CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The international context
1. While we can understand why the
Government has proposed a combined passport and identity card,
we regret that no analysis has been published of the costs and
benefits of a free-standing identity card. (Paragraph 20)
2. We consider in
detail later in this report the concerns raised in the United
Kingdom over the Government's proposals. The international experience
clearly indicates that identity cards and population registers
operate with public support and without significant problems in
many liberal, democratic countries. In a number of these, the
holding and even carrying of the card is compulsory and appears
to be widely accepted. However, each country has its own social,
political and legal culture and history: the nature of each identity
scheme and population register reflects those unique elements.
We cannot assume that any particular approach can be applied successfully
in the UK. Nor can we yet draw on any significant international
experience of the use of biometrics on the scale that is proposed
in the UK. (Paragraph 38)
Concerns of principle
3. An identity card scheme of the
sort and on the scale proposed by the Government would undoubtedly
represent a significant change in the relationship between the
state and the individual in this country. International experience
does not suggest that objections of principle are overwhelming,
although the development of a biometric-based scheme does introduce
new elements that have not been tested elsewhere. We do not, however,
believe that an identity card scheme should be rejected on constitutional
grounds alone. (Paragraph 59)
4. The test should
be whether the measures needed to install and operate an effective
identity card system are proportionate to the benefits such a
system would bring and to the problems to be tackled and whether
such a scheme is the most effective means of doing so. (Paragraph
60)
Practical concerns
5. The proposed system is unprecedentedly
large and complex. It will contain sensitive personal information
on tens of millions of individuals. Any failure will significantly
affect the functioning of public and private services and personal
and national security. Measures to ensure the integrity of the
design, implementation and operation of the system must be built
in to every aspect of its development. As we will remark at a
number of points throughout this report, the Government's lack
of clarity about the scope and practical operation of the scheme,
and the nature of the procurement process, does not give us confidence
that this will be achieved. We will make recommendations for addressing
this serious weakness later in the report. (Paragraph 64)
Benefits and weaknesses of the Government's scheme
6. It is reasonable for the Government
to have refined the aims of its scheme after a consultation exercise
and development of proposals for its implementation. It has now
set out its reasons for introducing identity cards, in its most
recent document, Legislation on Identity Cards: A Consultation,
which accompanied the publication of the draft Bill. (Paragraph
70)
7. However, many elements
of the design of an identity card scheme, from the national register,
to the design of the card and to its operational use, depend greatly
on the precise purpose for which it is designed. Although some
core functions are consistent and clear, the changing aims of
the scheme do not give total confidence that the Government has
arrived at a complete set of clear and settled aims for the card.
The Government has not yet clarified how it intends to deal with
some elements of the original proposals for entitlement cards,
such as which services should be linked to the card and whether
there should be unique personal numbers across public services.
We consider these issues further below, but it is clear that they
are central to the functioning of the scheme. (Paragraph 71)
8. The draft Bill
might have been expected to clarify the Government's aims but
we do not believe it has done so. It is essential that the Government
explain its intentions on issues raised in this report before
the Bill is published. (Paragraph 72)
Illegal working and immigration abuse
9. Identity cards could make it easier
for those seeking work to demonstrate their right to do so, and,
by the same token, make it easier for the police to show that
a company employing illegal labour had done so knowingly. (Paragraph
79)
10. We believe that
identity cards can make a significant contribution to tackling
illegal working. However this will need to be as part of wider
enforcement measures, including action against culpable employers.
We repeat our recommendations that the Government should target
employers who deliberately break the law and that the Proceeds
of Crime Act should also be used to seize profits made from the
employment of illegal labour. We welcome the steps the Government
has taken so far, but to be fully effective there must be properly
resourced enforcement of existing regulations. (Paragraph 80)
11. The Government
must clarify what action will be expected from the employer, including
whether presentation of card by a job applicant is enough or whether
an employer would have to check the biometrics or the authenticity
of the card. If so, the Government needs to be clear how often
this will be required and what access to biometric readers or
the National Identity Register will be available to employers
or other agencies. (Paragraph 81)
12. We are concerned
that the three-month period for EU nationals, or those claiming
to be such, might constitute a significant loophole: it is difficult
to see what would stop someone moving from job to job on false
papers. The Government must bring forward proposals to deal with
this loophole, as well as making a substantial commitment to robust
enforcement of laws against illegal working. (Paragraph 82)
13. It is also clear
that the integrity of the UK system will be dependent on the integrity
of the passport, asylum and visa regimes in other EU countries.
