30. Memorandum submitted by
Liberty
INTRODUCTION
1. Liberty has been at the forefront of
the campaign to resist the introduction of national identity cards
since the idea was floated in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks
on the United States in September 2001. Our opposition to the
introduction of ID cards is principled—we believe it alters
the relationship between the citizen and the state authorities
and that it is inevitable that minorities, particularly ethnic
minorities, will suffer discrimination as a result of the scheme.
We have also raised a number of entirely practical concerns: the
cost and operability of the proposed system; the lack of any firm
evidence that a national ID card would solve the myriad of problems
it is supposed to tackle; the "slippery slope" argument
that the functions of the card may well grow over time; and that
the scheme would lead to a further increase in the levels of surveillance
in the UK.
2. Liberty has long argued that ID cards
are a "solution looking for a problem" and we believe
that recent political history confirms this suspicion. Initially,
the proposal seemed to be focused on tackling terrorism. Since
then, Liberty has had a real fear that the justifications put
forward for an identity card have shifted with the news agenda.
Benefit fraud, illegal immigration and improving the delivery
of public services have all been suggested as susceptible to being
tackled by the scheme. Liberty takes the view that the potential
social benefits of an ID card are so minimal (possibly even non-existent)
and that the costs—both financial and in terms of civil
liberties—are so high, that the plans should be shelved.
3. This submission, prepared specifically
for the Home Affairs Committee, considers the questions raised
by the Committee in its press release of 18th November 2003, as
well as Liberty's more general concerns. Liberty does not pretend,
or aspire, to be an organisation with great expertise on the technical
aspects of the Government's proposals, although we do raise a
number of questions and concerns in these areas which we hope
will assist the Committee in its inquiry.
PRACTICAL ISSUES
INVOLVED IN
THE ID DATABASE
AND BIOMETRIC
IDENTIFIERS
4. Liberty is not persuaded by the Government's
ability to successfully implement and manage a technological project
on this scale. The identity card scheme would represent the most
ambitious project of its type ever undertaken by a British government.
We would welcome a more thorough and comprehensive approach to
data protection across public authorities. Without wishing to
prejudge the inquiry into the police's sharing of data during
the investigation into the Soham murders, Liberty believes that
there are real grounds of concern in this area. The potential
problems that could be caused for an individual citizen in terms
of inaccurate data input are substantial.
5. Liberty can understand the Government's
desire to use a biometric identifier—such as an iris scan—in
an attempt to improve the robustness and security of the scheme.
However, we believe there needs to be a thorough investigation
into the possible problems associated with the use of biometric
identifiers, paying particular attention to iris scanning, as
this appears to be the Government's favoured option.
6. One practical concern has to be the number
of so-called false positives and false negatives rendered by the
system. To give an example, if iris scan equipment was deployed
at British airports and used on every passenger, then even an
accuracy rate of 99% would render approximately 1.5m false positive
and false negatives per annum. With around 150 million passengers
using British airports every year, a failure rate of just 1% could
still lead to very substantial administrative—let alone
security—concerns.
7. Liberty would also welcome research into
any possible adverse health risks associated with iris scanning,
and a detailed study of public attitudes towards it. Liberty's
assumption is that a large number of individuals—even if
still a minority of the public at large—may find the process
intrusive and an affront to their privacy.
THE SECURITY
AND INTEGRITY
OF THE
SYSTEM
8. As referred to above, Liberty has real
concerns that the system would not be robust. We would urge the
Government to consider both the present funding of the Office
of the Information Commissioner, and ways in which a culture of
data protection can be encouraged throughout the public and private
sector before considering proceeding with plans to introduce ID
cards.
THE OPERATIONAL
USE OF
ID CARDS IN
ESTABLISHING IDENTITY,
ACCESSING PUBLIC
SERVICES, AND
TACKLING ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION, CRIME
AND TERRORISM
9. Liberty remains unconvinced of the efficacy
of an ID card scheme in tackling these very real social and political
problems. To begin with the issue of terrorism, it is worth noting
that all of those involved in the 9/11 atrocities had either legitimate
identification papers or very compelling forgeries. It is not
easy to see how an identity card—particularly based on a
scheme which stores limited information—would assist in
apprehending potential or actual terrorists. Furthermore, sophisticated
terrorist networks are likely to have access to the means of producing
counterfeit cards, or at least copies of papers, which could assist
an individual in securing an actual card.
10. Illegal immigration is also unlikely
to be tackled through the introduction of an identity card. Illegal
entry to the country, and illegally working once here, are—by
their nature—black market activities carried out by those
who are willing and able to bypass government checks, balances
and paperwork. Illegal immigrants tend to take very low paid jobs,
paid cash in hand by unscrupulous employers who are all too aware
that they are using an illegal workforce. At present, for example,
such employers tend not to ask for the individual's National Insurance
number. Given this, it seems optimistic to assume that they will
ask for national identity documentation in future.
