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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 117-i House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
Tuesday 9 December 2003 PROFESSOR JAMES BARBER and PROFESSOR DAVID SIMON MR JESMOND BLUMENFELD and MR ALASTAIR FRASER Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 83
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday 9 December 2003 Members present Donald Anderson, in the Chair Mr David Chidgey Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr Eric Illsley Andrew Mackinlay Mr John Maples Richard Ottaway Mr Greg Pope Sir John Stanley ________________ Memoranda submitted by Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: PROFESSOR JAMES BARBER, University of Cambridge, and PROFESSOR DAVID SIMON, University of London, examined. Q1 Chairman: Gentlemen, may I welcome the two of you to our Committee. Professor James Barber, Emeritus Professor of Durham University currently advising the University of Cambridge's Centre of International Studies, who worked in the field of South African studies for very many years, and published extensively; and Professor David Simon of Royal Holloway College of University of London, specialising in Southern African regional issues, again published extensively on foreign policy and development. We welcome you to what is the first of the sessions of the Committee in respect of South Africa. As a Committee we decided in the middle of July to undertake an inquiry into South Africa and to inquire into the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in relation to South Africa in the light of the strong historic connections which link the United Kingdom to South Africa. We have three planned sessions. The first is today; the second is due to take place on 3 February with another panel of experts, and then, finally, on 9 March with a Foreign Office minister before, as usual, we produce our report. Gentlemen, I had the privilege personally of being almost ten years ago at the remarkable election in South Africa: I was supervising the international observers in Port Elizabeth and there was a great euphoria. Prior to that there had been dire predictions about South Africa going the way of Algeria with the infrastructure collapsing, with the minority fleeing the country ‑ happily for many reasons, not least the wonderful example of the first President, Nelson Mandela, things have been very different and if we want a text, I was struck with what Matthew Paris said recently in an article in The Times on 25 October which was called: "A pessimist recants, the new South Africa is working", and the quote is: "Fitfully but unmistakably the new South Africa is working. The country today is richer, happier, more powerful, fairer and more secure than it was a decade ago, and the direction is still up. Tremendous problems remain ‑ HIV, unemployment, the unrealistic aspirations of the poor. Party allegiance is clustered around racial and tribal groupings and continues to stunt real democracy. Can these things be solved?" Are you gentlemen optimists or pessimists? Professor Barber: I think what has been said by Matthew Paris is very fair. It is a much more attractive place to visit and much fairer but, of course, it has enormous social problems as all societies have, particularly in South Africa with HIV/Aids as you mentioned, and crime and unemployment, but overall, if you have to take a great balance of one side or another, yes, it is a much better place now. I , too, was at the 1994 election and it was a marvellous up‑lifting experience. Since then, of course, things have not been perhaps as uplifting but overall I think that is a fair judgment of Matthew Paris'. Professor Simon: I would concur with that and particularly, if you take as the baseline the period of intense violence and intimidation that led up to that election, the transformation which followed is truly remarkable. I guess the longer term answer depends in a sense who within what position in South African society you speak to. There are many who would argue that the change has been quite remarkable; that the achievements are legion. If you talk to many of the historically disempowered or unempowered, particularly in rural areas or urban townships, you get a different picture, and I have heard it said quite recently that, "Very little has changed, our lives are much as they were before". Personally I find that hard to believe ‑ precisely because of the substantial change to the political economic climate, the situation, the repeal in many profound ways of the legal apparatus that apartheid initially underpinned even though the legislation has been gone now in some cases for sixteen or so years, but it is a question of structural change as much as superficial change whereby hangs the conundrum between the appearances of goodwill and progress and peace to all men and women, and the ability to address the fundamental deep‑rooted and historical legacies of inequality and deprivation. Q2 Chairman: But the legacy of the Group Areas Act is still there? Professor Simon: Yes. It is much more difficult to recast concrete, bricks, mortar and steel and glass than it is to amend legislation, and that I think is a very good illustration of how change can only come about in different ways, different speeds and different contexts. People can move and the extent to which there has been residential integration reflects in the first instance the working of the private property market because that is the principal means by which people can escape from their previous group area since the legislation was repealed, but only a small proportion of people have the wherewithal to do that and therefore are people who do not remain trapped either in high density townships or shanties or squat areas or some other form of social housing, and even the million or so RDP houses which were built in the first six years of the post‑apartheid period, one of the few RDP targets achieved, people speak disparagingly about because they are smaller than their predecessors, the so‑called matchbox houses of the apartheid era, many of them built in a way that has given way to a rise in structural faults and so on. So it does depend who you spoke to in what context, but there are many targets which are being achieved now and take longer to gestate. Q3 Chairman: Finally from me, Professor Barber, which areas, if any, disappoint you? I have heard a number of concerns about the exodus of skilled personnel from South Africa which has an adverse effect on public services, education and health. Where do you think the major failings are? Professor Barber: There has been but this is a mixed picture because South Africa gains from some of the regions. The brain drain is not all one‑way. For example, it has gained from Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has fine educational structure and regional movements out of Zimbabwe have been helpful to South Africa in some ways, but I remember the Health Services in this country were starting to retract largish numbers of nurses and doctors and therefore in that sense we gained at South Africa's expense ‑ and not just us but Australia and New Zealand as well. A fair number of doctors moved to New Zealand. So there has been but it is a mixed picture. It is an area I have read about rather than researched myself, but I do believe there is a mixed picture. South Africa has gained some of the brain drain from the region as well as losing some in a more advanced way. Q4 Chairman: So it has been disadvantageous to Zimbabwe? Professor Barber: That is right. Q5 Mr Illsley: Could I introduce a few questions on South Africa's role within the region? Already South Africa has been described to the Committee by a number of sources as the principal economic and military power in sub Saharan Africa. I think the World Service talked about the dominant military and economic power in southern Africa. Professor Barber referred to South Africa "punching above its weight". To what extent would you agree that South Africa is the dominant economic and military power within the region, and would you add any caveats to that? Professor Barber: No, I am sure it is. In almost every respect South Africa is more advanced and larger than its neighbours, but the South Africans are conscious that they cannot prosper fully as an island in a sea of desperation, and they are surrounded by difficulties. Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe are all in difficult circumstances at the moment, and this has a drag effect. There may be a brain drain, as I have mentioned, but overall the picture is not a good one in the region. This has an adverse impact on South Africa which is the giant, and there is this burden of expectation. We all somehow think that South Africa can solve the regional problems and I do not think it can by itself: it needs help internationally, and so, returning to your question, it seems to me there is too much a burden of expectation on South Africa in the region. Q6 Chairman: Do you agree? Professor Simon: At one level yes, at another no, and again I think it reflects the duality because we cannot talk about the rest of the Southern Africa or sub Saharan Africa in such singular terms. Last year I found myself in the space of about six months in South Africa, Ghana and Uganda on separate business and the contrasts in terms of what people were thinking and talking about and particularly their view, for example, of the NePAD programme as a whole and South Africa's role within it illustrate the tensions and these conundrums very well. Even within South Africa, which is one of the leaders of the programme, there are many people who are extremely sceptical and, indeed, critical of Mbeki's personal role and the government's position overall. Why? Largely, not entirely, because of the tension ‑ and this is the big caveat that I would add to what James just said ‑ and there is a direct sense within black South Africa, to the extent one can generalise, of a trade‑off between the use of resources and energy to redress the historical inequalities and the poverty within South Africa and the use of the skills and the resource of the investment to address similar disparities internationally within southern and sub Saharan Africa. In Ghana and in Uganda for slightly different reasons, but broadly because they are what you might call second‑string economies and powers within sub Saharan Africa, the perception was very critical because they feel they are likely to get very little out of the NePAD deal, and they point to the big four or five, if you like, who are the main drivers between NePAD as the ones who will gain mainly from the investment and the new opportunities from abroad. Q7 Mr Illsley: Just taking that a little bit further, the "burden of expectation", and looking at South Africa's peace‑making and peace‑keeping role, since 1974 South Africa has attempted to broker peace in a number of African conflict areas. In which of these areas do you think it has seen greatest and least success, and for what reasons? Professor Barber: I think the overall picture has not been particularly bright. It has improved slightly in the DRC. It was at first virtually rejected in the DRC but I think it has got some peace‑keepers there now. Angola is quieter. Mozambique is the one big success story in relation to South Africa and there it has been a combination of what has happened in Mozambique itself. South Africa has been able to offer Mozambique substantial help. The Maputo corridor and the help it gave when there were floods in Mozambique was useful so there it has had direct help, but also the combination of political change in Mozambique which has gone along at the same time as South Africa's and the connection between Nelson Mandela and Joachim Chissano I am sure has helped. Q8 Mr Illsley: Given that the South African government has shown an increased willingness to involve itself in regional peace‑keeping duties beyond the DRC, and bearing in mind the memorandum which you probably have not seen which we received from the BBC World Service which pointed out problems within the South African defence force of a lack of equipment and so on and so forth, does South Africa have the necessary capabilities to be putting itself forward for these roles? Coming back to your burden of expectation, are we expecting too much of South Africa in accepting these roles and, if that is the case, what further help should we and the rest of the western nations be giving to South Africa in that peace‑keeping monitoring way? Professor Barber: Some of the situations like the DRC relies on everybody's ability to handle, frankly. The early dilemma after 1994 for the South African forces was bringing together very disparate elements and merging them into one national force ‑ a very difficult job. I am not an expert on it but I think it has gone reasonably well towards the end with many difficulties as you had the liberation forces together with the old South African forces together with the Bantustan forces which had to be merged into one coherent force. It was a remarkable achievement to do it at all but there were lots of difficulties in doing so, of course, and while that was on South Africa was reluctant to involve itself in peace‑keeping operations. I think that phase is largely over, so I hear, and they are more prepared to involve themselves in peace‑keeping, but to equip yourself in peace‑keeping is different from other equipment. There has been a big debate about the arms purchase. You need to know what you are going to use them for before you buy your arms, and the arms purchase was mainly on the primary role of defence of the borders. Whether that is good for peace‑keeping or not is an open debate, so there has been uncertainty both about the peace‑keeping role and about the arms purchase. Professor Simon: The period immediately after 1994 was characterised by a deliberate rundown of South Africa's military capacity in every sense ‑ the scrapping of conscription which had been in many senses the backbone during the apartheid period, the planned obsolescence of some of the materiel, the