15. Memorandum submitted by
Dr N Ben Fairweather
1. I am concerned that the Home Office have
fallen victim to misleading marketing by suppliers who are hoping
to sell them an identity card system, and the associated computer
systems. It seems wildly implausible to me that it will meet the
objectives that the Home Office are hoping for it. In particular,
the Home Secretary has been quoted as saying that the scheme will
make it absolutely impossible to have a false or dual identity:
the scheme described does not appear even nearly capable of achieving
this.
2. According to Nicola Roche (uncorrected
transcript of evidence, q5) "When we move to the compulsory
phase . . . those that were here illegally would very quickly
be identified". While information systems are good at identifying
what is on them, identifying what data is missing is another matter
entirely.
3. Given that many people can go for years
without using the NHS, even with a compulsory ID card, the NHS
would not enable illegal residents to be quickly identified, even
if those without a card did not avoid using the NHS for fear of
being detected, and additionally NHS staff were willing to take
on a role of reporting illegal immigrants (given the comments
of Dr Edwin Borman of the BMA[9],
it should be clear that many doctors would consider such an action
to be contrary to medical ethics, and thus unprofessional).
4. In the sphere of employment, I strongly
suspect that a card will not prevent illegal employment. The "cash
economy" is so strongly established, despite continued action
against it, that it seems most implausible that the introduction
of a further regulation for those involved to break will have
any significant effect.
5. Indeed, there is a danger that matters
will be made worse by the introduction of compulsory ID cards,
since unscrupulous employers will be able to remove cards from
employees to prevent them getting legitimate employment elsewhere
in much the same way as passports are currently removed from some
illegally employed migrant workers.
6. According to Nicola Roche (uncorrected
transcript of evidence, q23) "There is absolutely no question
of people at any point being required to carry the card as a matter
of compulsion." I do not believe that "those that were
here illegally would very quickly be identified"(q6) unless
carrying a card were compulsory and there were routine checks
to ensure people carried a card, or equivalent biometric checks.
Even with checks of that sort, it was possible for some people
to live for a number of years in Nazi Germany and in Nazi-occupied
Europe without a card, even at a time when carrying a card was
compulsory and there were routine checks.
7. There is a severe danger that people
will hold cards that they are not entitled to, especially since
treaty commitments require the Government to allow those legally
entitled to work anywhere in the European Economic Area to work
in the UK, meaning that anybody who can fraudulently obtain "proof"
of entitlement to work in the EEA will be able to get a card.
This will have the consequence of reducing the level of security
of the card system to something close to the level of the most
insecure system in the EEA.
8. I am deeply concerned that rather than
preventing identity theft, the introduction of a biometric ID
card could make things worse. Where somebody has been using a
false identity for some time, there is a severe danger that they
will be able to use the normal card issuing procedures to obtain
an ID card with their biometric, thereafter giving them a greater
claim to the identity than the person who they stole it from,
whose biometric would not match that on record for the identity.
9. There is cause for concern in the assurances
that it will not be compulsory to carry the card. One aspect is
illustrated by the analogy Stephen Harrison (uncorrected transcript
of evidence, q66) drew with Immigration Officers taking biometrics.
If there is an effective power or ability to take biometrics from
the individual without their freely given consent, and checking
those against the database, the question of whether it is compulsory
to actually carry the card becomes effectively irrelevant. Individuals
would be subject to an equivalent level of state monitoring without
necessarily being aware of that fact.
10. A particular concern is that while "there
will not be a power for the police to demand that the card is
produced" (eg Stephen Harrison, uncorrected transcript of
evidence, q33), there is a danger that refusal to identify oneself
will put an innocent person under suspicion who would not otherwise
be under suspicion, then meaning that the innocent person could
be required, on pain of arrest, to identify themself. Unless the
law specifically prohibits the police from construing refusal
to identify oneself as grounds for suspicion the ID card scheme
will amount to "a compulsory to carry scheme", of the
sort that "Ministers" (Roche, uncorrected transcript
of evidence, q28) have repeatedly stated they do not want.
11. The "biographical footprint"
checks for those applying for a card alluded to by Katherine Courtney
(uncorrected transcript of evidence, q48) appear to be considerably
more thorough than those required to establish identity for a
Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check.[10]
If such checks are reasonably practical and it is reasonable for
them to be a compulsory part of a compulsory ID card scheme, one
wonders why they are not already compulsory for all CRB checks,
where failures to identify and false identity put the most vulnerable
at risk. Further, if they are considerably more thorough, it must
be expected that they will take considerably more staff time and
resources, and thus be considerably more expensive, yet the ID
is only expected to be slightly more expensive than a CRB "enhanced"
check (approx £34 against £29).
January 2004
9 BBC Radio4 World at One 29.12.2003. Borman commented,
for example, that the NHS should not be used as an arm of the
Home Office, and that doctors would consider it unethical to refuse
treatment to foreigners who refused to pay. A further concern
with the NHS being used as a method for detecting those without
cards, is that they may not seek inoculations or treatment for
infections, putting the health of the population at large at risk,
since those without access to the NHS would provide a reservoir
for infections. Back
10
Applicants for a CRB disclosure may choose not to give consent
for commercial sources to be checked, and still only be required
to produce as few as five documents, the most "secure"
of which is either a valid passport of any nationality or a valid
UK driving licence (whether photocard or paper). Back
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