11. The merits of demanding an individual
establish their identity is of questionable benefit in many areas.
Liberty understands that in the area of benefit fraud, for example,
that the crime rarely relies on an individual attempting to pass
of a false identity. Benefit fraud tends to be based on an individual
being honest about their identity but lying about their circumstances.
It is rare for a Mr. Smith to pretend to be a Mr. Jones for the
purpose of securing benefits, but is rather more common for Mr.
Smith to admit that he is indeed Mr. Smith but not to disclose,
for example, that he earns £15,000 per annum cash in hand.
Lying about one's circumstances is not going to be prevented by
a national ID card.
12. Crime more generally is unlikely to
be dented by the scheme the Government is proposing. Liberty is
heartened that, from the outset, the Government made it plain
that they would not entertain the idea of an "on the spot"
police power to demand an individual produces their identity card.
However, Liberty remains concerned that such a power could easily
be added in future through a simple amendment. The Government
has failed to adduce any powerful evidence from those Western
European countries with ID card schemes to suggest that they are
a helpful tool in reducing crime. In particular, these examples
have not shown to be cost effective. The test must not be just
whether identity cards help reduce crime, but whether they are
the most effective means of doing so. One can seriously question
whether the billions being spent on ID cards will have any impact
at all, but it seems an even stronger case to argue that several
billions of pounds spent on police recruitment, retention and
training would be more effective.
13. When the Government dubbed their favoured
scheme a "universal entitlement card", the focus appeared
to be on access to public services. Liberty believes that whilst
there may be a case for reviewing the robustness of present procedures
(the national insurance card scheme and the NHS card), there is
no need for, and indeed considerable dangers in, a national ID
card. It raises the difficult question of how individuals would
be treated if their card was lost or stolen, and potentially puts
the medical profession in a difficult position. Liberty believes
it is implausible and unreasonable to expect doctors to withhold
treatment from those requiring it, even if they suspected that
the individual concerned was, for example, an illegal immigrant.
ISSUES TO
BE ADDRESSED
IN THE
LONGER-TERM,
INCLUDING COMPULSION
14. Liberty remains opposed in principle
to a compulsory national identity card system. We are concerned
that even if the scheme were to begin with the collection of relatively
minimal and uncontroversial data, there will be inevitable pressures
towards "function creep" once the scheme is in place
(In Greece, for example, religious affiliation was, for a short
time, added to their ID card scheme). Whilst the Government may
believe that the long-term introduction of the scheme on the back
of passport and driving licence applications will be administratively
easier than establishing an independent ID card, the 20% of the
population who have neither a driving licence nor a passport are
likely to be those who need it most.
15. The Government also needs to consider
the YouGov polling evidence published in the Daily Telegraph on
8th September 2003. Whilst the poll indicated majority support
for the scheme, 7% of the population indicated that they would
absolutely refuse to carry and ID card, with a further 11% indicating
that they would be sympathetic to such a protest and may even
join in. By percentage these numbers may be small, but in sheer
numerical terms they amount to millions of British adults.
THE ESTIMATED
COST OF
THE SCHEME
16. As indicated in the introduction, Liberty
does not have the technical expertise to provide a full costing
of the scheme. We understand, however, that some industry estimates
have judged the cost of introduction to be as high as £7bn.
We would further note the tendency of public sector technological
projects to run over budget, often substantially. We would therefore
take the Government's financial estimates to be at the conservative
end of the spectrum. Liberty has used the figure of £3.5bn
as a rough estimate of the cost of introducing the scheme.
17. The Committee may wish to consider another
aspect of the YouGov poll findings in this context. Only 1% of
the electorate indicated that they believed £40 was a reasonable
charge for an ID card, with around 86% believing there should
be no charge at all.
CONCLUSION
18. Liberty believes that a national identity
card scheme poses many real dangers and threats whilst providing
no guarantee of real social benefits. In France, for example,
there are very real concerns that the application of their ID
card system has led to worsening race relations (those of North
African appearance are asked to prove their identity considerable
more often than the white population). The size and scale of the
database that could be created as part of a national identity
card system also gives rise to serious misgivings. Even if the
amount of information initially collected were to be limited,
there is a real possibility that this could be expanded in future.
Furthermore, it is difficult to be confident that such information
would be stored in a sensitive and secure manner.
19. Given the threats and costs of an ID
card scheme, Liberty believes the burden of proof lies firmly
with those favouring their introduction. After two years of debate
and an extensive public consultation exercise lasting some six
months, it is a burden which has not been discharged.
December 2003
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