31. First supplementary memorandum
submitted by Liberty
1. DO YOU
OPPOSE ID CARDS
IN PRINCIPLE
OR JUST
ON THE
GOVERNMENT'S
PROPOSAL? IF
THIS ONE
WERE JUST
VOLUNTARY WOULD
YOU STILL
OPPOSE?
Do you oppose ID cards in principle?
Any national identity scheme raises
profound constitutional concerns regarding the relationship between
the individual and the state, and the presumption of privacy and
individual liberty. These concerns and presumptions can only be
rebutted by clear and compelling evidence to the contrary, and
a proportionate and effective means of achieving the state's aims.
In other words, there is a rebuttable presumption in favour of
the liberty, autonomy and privacy of the individual (and thus
against ID cards). This is underpinned by Britain's common law
and constitutional tradition, and the analytical approach of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The issue is whetherthe
government's proposals rebut that strong presumption.
Unfortunately, the debate in Britain
so far has asked the question, "what's wrong with ID cards?"
The appropriate approach, however, should ask, "what's right
with ID cards?" (This is referred to as "the justificatory
principle" throughout this document).
If this one were just voluntary would you still
oppose?
(1) Any "voluntariness" would be
illusory. This is clear from both the language of the Home Office
and Home Secretary throughout this process, and comparative experience.
In September 2001 David Blunkett announced that the cards would
be compulsory to obtain, but not compulsory to carry; the consultation
document, Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud, claimed
the cards would be "voluntary" but public services would
be inaccessible without them, and so they would be de facto
compulsory (at least for the poor); the latest document, Identity
Cards: The Next Steps, reveals that they will be "mandatory"
for foreign nationals during phase one (what sanction will be
attached to non-compliance and how foreign nationals and British
citizens will be distinguished is unclear). Comparative experience
reveals that "voluntary" cards are often compulsory
in practice, to obtain and to carry (the Greek, French and Portugese
police routinely request ID cards to be produced from the wallets
of those they stop), and also that some governments dub cards
"voluntary" or "pseudo-voluntary" simply to
sidestep parliamentary and public criticism (Australia and New
Zealand[55]
are good examples of this, although in both cases the cards were
eventually rejected).
(2) If the scheme were to be truly voluntary,
this would undermine all of the supposed benefits set out by the
Home Office and Home Secretary.
2. WHAT DO
YOU THINK
ABOUT THE
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL STATISTICS
FOR A
UK POPULATION REGISTER?
IS THIS
NOT A
SENSIBLE WAY
TO MAKE
RECORD-KEEPING
MORE EFFICIENT?
No. Liberty has a number of concerns.
First, it is unclear what precise
records will be kept, and what the purpose will be. There are
two conflicting positions which we assume are being considered
by the Home Affairs Committee under this heading: (i) the National
Identity Register outlined by the Home Secretary in Identity
Cards: The Next Steps and in public statements; (ii) the Population
Register being considered by the Office for National Statistics'
Citizen Information Project.
(i) National Identity Register
Details unclear as to what information
the National Identity Register is to include and what purpose
it is to serve. It is presented in Identity Cards: The Next Steps
as a stepping stone to a national identity scheme, with no claimed
benefit in and of itself. Statements from the Home Secretary have
made clear that the register is to include only basic information
(name, address, age, sex) which suggests it is different to the
population register outlined below.
Even if the proposed National Identity
Register is this limited, it is proposed by the Home Office as
the basis of a multi-purpose schemenot just focused on
"record-keeping". A register connected to an ID card
scheme would not simply be a more efficient or "sensible"
method of conducting a current practice, but a new system for
a new, more broad-ranging aim.
(ii) Citizen Information Project and the
Population Register
Preliminary work completed in summer
2002 by Patrick Carter, a member of HMT's Public Services Productivity
Panel, indicated that government could provide better services
at lower cost if the same basic information about people was not
collected and stored in many different databases held by the public
sector. The Citizen Information Project feasibility study has
considered the proposition in more detail and concluded that benefits
could be realised by holding, effectively in one place, a selection
of information about people that could be widely used across the
public sector. The feasibility study examined operational concerns
only, and not ethical, legal and constitutional issues.