In our visit to Germany we were told of a pilot scheme involving
biometrics to prevent fraudulent asylum and visa applications.
The Minister of State has set out the UK's involvement in similar
schemes. As part of the development of the identity card scheme,
the Government should report regularly to Parliament on progress
being made across the EU to tackle any weaknesses in other EU
countries, and, in particular, those countries currently judged
to be the least secure. (Paragraph 83)
14. We conclude that
identity cards, by reducing the "pull factor" from work,
and public services, could make a contribution to preventing illegal
immigration, but only if the scheme is properly enforced and complemented
by action on access to public services. (Paragraph 84)
Organised crime and terrorism
15. We understand that the contribution
to fighting terrorism would be the ability to disrupt the use
of multiple identity, identity fraud and related activities like
money-laundering, and illegal migration by terrorists and their
networks. While, of course, not all terrorists make use of activities
based on false identities, and some will have legitimate national
or international identity documents, we believe that effective
action on identity would be a real and important contribution
to restricting the ease with which terrorists can operate. (Paragraph
94)
16. We note, however,
the real benefits of an identity card in fighting serious crime
and terrorism are only likely to be achieved with a compulsory
scheme covering all citizens and residents. It will also be dependent
on the effective use of the scheme to check identities, an issue
we discuss in the next sections. (Paragraph 95)
Identity fraud
17. We believe there is a danger that
in many day-to-day situations the presentation alone of an identity
card will be assumed to prove the identity of the holder without
the card itself or the biometrics being checked, thus making possession
of a stolen or forged identity card an easier way to carry out
identity fraud than is currently the case. The availability of
readers of cards and biometrics, including to the private sector,
is therefore a crucial factor. (Paragraph 99)
18. We think it would
be likely that identity cards would help combat identity fraud,
but only as part of a wider package of measures. The Government
should be clearer both about how and when it expects the card
and biometrics to be checked and about what levels of security
are appropriate in different circumstances. (Paragraph 100)
Entitlement to public services
19. Identity cards would make it easier
to establish entitlement to public services. But the Government
should take action now to ensure that measures to check identity
are developed across public services prior to the introduction
of the new card. (Paragraph 107)
20. The Government
should also review entitlements to public services across the
board with the aim of rationalising and standardising them, since
there does not appear to be a consistent set of principles underlining
access to government services. (Paragraph 108)
21. The existence
within the United Kingdom of up to four different systems for
checking entitlement to public services will be a possible cause
of confusion, particularly where cross-border services are provided.
The UK Government should liaise closely with the devolved administrations
on these issues, both to avoid confusion and to learn from the
experiences of the devolved administrations' own entitlement cards.
(Paragraph 112)
Easier access to public services
22. The Government's current proposals
would improve access to public services to the extent to which
this depends on identification. It is important to ensure that
the convenience to the state of having a comprehensive system
of identifying individuals and accessing data about them is accompanied
by an increase in convenience to the individual. The benefits
must not be entirely, or even predominantly, to the state. (Paragraph
118)
23. The Government
has not developed coherent proposals for using the identity card
in other ways to improve access to a wider range of services and
information or to promote greater coherence across public services.