reduction in the standing army notwithstanding the reintegration issue with assistance from BMAT as had been the case in Zimbabwe and Namibia before, got to a point where it was realised that some re‑equipment was required and retraining, hence the controversial arms deal. But I would like to add at this point a fundamental dilemma for South Africa and, indeed, other countries in Africa in respect of South African peace‑keeping or any other military form of intervention and that is simply this: that until the early 90s the experience of the rest of Africa in terms of South Africa's military was as a destructive, destabilising force, invading and occupying part of Angola and so on, sabotaging as part of that whole period of conflict, and that is still very firmly embedded in the minds of many people in South Africa and beyond and the thought of seeing South African soldiers in uniform and bearing arms as part of some other presence is still a difficult one. That is waning with time and, as James alluded, the role in DRC has been quite instrumental. The other success I would point to that he did not mention is Nelson Mandela's role in brokering agreement, however fragile it remains, in Burundi which received much less attention than the DRC, Zimbabwe and Angola. Q9 Mr Illsley: Turning to brief questions on the South Africa Development Community which it joined in 1994, what useful role does the SADC plays in facilitating economic and political development within southern Africa? Professor Simon: It played a far more useful and active role until the conflict in the DRC broke out and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola became directly involved. They are three of the SADC members and their involvement was, in effect, unilateral without going through the appropriate SADC channels which exist for multilateral agreement before such involvement commences, and that effectively emasculated the organisation for several years ‑ in fact, it damned nearly brought it to its knees. Another element of the dilemma is that there are at least three regional institutions with increasingly overlapping membership and in the post Cold War period increasingly similar aims and objectives. SADC is arguably the foremost; then there is COMESA, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African which stretches all the way up to Djibouti and Eritrea, and the oldest of them all, the southern African customs union dating from the period of the union of South Africa 1909‑1910 which now links up Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia and is only the real customs union to date of the three, although the others have now common markets and free trade areas on their agendas. But progress has been slow. The free trade area within SADC is being implemented very gradually. It is supposed to have an eight year implementation period but that has been delayed, and the individual countries are struggling with the old dilemma of, "Do we lower and remove the barriers to trade amongst the membership for the common good relative to what we as country X, Y or Z might gain or lose individually", and especially for the smaller weaker countries that is a very real dilemma. Q10 Mr Illsley: Regarding what you said about the countries which paralysed SADC for several years because of their inability to continue, what then is the significance of the recently signed Mutual Defence Pact by SADC members? Professor Simon: Potentially it is part of the resumption of progress. There used to be something called the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security which was a semi‑detached institution headed by Robert Mugabe, and a few years ago was part of the restructuring after South Africa joined SADC that was given a different status and brought in, and this Mutual Defence Pact is part of the political programme of SADC and this reconfigured organ. The Committee suspended from 3.33 pm to 3.43 pm for a division in the House of Commons. Q11 Sir John Stanley: As you know, the remit of this Committee is to scrutinise the foreign policy of the British government, and I would like to ask you both what you consider to be the top priorities for the British Foreign Office in relation to South Africa. Professor Barber: Let me try. One of them will be to help in the trade quest to help ‑ you will never get an absolutely even field, so far as I can see, but to help get an even field. It is one of the things that Alec Erwin mentioned when he was over here recently ‑ they want fairer trade situations particularly in parts of the agricultural structure. They have an agreement, of course, with the European Union on free trade arrangement, but the implementation of that I think is important. It is not just having an agreement but it is how it is implemented, and I think it is in British interests to help South Africa as much as possible in that. So that is certainly one area. In another area, if SADC is going to be effective HIV Aids should be one of the areas which it addresses because you cannot contain this to one country, it spreads over the whole region, and if we can give them any assistance and help in that we ought to do so. Professor Simon: I would draw attention to several things. The first and perhaps most problematic is the ambiguous, ambivalent relationship between South Africa and the United Kingdom which in a sense we saw coming to a head again at the weekend at CHOGM over, in this particular instance, Zimbabwe, but that is one ‑ albeit very important ‑ illustration of the difficulty and the way in which particular problems can cloud otherwise very productive and broadly co‑operative relations that have existed since the transition in South Africa. In that sense the difficulty is that South Africa finds itself, as we were saying earlier, in a leadership role on the one hand and also in the role of a recipient of aid and transitional assistance in various guises of the sort that we have alluded to, and in that particular context things like the Chevening studentship scholarship awards are profoundly important and the role of the British Council which comes under the Foreign Office. Here I would like to enter some concerns of the current view of those activities. One hears that the Chevening studentships might be reduced in number, that the higher educational links might be discontinued and a variety of those other mechanisms which are both of direct benefit to Britain but also crucially important to that longer term support, not least in the context of expanding the skillbase, compensating for the loss of people through HIV AIDS and so on, but the bigger issue of trying to find accommodation with a country like South Africa over joint foreign policy and World Trade Organisation related issues is very complex. The difficulty is how to find a strategy that works, and here I could draw attention to the contrast between the policy of at least one former minister of state for African affairs and the South African government. The one tried very upfront full‑on tackling of the issue; the South Africans, as they still do, prefer the quiet African Unity, supposedly behind‑the‑scenes role, and yet when you talk to officials on both sides it is clear that they feel equally frustrated at the lack of progress. So this is a real dilemma and it is not easy to say, "That was right, this was wrong", but it is a critical issue which is now likely to complicate the relationship between South Africa and the United Kingdom particularly after CHOGM at the weekend. Professor Barber: I would like to add international crime. South Africa, after 1994, became quite a centre for international crime including the drugs trade. We have given some help, I know, but that is another area in which we could help. Sir John Stanley: Following on from what you have both said, can you tell us whether there are any particular policies that the British government is currently following that you would like to see altered, or any policies not being followed now that you would like to see being adopted? Q12 Mr Maples: In relation to South Africa! Professor Barber: I think we could do probably more in training people, for police and, as David mentioned, universities. I know our universities, dare I mention it, here at the moment are controversial and under‑funded maybe but compared with South Africa we are very well off and it is the staff and post‑graduates that would be useful for us to help, if we could exchange them there. I will try to think of others as we go along. Professor Simon: The one I would urge most strongly is that benighted term joined‑up thinking and, crucially, joined‑up action to follow the joined‑up thinking, particularly in the interface between the FCO and DfID, the Home Office or the Department of Trade & Industry in respect of negotiations at the World Trade Organisation, the problems encountered at Cancun, and the way in which South Africa is again emerging as a significant player. But there was evidence that Britain did not dissent from the overall EU position which has caused some consternation among people in South Africa and others in that group of players. Q13 Sir John Stanley: You are referring to the tariff issue, are you? Professor Simon: In particular yes, but the wider agenda as well. Secondly, in respect of FCO and Home Office co‑operation or collaboration in terms of policy towards asylum seekers and migrants from South Africa, South Africa was recently added to the so‑called white list of countries from which asylum seekers will normally be presumed to have no bona fide case and are therefore subject to the new accelerated process that has been introduced. I have personally been involved over the last year in a number of asylum claims and appeals as a provider of expert evidence, and it is very clear from that work that there is a large category of people, not necessarily for party political reasons but nevertheless through well‑founded individual fears of persecution in terms of the scope of the UN declarations on refugees and associated legislation, who should not automatically be assumed to have no bona fide case and should be seen and heard on their merits. Q14 Chairman: Professor Barber, have you had any further thoughts? Professor Simon: No, I do not think so. The last time I wrote about this I said it was a comfortable relationship. Now that is an unfortunate word. Q15 Mr Hamilton: I wanted to move on to the subject of Zimbabwe, South Africa's neighbour and the problems in that benighted country. As you may know, this Committee has had an on‑going interest in Zimbabwe; we have published three reports to date, the latest was in May, and we devoted a section of our report to Zimbabwe in its region. May I just quote a small paragraph from that report? We said that, "If Zimbabwe's neighbours were fully to assume their responsibilities, for example, by imposing targeted non trade sanctions similar to those already imposed by the European Union by some Commonwealth countries and by the United States, then Mugabe's regime will be further isolated, his opponents would be encouraged and his days would be numbered". The government fully agreed with us, by the way, in its response to our report. However, some people who have submitted evidence to this inquiry have said that one of the reasons that South Africa is doing very little about Robert Mugabe is that there is this belief that the west has double standards; there is anger that the west appears to be so active in the issue of Zimbabwe yet apparently ignores the adverse impact of globalisation countries like South Africa. Firstly, why do you think that President Mbeki has been so reluctant to criticise the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, given the damage he is doing to that country and to the whole region, and to what extent is South African policy on Zimbabwe a reflection of demand for African unity as opposed to unwillingness to tackle the problem of Zimbabwe? Professor Barber: I think President Mbeki has problems both at home and abroad if he takes too strong a line. Robert Mugabe is not regarded in the same light by many blacks in South Africa as we regard him. For example, when the foreign minister, Dr Zuma, was here recently, she talked about an historical injustice ‑ that is the land question. Now, we do not perhaps see it as strongly as "an historical injustice", so there is that side. I am told when Robert Mugabe was in Fort Hare some months ago he was greeted as a hero because he challenges the old colonial structure, so internally I think there are people in the ANC who would be critical of Mbeki if he took too strong a line against Mugabe. Equally internationally, and the case I quoted in my paper was that some time ago when Mandela tried to take a very firm stand on Nigeria and Sarow Wiwa case and that isolated South Africa from the rest of Africa. It burnt its fingers very badly on the Sarow Wiwa case, and I do not think they have ever forgotten it. Do I need to remind you of the case? Q16 Mr Hamilton: No, I remember it very well, but my question then further to what you have said is this: surely, when pictures are broadcast ‑ and they must be broadcast in South Africa ‑ of the repression of the movement for democratic change, of the economic disaster that has been brought about, is it simply the case that the South African government blames the west in some way for what is happening economically to Zimbabwe and does not see Robert Mugabe as the cause of that economic damage and the repression that he is using against opposition? Is that seen simply as a way of putting down people who are supporting western ideas, or white ideas. Professor Barber: It is not that simple. I am sure there is criticism and I am sure Mbeki himself recognises the dilemma and the damage Mugabe is doing, but I am trying to say how does he face that publicly? They have tried to do it by quiet diplomacy which has failed, of course ‑ and there are some very strong critics including Mbeki's brother. He leads a campaign against Mugabe in South Africa and there was a meeting at the South African Institute of International Affairs I was at which was very strongly against what was happening