FORMAL MINUTES
Tuesday 13 July 2004
Members present:
Mr John Denham, in the Chair
Janet Anderson
Mr James Clappison
Mrs Janet Dean
Mr Gwyn Prosser
| | Bob Russell
Mr Marsha Singh
David Winnick
|
The Committee deliberated.
Draft Report (Identity Cards), proposed by the Chairman, brought
up and read.
Ordered, That the draft
Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 58 read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 59 and 60 read.
Question put, That paragraphs 59 and 60 stand part
of the Report.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 5
Janet Anderson
Mr James Clappison
Mrs Janet Dean
Mr Gwyn Prosser
Mr Marsha Singh
| | Noes, 2
Bob Russell
David Winnick
|
Paragraphs 61 to 63 read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 64 to 278 read.
Motion made, to leave out paragraphs 64 to 278 and
insert the following new paragraphs:
64. We accept that if it can be convincingly
shown that identity cards would act as a deterrent to terrorism
there would be sufficient justification for their introduction.
Terrorism undoubtedly presents a grave threat and it is likely
that this will continue for some considerable time ahead.
65. However, there is little reason to believe
that terrorism would be so undermined. Privacy International
has supplied us with a list of a number of countries that have
suffered most from terrorist attacks since 1986. Eighty percent
of these have long-standing identity card systems, of which a
third contain a biometric such as a fingerprint.
66. We note that both Turkey and Spain are included
amongst such countries, and certainly no evidence has been produced
that the recent terrorist outrages were hindered in any way by
identity cards. Neither has there been any evidence that the
biometric cards the Home Secretary intends here would have prevented
the attacks and the heavy loss of innocent lives. Those involved
in the 9/11 atrocities in the United States had - as Liberty and
others have pointed out - legitimate identification papers.
67. As mentioned earlier, the Home Secretary
accepted the proposed scheme would not prevent atrocities as in
Madrid and Istanbul, but went on to say it would nevertheless
help. We are not persuaded this would be so. Indeed, if such
means of identification were really necessary to combat terrorism
there would surely be a case for their much earlier introduction.
Illegal working and immigration abuse
68. One of the arguments put forward for what
is being proposed is that identity cards are necessary to deal
with illegal working and the abuses connected with this. In our
earlier report on Asylum Applications we said:
"We believe that a significant factor in the
problem of illegal working is the deliberate decision by some
employers to break the law. We recommend that the government
should target such employers, who are not only easier to identify
than those they employ but arguably more culpable. We refer below
to the government's commitment to use the Proceeds of Crime Act
as a weapon against people traffickers. We recommend that the
Act should also be used to seize profits made from the employment
of illegal labour. The Home Office should be pro-active within
government in seeking to ensure that other departments take action
against illegal working - for instance, by means of a concerted
attempt to prosecute employers of illegal labour for other related
breaches of employment legislation (e.g. failure to pay the minimum
wage or to observe health and safety regulations). We note the
comments by the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee
on the collusion of employers with illegal rural labour through
the gangmaster system, and support their view that the government
should treat this problem with greater seriousness."
69. The Minister of State for Citizenship and
Immigration told us that of 1st May this year the government required
employers to use a far more secure form of identification, that
employers now knew what the position was, and what was expected
of them. He added that employers would be given help and assistance
to ensure they could enforce the regulations. The Minister promised
the policy would be policed properly, but added that ID cards
would in time be offering employers a more secure form of identity.
70. We repeat our recommendations that the government
should target employers who deliberately break the law, and that
the Proceeds of Crime Act should certainly be used in such cases
to seize profits made from the employment of illegal labour.
71. We do not, however, accept that identity
cards would make a significant contribution to the problem of
illegal working. The real need is for firm and determined action
in acting against culpable employers.
72. It is most unlikely that had identity cards
been in existence it would have stopped the fifty-eight Chinese
nationals who suffocated in June 2000 when they were being smuggled
into the UK in a lorry working here if they had survived. Neither
would it have saved the lives of those who tragically died in
February 2004 working illegally at Morecombe Bay. The Law Society
argued that the real problem was the small number of employers
who did not carry out the appropriate checks, who would continue
to employ people illegally regardless of whether or not there
was a national identity card. We fully concur with this view
and that the criminal elements and some gangmasters will try to
evade any such scheme as they do now with existing laws over immigration
control and employment.