In addition to including personal information,
the register would include a unique reference number, an aspect
never mentioned by the Home Office or Home Secretary in relation
to the National Identity Register. This unique reference number
is needed for efficiency, but the Citizen Information Project
say it could have "a wider use," and they have specifically
mentioned "the potential for data linkage".
This proposal cannot be looked at
in a blinkered manner. It must be put into the broader context
and examined alongside the incremental expansion of Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) powers, the national DNA database,
proposed national database on all children, and so on. Of particular
concern is the Performance Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office's
proposed "presumption in favour of data sharing" unless
there is a specific reason not to share data, a reversal of the
traditional presumption in favour of the citizen's privacy and
autonomy and a reversal of the ECHR approach.
3. IF THERE
ARE PROBLEMS
WHY DO
SO MANY
OTHER EU NATIONS
HAVE THEM?
(1) Not comparing like with like:
No other common law countries have
them. The only other common law country in the EU (Ireland) opposes
them.
ID card schemes across Europe differ
wildly in function and form.
Cherry-picking selective aspects
of policy in other European countries is nonsensical. For example,
Germany has a fully compulsory ID card scheme but some of the
strongest privacy laws in Europe (a constitutional right and the
equivalent of a privacy "tort"). If we are to emulate
their card, why not their safeguards?
Differences of history and culture
lie behind the fact that other EU countries have ID card schemes
of some sort. There are two separate issues raised by the Committee's
question: (i) why did they bring them in the first place? (ii)
why do they still have them?
(i) Origin of ID card schemes in Europe
The majority of EU countries with ID card
schemes have had them in place for a long period of time (France
have had them in some form since 19th century; Belgium since
1919; Greece since the 1940s; Portugal, Spain, Germany and Italy
since they were ruled by fascist governments). The timing means
that there hasn't been any real, modern public debate in these
countriesit's wrong to imply they have positively endorsed
ID cards when they just haven't abolished them.
(ii) Retention of those schemes
The schemes have been retained for various reasons,
although primarily they have been retained in the absence of a
"positive" reason to abolish them (this was acknowledged
by the Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, in his evidence
to the Home Officethe long-standing existence of ID cards
means they've become a largely unquestioned aspect of society
in many of these countries). Another key reason for their retention
is the fact that military service is compulsory in many continental
European countries and so the relationship between the citizen
and state reflects this duty.
4. THERE IS
GOING TO
BE AN
EU HEALTH INSURANCE
CARD COMING
IN. DOES
THIS TYPE
OF DEVELOPMENT
MAKE ID CARDS
DESIRABLE AND
INEVITABLE?
(1) Does this development make ID cards
desirable? No. The EU health insurance card is purpose-specific
(the holder will be able to access free medical treatment anywhere
in the EU). There is a fundamental distinction between purpose-specific
identification (driving licences allowing you to drive, passports
enabling you to travel, library cards enabling you to borrow books)
and a general, multi-purpose identification card. The EU health
insurance card is designed to facilitate free movement of persons
and allow access to free medical treatment outside one's own country,
a reasonable and targeted purpose.
(2) Does this development make ID cards
inevitable? No. We already have NHS cards and national insurance
numbers in this country, but this does not make ID cards inevitable.
Besides, the EU health card proposals make clear that it will
be for each European country to choose whether to include records
of treatment received, photographs and biometric data.
(3) Finally, and most importantly, referring
to EU developments as a justification for the scheme outlined
in Identity Cards: The Next Steps is bizarre as the two-tier
system undoubtedly breaches EU law (despite the protestations
of the Home Office in footnote 2 of that document). European Court
of Justice case law has established that if there is a sanction
for non-national EU citizens not carrying/obtaining an ID card,
there must be a comparable sanction for nationals who do the same.
The Home Secretary's proposed scheme makes ID cards "mandatory"
for non-nationals staying in the UK for over three months during
phase one, but not compulsory for British citizens, which constitutes
a clear breach.
5. WHY DOES
PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL
THINK THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (ECHR) IS
BREACHED?
It's for parliamentarians to examine
the merits and proportionality of the government's proposals,
taking into account privacy, the narrower issue of data protection
compliance, and other issues.