in Zimbabwe, so there very strong critics, but if you ask me why Mbeki behaves as he does, I try to understand. Professor Simon: I would distinguish there are three elements to the answer. One is the issue you already alluded to, the allegations of double standards, and here we do not even need to look to relationships or treatment of different countries but different stages in respect of Zimbabwe and Rhodesia before that, and people draw attention to the fact that, even though there were international sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia as it was at the time, they were not strongly enforced despite appearances and some of the key economic linkages were maintained, that notwithstanding. The second element is the historical debt that Mbeki personally and the ANC in general feels towards Zimbabwe and the other frontline states for the sheltering and support during the struggle against apartheid, and in some cases Mozambique and sometimes Zimbabwe using the territory as a forward base certainly giving asylum and refuge to many South Africans. The third one is that in Africa as a whole, some would say, although others would draw more tight geographically regionally specific boundaries, there is a sense you do not fall out in public, you do not attack a fellow African leader at these sort of international fora but you deal with this quietly within the confines of your collective home, as it were, and that was perhaps the issue I was alluding to earlier in respect of the Foreign Office versus the South African relationship and what we saw at CHOGM at the weekend. But again, as James has said, it is by no means a universal sentiment; there are many in South Africa who feel just as desperate as the MDC supporters in Zimbabwe and many others, particularly on the part of Africa, but again there are differences. In West Africa my experience is that many people are much more openly critical of what Mugabe is doing and will say he is putting all of us under a cloud giving us all a bad name. In East Africa there is much more of that sentiment that James mentioned where people respect Mugabe as having the guts to stand up against the vested interests and the existing power structures of the international architecture, if you like. Q17 Mr Hamilton: Surely it is one thing to stand up against those structures and, as Professor Barber said, to challenge the old colonial structure, that is accepted, but when you see Africans starving, when you see that starvation and food being used as a weapon against African opponents, surely that is very different to dismantling the old colonial structures? I still fail to understand why that is not condemned. Professor Simon: I would agree, and that is why people I talk to in various parts of West Africa increasingly are taking the more openly critical view, and we saw President Obasanjo at the weekend at CHOGM, but I think in East and Southern Africa, the areas where white colonial settlement were profound and therefore land expropriation most widespread, that historical consciousness is rather different and there is a sense, perhaps ironically, in keeping with the UN and OAU charter that these are domestic affairs of fellow Member States in which you do not intervene, at least not publicly in that way. Q18 Mr Hamilton: Can I ask either of you whether you think there is any sign that South Africa's policy is now changing as things get worse in Zimbabwe? Professor Simon: I have seen little evidence thus far, at least on the public side of the policy. I think there are some intense debates and differences of opinion fairly high up in government, and certainly the flip side of that is that there has been growing concern within South Africa, and also Namibia, that if the land questions in those two countries are not successfully dealt with, then Zimbabwe's style scenario is no longer beyond the realm of possibility in South Africa and Namibia. There is great concern, and a couple of weeks ago the Namibian government intervened very forcefully to forestall a threatened land invasion by people who were members, as it happens, until very recently of the SWAPO affiliated trade union. Q19 Mr Hamilton: Do you think that the Foreign Office and the British government has failed to understand the reasons why the South Africa government cannot act more strongly against Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe? Professor Simon: I think there has been an attempt to understand them. Whether that understanding is fully fledged, shall we say, I am not sure, but it also reflects different positions and the whole question of the universality of human rights, of the balance between individual human rights and collective and social rights mediated by these historic inequalities. That is the nub of the disagreement. Professor Barber: One may add to it Mbeki's particular pride in being an African. He is the one who launched the African renaissance idea first and he thinks that too often black people have been blamed when whites have done wrong. He is a man who is proud of his ancestry and does not want to be seen as somebody trying to undermine the black side, the black combination, so there is a personal element coming into it as well. I am sure he has tried to change Mugabe but he does not want to be seen as a leader standing out against another major black figure who, as David said, was a major liberation figure. Q20 Mr Hamilton: And, of course, you could understand that more if the opposition in Zimbabwe was white but it is not ‑ well, it is partly but it seems to be mainly black. Professor Barber: Yes. Professor Simon: Very much so. Q21 Mr Hamilton: Finally, do you think the British government, the Foreign Office here, can in any way influence South Africa's attitude towards Zimbabwe? What should the FCO do now to influence future events or from what you say, Professor Barber, is Thabo Mbeki's position really pretty solid and he is not going to change? Professor Barber: He is not going to change publicly, I do not think. The hope is he will put some personal pressure, but I cannot seeing Mugabe moving because of the sort of pressure that South Africa has exerted so far. If you really wanted to pull the plug you could stop supplying not just food but electricity and so on, but South Africa has not done it so far and I cannot see it doing it in the future, so we just have to go on and hope, I suppose, that somehow Mugabe will be removed. Q22 Mr Chidgey: I would like to raise some questions concerning South Africa and the African Union. As you know President Mbeki was a very strong supporter of the OAU, the first president, and also a president of the AU. We all know, of course, that relations between the AU and the west, particularly the United Kingdom, were at times more than a little strained but what I am particularly interested in is how does the new African Union differ from the old OAU? What potential do you think it has to tackle effectively the complex social, political, economic problems which, of course, is set out in its constitution as its major role. Is this a realistic approach? Professor Simon: It is a very good question. The answer is difficult because it is probably shades of grey and matters of degree, at least in the short term. One of the key issues that some would find problematic is the role that Libya's president has played in the whole transformation from the OAU to the AU, and the way in which it is alleged in some quarters he was attempting to do this to create something, as it were, in his own image and perhaps another way of looking at it would be to counter the increasing influence of South Africa and the southern cone, if you like, within the pan continental movements. It is not quite clear how much of the resourcing he is providing but certainly during the transitional process and the negotiations that followed it was substantial, so I think there is a little bit of concern there. My sense is that in many parts of the region there would be greater support for the more geographically specific regional economic initiatives, like SADC and ECOWAS because they are more coherent ‑‑ Q23 Mr Chidgey: Support from whom? Professor Simon: The Member States themselves, and they would see those as more potentially useful vehicles for the economic collaboration than the pan continental. At the continental level the question becomes the relationship between the African Union and NePAD and, again, there is still some definition that we need to have there. Professor Barber: It is rather early to judge, that is the dilemma. It is a new initiative and the hope is that new initiatives improve things, but SADC itself has reorganised itself recently with the hope that it will be more efficient. In the past it gave out segments to a particular state to carry out, for example, South Africa had health as one of its segments, but it was done by civil servants in South Africa. Now there has been a change in SADC and they have six areas in which they are doing it as a unit, and the hope is that that will be more effective. Q24 Mr Chidgey: On that point, particularly your reference to SADC, has the disappearance of the Zimbabwe damaged the AU and, particularly, SADC? Professor Barber: Oh, I should think it has damaged most things, yes. There was a big argument earlier over the AUGA between Mugabe and Mandela because Mugabe had been rather cock of the walk before the South Africans arrived. When the South Africans arrived Mandela became the dominant personality and Chairman of SADC. Mugabe, put out by this, wanted to have a separate area of his own and he tried to take over the AUGA, so they had quite a substantial clash. Professor Simon: I would agree with that. Q25 Mr Chidgey: You, of course, know that South Africa was very strongly for the creation of a Peace and Security Council within the AU. I really want to ask you whether you think the scheme will come to fruition and what it could achieve, bearing in mind they see this as a vehicle to produce an African stand‑by force, rather along the lines of the EU model, I suppose. But I want to link that question to something you alluded to earlier which is the controversy over the arms deals in South Africa which go right up to the Vice‑President. It is a matter of record that Mbeki decided he will not be prosecuted even though there seems to be quite a lot of evidence that suggests a prosecution should have gone ahead, and this involves two major very large companies, if not entirely British they certainly have a very large British involvement in their operations. So really I am asking, firstly, how can South Africa have any credibility in a programme such as NePAD, which is linked to the AU which Mbeki is a great supporter of and which is out there to drive against and eliminate corruption, when at the very highest level within their own government there are huge questions about the propriety of arms purchases? If you then link that to whether they have any credibility in sponsoring a pan African peace‑keeping force, does it not all seem a bit of a mess? That is one way of putting it, but it does not have much credibility, does it? Professor Simon: I can understand that view and I think the central difficulty to grapple with is, on the one hand, the sense that I think does have genuine roots at least in some quarters amongst African governance that there is a need for some such institution and, on the other hand, increasing concern which has been reflected in some of the critiques offered by South Africa and other African states that ultimately what is driving this is a western attempt to devolve international peace‑keeping down to the continental and subcontinental region. Particularly they would point to the role the US has taken on in the post Cold War period as global policeman and enforcer, in the sense that, as we have heard in recent weeks, the American government has realised even it has limitations of resourcing and personnel to do this in too many conflict zones simultaneously, and really what is driving this is an attempt to devolve that responsibility and the risks and so on on to Africans. Q26 Mr Chidgey: But is not that the wish of the African countries themselves? Professor Simon: Well, there is support in some circles but not unanimously. There is great concern about this and therefore the balancing act to be trodden is how to support, train and facilitate to resource this without, again, being seen to be the sugar daddy to something that is going to dance to the pay master's tune. Professor Barber: What I would say is that South Africa has been more open than most places. There is corruption, of course, but at least in South Africa there is reasonably free press, it investigates things, and we know about the degree of corruption. So in that sense it is rather hard I think to say that it is like other African states. I think South Africa in some ways is different from other African states, and one of the things is that it has quite a strong civil society and it has a press that is reasonably free and critical. When it comes to the OAU I have only once been and I found it rather depressing experience so I am a poor advocate of it. Whether the AU will be better, I do not know. Q27 Mr Chidgey: We have touched on this already but it relates to our relations in this area with South Africa and, of course, those of the EU looking particularly at the AU's aims for the continents which involve, of course, peace‑keeping forces as well. Really what I want to ask you is, in short, what more could we be doing in the United Kingdom and the EU to assist the AU in achieving its aims, and do we suffer at all from the fact that this arms deal in South Africa has been a huge controversy, and they are the key players in trying to establish a regional peace‑keeping force? Does that rebound in any way in the assistance that the United Kingdom can offer? Is that rather tarnished by this because of the involvement of British firms? Professor Barber: I doubt it. It seems to me the AU is a bigger issue than the arms deal. Now the EU relationship with Africa generally is one that, as I mentioned before, I would like to see more sympathy with in terms