73. We consider that having to live and work
in the UK under a false identity is not in itself a significant
disincentive to many potential illegal immigrants. Being here
in such circumstances and readily exploited by unscrupulous employers
can hardly be pleasant, but it would be considered better than
where they came from and hence the large sums paid to the criminal
outfits to get them to European countries. Very often the money
is paid in stages after they start working illegally.
Identity Fraud
74. The Foundation for Information Policy Research,
an Internet policy think-tank, were sceptical about the effects
of identity cards on identity theft, arguing that it was more
a regulatory issue centred on enforcing the correction of inaccurate
records; they also said that "fraud patterns do not appear
to vary across Europe according to the existence or absence of
ID cards". Professor Ross Anderson, the Foundation's Chair,
told us that in his experience the main determinant of levels
of fraud was not the card technology but the diligence and frequency
of online checks on whether a transaction was valid or not. The
Law Society also pointed to international comparisons, arguing
that no evidence had been produced to demonstrate how similar
schemes across the world had made an impact on identity or improving
the prevention and detection of crime.
75. As we have seen, The Home Secretary accepted
that it would be possible to create a false identity under his
proposed scheme, but he argued that the person who did this would
be forced to keep it and would be unable to return to his or her
true identity.
76. If anything, the danger would be that far
too much reliance would be placed on such cards and that automatically
it would be assumed to prove the identity of the holder. It is
doubtful if in day to day busy situations the biometrics would
actually be checked, and thus ironically making possession of
a stolen identity card easier than now to carry out fraud. We
return later to the reliability of biometrics.
Entitlement to free public services
77. Entitlement to services and entitlement to
an identity card will not always coincide. For example, the Rt
Hon John Hutton MP, Minister for Health, told us that: "It
is the case of course that you can have entitlement to NHS care,
but not an ID card and it is perfectly possible that you could
have an ID card, but not be entitled to NHS care" . The
Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP, Secretary of State for Education and
Skills, noted that "Education legislation does not impose
any conditions relating to the nationality or immigration status
of children seeking entry to a maintained school. So questions
of proving entitlement to schooling are irrelevant."
78. The British Medical Association strongly
supported the government's intention to reduce the inappropriate
use of health services, and recognised that the NHS had a legal
duty to check the eligibility of individuals wishing to use free
health services. The BMA was, however, concerned that any potential
system should not cost the NHS more, in terms of additional bureaucracy,
than it saved.
79. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the
Department for Work and Pensions, Mr Chris Pond MP, told us that
his Department estimated that of the estimated £2 billion
total annual benefit fraud, £50 million was identity fraud.
He argued that as the Department clamped down on other forms
of fraud, there would be more attempts at identity fraud. He
also believed that identity cards might help tackle an additional
£50 million of other types of benefit fraud annually.
While £50 million of public money in identity
fraud must be of concern, even against the estimated £2 billion
total annual benefit fraud, we were not provided with evidence
of how necessarily the cards would prevent this. The additional
£50 million mentioned seems again to be a guess or a hope.
80. We note that the devolved administrations
have differing views on access to public services if identity
cards were introduced. Scotland was likely to proceed with a
voluntary scheme while the Welsh First Minister, Rhodri Morgan,
AM, has said that "The current Assembly Government has no
intention of cutting back on or denying services to people who
do not have identity cards." He explained to us "We
will consider the implications for Wales of the Home Secretary's
proposals for identity cards as these proposals are firmed up.
But, as the Home Secretary has announced, decisions on the use
of these cards to access services for which the Welsh Assembly
Government is responsible will be a matter for this administration.
I used the opportunity of an Assembly Question to provide reassurance
to people in Wales that their access to public services will not,
in the foreseeable future, be dependent on the possession of an
identity card."
81. If the devolved administration on Northern
Ireland is included there could be four different systems in the
UK for checking entitlement to public services and causing possible
confusion. We do not believe that access to such services should
be dependent on the possession of an identity card.
Biometrics
82. What of the reliability of biometrics? Professor
Ross Anderson was asked what evidence he had that it is practically
feasible to produce contact lenses to fake irises on a significant
scale. He replied:
"Well, I have not done it myself but I have
seen a photograph of one that was produced by one of the researchers
in the field and, given the underlying mathematics, I do not think
there is any difficulty in principle with producing a contact
lens that will produce a certain iris code. The manufacturers
of iris scanning equipment will say in their defence that it is
possible to measure the nictation, the oscillation in the diameter
of the pupil. I understand that none of the equipment currently
on sale does that and I would be worried that someone might produce
a well printed contact lens with a sufficiently clear area in
the middle where the movement of the underlying eye would be taken
by the scanner as indicating that the genuine eye were present.