Article 8, ECHR provides a useful
tool for the Houses of Parliament to examine whether the arguments
made in favour of ID cards in general and the proposed scheme
in particular stand up to scrutiny. Article 8 is structured in
a manner which gives presumptive weight to the right to privacy,
and limitations to that right must be strictly construed. This
dovetails with the justificatory approach to privacy, liberty
and autonomy issues in the British constitutional tradition.
The "margin of appreciation"
doctrine in Strasbourg jurisprudence means that there's a self-fulfilling
prophecy element to this: if the majority of European states choose
to have an ID card scheme, and have had one since before the ECHR
was signed, a Strasbourg court will not necessarily be able to
find that it breaches Article 8. However, there is no "margin
of appreciation" doctrine in the domestic courts and so the
domestic courts must approach Article 8 in a stricter manner than
the Strasbourg courts. The justificatory approach was adopted
by the House of Lords in the Daly case.
6. THE HOME
OFFICE DO
NOT CLAIM
ID CARDS ARE
A MAGIC
BULLET BUT
DO YOU
ACCEPT THEY
ARE A
USEFUL TOOL
FOR FIGHTING
CRIME?
No. There is no evidence which backs
up this crucial assertion by the Home Office. How would an ID
card scheme help tackle crime? There is no real evidence from
other countries with ID card schemes that it has any impact on
general crime or even identity fraud. Apparent "evidence"
is entirely anecdotal. Common sense shows no link between the
problem and the proposed solution.
"General" crime: the police's
problem is not with identifying suspects, but with the evidential
chain linking suspects to the crime. ID cards could not assist
with this.
Illegal immigration and working: currently,
employers are obliged to request identification and entrants to
the country are obliged to give a biometric (fingerprints) for
the purposes of the Application Registration Card (ARC). If unscrupulous
employers do not currently ask for existing documentation why
will they suddenly start asking for ID cards?
Identity fraud: if anything, identity
fraud may become easier and more profitable. If the card is trusted
as a gateway to a plethora of public services and entitlements,
the market in forgeries will be high. Also, common sense suggests
that having to provide multiple forms of ID is some sort of barrier
to ID frauda one card proves all approach is fraught with
dangers (this is why the "trusted traveller" card has
been opposed in the US).
Even if ID cards could help to tackle
some crimes in some ways, this is notof itselfenough
to justify them. The ID card would have to be shown to be proportionate
and cost-effective. Police resources could be better focused,
eg more police to improve detection rates, and benefit agency
workers could be better trained in spotting fraud, and so on.
The scheme as proposed does not allow
for on the spot requests for ID cards (although French and Belgian
experience suggests this will not stop it happening). The 7-day
rule means that the scheme will only inconvenience the law-abiding
citizen and the police and will play no part in stopping the lawbreaker.
Even the Home Secretary cannot make
up his mind on this. The Home Office itself accepted that terrorism
and "ordinary" crime would not be tackled by an identity
card scheme in the Entitlement Cards document (this "acceptance
that entitlement cards will have little part to play in bringing
criminals to justice or fighting terrorism" was praised by
the Information Commissioner in his submission to the HO, page
1). However, these arguments were revived after the consultation
had concluded.
7. LIBERTY EXPRESSED
CONCERN ABOUT
THE GOVERNMENT'S
ABILITY TO
KEEP DATA
SECURE. IS
THIS A
QUESTION OF
PERCEPTION? IF
NOT IS
THERE AN
INDEPENDENT BODY
WHOSE ASSESSMENT
OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S
PLANS LIBERTY
WOULD TRUST?
Is this a question of perception?
This is far more than a perception
issue. Reviews of data matching, data mining and Data Protection
Act (DPA) compliance by public bodies have shown this. Two possible
examples: (i) RIPA examplepublic bodies have consistently
stepped outside the bounds of what's permissible under RIPA, and
it's then been necessary to draft orders to make widespread illegal
behaviour legal ("regulate the unregulated," in HO speak);
(ii) recent statements by IC regarding lack of compliance with
his Code of Practice on CCTV by public bodies, including the police.