As a result, citizens are still likely to be required to carry
a wide range of cards and documents to use many local and national,
public and private services. We believe that this is a missed
opportunity. (Paragraph 119)
Key issues
24. We note that at the moment there
is very little clarity about the level and nature of checks that
will be required and carried out, even though this is fundamental
to the whole scheme. We recommend that the Government should provide
estimates of the proportion of checks that would be biometric
and therefore highest security. (Paragraph 125)
25. It is not clear
that Government departments have identified how the operation
of their services, or entitlement to them, need to be changed
to make best use of an identity card system. (Paragraph 126)
26. In most cases,
identity cards will only be fully effective if complementary enforcement
action can be taken. (Paragraph 127)
27. Finally, more
could be done to check identities today and there is a danger
that action will be delayed pending the introduction of an identity
card. (Paragraph 128)
Public support
28. It may be that citizens will choose
to use identity cards voluntarily on an extensive basis. However,
until identity cards are compulsory there should be realistic
alternatives to their use in every case. There should also be
effective restrictions on inappropriate demands for them. (Paragraph
133)
The 'voluntary' stage
29. Given the Government's decision to
base identity cards on passports and driving licences, we believe
the incremental approach to introduction is justified. We set
out our concerns about the implications of this choice in paragraphs
19-20 above. (Paragraph 138)
Vulnerable groups
30. The effect of the identity card
scheme on minorities, such as the elderly, the socially excluded
and ethnic groups, is of the utmost importance. The Government
should ensure that the scheme imposes no new disadvantages on
these groups, and do so before it is implemented. (Paragraph 141)
The National Identity Register
31. We do not ourselves have the expertise
to make judgements on the technical issues involved in setting
up a national identity card system, but we have been struck by
witnesses' insistence on the importance of the Government getting
the structure right from the beginning and sticking to its decisions.
We are concerned that the Government's approach has not taken
into account the need to ensure adequate technical debate and
public scrutiny of the design of the system. (Paragraph 144)
Architecture of the database
32. The structure of the database,
and how to set it up and manage it, are among the most important
choices the Government has to make. We are greatly concerned that
the Government's procurement process appears to be taking these
key decisions without any external reference or technical assessment,
or broader public debate. We recommend the Government publishes
details of consultations with any external bodies and also any
technical assessments that have been undertaken. (Paragraph 147)
Access to the database
33. A balance needs to be struck between,
on the one hand, protecting individuals from unnecessary access
by public and private bodies to information held on them and,
on the other, ensuring that users of the database have the information
they need for the scheme to fulfil its purposes. Above all, it
is important that the public should know who may be able to see
information about them, and what that information is. (Paragraph
151)
'Function creep'
34. Whatever the merits or otherwise
of such developments [eg. the establishment of a national fingerprint
register], their potential should be recognised. It is essential
that they do not develop incrementally or by executive action
but are subject to full Parliamentary scrutiny. These issues are
at least as significant as the decision to make cards compulsory.
(Paragraph 158)
35. In a similar way,
identity cards are not planned to be a single card for all public
services, but it clearly is possible, and perhaps desirable, for
a successful identity card scheme to develop in this direction.
But this should be a decision of Parliament, not of the executive.
(Paragraph 159)
Information on the database
36. The functions of the Register
entail establishing an individual's identity in a number of different
circumstances. For some of these, such as interaction with local
authorities, addresses may be necessary. There is therefore a
case for including them in the National Identity Register. But
to do so would have significant administrative and operational
consequences, since the Register would need to be updated frequently;
the extra work could lead to mistakes which would be disastrous
if not properly handled. The Government should be more explicit
about the case for including addresses and demonstrate that the
advantages of doing so outweigh the problems that would be created.
The Government should also clarify whether addresses would be
only on the Register or whether they would be legible on the surface
of the card itself. (Paragraph 163)
37. In many parts
of Europe, including Sweden and Germany, where there is a requirement
to register addresses, it is a legal requirement for landlords
to register their tenants. We recommend that this be adopted if
the Government decides to include addresses, since it would help
alleviate the problem of frequent changes of address. (Paragraph
164)
38. The nature of
the individual number and its relationship to other identifying
numbers used by the state are more decisions that are crucial
for the design and development of the system. The Government must
be clear and open about the issues involved and enable informed
parliamentary and public scrutiny of any decisions (Paragraph
167)
Biometrics
39. The security and reliability of
biometrics are at the heart of the Government's case for their
proposals. We note that no comparable system of this size has
been introduced anywhere in the world. The system proposed would
therefore be breaking new ground. It is essential that, before
the system is given final approval, there should be exhaustive
testing of the reliability and security of the biometrics chosen,
and that the results of those tests should be made available to
expert independent scrutiny, perhaps led by the Government's Chief
Scientific Adviser. (Paragraph 175)
Medical information
40. We agree with the BMA: it would
not be either useful or appropriate to keep medical details on
the Register. But it would be sensible for the identity card to
be the mechanism that enables individuals to access their NHS
records. (Paragraph 176)
The Citizen Information Project and other Government
databases
41. We doubt that the Citizen Information
Project will provide "a strong and trusted legal basis for
holding personal contact information" if the information
on it has to be confirmed by another, separate identity card Register.