There is room for further technological work here. As things
stand I am afraid that iris scanners, like fingerprint scanners,
are liable to be defeated by sophisticated attack if they are
used in an unattended operation. Attended operation is different,
of course, if you train the staff properly they can feel people's
fingerprints, they can look carefully at the eye and check there
is no funny business."
83. The Association of Payment and Clearing Services,
which has taken the lead in credit and debt card security, is
reported to have doubts about the quality of biometric identification.
Such a system was under consideration for the new generation
of chip and pin credit and debit cards but it was rejected because
no system was found to be reliable enough.
84. Privacy International, which is a campaigning
organisation against identity cards, has concerns about the ability
of technology to keep one step ahead of the criminal:
Can an ID card be forged?
"Invariably, yes. The technology gap between
governments and organised crime has now narrowed to such an extent
that even the most highly secure cards are available as blanks
weeks after their introduction. Criminals and terrorists can
in reality move more freely and more safely with several fake
"official" identities than they ever could in a country
using multiple forms of "low-value" ID such as a birth
certificate.
Criminal use of fake identity documents does not
necessarily involve the use of counterfeiting techniques. In
1999, a former accountant was charged in London with obtaining
up to 500 passports under false identities. The scam was merely
a manipulation of the primary documentation procedure.
It is worth considering some inevitable formulae
that apply across the board to the black-market economy. Whenever
governments attempt to introduce an ID card, it is always based
on the aim of eliminating false identity. The higher the "integrity"
(infallibility) of a card, the greater is its value to criminals
and illegal immigrants. A high-value card attracts substantially
larger investment in corruption and counterfeit activity. The
equation is simple: higher value ID equals greater criminal activity.
85. It should be noted that the feasibility study
commissioned by the UK Passport Service, DVLA and the Home Office
on the use of biometrics admitted that biometric methods do not
offer 100% certainty of authentication of individuals. The study
also said that about 1 in 10,000 people did not have an iris that
can be used for iris recognition, while over 1 in 1,000 fingers
were missing or have no readable fingerprints. Even facial recognition,
the nearest to universal, would have cases where automatic enrolment
fails. Biometrics are not constant over a lifetime since, for
example, fingerprints can be worn away by manual work.
86. In addition to "failure to acquire rates",
any biometric has both a false non-match, or false rejection,
rate (in which legitimate card holders are not matched with their
recorded biometric) and false match rates (in which someone is
matched to a biometric that is not their own). These are linked,
so that a reduction in the false match rate leads to a rise in
the false rejection rate, and vice-versa.
87. Figures for performance by biometrics depend
on whether the check is one-to-one ? checking that someone is
who they say they are ? or one-to-many ? checking whether someone
is already on the database. The National Physical Laboratory's
feasibility study noted that in one-to-one checks good fingerprint
systems were able to achieve a false match rate of 1 in 100,000,
with a false non-match rate of approximately 1 in 100. Iris recognition
could achieve a false match rate of better than 1 in 1,000,000
with a false non-match rate of below 1 in 100. Under ideal lighting
conditions, with subjects directly facing the camera and using
photographs 1 or 2 months old, facial recognition achieved a false
match rate of 1 in 1,000 and a false non-match rate of 1 in 10.
88. The study concluded that for one-to-many
checks to be workable with a database of more than 50 million
people at least four, and preferably all, fingerprints should
be collected, and for iris recognition, both irises. Face recognition
was not reliable for a database of this size.
89. However, other assessment of fingerprint
matches, such as one by the US General Accounting Office, show
far higher error levels. The critical difference between these
studies appears to be the assumption about the circumstance in
which the fingerprints are taken and checked against the central
register. Fingerprints taken to police standards have a high reliability
rate; fingerprints taken by less well trained personnel will have
higher false matches and false rejections.
90. The security and reliability of biometrics
are at the heart of the Government's case for their proposals.
We note that no comparable system of this size has been introduced
anywhere in the world. The system proposed would therefore be
breaking new ground. We have considerable doubts over the reliability
and security of the biometrics chosen, and even more so given
the major failure of the IT projects brought in by the Home Office
over a period of time.
Costs
91. The Home Office's public figures for the
estimated cost of the proposals remain the £1.3 to £3.1
billion set out in the first consultation paper of July 2002.