If Not Is There an Independent Body Whose Assessment
of the Government's Plans Liberty Would Trust?
Parliament is the appropriate independent
body to review the government's proposals at this initial stage.
Liberty would not be satisfied with the introduction
of an ID card scheme with "safeguards" vested in another
body. Liberty is not simply looking for safeguards to the scheme,
but a justification for its existence in the first place. No independent
body can give us that when the government has failed to.
A number of issues are raised by
this suggestion:
(i) Can wide-ranging constitutional concerns
be appropriately sub-contracted to any body other than existing
limbs of the constitution?
(ii) Can this question be answered anyway
when it is so vaguely phrased (what body, how independent, what
precise safeguards)?
Justificatory principle again: we are
not simply looking for safeguards to the scheme like the IC, but
a justification for its existence in the first place. No independent
body can give us that when the government has failed to.
8. EVERYONE HAS
EXPRESSED CONCERN
ABOUT EG
FORGERY. COULD
TWO FORMS,
EG IRIS
SCAN AND
FINGERPRINT, SOLVE
THIS?
Germany's study into a double biometric
(to be potentially introduced from 2006) does not appear to have
been examined at all by the Home Office.
A leading biometric expert, based
in the UK and responsible for a number of governmental biometric
schemes (including facial recognition technology deployment) has
expressed concerns to us regarding the most advanced biometric
technologies available on the market. The leading US system was
cracked by a group of Japanese graduate students within a term
in 2003.
9. LIBERTY EXPRESSED
THE NEED
FOR PROPER
INVESTIGATION INTO
FEASIBILITY. IS
NOT, FOR
EXAMPLE, THE
PASSPORT OFFICE
PILOT AN
EXAMPLE OF
THIS? WHAT
ELSE WOULD
YOU ASK
FOR?
No feasibility study would assuage
our principled concerns.
The passport office pilot involved
a self-selecting group and the number of refusals to participate
in the trial was not even recorded. Lack of honesty and methodological
rigour in the process.
No adequate comparative work has
been undertaken, probably the best way to test feasibility. The
Home Office consultation document included a comparative section
but it was riddled with errors and omitted unfavourable information.
The claim that it was "not possible to have follow-up discussions
with all of the countries surveyed" is unconvincing, given
that the countries without ID card schemes were the ones neglected.
Besides, the track-record of government
IT projects is execrable, eg Libra Magistrates scheme. When this
is added to the fact that no biometric project on this scale has
ever been undertaken, and no current technology comes close to
the sort of reliability needed, feasibility is certainly not addressed
by a small-scale "investigation" such as the passport
office pilot in which a first year undergraduate science student
could spot the basic methodological errors.
10. THE HOME
OFFICE WILL
PUBLISH A
RACE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT. WHAT
WILL YOU
BE LOOKING
FOR?
Any race impact assessment must be
objective and wide-ranging. Given the Home Office's political
interest in the outcome, and its poor and misleading comparative
material in the consultation document, it is incapable of conducting
such an objective and wide-ranging assessment.
Adverse race impact can be predicted
from three things:
(i) Comparative experience (young Algerian
men in France, despite the "voluntary" nature of the
French ID card; Turkish Gastarbeiter in Germany, which
has a fully compulsory scheme);
(ii) the skewed operation of stop and searches
under existing legislation (PACE, the Terrorism Act 2000, the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act) which has soured relations
between the police and minority communities for years;
(iii) structural, institutionalised discrimination
in the scheme as proposed in Identity Cards: The Next Steps,
both in its aims (if stopping illegal immigration is one of the
scheme's justifications, it stands to reason that skin colour
will be a factor in deciding who to question) and its method (the
two-tier system discriminates between foreigners and British citizens
from the outset).
This links to the voluntary/compulsory
spectrum. On November 12th 2003 David Blunkett said (as reported
by BBC News) that while people would not initially be compelled
to carry their ID, "mobile technology was on the way which
could allow police on the streets to check people's ID by checking
their fingerprints or eye scans."[56]
11. COSTS: THERE
ARE GOING
TO BE
CHANGES TO
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS,
EG PASSPORT/DRIVING
LICENCES. THE
GOVERNMENT WILL
NEED TO
MAKE CHANGES
ANYWAY. WILL
ID CARDS NOT
ADD LITTLE
TO THE
COST THAT
IS ALREADY
GOING TO
BE INCURRED?