of freedom of trade and so on, and encouragement of the people of Africa to be able to sell us their goods, so it is that general level, and Britain can play a role in the EU helping the AU in that sense. Professor Simon: I would underline that last point. Many people in South and Southern Africa see Britain as potentially one of the main allies within the EU context, particularly over fishing rights and other resources where Spain or other countries have taken quite hard line positions. My sense, to answer your question more directly, is that the FCO and the British Government more generally have been far more positive in responding to NEPAD than thus far to the African Union, but even there I would characterise it largely as something like, "Make encouraging noises but let's wait and see; let's look for evidence of progress before committing ourselves." Q28 Mr Chidgey: But NEPAD is an AU programme. Professor Simon: That relationship is not as straightforward as may seem. Q29 Mr Maples: I want to look at South Africa in a slightly bigger context. How does it see the Commonwealth, its role in the Commonwealth, how it might use it, whether it feels it gets used by the Commonwealth? How do they see that? Professor Simon: I think Mbeki's take on that would be rather different today from a week ago, for very obvious reasons. Let me answer it in an indirect way. I think the kind of perspective we had portrayed by Mugabe at the weekend of nothing but a talking shop and a club does it a disservice and demeans it. That said, Zimbabwe's departure probably does not demean the Commonwealth in the short-term because there are precedents that if there is a change of government the country could be invited to rejoin, and that gets us out of that particular problem. In specific relation to South Africa, I have little doubt President Mbeki himself sees it very much as one of a suite of global multilateral institutions where South Africa can play a pivotal role, often as a broker between if you like the old Commonwealth and the new Commonwealth - Europe, Australasia, Canada, and Africa, Asia. The trouble is, what happened at the weekend has probably been something of an implicit or indeed explicit rebuke to Mbeki's envisaged role. I think broadly speaking there is still fairly solid support for South Africa's membership and role, and South Africa has been greatly encouraged by the accession of Mozambique, more recently of Cameroon, in the sense in that respect it might assume something more of a wider role than simply a former British ex-colonial club, because after all Mozambique was never a British colony, protectorate or anything else. Professor Barber: South Africa sees itself as a bridge-builder between the first and third worlds, and in that sense it has been reasonably successful. When it first came into the multilateral, after 1994, there was great enthusiasm of course. A friend of mine was at one of the meetings, on fisheries I think, and he said that when the South African came in everybody stood up, cheered, he said it was like the Second Coming. They have managed to build on that and I think one of the successes of South Africa has been in things like the World Trade Organisation, in the Nimamba (?) Movement and so on, to be a bridge between the First and Third Worlds, and they see it that way. I will again quote Alec Erwin who said, "We have both the First and Third World here, therefore we are in a position to help." I can only agree, I think it has been one of the most successful areas of South Africa's international efforts to bridge-build. Q30 Mr Maples: Can they be both a bridge-builder and a leader of Africa, or Sub-Saharan Africa? Professor Simon: They are attempting to be, yes. Q31 Mr Maples: Are those things at some point going to come into conflict? Professor Barber: They have not always been welcomed by African states. Some African states have said, "They are trying to speak for us and they do not understand." They did not get full support for their Olympic bid from some Africans, so there is uncertainty. Q32 Mr Maples: The same question really in relation to the United Nations. The United Nations might be a better place to play that role of bridge-builder. Professor Simon: Again, there is evidence in several respects, one of which, perhaps most conspicuously, was South Africa's role in promoting the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines in 1997. There are other examples where in the bridge-builder role the role has been played very successfully and in that case South Africa certainly does, to quote the phrase, "punch above its weight." That depends obviously on maintaining and retaining support within Africa and again there is that slight ambivalence because of the historical role and the sense on the part of many of the smaller and weaker countries that South Africa stands to gain much more than they do from many of these pan-African and global movements, so that is a tension line I would draw attention to. Q33 Mr Maples: Do you think in both these contacts, the Commonwealth and the United Nations, South Africa has fully bought in? To what extent has it bought into the good governance, democracy, human rights, rule of law agenda? That seems to be going pretty well within South Africa, but has it bought into that agenda as far as the rest of the Third World is concerned? Do we see them as an absolutely essential ingredient, that it is not going to work for them if they do not have these things in place? Professor Barber: If I may go back, in terms of the UN they may not say it openly to you but they would like to see a reform of the Security Council with permanent seats for an African or African states, and they see themselves of course as the natural inheritor of the seat for Africa. Others do not necessarily share that view. Q34 Mr Maples: Would they see that as something they could use to promote this agenda, or is our agenda fundamentally different from theirs in this respect? Professor Simon: I think it also depends, in the sense of chronology, which interests predominate within, say, the Department of Foreign Affairs. Certainly in the first few years after transition in 1994 there was remarkably little change of key personnel except at the very top. So they had a strong continuity of, if you like, old guard people who had served under the National Party Government, and that played a quite important role in terms of South Africa's response on a number of these sorts of initiatives and the relatively uncomplicated way in which South Africa signed up to some of these apparently universal, individualised rights. Gradually as personnel change was effected, as the Mandela regime has yielded to the Mbeki regime and his very different vision, that has become a little more complicated, and there is this balance which I alluded to in response to an earlier question between the sense of a more, as it were, communalist, collective Africa perspective on rights rather than the kind of Western focus on the principal priority of individual rights, and that difficulty again, that conflict, I think is beginning to come out in some of the apparently divergent views and responses to different initiatives, often in quite rapid succession. Q35 Mr Chidgey: Just a few questions on NEPAD. We have touched on it so I will try and be succinct. You have already made clear to us that there is a feeling that NEPAD suffers from being different things to different people, both within and without the continent. Some see it as a tool for securing better governance, particularly donors, and others see it as a means of securing more aid for African nations. Can those two needs be satisfied, or is it a game of chess? Professor Simon: Yes, as they say. Chairman: A good game of doubles - not a ball between you! Q36 Mr Chidgey: Let me be specific. Really it is a question of whether you believe Western donors will continue to support NEPAD without an effective Peer Review Mechanism. I want to couple that with an interesting contrast and that is that the United States administration does not support NEPAD, it has its own millennium fund which has a rather more commercial approach to assisting Africa. Professor Simon: Yes. Q37 Mr Chidgey: I would like your views on, will we support that Peer Review, and is the American approach the best way for Western donors? Professor Simon: I think the answer to the latter is probably no. There is an important role for a multilateral approach and the broad strategy of trying to co-ordinate an EU policy is probably right. The critical question which I alluded to earlier is to what extent is the EU in general or Britain in particular prepared to put something up-front beyond saying, "We are waiting for evidence of development on the ground", and this Peer Review Mechanism is precisely one of those thresholds which people are carefully waiting to be crossed. There again we see differences within NEPAD as to how readily the individual member countries are prepared to sign up to that sort of thing. It comes back to this earlier difficulty which many governments have, about being seen publicly and especially now through some kind of formally instituted African mechanism to be rebuking and reprimanding other countries. I think the one glimmer of hope is that they would probably prefer to do it in that more specifically African-centred forum than either the Commonwealth or the UN, which is a kind of north-south global forum where the pressure to stand united might be even stronger. Professor Barber: All I would add is that the American view since Bill Clinton's time has been private enterprise not aid. They have been pushing that very hard. Professor Simon: And the principal beneficiary of the African Growth and Opportunity Act in the first year or two of its operation has been only two or three countries - South Africa, Nigeria and to a lesser extent Kenya - which again reflects minerals and mineral-based manufacture. Q38 Mr Chidgey: On this Peer Review Mechanism, you will be aware of course that President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal was recently reported as calling into question the Peer Review Mechanism. He apparently believes it will be undermined by the length of time needed, the absence of objective norms and the lack of sanctions to make countries comply. That is very interesting because of course South Africa and Ghana are the first two countries to volunteer to be subject to this, so are we going to see South Africa as an example of best practice. Will it mean that in fact effectively it will not change significantly poor governance in African countries? Will it be in effect toothless? Is this a huge challenge for South Africa or will it just pass by? Professor Barber: Yes, I think it is a big challenge. Q39 Mr Chidgey: Is there anything we can do in the UK as British foreign policy to aid this process? Professor Simon: Assisting South Africa to play a leadership and catalytic role in respect of mechanisms like that could bear some fruit. Q40 Mr Chidgey: Should we be using the carrot and stick through the G8 Action Plan in the UK's policy towards Africa? Professor Simon: I would be tempted to say that putting some funds and some commitment up-front would be as useful as that. Certainly, as you will see in one of the attachments to my memorandum, the Evian Summit earlier this year was felt to be disappointing by both sides. NEPAD and the African communities were looking for some concrete evidence of G8 commitment or OECD commitment and, vice-versa, they were looking for progress on peer review mechanisms, but at the moment there is this kind of dancing around but nobody is prepared to take the first step and say, "We are going forward." Q41 Mr Chidgey: Very specifically then, are you saying you do not agree with the principle that G8 support should be withheld until improvement in good governance can be demonstrated? Professor Barber: I think in South Africa there is evidence of good governance; enough to encourage ---- Q42 Mr Chidgey: Enough to unlock the support from G8? Professor Barber: Yes. Professor Simon: And in a growing number of other countries. Certainly some support up-front with caveats as a reserve position, but crucially being seen to be willing to commit some resources and move forward on that basis and not stand back. Professor Barber: Yes, I agree. Chairman: A perfect note on which to end. Gentlemen, you have been most helpful to the Committee. I would call this first session to an end and we will begin in ten minutes' time with the next witnesses and Mr Illsley will begin.
Memoranda submitted by Action for Southern Africa and Mr Blumenfeld