Officials giving evidence to us cited commercial confidentiality
for saying nothing more than they were "moving away from
the lower end" of this £1.8 billion range. The Home
Secretary told us that this figure does not include the costs
of biometric readers and other equipment to be installed in other
Departments, such as the Department for Work and Pensions, or
the National Health Service. We note that the overall costs of
these would, in any case, be difficult to establish as there is
little if any certainty about the numbers and types of readers
required.
92. The Home Office have provided us with details
of the assumptions on which their costings have been based, on
a confidential basis. We are not convinced that level of confidentiality
applied is justified. Cost information is an essential element
in determining the value for money of any project. It is of prime
importance where expenditure is funded from the public purse,
and of particular relevance with regard to public sector IT projects
which have a history of poor performance and cost-overruns. We
are also concerned that the least robust cost estimates appear
to relate to the assumptions with the greatest cost-sensitivity,
such as the length of enrolment time, the anticipated number of
applications requiring further investigation, the cost of card
production and the criteria for subsidised cards. Changes to
any one of these factors could cause significant increases to
the cost of the programme.
93. We believe that the failure to attach a Regulatory
Impact Assessment to the draft Bill, or to provide any detailed
information on estimated costs and benefits, significantly weakens
the basis for pre-legislative scrutiny and the public consultation
exercise. This secrecy is all the more regrettable since the
case for an identity card system is founded on whether its benefits
are proportionate to the problems it seeks to address: a proper
cost-benefit analysis is an indispensable element of this. We
firmly believe that commercial sensitivity should not be used
as an excuse not to publish a full Regulatory Impact Assessment
with the Bill.
94. We can be reasonably sure, going by past
experience, that the final sums involved will be higher and probably
considerably so than the present estimated costs. Nearly every
government computer project has had massive cost-overruns, and
this project is not likely to be different in that respect.
95. It should be borne in mind that £3 billion
amounts to the whole NHS capital project for 2003/4.
Function creep
96. We are concerned that if the Government's
proposals become law, and identity card will need to be shown
for all kinds of purposes. An example was given by the Information
Commission who drew a historical parallel:
"In the written submission we gave to the committee
we gave you details of a government committee in the early 1950s
looking at the Second World War national identity card. That
was introduced in 1939 with three stated purposes: for conscription,
for national security and for rationing. By 1950 the government
committee of the day found that in those 11 years that the scheme
had grown to 39 stated purposes. The debate at the time the committee
reported in the early 1950s was that the main rationale for identity
cards was the prevention of bigamous marriages."
97. It remains very likely that any voluntary
identity card scheme would be shortlived; there would be pressure
from the police in particular on the government of the day to
make the scheme compulsory as quickly as possible. Already the
enthusiasts for these cards argue that a voluntary scheme would
serve little purpose.
Public Support
98. It is not surprising that there is public
support at the moment for the principle of identity cards; at
a time of concern over asylum seekers, 'health tourism', benefit
fraud , etc, it might appear that the cards would considerably
help in tackling these matters.
99. However, a poll commissioned in Britain in
October 2003 by Privacy International found only 61% in favour
of ID cards, with the number saying they were strongly opposed
at 12% . It is also the case that those questioned were less
than enthusiastic about paying for them (see paragraph 103 below),
and were distinctly sceptical about the Government's ability to
introduce them smoothly - 58% of those questioned by Detica had
little or no confidence in this - or to protect information on
the database - in the same poll 48% were not very or not at all
confident in the government's ability to store personal information
securely.
100. The Home Secretary thought that demand for
identity cards would be high from the opening of the scheme:
"I happen to believe that once we have got this
up and running, as with the pilot for biometrics that we announced
a week ago, people will queue up for it and we will have to deal
with the flow and the flood of people wanting it much earlier,
wanting to renew their passport and get an ID card very fast".
Intellect, the trade association representing IT,
telecoms and electronics companies in the UK, was less sanguine
and argued that "an ID card will have to deliver rapid and
compelling benefits to citizens to shift negative perceptions
and establish the foundations for long term success."
