Select Committee on Home Affairs Written Evidence


46.  Supplementary memorandum submitted by the British Computer Society (BCS)

  The BCS would wish to draw the attention of the committee to the previous consultations on this topic where we have raised some concerns over the viability of the project, and we will be reiterating those concerns in our submission to the Home Office later.

  The primary concern is that there does not seem to be any firm and fixed statement of what the system is meant to achieve, what success or failure criteria are imposed and which scope limitations have been imposed. Without such fixed objectives, the risk of failure is significantly increased. Given the already high risk attached to extremely large systems this would be a major concern. It is also a concern that this work does not seem to tie in to current work on identification of the citizen, as proposed by e-government initiatives, and there seems to be a risk that the two systems may not be fully compatible (or mutually consistent). It is imperative that if the system is to retain its credibility it must be demonstrably reliable, secure and accurate.

  Whilst the British Computer Society will be submitting evidence upon the consultation paper issued by the Home Office, the following points upon the draft bill are highlighted for the consideration of the Home Affairs Committee.

  1.  We note that there is no clause in the draft bill to cover the situation of those within our society who are incapacitated, infirm or otherwise incapable of handling the complexities of an identity card. Such people, who need to be recognised, may have a responsible carer or legal attorney handling their affairs. It would seem sensible to allow a nominated "carer" or legal representative to act for an individual in some (carefully controlled) circumstances. However the way the bill is currently worded this action appears to be an illegal act. Access to a person's details by their executors also appears to be impossible.

  2.  We note that Clause 3.4 and 3.5 implies that the Home Secretary may be able to modify the information held. Can this clause be reworded to be more explicit in its meaning as it is assumed that the intent is for the Home Secretary to alter the nature of the information to be kept, rather than the information itself.

  3.  In Clause 22(2) we note that information from the Identity Register about a person may be released without his or her consent. This information can be released not only to a wide range of "responsible" people, but to those people requesting verification of identity, if any of the facts they quote is in error. The latter seems to introduce a process weakness which could result in the release of valid information to an interested enquirer who has randomly supplied incorrect information. It seems unlikely that the Clause intends this to happen. Any release of personal information without the person's, specific consent, or notification to the citizen should be subject to stringent control, and should be restricted to security authorities and others empowered under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.

  4.  The bill and consultation documents state that children will not have an identity card until they reach the age of 16. The BCS questions the reasoning behind this statement, on the grounds that unless you are identified at birth, (or at entry to the UK if born overseas), it is quite difficult to prove someone's identity later and adds to the complexity of the whole process.

  5.  Clause 12.1. There is a requirement to notify the death of a citizen to the register and we assume that as under current passport requirements the identity card should be returned. We trust that this will be a part of the registration of death processes performed by the deceaseds' next of kin, as Clause 12.1 states that "an individual to whom an ID card has been issued must notify etc" and this is clearly impossible after death. The bill as it currently stands is unclear.

  6.  The draft bill makes it a requirement that a citizen must supply his or her biometric information on request. This may not always be as easy for people to supply as the act suggests—not only for the disabled, house-bound or institutionalised members of our society, but also country dwellers who don't have easy access to transport, may also suffer. In remote areas an individual may have to travel considerable distances in order to find a centre with the right equipment. The Committee may wish to make provision for those people who are housebound or infirm, and also those who are unable to drive (or can't), people who can't leave their livestock (for example at spring lambing season), and people who through hardship cannot afford the train or bus fare, etc.

  7.  Whilst not strictly part of the bill, it should be noted that BCS has already raised a major concern in previous consultations that the management of large databases (and indeed large systems) such as that proposed by this bill, is extremely complex and prone to error. We note and welcome that in the consultation paper an Inter-Departmental Identity Card Programme Board is proposed, but might suggest that this could include advisors from organisations, who have relevant experience in this field, such as BCS.

  8.  The BCS would like to remind the Committee that biometric data, whilst highly accurate, is not infallible. There is always a possibility of process error being introduced in the back-end systems, further reducing the accuracy of the system. The BCS is concerned that information originally correctly supplied to the Identity Register may become corrupt or lost. Considering the proposed uses of the Identity Register, incorrect data would constitute a very serious matter for the citizen involved. The Act should therefore make specific provision for the detection and correction of errors which may arise. A formal process should be created, whereby the citizen confirms, on a regular basis, the correctness of the stored information. This verification process should be free of charge to the citizen. Further to this, if the Identity Register is found to contain wrong information pursuant to Clause 22.2 or other relevant clauses, and the citizen suffered embarrassment or loss as a result, who would be liable for the damage caused?

  9.  The BCS is pleased that the points which were raised in previous consultations on this subject have been taken on board and included in the current consultation paper.

May 2004





 
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