Select Committee on Home Affairs Written Evidence


37.  Memorandum submitted by the Police Federation of England and Wales

IDENTITY CARDS: A POLICING PERSPECTIVE

Background

  1.  The Police Federation of England and Wales is the representative body for over 133,000 members of the police service below the rank of superintendent.

  2.  For reasons of brevity, we have chosen to comment only upon those aspects of the Home Affairs Committee inquiry with which the Police Federation has both expertise and experience. In addition to rationalising the justifications to introduce identity cards, this paper highlights those areas we believe require further consideration.

Introduction

  3.  The Police Federation has supported the introduction of a national identity card scheme for over a decade, not as a reaction to any one event, but following objective appraisal. We have taken cognisance of the views from both sides of what has become an acutely polarised debate, but believe now is the time for the debate to move on to discuss specifics and the practicalities of the various possible forms of identification.

  4.  Identity cards should be kept in perspective. They are not a panacea. Nonetheless they could be part of a broader solution and would make a police officer's job on the street easier.

  5.  We support the government's decision to introduce a draft bill. Less evasive but secure systems are likely to be accepted quickly. Unless, however, the public are made aware of the positive value of identity cards it is entirely understandable that a degree of reluctance will persist. As awareness of the benefits of identity cards increases, so too will the level of public support.

Practical issues involved in the ID database and biometric identifiers

  6.  Technological developments provide the opportunity to explore in greater detail the introduction of a system that incorporates biometric data unique to the individual.

  7.  It would be wrong to depict ID cards as `Orwellian' merely because they utilise biometric identifiers. It should be borne in mind that biometric identifiers would prevent forgeries, thereby protecting one's identify. The UK could potentially enjoy the most advanced identity card system in the world.

  8.  The use of biometric identifiers is likely to increase throughout society, an example of which is North Somerset Police's "thumbprint ID program" with local retailers, whereby on purchase with a credit card shoppers may be asked to submit a thumbprint in addition to a signature. Shoppers and retailers alike therefore benefit from identity protection.

  9.  We fully support examinations into the security of the proposed identity card and integrity of the accompanying database. The Police Federation will therefore pay close attention to the UK Passport Agency pilot scheme eg assessing the popularity and effectiveness of the different forms of biometric identifiers. It is appropriate for this to precede decisions concerning which data could and should be held on any future card.

The security and integrity of the proposed system

  10.  The security and integrity of the proposed system is clearly an issue of paramount importance. Whilst we can understand concerns some individuals may harbour, we are confident that lessons learnt from systems abroad, coupled with technological advances, should ensure any UK-wide identity card system is both reliable and robust.

The operational use of ID cards in establishing identity, accessing public services, and tackling illegal migration, crime, and terrorism

  11.  This submission primarily concerns operational issues with which our policing experience affords a unique insight. Although we support those arguments in favour of introducing identity cards with regard to benefit fraud etc., we do not feel sufficiently qualified to comment on such matters within this submission.

Amelioration of working practices

  12.  Identity cards could bring a wide range of benefits to the police in terms of working practices, for instance expediting the criminal justice system.[66]

    (a) Driver Identification: despite the new form of driving licenses, the police currently have no reliable means to identify drivers. Whilst the Police National Computer (PNC) enables us to identify the vehicle, together with the criminal and motoring history of an individual, the driver remains anonymous unless a time-consuming driver interrogation is undertaken. Positive identification would allow the police to fully utilise their resources, for instance the information held upon the PNC. In addition, driver identification would prove beneficial following non-criminal incidents, such as road traffic accidents.

    An issue stemming from driver identification is one of liberty, and is an example of a fundamental flaw at the very core of the argument that identity cards abridge freedoms. If requested by the police, the driver, on request from the officer, must report to a police station within seven days. This is as onerous as it is irksome and amounts to a far greater `infringement' of liberty than simply producing a card to confirm their identity.

    (b) Stop and Search is a vital tool in our armoury, without which a minority of individuals would have the confidence to carry whatever they liked upon their person.

    Stop and Search procedures would be greatly improved following the introduction of identity cards. Firstly, police officers would be able to identify individuals beyond doubt. Secondly, curtailing the time taken to conduct stop and searches would enhance an individual's liberty. Thirdly, this time saving would also greatly benefit the police, allowing officers to spend more time policing the streets.

    If identity cards were compatible with a system of police smart card readers, officers would simply be able to check if and when they or their colleagues had stopped an individual before. This would ensure that the same individuals are not repeatedly searched within a given time-period.

    (c) Football grounds/hooligans—proper implementation of banning orders would be far easier if a quick and easy identification assessment could be made.