There is a very large degree of overlap between the Citizen Information
Project and the National Identity Register. The Registrar General
mentioned the options of "comprehensive legislation to oversee
information matching which in itself was conducted by individual
agencies but which improves the quality of individual registers
without actually going to the next step of creating a register"
and of "common standards for register management in the British
government": each of these would be more worthwhile than
the Citizen Information Project as it is currently planned. (Paragraph
185)
42. We are concerned
by the proliferation of large-scale databases and card systems,
since we have seen little to suggest that they are being approached
in a co-ordinated way. While we have not taken detailed evidence
on current proposals, other than the Citizen Information Project,
we have the impression that each government department is continuing
with its own project in the hope that it is not going to be significantly
affected by other projects. The format of registration on different
databases should be coherent and consistent. (Paragraph 186)
43. We believe that
the Government must tackle this proliferation of databases, examining
in each case whether the number, identifier or database is needed,
what its relationship is to other existing or planned databases,
how data will be shared or verified and other relevant issues.
For this action to be effective, it must be co-ordinated at the
highest levels of the Civil Service. (Paragraph 187)
44. We do not think
that there should be a central database with all information available
to the Government on it. But an identity card should enable access
to all Government databases, so that there would be no need for
more than one government-issued card. (Paragraph 188)
Registration and enrolment
45. The integrity of the enrolment
and registration processes are central to both the smooth running
of the system and to its security. Without data of investigative
or evidential quality, few of the objectives of the scheme can
be achieved. Issues the Government must consider include: the
number of mobile units to enrol the housebound, the elderly and
those in remote locations; how sensitive the equipment is to the
environment; the training of personnel; and the need to minimise
opportunities for corruption and fraud. More study of these aspects
is needed. (Paragraph 193)
Cards
46. The type of card to be used is
a decision of the same order of importance as the architecture
of the database, since it has consequences for issues such as
how the card will be used and the number of readers and the infrastructure
needed, both of which have significant implications for costs.
Some choices, such as the nature of the chip, seem to follow a
decision to use the passport as an identity card (and therefore
follow ICAO) rather than any independent assessment of what would
be most appropriate for an identity card. We are concerned that
the Home Office appears to be taking these key decisions without
any external reference, technical assessment or public debate.
(Paragraph 197)
47. The Government's
figures on how much cards would cost compare them to 10-year passports
and driving licences. The Government has not, however, confirmed
explicitly how long the validity of identity cards would be. It
must do so before the Bill is published. (Paragraph 198)
Readers and infrastructure
48. We are deeply concerned that the
Government has published so little information about the number,
type, distribution and cost of card readers and the infrastructure
necessary to support this. This information is not only essential
to proper costing of the scheme, but also to an assessment of
how effective the scheme will be.
(Paragraph 201)
49. We are also concerned
that the Home Office may be leaving it to other government departments,
local government and the private sector to decide what level of
investment to make in card readers and infrastructure. There is
an obvious danger that each organisation will opt for a low level
of security, relying on others to raise the level of security
in the system as a whole. If this happens the value of the identity
card system will be significantly undermined. We also expect the
Home Office and other Departments to give at least broad estimates
of the numbers of readers they expect to need of each type and
what level of provision other organisations are expected to make.