101. Other witnesses expressed the concern that
even a voluntary scheme would become effectively compulsory if
a card was required to access large numbers of services; the
Law Society was concerned that "in practice, a voluntary
scheme could become in effect compulsory as more and more organisations
and service providers required production of the card to prove
identity". The Information Commissioner raised the linked
issue of inappropriate demands to produce a card:
"I would be unhappy if a local authority gymnasium
required you to produce your identity card in order to make use
of that local authority gym. I think that is going well beyond
what should be acceptable. The local video shop, when you are
renting a video: for them to insist upon the production of an
identity card for you to rent a video would in my view be disproportionate
and unacceptable and I would want to see appropriate restrictions
stopping that sort of activity."
102. We would be very concerned that production
of an identity card would be required along the lines mentioned
by the Information Commissioner. Moreover, the non-production
of the card will arouse suspicion, however unjustified.
103. We also note that public support for the
principle of identity cards does not extend to the reality of
having to pay for them. In the Daily Telegraph poll of September
2003, only 1% believed that £40 was a reasonable charge for
an entitlement card, while 86% thought the card should be provided
free. Similarly, in the Detica poll cited in para 99, 40% did
not want to pay anything, while a further 32% were only prepared
to pay up to £25.
Vulnerable groups
104. A wide range of witnesses expressed concern
to us over the effects of any identity card system on vulnerable
groups, such as the elderly or those suffering from mental illness.
The British Medical Association, for example, said "Socially
excluded groups are among the least likely to access public services
effectively, and the need to register for and hold an ID card
in order to access vital services could operate as an additional
disincentive." The Metropolitan Police linked this concern
to the issue of how the card would affect minority ethnic groups:
"The scheme could become compulsory prematurely
for those disadvantages members of society, because they would
have to have an ID card in order to access social security benefits,
etc. It should also be noted that many of the visible ethnic
minorities are over-represented in this socio-economically deprived
group. We have severe reservations that the scheme could add
to tensions at a time when the police service is investing greatly
in gaining confidence across all communities."
Trevor Phillips, Chair of the Commission for Racial
Equality, also noted the concerns of the minority ethnic groups
over the operation of an identity card, pointing to "the
lack of evidence about the potential impact of the scheme on different
ethnic groups and communities." As noted in para ## above,
the Director of Liberty was concerned that identity cards might
exacerbate existing tensions with minority groups; Mr Phillips
pointed out that the perceptions and expectations of such groups
regarding identity cards were as important as the reality in affecting
community relations.
105. Press for Change (PFC), "the largest
representative organisation for transsexual people in the UK"
made the point that even before the move to full compulsion, anyone
applying for a new passport or driving licence would have to apply
to be put on the National Identity Register and would be given
an ID card version of the relevant document. They argued that
"Protection for trans people and other vulnerable minorities
must therefore be assured before any implementation of the NIR
or of enhanced versions of existing documents, rather than delayed
until consideration of universal compulsion."
106. The effect of the identity cards scheme
on minorities, such as the elderly, the socially excluded and
ethnic groups, is of the utmost importance. We fear that such
groups could be adversely affected and that ethnic minorities
in particular would be asked more frequently by the police and
officialdom generally to produce an identity card. This could
have an adverse effect on community and race relations.
Civil liberties and privacy
107. The introduction of identity cards would
not make this country less of a Parliamentary democracy, any more
than it did during the Second World War. It is also the position
that a number of European democracies have such cards, though
their history tends to be somewhat different than ours.
108. In the evidence presented to the Committee
by Liberty the following statement was made:
Any national identity scheme raises profound constitutional
concerns regarding the relationship between the individual and
the state, and the presumption of privacy and individual liberty.
These concerns can only be rebutted by clear and compelling evidence
to the contrary, and a proportionate and effective mean of achieving
the state's aims. In other words, there is a rebuttable presumption
in favour of the liberty, autonomy and privacy of the individual
(and thus against ID cards). This is underpinned by Britain's
common law and constitutional tradition, and the analytical approach
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The issue
is whether the government's proposals rebut that strong presumption.
106. The Information Commissioner, Mr Richard
Thomas, stated in evidence to us that on his last appearance before
the Committee he had used the language of "healthy scepticism"
about the government's proposals. He then stated that having
looked at the detail, this was beginning to change to rather more
like "increasing alarm". He went on to say "I
think that as we see the detail of these proposals it is now clear
that we are talking not about ID cards as such. This debate is
primarily about a National Identity Register and all the consequences
of that. Some of the issues arising from information sharing
have been discussed earlier this afternoon. This is beginning
to represent a very significant sea change in the relationship
between the state and every individual in this country, and I
think it has to be seen in that sense."