    (d) Proof of age identification causes great problems for both retailers (licensing, gambling etc.) and the authorities alike, especially in the `night-time' economy. Some eighteen year olds look thirteen and vice versa. Identity cards would remove this ambiguity, allowing for a more stringent application of the law. At present many different voluntary identity systems are in place and are demanded in some premises.

    (e) Street bail—if it were possible to ascertain a bona fide name and address to forward charges by post, the timely necessity of arresting individuals until the correct details are established (or detention in the case of Community Support Officers) would become redundant. This would therefore save later enquiries when name and addresses are proved to be false.

    (f) Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs)—identity cards would make it far easier to determine whether or not individuals were breaking an ASBO. This would greatly strengthen the existing legislation.

    (g) Background checks—processes for vetting individuals (be it for jobs working with children or as door security in pubs and clubs) are not watertight. Until positive identification can be fully guaranteed holes in the integrity of the system such as the use of dual identities will persist.

    (h) Identity protection—the fight against identity theft would be revolutionised if an identity card system were to be introduced.

The security dimension

  13.  National security is likely to be an issue at the top of the policing agenda for the foreseeable future. All possible steps should therefore be sought to ensure security is maximised and we wholeheartedly support the introduction of identity cards within this context.

  14.  We have never argued identity cards would have a panacean effect with regard to terrorism. No one factor could ever have such an impact. They would, however, be part of a broader solution, helping to safeguard security by placing an additional hurdle in the path of terrorists. Clearly not all terrorists would be caught as a result of identity cards, but this in no way obviates the need for them in the first place.

  15.  Identity cards would facilitate the build up of essential intelligence information on terrorist suspects in much the same way as with any individuals with criminal intent. Developing patterns of movement based upon where suspects have been recorded etc. could be invaluable for anti-terrorist operations.

Issues to be addressed in the longer-term, including compulsion

  16.  Our views vis-a"-vis compulsion are clear and unambiguous. We support the implementation of a universal and compulsory system. This is not to say that we would be opposed to a lesser implementation of identity cards—a form of limited identification is better than none whatsoever—rather our preference is based upon elemental logic. As the level of compulsion and universality increases so too does the effectiveness. Under a non-compulsory and non-universal identity card system not all potential cost-savings and benefits could be fully realised, thereby maintaining existing inefficiencies in the criminal justice system.

  17.  We believe the policing `need' for identity cards should be married with public support. A compulsory system should therefore be preceded by a `phased-in' voluntary system. Such a transition would enable the public to become accustomed to using their cards, in addition to smoothing out any initial logistical challenges.

  18.  In the long-term, two key issues will need to be addressed. Firstly, under what circumstances would police officers or other authorities be able to ask to see the identity card. Secondly, if a compulsory system were to be adopted in the future, what sanctions would exist for the non-carrying or non-display on request of an identity card.

  19.  We are confident that neither of these riders would be a cause of concern for law-abiding citizens, especially because a voluntary identity card period would promote both their use and an understanding of their importance.

The estimated cost of the system

  20.  Clearly whatever the specifics of the chosen scheme, it will require substantial initial investment. These start-up costs should, however, be viewed over the lifetime of the system. It is therefore the cost per annum that is of greatest significance.

  21.  Significantly, transitional costs are the most frequent figure quoted by those opposed to identity cards. No mention is made of the benefits in monetary terms that the cards would secure. To say that the costs exceed the benefits is therefore an inherently facile analysis. Whilst it is complicated to quantify many of the benefits accrued, it is not impossible. In policing terms (paragraphs 11 to 15) benefits are both direct eg streamlining the criminal justice process, and indirect eg substantial timesavings. It is these opportunity costs that are vital but are too often hidden behind smoke and mirror figures.

  22.  We firmly believe the merits outweigh transitional and running costs. Until the debate moves forward however the public will continue to be informed of the cost of everything, but the value of nothing. Recognition must therefore be made of these intangibles, the most significant and controversial of course being the impact upon security. It should be recognised that every major policing organisation fully supports a system of identity cards.

Conclusion

  23.  With such a wide range of advantages, we believe introducing identity cards is in the best public interest and should therefore be embraced, not feared. A draft identity card bill is therefore an important stepping stone in a process that we hope, in time, will culminate in the phased introduction of a universal and compulsory identity card scheme.

  22.  Debates regarding the merits of specific aspects of any future identity card bill will no doubt be marked by the same strength of feeling as those which have taken place to date. The discussions should not distract however from the substantial arguments in favour of progression. At present, the police and the majority of the public support identity cards. Criminals and terrorists do not. In the fullness of time we believe people will question why it took so long for them to be introduced in the first place.

January 2004








66   It should be noted that the examples enumerated represent only a snapshot of the advantages of identity cards. Back


 
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