(Paragraph 202)
Multiple cards
50. We support the issue of multiple
identity cards to an individual in cases where there is a legitimate
need, and welcome the Home Office's expression of flexibility
on this issue. (Paragraph 203)
Security
51. We believe that an identity card
system could be created to a sufficient level of security. We
stress, however, that the security of the system depends as much
on using the proper procedures with the appropriate level of scrutiny
to verify the card in use as it does on the integrity of the card
issuing process or the identity register. (Paragraph 207)
Costings
52. The Home Office have provided
us with details of the assumptions on which their costings have
been based, on a confidential basis. We are not convinced that
the level of confidentiality applied is justified. Cost information
is an essential element in determining the value for money of
any project. It is of prime importance where expenditure is funded
from the public purse and of particular relevance with regard
to public sector IT projects which have a history of poor performance
and cost-overruns. We are also concerned that the least robust
cost estimates appear to relate to the assumptions with the greatest
cost-sensitivity, such as the length of enrolment time, the anticipated
number of applications requiring further investigation, the cost
of card production and the criteria for subsidised cards. Changes
to any one of these factors could cause significant increases
to the cost of the programme. (Paragraph 212)
53. The failure to
attach a Regulatory Impact Assessment to the draft Bill, or to
provide any detailed information on estimated costs and benefits,
significantly weakens the basis for pre-legislative scrutiny and
the public consultation exercise. This secrecy is all the more
regrettable since the case for an identity card system is founded
on whether its benefits are proportionate to the problems it seeks
to address: a proper cost-benefit analysis is an indispensable
element of this. The excuse of commercial sensitivity should not
be used to avoid publishing a full Regulatory Impact Assessment
with the Bill. (Paragraph 213)
Procurement
54. We welcome the Home Office's efforts
to overcome their record on IT procurement. We do not believe
that it is impossible for them to deliver the project on time,
to specification and to cost. (Paragraph 215)
55. But we are concerned
about the closed nature of the procurement process which allows
little public or technical discussion of the design of the system
or the costings involved. We do not believe that issues of commercial
confidentiality justify this approach. Any potential gains from
competing providers providing innovative design solutions are
likely to be more than offset by the unanticipated problems that
will arise from designs that have not been subject to technical
and peer scrutiny. (Paragraph 216)
56. Nor do we believe
that the Government's OGC Gateway process has yet demonstrated
the robust track record on procurement projects that would allow
it to be relied upon for a project of this scale. (Paragraph 217)
57. The Home Office
must develop an open procurement policy, on the basis of system
and card specifications that are publicly assessed and agreed.
The Home Office should also seek to minimise risk, including,
as appropriate, by breaking the procurement process down into
manageable sections. We have already recommended that the Chief
Scientific Officer be invited to oversee the development of the
biometric elements of the scheme. We recommend that individuals
or groups with similar expertise be invited to advise on the scrutiny
of other aspects of the scheme. (Paragraph 218)
Conclusions
58. Identity cards should not be ruled
out on grounds of principle alone: the question is whether they
are proportionate to the aims they are intended to achieve. Identity
cards could make a significant impact on a range of problems,
and could benefit individuals through enabling easier use of a
range of public services. This justifies, in principle, the introduction
of the Government's scheme. But the Government's proposals are
poorly thought out in key respects: in relation to the card itself,
to procurement and to the relationship of the proposals to other
aspects of government, including the provision of public services.
These issues must be addressed if the proposals are to be taken
forward. It is important that the Government clarifies the purposes
of the scheme and makes them clear through legislation. (Paragraph
219)
The draft Bill
59. The draft Bill gives the Government
powers to require and register a wide range of information not
obviously needed to establish identity. It gives a wide range
of organisations access to that information and to the audit record
of when and by whom the National Identity Register has been accessed,
so giving information on key actions of individuals. While the
draft Bill undoubtedly enables these actions to be taken in the
fight against serious crime or terrorism, it allows for far wider
access to the database than this justifies. In particular, given
the lack of clarity about the aims of the identity card, to leave
so much to secondary legislation is unacceptable. (Paragraph 222)
60. It is unacceptable
that basic questions about the degree of access to the National
Identity Register should be left to secondary legislation. The
Government must clarify what access will be given to public and
private sector bodies, and under what circumstances. Once identity
cards are compulsory, there is a significant danger that the concept
of consent to disclosure of information will in practice be eroded,
unless there are clear statutory safeguards against improper access
to the Register. (Paragraph 224)
61. We note that whilst
a range of data might be required to verify an application, it
is not necessary for all that data to be retained on the National
Identity Register. They could either be returned or, if necessary
for audit purposes, held on a separate database. The Bill should
be amended to restrict data held on the register to that information
required to establish identity once the card has been issued.