THE GOVERNMENT'S
FIGURE IS
£4 PER PERSON
PER ANNUM
OVER 10 YEARS
We would not support this scheme
if it were free.
2. ID CARDS:
COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
2.1 General Observations
Unfortunately,
there is a lack of methodologically and conceptually rigorous
work in this area: there is a tendency for such "analysis"
to be conducted by highly interested parties in a selective manner;
apparent "trends" in countries with long-term experience
of ID cards have not been fully investigated and so much of the
evidence is merely anecdotal or assumptive. The most comprehensive
work to date has been conducted in Australia. and there has also
been strong research into the impact of national ID card schemes
on ethnic and social minorities in some Continental European countries.
Comparative legal (and policy) analysis
is often misleading, as concepts and practices acceptable in one
context may have very different effects and implications in other
contexts.[57]
Simply transplanting an idea from one legal soil to another without
considering the local conditions does not work.
This caution is particularly important
when comparing different legal families, such as civil law systems
and common law systems. (An unfortunate aspect of the Home Office
comparative material set out in Entitlement Cards and Identity
Fraud is its neglect of the common law experience on the overall
issue of a national ID card, yet its focus on Canada and the US
on the issue of non-nationals.)
The very term "national ID card"
has the tendency to mislead, as it can take many different forms.
The term is used throughout this document to refer, generally,
to centralised, multi-purpose systems.
As privacy is one of the issues of
relevance to this discussion, it is important to remember that
it is a complex term, and means very different things in different
contexts. To some it refers to a catch-all "right to be let
alone"; to others it refers to informational privacy only,
and, more narrowly, to data protection rights. Surveys reveal
that the Americans and some Continental European countries, for
example, rate their financial privacy more highly than sexually
explicit personal data. In Germany, they have comprehensive privacy
laws and a strong understanding of the appropriate limits of government,
the public have regularly protested about the proliferation of
CCTV, yet they have an ID card which must be carried at all times.
In the U.S. since 9/11, Americans have accepted many incursions
into their personal privacy in the name of increased security,
yet John Poindexter's Total Information Awareness programme collapsed
following public protest and Bush's proposal for a national ID
card was defeated in the early stages.
Despite these caveats, however, a number of
loose trends may be observed:
Similar assumptions about the supposed
benefits of ID cards are constantly made. This has been obvious
on a micro level, within the U.K. alone: the arguments made in
the House of Commons in 1989 when a Private Members' Bill supported
the introduction of ID cards (assumption that it would help tackle
crime, illegal immigration and benefit fraud) were made again
by Michael Howard in the 1990s and now by David Blunkett. International
experience reveals that ID card schemes tend not to be based on
any formal statement of objectives, and supporting rhetoric and
documentation tends to assume schemes to be general-purpose in
nature.
There is an unfortunate absence of
the use of the justificatory principle in most national debates
on ID cards (this is partly because ID card schemes in Western
liberal democracies often predate the establishment of democratic
government, and partly because of the above assumptions). Debates
on ID cards, when they occur at all, often pose the question "what's
wrong with ID cards?" The common law countries, however,
buck this trend, and tend to frame the question differently"what's
right with ID cards?" Liberty supports this approach, beginning
from a presumption that the citizen's liberty, autonomy and privacy
should not be disturbed by the State unless a legitimate reason
to do so is shown, clear and compelling evidence supports the
method chosen to achieve that aim, and a proportionate approach
is taken.
Prior to the introduction of ID card
schemes, the public's support of such schemes is in inverse proportion
to their knowledge of the proposals. In both Australia (1985-86)
and New Zealand (1991) the public initially supported the idea,
but as they found out more that support waned.
Once card schemes are settled and
in place, however, they tend to become accepted, in the sense
that mainstream opposition fades. Again, this trend must be qualified
by the fact that most developed countries with ID card schemes
have had them in place for a long period of time, eg ID cards
have been used in Belgium since 1919, so it is little wonder that
they are now an uncontroversial part of life for anyone over 12.