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: MR JESMOND BLUMENFELD, Brunel University, University of Oxford and Oxford Analytica, and MR ALASTAIR FRASER, Policy Officer, Action for Southern Africa, examined. Chairman: Gentlemen, I welcome our two new witnesses, Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld of Brunel University, University of Oxford and Oxford Analytica, who, as I know personally, was one of the key figures in the Chatham House Study Group on Southern Africa for very many years. I welcome also Mr Alastair Fraser, a Policy Officer for the Action for Southern Africa, which is a successor organisation of the anti-apartheid movement in the UK. Gentlemen, welcome. I can assure you that we are unlikely during the course of your session to be summoned by the bells to vote, so you can relax on that. Let us move straight into business and I call Mr Illsley. Q43 Mr Illsley: One issue which a lot of people who do not make a study of Southern Africa would recognise is the incidence of HIV-AIDS in South Africa. My two questions to kick off this session are, what impact has the HIV-AIDS pandemic had on South Africa's domestic politics and what effect will it have on the country's future? One interest I have in that is that I have been to meetings in the past where South African and other countries' politicians have mentioned of number of key personnel - teachers, doctors, et cetera - who have died from AIDS, substantial numbers, where those countries simply were not able to train the people to replace the ones who died. Your comments on that please. Mr Blumenfeld: It has had a profound impact on the politics of South Africa, mainly because in a rather maverick kind of way President Mbeki has clearly had some personal difficulties with the whole concept of the HIV virus. There has been a great reluctance on the part of the South African Government to take active steps to deal with the pandemic. That has changed quite dramatically in the last 18 months or so, first with an undertaking to provide anti-retrovirals to all pregnant women, that was about 18 months ago, on a universal basis, although the role-out of that is very slow. More recently, first in August, an undertaking to provide anti-retrovirals for people in an advanced stage of the disease, and much more recently than that an undertaking to have a universal programme over a period of time which would make anti-retroviral treatment available to everyone who was HIV-positive. So it has been a very delayed process and very controversial and it has infuriated, exasperated, and alienated a great many constituencies both domestically and internationally. As I say, it is in the process of changing which means we will now have an attempt to deal with the issues of prevention and the issues of treatment. As far as the future is concerned, on the economic side it is very difficult to offer any clear answers. There are a number of models which have been used in an attempt to measure the demographic and macro-economic effects. There are disagreements amongst scholars about the validity of those results. What research there has been has tended to suggest that in macro-economic terms, oddly enough, the impact of the HIV-AIDS pandemic is probably relatively limited. In other words, it will slow the rate of growth, for example, but will not do much more than slow it. Even a one percentage point slow-down in the rate of growth is serious but we are not talking about a catastrophic melt-down, or at least that is what the research suggests. One of the reasons for that is that although the majority of people who are HIV-positive and who will die from AIDS are unskilled, poor people, there is a great pool of other unskilled labour available to replace them. Much more difficult, of course, when you come to replacing skilled personnel, professional people and so on. So one can look at a whole series of areas in which there are clear costs which would be incurred and try to come to some understanding of what the impact would be. The other thing I would say which has been evident, not only in South Africa and other African countries as well but particularly in South Africa, is that having seen the inability or unwillingness of the Government to take active steps to deal with the problem, a substantial number of employers, particularly large employers, have done their own kind of cost benefit analysis and worked out it is actually more cost effective for them to provide free treatment for their own workers, and in some cases for the families of their employees as well, rather than sit back and do nothing. So we are seeing a two-pronged approach to the problems from both the public and the private sectors. Mr Fraser: I think obviously the most significant impact in South Africa is on the people who are dying. It is estimated there are 600 people dying every day in South Africa alone from AIDS. One of the major political impacts has been to reveal essentially the strength of South African civil society in terms of its response to that, the emergence of the treatment action campaign and its ability to mobilise the unions, parliamentarians, the media and almost the whole country in order to secure the pressure required to bring about the five year plan, the national treatment plan and the budget to support it. I agree with some of what Mr Blumenfeld has said but if I could pick up a couple of things. The first one is on the companies. As he has suggested some companies have noticed treating their workers may be one way of cutting their costs but there is a tension in there in that the level of unemployment in South Africa means that the workforce is essentially replaceable, so we are talking about a minority of companies there. There is a lot of work which could be done particularly with British investors or with British companies to ensure that treatment plans go out to both the workers and to members of their families. Q44 Mr Illsley: Is there any obvious reason why Mbeki took the attitude he did? Was it economic, that he did not want to pay for the drugs, or did he simply refuse to acknowledge the extent of the epidemic? Mr Blumenfeld: It is difficult to say without asking President Mbeki himself, but insofar as one can understand how his mind has worked on this, I think it goes back to his deep, passionate concern and pride in being African and a perception, rightly or wrongly, on his part that there were people in the West, in the industrialised world, who were in his view blaming Africa for the emergence of this new disease, and it was a kind of visceral reaction on his part to that. It is very difficult to explain. I do know, because I have spoken to people who at the time were in close correspondence with him about the issue, that he got some of his information in the first instance from the internet and picked up the notion of the dissident view about HIV-AIDS and the argument was that there is no such thing as the HIV virus, or certainly if there is it is not that that causes AIDS, that the problem is social deprivation, poverty and the susceptibility of poor people and deprived people to all kinds of infectious illnesses, and that is where the efforts should go. It is that sort of understanding of the problem which led the Government to focus particularly on diet and other issues as the means of dealing with the problem. Mr Fraser: On the pricing issue, I do not think it is necessarily helpful to try and pry into the President's mind on those issues. There is a Cabinet decision to go ahead on a new track and that is what we should focus on. I think the issue of drug pricing is key and it does restrict South Africa's ability to roll out an effective treatment plan. There has been a recent agreement within the WTO to make production of drugs an easier thing for developing countries to do. There are steps though which the UK could still take to move the agenda forward. Canada, particularly, has been looking at whether as a G8 country it should be considering the production of generic drugs for export to African countries. The UK could do a similar thing which would require some legislative change but I think it would be one of the things the UK could do to win some goodwill where a lot has been lost through the pharmaceutical challenge to the South African Medicines Act and a less than helpful approach from the WTO. Q45 Sir John Stanley: Can I start by asking you the same question which I asked the two previous witnesses. Could you tell us whether there are particular British Government and particularly British Foreign Office policies which are being pursued now which you would like to see altered, and whether there are policies which are not being adopted now which you would like to see followed? Mr Fraser: I tried to work out what the Foreign Office policy was towards South Africa as part of the process of responding to your inquiry, and it was not easy to see it. I do not think there is a coherent South Africa strategy, as it were, and there is certainly no coherence between departments. Reading some of the Foreign Office website documentation, one of the most worrying things from my perspective is the heavy focus on business opportunities for UK companies as almost the Foreign Office primary concern in South Africa. Given the history and the relationship between our two countries, I do not think that should be our primary concern, also given the situation of poverty and AIDS and those kind of issues in South Africa. I think the Foreign Office might like to look at almost its presentation there. There seems to be an approach that there is an economic debate within South Africa about what model should be followed, and the UK it appears to me is putting itself very firmly on one side of that debate in a way which could be seen as interference in a domestic economic debate. I find that worrying and would be interested in the UK taking a different line. In terms of the policies the UK should pursue more vigorously, debt cancellation for the region of Southern Africa, although not such a big issue for South Africa but for the Southern African region, there has been a lot of talk and very little action on effective debt cancellation. Similarly, on trade both within the WTO and the EU ACP talks as well as in the review of the South African Free Trade Agreement which is coming up, I think the UK could take a much more aggressive role with the European Commission whose position is distinctly unsympathetic. Mr Blumenfeld: I think I said in my memorandum that obviously there are certain policy issues that the UK should be pursuing in relation to developing countries in general, and you have been round this particular course before on the issues of agricultural protectionism in the Common Agricultural Policy and so on which I think is harmful to the development prospects of not only South Africa but other countries as well. I would take a slightly different approach from Mr Fraser in saying that the South African Government has been striving very seriously in the past decade to regenerate economic growth, to regenerate the economy and in so doing to tackle all the challenges that the country faces. In my view the most straight forward and obvious task for the British Government is to give every support to that process. It has been a painful process for South Africa because there has been a huge degree of structural adjustment which has been needed to the economy, it is politically difficult in some cases to achieve those policies, and they are slow to deliver benefits. Every support that the UK Government can give to the creation of an environment that is favourable for investment, that tackles the skill shortage, which is a fundamental constraint on growth and development in South Africa, that looks towards the relief of poverty, assistance with combating the HIV-AIDS pandemic, all those kind of issues that is where the focus certainly of economic policy on the part of the UK Government should lie. Q46 Sir John Stanley: Can I turn to a specific issue. When I was in South Africa in September, I was told to my surprise that the number of white farmers who have been murdered in South Africa is greater than the number who have been murdered in Zimbabwe. Do you believe that is factually correct or not? Mr Blumenfeld: Yes. Mr Fraser: No idea. Q47 Sir John Stanley: Am I right in saying that the overwhelming preponderance of the farm attacks and murders which are taking place have been in the Transvaal in the North? Mr Blumenfeld: I am not au fait with the particular geographic distribution. I am aware of the problem but not the distribution of it. Mr Fraser: I could not help you on that. Q48 Sir John Stanley: I believe they are overwhelmingly in the North. Do you have any comments on this particular issue? Do you believe this high level of attacks and indeed of murders which are taking place is basically motivated by criminals who are seeking to rob et cetera, or do you believe there is a racist element behind it? Mr Fraser: I am afraid you are asking me to delve into the mind of somebody committing the act. I could not do that. Mr Blumenfeld: I am not really in a position to speculate. I have seen the various reports, I am aware of the inquiries that the South African Government instituted into the problem and the conclusion that it reached, that these were predominantly criminal acts. I have to say that the prima facie evidence, the anecdotal evidence, one sees and hears about the nature of many of these attacks gives rise to certain questions about that. But I would not have sufficient expertise to be able to give you a clearer answer than that. Q49 Sir John Stanley: I wonder if either of you saw the BBC report which I saw a few months ago, it was only a relatively short clip and it may have been representative or completely unrepresentative, but it was a piece about the attacks on white farms in the North, and it showed first of all a group of black labourers at least one of whom had been very severely beaten up by the white farmer, and it was then followed by what I have to say was a quite appalling interview with the white farmer who took the line that physical beating up was basically the only language which his workers understood. If that was in any way representative, that would suggest to me there is a singularly unreconstructed apartheid, Afrikaner type view amongst certain sections of the white farming population. Does what I am saying and what you may or may not have seen on the BBC ring true, or do you think that was very unrepresentative? Mr Blumenfeld: All I can say is, if, as you say, it is representative I would be as appalled as you are. I am unable to give you an answer as to whether it is representative or not. Certainly we know that there are plenty of issues around farming, rural development, land issues, employment issues, which have affected agricultural employment over many decades. It would be surprising - welcome but surprising - if attitudes had changed in the rural outposts of South Africa as radically as they have changed elsewhere. Mr Fraser: The only comment I would have is that I think a lot of people are aware South Africa implemented some very progressive labour laws early on in the transition but obviously following up and implementing labour standards and union rights in far-flung farms has been very challenging, as it is in workplace factories in far-flung areas. The size of the Civil Service required to do the health and safety or union rights, which we take to be quite standard here, is just not there and it is very difficult to follow through. Q50 Sir John Stanley: Do you see any prospect in South Africa of the aspirations of black people in South