(Paragraph 229)
62. The one exception
would be information about immigration status. This is so central
to the justification for the Bill that it would be useful and
convenient to hold this on the central register. (Paragraph 230)
63. The purposes of
the draft Bill as set out in Clause 1 are very broad and the list
of registrable facts is longer than those the Home Office has
said are necessary to establish identity. Both the purposes of
the Bill and the registrable facts should be strictly limited
to establishing identity and immigration status, so as to ensure
that the provisions of the Data Protection Act cover the operation
of the scheme effectively. (Paragraph 231)
64. It is not yet
possible to be more precise about the list of registrable facts,
because the aims of the scheme, and hence the requirements for
information to be registered, are not sufficiently clear. As the
Bill proceeds, the Government must set out its justification better.
(Paragraph 232)
65. Clause 1 should
set out the aims of the scheme. A possible formulation might be:
"to enable an individual to identify himself in order to
gain access to public and private services or when required to
identify himself for the purposes of law enforcement". Wording
of this sort would establish a test against which the data to
be stored and used could be tested. It would also guard against
the type of function creep in which the state uses the register
to identify individuals without amendment by Parliament. (Paragraph
233)
66. There should be
explicit provision in the Bill that all access to the register
must be recorded. (Paragraph 234)
67. We support the
provisions in Clauses 2(4) and 8(4) that enable registration of
failed asylum seekers and other similar cases, but recommend that
the Home Office clarify the purposes of these Clauses in the Bill.
(Paragraph 235)
68. Clause 3 provides
an acceptable mechanism for amending the information required
to be held on the Register, but only if the statutory purposes
of the Bill are clarified as we recommend. (Paragraph 237)
69. It is practical
to allow some flexibility over precisely which documents are required
at registration and that these should be set out in secondary
legislation. But the Bill should state that only those documents
that are reasonably necessary to establish identity may be required.
There should be a right of appeal to the National Identity Scheme
Commissioner. (Paragraph 239)
70. The proposed penalties
[for failing to register when required to do so and for failing
to provide information] are reasonable given their purposes and
existing penalties for similar offences. (Paragraph 244)
71. It is unlikely
that if full Parliamentary procedures were followed the Government
would, as it fears, be accused of "proceeding by stealth".
The move to compulsion is a step of such importance that it should
only be taken after the scrutiny afforded by primary legislation:
the proposed "super-affirmative procedure" is not adequate.
We would, however, support the inclusion in the Bill of powers
to enable the Government both to set a target date for the introduction
of compulsion and, if necessary, to require agencies and other
bodies to prepare for that date.
(Paragraph 248)
72. The Government
should consider statutory provisions to ensure the integrity of
the registration and enrolment system, as well as specific penalties
for breaches of these provisions. (Paragraph 250)
73. It is reasonable
to require individuals to report relevant changes in their circumstances,
provided that the range of information they are required to update
is not excessive and that they are able to check that the information
held on them is accurate. We do not believe that there should
be charges for updating information on the Register, since this
would be likely to affect adversely the accuracy of the information
held. (Paragraph 253)
74. We find it anomalous
that failure to update a driving licence should be a criminal
offence, especially when failure to update the National Identity
Register will not, and we note that the Home Office does not know
how many prosecutions there have been for failing to update a
driving licence. This offence should be reviewed in the light
of the proposed legislation on identity cards. (Paragraph 254)
75. Clause 11(1) could
have significant implications for past and current employers,
neighbours, landlords, family members and past spouses, all of
whom might be required to assist in the identification of an individual.