"Function creep" in ID
card schemes is well documented. This occurs both with official
sanction and without. Officially sanctioned creep involves the
addition of new purposes or information to the card once in place.
Creep without official approval most commonly occurs when a "voluntary"
aspect of the card scheme becomes de facto compulsory. This has
occurred in countries both with a card which is compulsory to
obtain, but not to carry, and in countries with a fully voluntary
card. The best documented (and perhaps most worrying) example
of this relates to discriminatory policing,[58]
but other examples include private sector companies routinely
requiring the ID card to, for example, open a storecard account
and security guards in public buildings requesting the national
ID card before entry is permitted.
Many ID card schemes, actual and
proposed, have avoided the use of biometrics as identifiers in
the past, despite their availability. The reason for this is unclear,
although the most likely explanation is that, until recently,
the only technically effective basis was fingerprints. As fingerprint
identification techniques were developed for the express purpose
of assisting in criminal investigation, it has been suggested
that some qualms would be felt at applying such a technology to
the entire population (similarly, a biometric based upon measuring
the skull with calipers would be unlikely to be widely used by
any political party given its unfortunate associations).
ID cards are usually derivative from
seed documents such as birth certificates and passports. Of course,
there are criminal aliases with impeccable credentials and passports,
and birth certificates tend to be issued for the purpose of evidencing
recorded details of the birth of some person, not to prove that
a person is who he claims to be. In order to achieve the critical
target of a one-to-one relationship between cards and individuals,
the criteria used would need to be far narrower than tight passport
and birth certificate rules. This has been a recurring issue in
countries introducing an ID card for the first time.
2.2 Common Law Jurisdictions
No common law country has a national
identity card, an often-overlooked fact in comparative ID card
analysis. In the Home Office material (Annex 3 to Entitlement
Cards and Identity Fraud) these countries and their reasons
for rejecting ID cards consistently are not examinedinstead,
simply the bald words "no card" are listed.
Proposals to introduce such a card
have been rejected by Australia (1987), New Zealand (1991) and
the U.S. (most recently, 2002). The "Australia Card"
example is remarkably similar to the current U.K. situation politically
(suggested by a Labour government using many similar arguments),
but the U.S. example is most telling. In the U.S. since 9/l1,
Americans have accepted many incursions into their personal privacy
in the name of increased security. Airline passengers have removed
their shoes and stood with arms outspread as uniformed officials
peered into their cabin baggage; the Department of Homeland Security
has had mainstream support for its proposal to colour-code all
passengers based on the likelihood that they may commit a terrorist
act; banks have requested information from new customers which
is promptly transferred to federal investigators. In this context,
the collapse of the "Total Information Awareness" system
and the withdrawal of the ID card proposal are extremely significant.
Whilst no common law country has
a national, universal, multi-purpose card, sectoral cards or identifier
systems are often used for particular purposes, such as health
or social security.[59]
Examples include the Social Security number in the U.S., the National
Insurance number in the U.K., the Social Insurance Card in Canada
and the Medicare Card in Australia. These were introduced as low-integrity
systems designed for a single purpose, although the U.S. and Canadian
Social Security numbers did grow from this and have been used
for additional public and private sector purposes. Successive
Committees established during the 1980s and 1990s to consider
whether the U.S. Social Security number and Card scheme should
be replaced recommended against such a project on the grounds
of impracticality and excessive infringement of human rights.
Some common law countries also use identifiers for particular
groups, eg flngerscanning systems for welfare recipients have
been implemented.[60]
The concept of "one-person-one-identity"
which underlies the Home Secretary's proposed scheme is, as has
been pointed out in the Australian debate in particular, dubious
in a common law context. It is a concept foreign to traditional
British and Australian law, because the use of an alias has never
been in itself a crime. Many people "hide behind" more
than one name, variously for psychological, security and sometimes
criminal reasons. Users of aliases include creative people like
artists, authors and actors, and professional people, particularly
females, but also staff at psychiatric and prison institutions,
private detectives and intelligence operatives.