Africa for land ownership being able to be matched in terms of the voluntary availability of suitable land? Mr Blumenfeld: The land reform programme in South Africa has been slow to develop. Again this is not particularly an area of expertise on my part but I am aware of the fact that it has moved up the political agenda in the wake of the developments in Zimbabwe. I am not sure that the land issue in South Africa has quite the same fundamental political salience as it has certainly in Zimbabwe and possibly other countries as well. That is because that is not where it seems, from the point of view of the main political parties, their constituent interests predominately lie. I think they lie elsewhere. There are competing issues to do with land reform in terms of ownership and tenure. There is one school of thought which would argue that land reform ought to be redistributive in nature, and there is another school of thought which would argue that land reform should be productivity-enhancing in nature, and they do not necessarily lead to the same kind of policies. I would suspect that the proponents of the second view, the productivity-enhancing view, probably have the ear of Government more than the others simply because they are probably better organised. In South Africa it might be slightly more balanced in that I know there are NGOs which are concerned about landless people in South Africa, but I would suspect the productivity-enhancing view would probably have a stronger purchase on this. But, I have to repeat, this is not an area of expertise I would claim. Mr Fraser: The only thing I would add to that is that access to land and secure tenure is at least as much an issue in urban areas as it is in rural areas in South Africa. Sir John Stanley: I agree, there are crucial issues in relation to housing and the ever-expanding shanties in Johannesburg and Cape Town. I understand that. Q51 Chairman: Gentlemen, on the economy I recall some years ago, Ambrose commissioned one of their senior members to write why the economy was under-performing, Clem Sunter - you may remember the book - said one of the conclusions was not remarkable, it was that South Africa was placed in an unfavourable geographical position at the end of a continent which was under-performing generally, it did not have growth economies as its neighbours, and therefore nothing much could be done about that. However, it did say that the other major component of the poor performance was the education of the black majority, that at the time of the Bantu Education Act the blacks were hardly taught science, there was a minuscule number of black engineers, and that meant private companies had to educate their own engineers and scientists from the majority. Has that changed? Is there a fundamental change in the South African education system so that black men and women can hope to achieve in science? Are the resources going there? Can we expect any serious change? Mr Blumenfeld: The allocation in the annual budget to education is the highest share of any category of expenditure. So within the resources available there seems to be no question that the Government is putting considerable emphasis on education. Q52 Chairman: And the results? Mr Blumenfeld: We are looking at a very long-term programme. It is a generation before it has any really significant effect. To go back to your preamble, I think that the explanation for slow growth in South Africa and the difficulties of regenerating the economy is much more complicated than simply that it sits at the end of a continent which is far away from world markets and the skills issue, though the skills issue is absolutely crucial, I think there is a whole raft of factors which have been constraining economic development in South Africa which was part of the inheritance of the ANC when it came to power. It is the most advanced economy in Africa certainly, but it was beset by a whole host of problems. You have mentioned the skills deficit which I think was absolutely crucial --- Q53 Chairman: And science education for blacks. Mr Blumenfeld: Absolutely, because blacks under apartheid were denied any kind of useful and technological education like that. But there were also very serious developmental backlogs in terms of housing, infrastructure, access to water and so on, all of which are part of the social wage, if you like, which helps to build productivity. There were extreme degrees of poverty and inequality in the country, there were very serious structural deficiencies to the economy and I would mention three in particular. First, a very seriously uncompetitive manufacturing sector; South Africa was not competitive in world markets in manufactured goods. Secondly, a severe balance of payments constraint which effectively precluded the economy from growing at a more rapid rate on a sustained basis. Thirdly, a very poor employment generating capacity, so when investment did take place it tended to add very little to employment. These are characteristics which go way back in South Africa's history. Q54 Chairman: How successfully have these factors been addressed? Mr Blumenfeld: They are in the process of being addressed, some of them more successfully than others. But I think ten years is a relatively short time to turn that round, because it is like turning a supertanker around, it is a very slow process. It is a politically painful and difficult process because structural adjustment, which is what it is - it is self-imposed in this case rather than externally imposed by the IMF or the World Bank but the solutions are fundamentally the same - destroys jobs. That is why there has been such resistance within the unions and the left wing of the ANC to a privatisation programme, partly ideological opposition but partly also a pragmatic recognition that there would be thousands more jobs lost. I think one should bear in mind that from the time of the onset of the recession in South Africa in 1989 and from then until the time of the political transition in 1994, half a million jobs were lost, and since 1994 until now another half a million jobs have been lost. So one is looking at very, very fundamental structural problems. Q55 Mr Chidgey: Carrying on from the Chairman's comments, we have tackled the business of skills shortages and the educational issues, but this whole business of structuring the economy is worth more examination. There is a concept we hold that the South African economy is capable of being the powerhouse of the region, and yet you have already set out there is resistance to privatisation as a way of bringing in the investment presumably needed to modernise industry and make it competitive within the African continent, and I am conscious that Mr Fraser's paper sets out a view which opposes privatisation. Is this not the conundrum? Unless you do get a step change in the African economy to enable it to benefit from a much invigorated export market, you are not going to bring in the changes which will eventually lead to mass employment even if you have increased the education opportunities for the majority of the population. Whilst I do not hold a flag up for the privatisation policy we have been through in this country, it is a fact that a decade or so after they were introduced, or two decades, we do have more or less full employment, and the two things are not inseparable. Is there not an issue here of a knee-jerk reaction to something which philosophically sounds unacceptable, yet evidence elsewhere shows it does perhaps provide a solution to the problem? Mr Fraser: Three points on those comments. The first is, our submission does not oppose privatisation, what it says is that economic decision-making should be the business of the South African people, and there is a highly heated debate in South Africa between the trade unions, various wings within the ANC ---- Q56 Mr Chidgey: So you are reluctant to have foreign investment because that may mean foreign control? Mr Fraser: No, foreign investment is absolutely key to growth in South Africa. The point is, is there a policy prescription which follows, either from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office or even this Committee of MPs, towards South Africa. If we talk about UK policy towards South Africa, is it the business of the Foreign Office to be attempting to influence the economic policy followed by the South African Government, or is that a question for the South African people. That is the question I want to ask in the paper. Any conjecture I might have on whether privatisation works for South Africa is to some extent irrelevant, I am not a South African citizen, neither are you, neither is anybody who works in the Foreign Office. The second point on the idea, and this may seem contradictory, that we can export a model of privatisation which may or may not have worked in the UK to the conditions in South Africa I think is highly contestable. There is an assumption within a lot of UK policy towards South Africa that South Africa is a normal country, a bit like us only poorer. It is not, it is nothing like us. The legacy of apartheid, the position within the global economy, the position and relationship to the international financial institutions, are completely different and makes the situation in South Africa completely different. The idea that we can help to export a model there which will work there by default is I think completely flawed and something we should get away from. Q57 Mr Chidgey: I think that is a very fair point, but it does beg the question, what model would work in South Africa and how we, as outsiders, how our Government through its policy, could help the appropriate model for South Africa. Mr Fraser: There probably is not an appropriate model for Southern Africa. The countries of South Africa ---- Q58 Mr Chidgey: I am interested in South Africa. Mr Fraser: Even in South Africa, to my mind, there is not a model, it is almost a fallacy of economics that there is a model which must be applied on to this country. There is a political process, a very difficult political process, which relates to all kinds of legitimate demands within society. That process and the democracy in South Africa, which is its greatest achievement since the transition, are to some extent contingent on South Africans being allowed to make decisions for themselves, and for that debate being allowed to happen as it happens in developed countries. Q59 Mr Chidgey: I would like to pose the next question, surely the continuous stability and development democratically of South Africa depends upon reaching the population right down to levels which were previously excluded under the old regime? So you cannot just say, "We have no solution", because if we have not got a solution then the stability of South Africa is at risk. Mr Blumenfeld: I would argue there is a home-grown South African policy on this. In 1996 when the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme, known as GEAR, was introduced, privatisation (which was not called privatisation but called restructuring of state assets) was a key element within that. It is a contested policy, there is no question about that, and for that reason, and one need hardly tell you, it is difficult for governments when they are opposed by their own party members on important policies to carry those policies forward. We do not have to go far away to find that. So it has been a difficult process for the Government to go through but in August 2000 the Department of Public Enterprises finally came up with a very coherent, substantial agenda for privatisation. It unfortunately was still a bit slow in implementing that and therefore, particularly in the case of the telecommunications corporation, Telcom, fell foul of the collapse in international markets. But in practical terms, if you look at the flow of foreign direct investment into South Africa since 1994, there are only two years in which there was very significant foreign direct investment, the one was I think the partial privatisation of South African Airways, and the other was the first partial privatisation of Telcom. What does it do? It brings in foreign currency, it contributes to tax and government revenues and thereby assists the budgetary problem, and it also brings with it new technologies, access to new techniques and technologies and know-how. That is South Africa's own, home-grown privatisation policy. It has been difficult for them to implement it for political reasons and they have suffered as a result of their slowness in doing so. Q60 Mr Chidgey: Is by any chance, and I am not sure on this at all, within this equation, within this controversy, this opposition, whatever, is there a factor there that there is a concern that the privatisation exercise might result in the creation of a new elite, a new ruling class to replace the old, white-based elite? Mr Blumenfeld: No, I would not say that, because all privatisation transactions would, like most other investment transactions, be subject to the whole new approach which ensures there is a substantial black empowerment element within the investment. Q61 Mr Chidgey: Could it be a black elite which was created out of this process? Mr Blumenfeld: A black elite has been created, and again this is a contested issue and one of the problems around the whole black economic empowerment programme. In the second half of the 1990s there was a privately-driven, market-driven process whereby corporations sold off stakes to black empowerment groups, the terms on which they were done, the financial structures underlying those deals, were often not very sound, they were based on black groups borrowing substantial funds in the hope that both capital gain on the stock market and organic growth within the companies would enable them to repay those loans, and the stock market then collapsed. So what one got was a perception of black economic empowerment, which was the creation of a get rich quick, capitalist elite. That led to the appointment of the Black Empowerment Commission which deliberated for two or three years, produced a report which has formed the basis of the new legislation which is currently going