the things that could be done is to get some objective measure as to how many settlers there are in the north and then the question of how many might be entitled to citizenship might be a little easier to resolve. Mr MacShane: It is true that in the Annan Plan there was an up limit of 45,000 settlers that would be allowed to stay in the north were the island to be reunited, and I assume from memory reading the Plan there was provision in it on how you would establish who was a settler, who was a second generation settler, to use that terminology. But yes, I accept fully it would be good to know the numbers on the island. I was very struck in the Karpaz Peninsula by a lovely village where there was a school for Greek Cypriot children who still remained on the peninsula that had been opened since Mr Talat had taken power, and there was a woman there teaching art who spoke with the most perfect English accent and her daughter was there who taught in the King's School-not in Canterbury but in a Kent town, maybe Chatham-and the woman had been brought up in London but the daughter had been brought up in Nicosia, and it seemed to me they were living between England and Cyprus almost without-I am not sure whether they were British or Cypriot citizens, and where they would be counted for census purposes. Cyprus has always been an island with a great deal of population movements in all directions. Q209 Chairman: But are we to conclude that the Government would favour clarification of the status of those in the north by an international supervised census? Mr MacShane: I would like to know the numbers. If that requires an international supervised census, it seems to me ‑‑ Q210 Chairman: But that is the position? Mr MacShane: No, it is an important point which I have not had put to me-I am sorry, you have obviously met different people-that that was a huge issue, so I do not want to suddenly announce this afternoon that we are proposing ‑‑ Q211 Chairman: No, that we would favour it? Mr MacShane: ‑‑ that an international body goes into Northern Cyprus and starts counting people. I am not sure that is particularly helpful at this stage. So I would make my own inquiries into whether that really is ‑‑ Q212 Chairman: And reply to the Committee? Mr MacShane: I will certainly reply to the Committee on that question. Q213 Chairman: Moving on, Minister, you will know that at the 11th hour there was an attempt by the US and United Kingdom governments through the UN Security Council to provide security guarantees for the Greek Cypriot population which was vetoed by Russia. One of our witnesses, Lord Hannay, said this was at the instance of the Greek Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot; another senior Greek Cypriot on the island told our colleagues that it was the Turkish Cypriots, or rather Turkey, which had sought that. What is our view? Mr MacShane: I genuinely do not know. I can only give you two facts. I know Mr Iakovou, the Greek foreign minister, was in Moscow around the time just before the veto. I also know that the Republic of Cyprus government voted against the resolution. All I can say is that I thought that was an extraordinarily unhelpful veto but there we are. In the UN countries like to use or threaten vetoes and we just have to live with that and it is in the rule book. Q214 Chairman: Back on the UN, just for clarification, Annan Five is dead. Do you believe there is any prospects within an immediate future of the UN again addressing the problem? Mr MacShane: I believe that the UN is the body that has to engage with Cyprus. It is not a problem to be solved by the EU or by the Treaty of Guarantee powers. We need to see that there is clear willingness on both sides to resolve the Cyprus problems through a bi-communal or bi-zonal federation, and that willingness must be publicly and explicitly demonstrated. Q215 Chairman: And you do not see any immediate prospect of that willingness being evident? Mr MacShane: I did not in my visit or in any of the reported telegrams or any of the discussions I have had, let us just say since April, seen the demonstration of that willingness-and this is what Kofi Annan is arguing for, a demonstration of willingness. It is my wish and the government's wish that people would wake up to the fact that a united Cyprus will benefit all citizens of Cyprus. Q216 Chairman: But if a condition precedent to the UN seeking to address itself again to the problem is a clear expression of the willingness on behalf of both the parties, your conclusion is there is no immediate prospect of the UN again addressing the problem? Mr MacShane: What Kofi Annan said in his report on his mission of good offices was that the Security Council "would be well advised to stand ready to address concerns"; this is to do with security in the implementation of the plan. So yes, I think the door is open at the UN, but we need our friends in Cyprus to be willing to walk through it. Q217 Chairman: And I understand that you have personally studied the Cyprus problem for a long time, yet you seem to indicate that you did not realise that the continued existence of Turkish troops on the island would be a severe provocation to the Greek Cypriots. Is that true? Mr MacShane: No. I have heard that point