The Government should clarify the scope and limits of this clause
on the face of the Bill. (Paragraph 255)
76. The practical
application of Clauses 11 and 12 to socially excluded groups must
be clarified as soon as possible. This should be done in such
a way as to ensure that such groups are no further disadvantaged
by the operation of the scheme. The Bill should contain legal
duties on the Home Secretary to take into account special needs,
such as health, in applying these clauses; and to establish a
clear legal status in the primary legislation for those of no
fixed abode. (Paragraph 256)
77. We agree with
the CRE that the Bill should be accompanied by a full Race Impact
Assessment and that there should be a further Assessment at the
time of the move to compulsion. (Paragraph 257)
78. A reasonableness
defence to the offences that might follow from Clause 13(1) should
be included on the face of the Bill, rather than left to regulations.
(Paragraph 258)
79. The Bill should
contain an explicit reaffirmation of the right of individuals
to see both the data held on them and the audit trail of who has
accessed those data and on what occasions, subject only to the
national security and crime exemptions of the Data Protection
Act. (Paragraph 259)
80. It is reasonable
that there should be the possibility of restricting releasable
information in certain cases. We welcome the Home Office's readiness
to consult on the issue. (Paragraph 260)
81. Earlier in this
report, we referred to the different levels of security, from
simple visual examination of the card to access to the National
Identity Register, which the Home Office expects to be undertaken.
Although it would not be possible to specify in detail all the
circumstances in which different bodies might have access to the
Register, we believe that the principle and tests of reasonableness
should be placed on the face of the Bill. (Paragraph 261)
82. The Bill might
also allow individuals to limit access to certain data under certain
circumstances. For example, a citizen might choose that addresses
could not be released to all those who access the Register. (Paragraph
262)
83. We welcome the
provisions of Clause 19 prohibiting any requirement to produce
an identity card before the move to compulsion. (Paragraph 264)
84. We are not opposed
in principle to access to the database and to the audit trail
without the consent of the individual concerned. But we are extremely
concerned by the breadth of the provisions of Clauses 20 and 23
and particularly by Clause 20(2) which would allow nearly unfettered
access to the security and intelligence agencies. At a minimum,
disclosures without consent should be limited to cases of national
security or the prevention or detection of serious crime. (Paragraph
269)
85. It is not acceptable
to have as broad a Clause as 20(5) simply because the Government
is unclear about its objectives. (Paragraph 272)
86. The Bill should
have explicit data-sharing provisions to make clear the relationship
between the National Identity Register and other official databases.
Some of the proposed databases have no statutory basis—this
is unacceptable and needs to be addressed in further legislation.
(Paragraph 273)
87. It is reasonable
for the scheme to be operated by an Executive Agency similar to
the DVLA or UK Passport Service. But we reject the argument that
since their operations are not overseen by a Commissioner, neither
should those of an identity card agency. We believe that because
the identity card scheme would directly affect the daily lives
of millions of people, and routinely involve sensitive and often
highly personal information, oversight of its operation is utterly
different to that of the DVLA or UK Passport Service. The National
Identity Scheme Commissioner should report directly to Parliament.
He or she should have powers of oversight covering the operation
of the entire scheme, including access by law enforcement agencies
and the security and intelligence services. (Paragraph 276)
88. There are no provisions
in Clause 27 to cover aiding and abetting the offences created,
or conspiracy to commit them. It is possible that these can be
dealt with through existing legislation, but we believe that it
would be more sensible to cover them explicitly in the Bill. (Paragraph
277)
89. We welcome the
Home Office's commitment to enabling complaints to be made about
the operation of the scheme. The provisions to enable this must
be effective, unbureaucratic and practical. (Paragraph 278)
Overall conclusions
90. We believe that an identity card
scheme could make a significant contribution to achieving the
aims set out for it by the Government, particularly tackling crime
and terrorism. In principle, an identity card scheme could also
play a useful role in improving the co-ordination of and the citizen's
access to public services, although the Government has not yet
put forward clear proposals to do so. We believe that the Government
has made a convincing case for proceeding with the introduction
of identity cards. (Paragraph 279)
91. However, the introduction
of identity cards carries clear risks, both for individuals and
for the successful implementation of the scheme. We are concerned
by the lack of clarity and definition on key elements of the scheme
and its future operation and by the lack of openness in the procurement
process. The lack of clarity and openness increases the risks
of the project substantially. This is not justified and must be
addressed if the scheme is to enjoy public confidence and to work
and achieve its aims in practice. (Paragraph 280)
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