through Parliament for the establishment of what is called the broad-based black economic empowerment strategy. There is concern about the fact that a relatively small number of elite people are benefiting from this to the exclusion of others; that is very much part of the debate in South Africa. Mr Fraser: Just on that, there is an important point about the idea of a home-grown adjustment process in South Africa, because although I have said economic policy should and is being made by South Africans, the key focus both for the Foreign Office and for this Committee should be on the international constraints on South African policy making. We need to be aware that, for example, the shift from RDP to GEAR was heavily informed by the currency crisis in South Africa, itself in many ways a result of the international financial system over which the UK has significant influence, and therefore it is something we can do something about. Similarly, the World Bank and IMF advisers who ultimately answer to the board members in the UK to some extent were offering expert advice in South Africa so-called right through the transition and through the RDP/GEAR period, and we need to be aware of that. We need to be aware of what our Government is selling to the World Bank and IMF to sell to other countries. South Africa is also constrained by the rules in the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement with the EU, and it is constrained by the rules of the WTO, and South Africa itself is very aware of these problems and has laid out an ambitious challenge to it in the form of NEPAD, which you talked about earlier. It runs through all these issues. The interesting thing about the G8 response to NEPAD is that it has attempted to entirely ignore that structural debate and to shift focus on to the issues which interest us. So there is a real problem there and if we are not able to pick up on that, we are not really saying anything to the UK Government. Q62 Richard Ottaway: May I touch on the point Mr Blumenfeld touched on, black economic empowerment. You seemed to be suggesting a second ago that you did not think it was making much progress. Is that right? If so, what can be done to speed it up? Mr Blumenfeld: What I was suggesting was it did not make much progress in the first phase of this, which was in the late 1990s, and it became a rather discredited strategy. In a way, black economic empowerment has now become almost the new religion in South Africa, and that I have to say worries me somewhat. There is no quibbling with the fact that blacks need to be empowered, that a much greater share of ownership and control of resources ought to be exercised by black South Africans, my concern about the current policy is that it comes out of the report of the Black Empowerment Commission which came up with the key conclusion that economic growth in South Africa is being fundamentally held back (a) by the lack of empowerment and (b) by engrained racism within the control of the economy. My point about that, and I spelt it out earlier, is that I think one should not be looking for simplistic explanations for why growth in South Africa has been slow. It is a very complicated story, there are huge structural problems which need to be addressed or are in the process of being addressed, and lack of empowerment of blacks is only one element of that. But the conclusion of the Commission was that this was a fundamental constraint on economic growth, therefore if one empowered blacks one would get much more rapid economic growth. That has yet to be seen. Q63 Richard Ottaway: What is the logic in that? Mr Blumenfeld: If something is a constraint and you remove the constraint, presumably you are expecting ---- Q64 Richard Ottaway: Why was lack of black economic empowerment a constraint? Mr Blumenfeld: That was the argument of the Commission, it is not my argument, I am simply reporting the findings of the Commission. I am just trying to say that I think the reasons why South Africa has problems growing at a much more rapid rate are very complex and there are a wide range of them. For one thing the market is relatively constrained because you have had for four generations a relatively small number of people who owned assets, had access to income-enhancing educational opportunities and so on, and the vast majority did not, so by definition you have a restricted domestic market. The more that market grows the greater the economic opportunities which are there. The more blacks are acquiring assets and property and marketable skills, the greater the benefits which will come from that. My concern is that is being seen as the key policy aspect at the moment, and whilst there are certainly strong commercial arguments for firms to take account of the pressures for black empowerment, some of this is being induced. It reminds me in a way of the era of the Reconstruction and Development Programme immediately after 1994. The Reconstruction and Development Programme was the ANC's policy manifesto and when you spoke to South Africans, it did not matter who you spoke to, you could not find anybody who did not believe in the Reconstruction and Development Programme, but it proved not to be a coherent strategy and it was dumped very quickly, by early 1996 the RDP office had been closed down and the RDP has been abandoned in all but name and replaced by this new Growth Employment and Redistribution strategy. One senses the same sort of thing happening now in relation to black empowerment. Everybody is on the black empowerment wagon. Without in any way denigrating the need for greater empowerment I think there is insufficient attention being paid to the risks and the costs which are involved. Insofar as the perceptions of those risks inhibit new investment, that is a factor which ought to be taken into account. Mr Fraser: My only comment would be about UK companies and investors and again focusing on what contribution we can make to black economic empowerment. There is an obvious need for black economic empowerment. In 1995-2000 the average household income for an African family in South Africa dropped 19 per cent, for a white family it rose 15 per cent, so there is an obvious need. There is the issue of a mass consumer market amongst the black population which is essential to have a balanced economic development. I would come back to the point that South Africa is not normal, it is one of the world's most unequal societies, and that does something distorting not just to society but to the economy, and whatever it means, black economic empowerment is a necessary rejoinder to that situation. For UK companies, I guess our investors need to be looking at what they can do to make the maximum contribution to the society and the communities they are investing in. For example, in fields like tourism and mining, and a lot of the investments are in those fields, it is very easy to repatriate profits very quickly without any significant impact on the local environment. So it is thinking through what the UK companies can do to go beyond the legal minimums, which in South Africa compared to the UK are fairly basic - they are not legally required to leave very much in the communities - and they need to think, "Do we need to hit the legal minimums or do we need to become model employers and model investors", and there are questions about what the UK Government could do to encourage that. Q65 Richard Ottaway: Has black economic empowerment filtered down into the education system at all? Mr Blumenfeld: It depends what you mean by black economic empowerment. If you are asking whether the composition of the labour force or the composition of the school teaching force and so on within education has changed, the answer is yes, dramatically. But it really depends what you mean by empowerment. I would understand empowerment in that sense to mean effective control and direction and ownership of productive resources. Q66 Richard Ottaway: Has this been discussed? Is it part of the national curriculum? I am sure there is no such thing as a national curriculum but is it becoming part of everyday life? Mr Blumenfeld: I would answer that rather differently by saying there was a whole series of legislative measures in the mid-1990s, some of the first legislative actions that the Government undertook, which were to redress what it regarded as the inequities and imbalances in the labour market, and that is where the empowerment thrust was in the first three, four years of the new Government. It was to begin a process of correcting the legacy of discrimination and inequality in the labour markets. So there were a number of employment equity laws and related laws which were passed which sought to ensure that the composition of the labour force at all levels and in all occupations and across firms and sectors and so on more accurately reflected the composition of the population. It was not quite a quota system but it was informed by the same idea, that the composition of the labour force not just at the unskilled level but at the middle management level and senior management level and the board of directors level and so on, should reflect more accurately both the gender composition of the population and the racial composition. That was where the thrust was initially. That is having very dramatic effects. There was a whole series of affirmative action programmes which had the same consequences. Q67 Chairman: How significant is crime, or the perception of crime, a deterrent in terms of inward investment and skilled personnel at a senior level moving to South Africa? Mr Blumenfeld: It is one of a number of factors which inhibit inward investment. There is no getting away from it. The crime problem is serious, it creates difficulties for any firm wanting to send skilled personnel there because they have a responsibility for their welfare, and there is both a perception but also a reality that crime levels are high particularly in certain areas. There is no question that it does have an impact on investment. It is of course one of the reasons why one of the most rapidly growing industries in South Africa is the security industry, it is an ill wind which blows nobody any good, but there is no getting away from the thrust of your question. Mr Fraser: It is difficult to know what is going on in the mind of investors, it is rather like knowing what is going on in the mind of criminals. I suppose the two most useful comments I can add are that the latest crime statistics suggest there is some downward trend and that there is a new plan for the regeneration of Central Johannesburg. Q68 Chairman: Is that an area where the UK can help - in training? Mr Fraser: There are already police exchanges and that kind of thing, so I imagine so, yes. The situation in Johannesburg is interesting because it is the location where big investors, both South African and foreign, will look, and having a city of that size which has a CPD in the situation it is in at the moment is bizarre. Q69 Chairman: Is the Carlton Hotel still mothballed? Mr Fraser: There is a lot of property still mothballed but there is a plan which has emerged for the state legislature and the state government to take over significant land and some of the empty buildings in Johannesburg city centre - they are trying to turn it into a pedestrianised area - and there may be some hope that the atmosphere in that area could be turned around. Q70 Chairman: How significant a constraint is the exodus of trained people? We may be benefiting our own National Health Service, for example, at the expense of South Africa. Is that a significant factor? Mr Fraser: It is a huge factor and it is something which enormously annoys both South Africans and the South African Government. It is quite a complex issue to try and find a solution to in that you cannot stop people travelling or taking individual decisions about how to lead their lives. There has been, as I understand it, a deal struck recently which has something to do with compensating for the training of nurses which has gone on, but there are numerous issues, some of them to do with the operation of British employment agencies which recruit in South Africa, both their recruiting techniques and what they are telling people the situation will be in the UK. There is then the situation for nurses when they arrive in the UK, and it is something UNISON has done quite a lot of work on, the situation for migrant nurses arriving here and finding it is not quite what was advertised. Mr Blumenfeld: I would not dissent from that at all. I would add of course that the opposite is happening within Africa, in that South Africa is denuding many other African countries of their skilled personnel and professional people from teaching, universities and professions. You find people from every corner of the African Continent in South Africa at the moment, and they have gone there because the opportunities seem to be better there than in their home countries. So it is a complex issue. Q71 Mr Hamilton: I think both of you were in the room when I asked Professors Simon and Barber about Zimbabwe and South Africa, and South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe and the attitude of leaders in South Africa. I wanted to explore some of those points with you. You will have heard me say that we have published three reports as a committee into Zimbabwe, the latest being in May of this year, and one of the points we drew attention to in our most recent report was the fact that South Africa could have enormous influence on the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe but seems very reluctant to be at all critical. In the light of the worsening situation in Zimbabwe, especially the economic spiral downwards and the effect that has not on the white farmers who are left but on the Zimbabwean population, the African Zimbabweans, I wonder whether you would concur with Professors Simon and Barber in their views that there were many complex reasons why South Africa and especially Thabo Mbeki refused to be critical openly of Robert Mugabe despite the gross violation of human rights in Zimbabwe? Mr Blumenfeld: I do not think I would be