made. I am just saying that 650 troops, as provided for under the 1960 Treaty, does not seem to me to constitute a mammoth force of occupation or disturbance. Q218 Chairman: That may be true but there has been a rather important development since, namely the Turkish invasion in 1974, do you not think? Mr MacShane: I accept that, but equally I have to invite the Committee to look at the important developments in terms of the Turks who suffered in the various inter-communal problems that arose between 1960 and 1974. When I talk to the Turkish Cypriots they talk in terms of pogroms and massacres and all the rest of it. I am not being judgmental, so if there is an alternative because Turkish troops are members of NATO, if there is another way of badging this ultimate force, so be it, I would not object to that, but I do think that it is wrong to hide exclusively behind that issue. Q219 Chairman: It is not a question of hiding exclusively; it is for the Greek Cypriots a major point of principle. Would the United Kingdom government seek to take an initiative to explore whether the replacement of Turkish troops by US or EU troops might prove a way of resolving the problem? Mr MacShane: Well, the difficulty is if it is US or NATO-and I have not ever had the slightest indication that the United States should station troops in Cyprus-if it is NATO, Turkey is in NATO, the Republic of Cyprus is not. If it is the EU, under the ESDP flag, the Republic of Cyprus is part of that but Turkey is not. Q220 Chairman: You set out the difficulties. Are you saying that you do not think it worth seeking to explore that change? Mr MacShane: I had no suggestion from any of my interlocutors, particularly on the Republic of Cyprus side, that simply inviting another power's troops to come in would do the trick. If they announce that and put a proposition to us and say "We are ready to go out and campaign for Annan Five but simply with tweaking in terms of troop levels", that would be very interesting. If we could have an assurance from President Papadopoulos and all AKEL and all the parties in Cyprus, "Give us fewer Turkish troops or security troops badged in a different way, whether from another foreign power, from NATO, the EU, and that opens the door and we will sign up for Annan Five", that would be a very interesting proposition but I do not know if the Committee felt that such a statement was likely to emerge at the moment from the different leaders of the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot region. Q221 Chairman: You have quite properly said you are wary of top down solutions and much must come well up from the people from the two communities. I know Friends of Cyprus have said that there should be much greater efforts to build bridges between the two communities, perhaps in London but also on the island itself. Does the United Kingdom Government have any specific initiatives in this field to break down the barriers of suspicion between the two communities on the island? Mr MacShane: To encourage them. They can both freely walk across the Green Line now. I do remember in the past that some, particularly parties on the left, were talking to each other thinking the problem in Cyprus was one of class politics rather than national differences but I think we have now seen that the division in Cyprus, alas, has become such in the last 30 years that people are Greek first or Turkish first rather than workers ‑‑ Q222 Chairman: That said, are we prepared to broker any initiatives to ‑‑ Mr MacShane: Our High Commission does. It organises and is used regularly for meetings, and I really do think that putting AKEL and let us say one of the left wing parties of the Turkish Cypriot community together-you do not need the British government to do that; they do it anyway across the Green Lanes, let alone the Green Line, in London. These meetings and discussions take place all the time. Believe me, I understand the desire of the Committee to find solutions and ways forward; I would love to see them. We have conferences at Wilton Park and Ditchley Park; there is one organised early next year involving Cyprus at Wilton Park to which all the members of the Community will come. I assisted at one in Hydra, the Greek island, where Turkish Cypriots were present as well as Turkish political leaders and representatives. Those discussions are happening all the time. Q223 Chairman: Can you give us a list whilst you are writing to the Committee saying what has been done by the High Commission, by HMG over the past 12 months and what we are planning over the next 12 months?[5] Mr MacShane: By all means. With pleasure. Q224 Chairman: Very helpful. May I thank you on behalf of the Committee. We understand the vast difficulties and we know that you will be doing what you can within the Union and elsewhere to build bridges. Mr MacShane: I look forward to reading the Committee's report. Chairman: Thank you, Minister.
[1] Note by witness-later corrected to 76% [2] Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted by the FCO. [3] Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted by the FCO. [4] Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted by the FCO. [5] Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted by the FCO. |