107. Mr Thomas continued by saying… "It
is about the nature of the information held about every citizen
and how that is going to be used in a wide range of activities.
In many ways I was not unduly surprised to see the detail of
the draft Bill, but when one sees the way that the draftsman has
clearly approached all the various issues which need to be addressed
in the process of constructing a scheme like this, once begins
to see fleshed out on the face of this draft Bill, with a great
deal of details to come later as regulations are made, just how
complex this issue is and how far-ranging and extensive the arrangements
are going to be."
108. In answer to a question from the Committee
Chairman on whether the draft Bill is far broader than the stated
aims, the Information Commissioner responded… "One can
only make judgments about the appropriateness of the detailed
drafting and the acceptability of the various safeguards when
one is absolutely clear what are the purposes. Is this primarily
about dealing with illegal immigration or illegal working? Is
it primarily about access to public services? Is it primarily
about the fight against crime and terrorism? It is only when
one sees the Bill as drafted that one sees that it is all of these
things and many more, and I think the draftsman, perhaps as you
are suggesting, has identified a very wide range of issues which
need to be addressed with a comprehensive scheme. The point I
want to make to you is that this is a very comprehensive scheme.
I think it would probably be the most comprehensive and ambitious
scheme anywhere in the world. Leaving aside all the technology
aspects, this would be an unprecedented scheme."
109. He was also of the view that just as the
passport is widely targeted by criminals and counterfeiters, so
would identity cards, even with biometric details. We also accept
this would be the case and that the more sophisticated international
criminal gangs would do their utmost to produce false cards.
110. We fully share the concern of the Information
Commissioner about such a National Identity Register, and consider
that the implications are disturbing for the intrusion into the
lives of law-abiding UK citizens and all others lawfully resident
here and no less law-abiding.
111. While we fully accept that the Home Secretary
is motivated by what he considers to be the public good, nevertheless
we are not persuaded that identity cards are necessary in tackling
the matters we are all concerned about. We consider that the
negative factors far outweigh any good that might come about by
their introduction. Therefore we recommend that the proposals
be rejected and as such we are opposed in principle to the draft
Bill.—(David Winnick.)
Motion made, and Question put, That the paragraphs
be read a second time.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 2
Bob Russell
David Winnick
| | Noes, 5
Janet Anderson
Mr James Clappison
Mrs Janet Dean
Mr Gwyn Prosser
Mr Marsha Singh
|
Question put, That paragraphs 64 to 278 stand part of the Report.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 5
Janet Anderson
Mr James Clappison
Mrs Janet Dean
Mr Gwyn Prosser
Mr Marsha Singh
| | Noes, 2
Bob Russell
David Winnick
|
Ordered, That further consideration of the Chairman's draft
Report be now adjourned.—(The Chairman.)
Report to be further considered upon Tuesday 20 July.
[Adjourned till Tuesday 20 July
at 9.30 am.
Tuesday 20 July 2004
Members present:
Mr John Denham, in the Chair
Mr James Clappison
Mrs Claire Curtis-Thomas
Mrs Janet Dean
Mr Gwyn Prosser
| | Mr Marsha Singh
Mr John Taylor
David Winnick
|
The Committee deliberated.
Consideration of the Chairman's draft Report [Identity Cards]
resumed.
Paragraphs 279 and 280 read.
Question put, That paragraphs 279 and 280 stand part
of the Report.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 6
Mr James Clappison
Mrs Claire Curtis-Thomas
Mrs Janet Dean
Mr Gwyn Prosser
Mr Marsha Singh
Mr John Taylor
| | Noes, 1
David Winnick
|
Annex agreed to.
Question put, That the Summary stand part of the
Report.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 6
Mr James Clappison
Mrs Claire Curtis-Thomas
Mrs Janet Dean
Mr Gwyn Prosser
Mr Marsha Singh
Mr John Taylor
| | Noes, 1
David Winnick
|
Motion made, and Question put, That the Report be the Fourth Report
of the Committee to the House.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 6
Mr James Clappison
Mrs Claire Curtis-Thomas
Mrs Janet Dean
Mr Gwyn Prosser
Mr Marsha Singh
Mr John Taylor
| | Noes, 1
David Winnick
|
Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That the provisions
of Standing Order No. 134 (Select committees (reports)) be applied
to the Report.
Ordered, That the Appendices
to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported
to the House.
Several memoranda were ordered to be reported to
the House.
[Adjourned till Wednesday 8
September at 2.15 pm.
| 