2.3 European Countries
Most European countries have some
form of identity card, although they are (as acknowledged by the
Information Commissioner) "not on the scale envisaged in
the government's consultation paper".[61]
Significantly, the only other common
law country in Europe, Ireland, has no identity card or national
ID scheme and its Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, publicly
refuted recent claims in Home Office documentation that it was
considering introducing such a scheme.
The purpose and function of schemes
differ wildly across Europe. In Austria, Finland, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden ID cards are
"voluntary"; Belgium, Greece, Germany and Spain require
citizens to carry the ID with them at all times.
Identity cards in continental European
countries are now largely uncontroversial largely due to the timing
of their introduction. They have been in place for over half a
decade in most countries (Belgium, 1919; Greece, 1940s; Germany,
since the war; Portugal and Spain, hangovers from dictatorships
although now used for benign purposes, obviously).
Identity cards in many of these countries
are linked to the fact that military service is compulsory.
Although the cards are long-standing,
recently biometric cards and/or smartcards have been phased in
in a number of countries. Italy and Spain announced the introduction
of microchips in cards to little complaint in 2003;[62]
Germany added biometric data to the card in response to 9/11 and
by 2006 plans to include a digital photo plus fingerprints, a
double biometric; Belgium is rolling out a card with a smart chip
with the holder's digital signature and authentification certificate.
Two-tier identity card schemes have
been held to breach European Union law. Community law does not
prevent a Member State from carrying out checks on compliance
with the obligation to be able to produce a residence permit at
all times, provided that it imposes the same obligation on its
own nationals as regards their identity card (Case 321/87 Commission
v Belgium [1989] ECR 997, paragraph 12; Case C24/97, Commission
v Germany, Opinion Of Advocate General Jacobs (1998); Case C24/97.
Commission v. Germany, decision of the ECJ (1998), all annexed
to this document). In the event of failure to comply with that
obligation, the national authorities are entitled to impose penalties
comparable to those attaching to minor offences committed by their
own nationals, such as those laid down in respect of failure to
carry an identity card. (A further restriction is that even if
the sanction is comparable to that imposed upon nationals, it
cannot so disproportionate a penalty that it becomes an obstacle
to the free movement of workers.) The scheme outlined in Identity
Cards: the Next Steps breaches this principle of equal treatment
(compulsory in phase one for non-nationals, including EAA citizens).
3. FURTHER REFERENCES
3.1 The Home Office: Card Schemes in other
Countries
3.2 The proposed "Australia
Card" scheme
3.3 Case C24/97, Commission v. Germany,
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs (1998)
3.4 Case C24/97, Commission
v. Germany, Judgment of the European Court of Justice (1998)
February 2004
55 It is interesting to note that the term "Entitlement
Card" was first used in New Zealand in 1991 to disguise a
de facto compulsory card as a "voluntary" one.
It is inconceivable that the Home Office and the government were
unaware of this when they used the term in 2002. Back
56
"Blunkett Outlines ID Card Plans," BBC News, 12 November
2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/uk_politics/3259285.stm. Back
57
See further eg Otto Kahn-Freund, "On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law" (1974) 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1; Basil Markesinis,
"Comparative Law-A Subject in Search of an Audience"
(1990) 53 Mod. L. Rev. 1. Back
58
The decision in the Wilcock v. Mucide [1952] 1 K.B. 367 case
is a homegrown example of this. Back
59
Interestingly, the reverse is also true in a non-common law country,
Sweden: it has a ubiquitous national number, but no single official
identity card. Back
60
See further Philip E. Agre, "Beyond the Mirror World: Privacy
and the Representational Practices of Computing," in Agre
and Marc Rotenberg (eds.), Technology and Privacy: The New
Landscape (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 29-62,
at p. 55. Back
61
ICO's Response to Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud, January
2003, p. 2. Back
62
In Italy the new documents look like credit cards. Personal information
is stored in an optical memory strip and in a microchip. Individuals
have the option of including health and financial information
on the card's digital record. The new Spanish model is dubbed
the world's first "internet ID card". The card may be
placed in a reader attached to a home computer and thus apply
for a passport from home, or do other official business with the
state or local administration. Back
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