able to add very much beyond what they said. I think they summed it up fairly accurately. Mr Fraser: I have submitted comments to your Zimbabwe Inquiry as well. Particularly given the last few days, one of the mistakes we could make would be believing that British pressure on South Africa to put pressure on Zimbabwe would be a positive thing. South Africa has its reasons which have been discussed for its approach to Zimbabwe, some of which we would disagree with - South African quiet diplomacy should be more balanced, much clearer condemnation of the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, for example. But South Africa being seen to act in response to a UK demand for it to do so is likely to be extremely counter-productive. So in terms of FCO policy, there are real questions about how much is done in the background and how much is done in the foreground. Our consistent advice to the FCO is, yes, they should be talking but they should be talking in the background. Every time the megaphones come out in the UK, it tends to have an unfortunate result, whatever the intention. Q72 Mr Hamilton: I understand that and I think you are right, Professors Simon and Barber expressed it very clearly, but I wonder this: surely South Africa as a sort of beacon of democracy in the region would enhance its own reputation by being seen to come down fairly hard on an African leader who is oppressing many more of his own people than any perceived colonial influence or white influence? Mr Fraser: I think it rather depends what you mean by "come down very hard". Q73 Mr Hamilton: Well, be very critical and try and support a democratic change in Zimbabwe as well as economic change. It seems to me the people who are suffering are the very people who cannot afford to suffer, not that anyone can afford to suffer. Mr Fraser: Nobody disagrees with that. I think the question of what South Africa's best role could be is a difficult one. Its current approach is claiming to be a mediator between the two parties, and obviously for anyone attempting to act as a mediator, overt bias is a problem. One of the comments we have made is that South Africa is in danger of being seen to be overtly biased in favour of the regime, and it needs to balance this position, but balancing this position does not mean coming out in favour of the opposition, taking a very strong public line. It is a very difficult balancing act. Q74 Mr Hamilton: Is there not enough evidence made public of the severe oppression of anybody who opposes Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe? Mr Fraser: Of course there is. Everybody recognises that. The question is how useful is it to shout that from the rooftops as compared to announce you believe there are human rights abuses in the country, announce you believe it is a complex crisis which involves the economy, governance, AIDS, famine, et cetera, you understand the breadth of the issue and that you want to be a mediator and a neutral mediator. It simply depends on how you want it done. I never quite know what people mean. When you say "South Africa should come down very hard", if you mean South Africa should cut off the power, you will not find a mass based democratic legitimate movement in Zimbabwe which agrees with you, so why say it? That is the dilemma for South Africa. Q75 Mr Hamilton: I know, Mr Blumenfeld, you wanted to come in but let me finish off by asking you this: is there any sign that South Africa's official policy is changing to become, as you say, Mr Fraser, more balanced between the parties so it can be a genuine mediator and ensure the very people who are suffering have their suffering alleviated? Mr Fraser: None that I have seen. Mr Blumenfeld: No, I do not think so, though the pressure is on and I think that pressure should be maintained. As a UK citizen I would hope very much that the UK Government will at every opportunity, not necessarily in public but certainly in private, make clear to the South African Government that it is in South Africa's and Africa's own interests that this problem be dealt with, that the South African Government in my view made an error of judgment to begin with in not distancing itself sufficiently from what was going on. The reasons for that were partly explained by Professors Simon and Barber, but I think also because there was a poor judgment made by South Africa's policy makers on the nature of the problem and the issues that it was going to raise, and I think they are backing themselves into a corner. It is very difficult to change policy in that way without losing face. NEPAD is about improving good governance and the South African Government almost seems to be saying, "Zimbabwe is such a special case we just cannot deal with that under NEPAD, it is too complicated." My personal view is that this is a case of a naked attempt to retain power, and I do not buy all the arguments that the key issue is land reform; I do not dismiss the importance of land reform but I look at the consequences of the land reform policy introduced and I am appalled. So I do think there is an onus on the UK Government to recognise this and to push for change. It is very difficult from the outside to bring about change, it can only come from inside, but every support should be given to that. Q76 Mr Chidgey: You were both here to hear the earlier evidence and you may remember I asked a number of questions about NEPAD, so I will try and do this fairly shortly as you must know the questions. There is one I did not ask before and I would like to run by you, and this is concerning the Peer Review Mechanism which we are all familiar with. I understand so far 16 countries have volunteered to be reviewed and Ghana and South Africa are the first two. I wonder whether you could give me your view on recognising that some countries in Africa are less enthusiastic than others about the process, and perhaps do not quite see the relevance as others might do. Can you give me your view on what might be a critical mass in getting universal acceptance throughout the Continent? You have 16 countries so far out of a total of 53, 54 countries in Africa, what is the critical mass for getting the concept of peer review universally accepted throughout the AU? Coupled with that, are there any key players who by signing up to the Peer Review Mechanism would give this authenticity or authority which would make others willing to join and accept this is the way forward? Mr Blumenfeld: Your comments began with "we are all familiar with it", I am glad you are familiar with it because my problem with the Peer Review Mechanism is trying to work out exactly what it is. I know in principle what it is but where is the beef? I think the answer to your question is, they need to get it going. I do not think the critical mass is an issue. Q77 Mr Chidgey: So you agree with President Wade, that it is taking too long and if it takes much longer it will drift away? Mr Blumenfeld: Absolutely. Mr Fraser: I do not have a strong view on it. Although it is hard to work out exactly what it is, which I find true of NEPAD in general, I think the one thing you can say about the Peer Review Mechanism is that it is a remarkable thing to talk about doing. Nobody else in the world does it. I think that we need to be careful about how we chivvy people along and saying, "Come on, everybody must get into this thing"; though we are a supporter of the idea I think there has to be a certain level of understanding about what people are committing to and what kind of achievement that would be. Q78 Mr Chidgey: I wonder if the EU nations would be happy to have a peer review mechanism, but that is an aside. We have looked at NEPAD already, how significant is it, what can it potentially deliver for South Africa and for the Continent as a whole? Have you anything you want to add? Mr Fraser: NEPAD as a whole? Q79 Mr Chidgey: Yes, what can it deliver? Mr Fraser: I think it is enormously significant, even if it is difficult to work out what it is. The fact that a large group of African countries are able to agree to a programme which lays out particularly the structural challenges within the international system and sets that out as a challenge to the rich world, "What are you going to do about this, we are serious about this, we are going to come to the G8 meetings and ask you what you will deliver", I think is enormously significant. The G8 has within its power to completely kill NEPAD off and I think it is doing a good job of it so far, because its response to the structural challenges has been so disappointing, on debt, on trade, and even on the promises it has made on aid or aid for AIDS specifically, it is either "No Comment" or it is an empty promise. I think that is enormously dangerous for the whole idea of a North-South partnership, which for me is the most exciting thing about NEPAD. What it looks like will happen is that they will go away from a series of G8 meetings enormously disappointed, African leaders will say to themselves, "Let's just get on with this thing ourselves. It was a challenge to the West, the West has failed the challenge, let's get on with a variety of programmes, peer review mechanisms, et cetera, we will do it ourselves", and that is great but it is an enormous missed opportunity on our part. Mr Blumenfeld: I also think it is enormously significant - or I would add the word "potentially" enormously significant - but for very different reasons from Mr Fraser. I think the appeal of NEPAD was that it was sold as an African-owned and African-produced solution to Africa's problems, and the undertaking was, "We in Africa will do X, Y and Z in relation to economic reform and governance and the establishment of peace and security, in return for which we seek a partnership with the international community." The fact it is already being interpreted as "going cap in hand to the G8 for more aid" I think simply undermines completely the innovative aspects of NEPAD and if that line continues will consign NEPAD to the same dustbin as every other programme of African attempts to put the Continent back on the world's agenda. African leaders know what it is they need to do in order to attract the attention of the world again and to get the world to be committed to sharing in a partnership with them in moving forward. Mr Fraser: Can I come back on that? I honestly think that is a crazy position. The arguments for engagement with Africa, debt relief and fair trade, stand with or without NEPAD. The idea that Africa needs to prove itself worthy when much of the debt is what is described as odious debt, when much of the debt has been repaid twice over; the idea that Africa needs to prove itself again in order to get anything in an unjust global trade system or through debt or through the World Bank and the IMF, is ridiculous. The arguments for those institutions stand whether or not African leaders are demanding them, which they are, and our response is not dependent on them playing tricks to the audience. Q80 Mr Chidgey: You made a comment earlier that the UK Government was doing a good job in killing off NEPAD. Is that a sin of omission of commission, in your view? Mr Blumenfeld: I think the Africa Action Plan was partly the G8 saying to the African countries, "You have undertaken to do these things, let's see the colour of your money as it were and then we will deliver." Having said that, there is no question in my mind that there is a lack of firmness in the commitment, I put it that way, on the part of the G8 countries to bring forward resources, but I think it was a wait and see message to Africa. Mr Fraser: I think the sin of omission is the answer, in that G8 countries basically want NEPAD to work, they want it to work without them having to do anything particularly on debt relief. Debt continues to be used as a lever to win economic reform, and one of the reasons why they do not want to cancel debt, which is what they should do and which they have committed themselves to numerous times, is they can continue to use it as a lever for economic reform. Q81 Chairman: Gentlemen, one very last question, revisiting what Sir John asked earlier. This Committee will have to make recommendations to the Foreign Office on what the British Government can do. I hear what you say about deft relief and aid but the Government will say that they are the second largest provider of help for HIV-AIDS in the world and the initiatives for debt relief have come from HMG. Leaving aside the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, how can we as a country best intervene in co-operation with South Africa to assist positively their development? One or two quick final comments. Mr Fraser: Are you asking me to leave aside the structural issues? Andrew Mackinlay: He is asking you to give us some meat for this report we are going to produce because at the moment it is a bit flimsy! Q82 Chairman: You have given the grand, high level ones like debt relief, we as the UK and the FCO can do things to help bilaterally in South Africa, give us some examples where it can most profitably be done? Mr Fraser: I do not mean to be obtuse but I guess the problem for me is that we have had hundreds and hundreds of initiatives, much of South Africa's problems and much of Africa's problems are structural and so for all the goodwill and initiatives and training exchanges, for me that is not the meat of the debate, and that is not where you should focus your advice. Mr Blumenfeld: I agree it is structural but I suggest I am using "structural" in a slightly different sense from Mr Fraser. I suspect Mr Fraser means the problem lies with the global economy, of course there are problems with the global economy ---- Q83 Chairman: At the bilateral level. Mr Blumenfeld: At a bilateral level, I think it is the promotion of trade and investment underpinning all the initiatives that African Governments themselves have to produce for sensible improvements in governance, reform of their economies, promotion of economic growth and targeted assistance for poverty relief. Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen, very much indeed.
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