Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40
- 59)
THURSDAY 11 DECEMBER 2003
NICOLA ROCHE,
KATHERINE COURTNEY
AND STEPHEN
HARRISON
Q40 Chairman: Perhaps we will ask
the DFES, but if the aim of the system is to prevent people who
are not entitled to expensive public services getting access to
public services, it seems a bit odd that that would not apply
to schools.
Nicola Roche: Well, in terms of
the parents being here illegally, there will be other ways of
highlighting their presence here through other services. We have
not worked through in terms of what it would mean about children
at school, but clearly it is a matter for the DFES.
Q41 Chairman: But unless the parents
were picked up in some other way, the DFES have no objection to
children getting free education in this country, even though they
and their parents have no right to be here?
Nicola Roche: That is clearly
a matter for the DFES, but this is about the adult population,
this is not about children. In respect of GP surgeries and GPs
checking, there would not be an expectation that every time you
went to a GP you had to produce your ID. It would be about when
you first registered, for example. What we would want to do is
work through both Primary Care Trusts and with GP surgeries. Clearly
this is the Department of Health in the lead on this, with the
Home Office in support, making sure that what we have is something
that was easy to operate, actually facilitating the work that
they are doing already. The Department of Health announcement
in terms of health tourism earlier in the year did highlight that
there is great misuse of the services that are free for people
who have an eligibility but are being misused by people who claim
to have an eligibility who do not. So this is about enhancing
what is going on already.
Q42 Chairman: But some parts of the
Health Service, when people register with the GP, would require
the use of the ID card to establish their entitlement?
Nicola Roche: Yes.
Q43 Chairman: So the system would
exclude children of illegal migrants from the Health Service when
the parents went to register them, but not include those same
children in getting access to the Education Service?
Nicola Roche: I think in terms
of registering children, I do not think anyone would want to deny
children getting health treatment and there would no question
of emergency health treatment ever being subject to a card.
Q44 Chairman: But GPs too?
Nicola Roche: In terms of that
we are still working through the detail with the Department of
Health.
Q45 Chairman: But will these issues,
which are quite important, be clear when the Draft Bill is published
or will this all be left to be defined?
Nicola Roche: I think we are still
working through that detail and how much of it will be in the
Draft Bill is still being looked at and clearly we will want to
get it right. In terms of first registering with the GP, the card
being used for education services, that would be for phase 2 and
these are exactly the sort of issues we will want to make sure
are absolutely right before advice goes to Cabinet and then to
Parliament on the ultimate decision.
Q46 Mr Prosser: I want to ask some
questions about the National Identity Register. Have you made
any firm decisions on what information will go into the Register
and, if so, what are they?
Katherine Courtney: The information
that is proposed to be held on the National Identity Register
is simply that information which is required to establish a person's
core identity. So that might include name, date of birth and a
record of certain biometric identifiers. However, the decision
of exactly what is going to be held on the Register is subject
to legislation and, therefore, is really a matter of Parliament.
That decision has not been taken yet.
Q47 Mr Prosser: What measures will
you take to ensure that some sort of fraud does not take place
at that critical moment and therefore undermine the whole issue
of an ID card?
Katherine Courtney: At the moment
of enrolling an individual into the Register?
Q48 Mr Prosser: Yes.
Katherine Courtney: Quite rigorous
security will be built into the system. Just to give some of the
examples; first of all, recording the biometric details of an
individual will enable us to check against other records held
on the Register to ensure that, for instance, a person is not
presenting themselves with a second identity and trying to claim
that they should be issued with a second ID card; secondly, at
the point of first enrolment we will be undertaking a very rigorous
background check on the individual based on the information that
they supply in the application procedure. So that will include
looking at what we call a "biographical footprint" or
where that individual has had contact with other Government departments
in the past. That is not to capture that data into the Register
but simply to verify that individual's existence in the UK. It
is very difficult for somebody to invent a biographical footprint
and so that is a very effective fraud prevention measure in itself.
Q49 Mr Prosser: Will that registration
be linked to the Civil Registration Service? Will there be any
linkage between the two?
Katherine Courtney: We hope to
have a link in that the Civil Registration Service is working
towards electronic records of births, marriages and deaths and
it would certainly be an easy way for us to validate information
that people are presenting to us about their birth date, for instance,
if we were able to check that electronically against the new electronic
registration database, as we know the current paper documentation
for birth certificates etc. is not particularly secure.
Q50 Mr Prosser: You have been using
the expression "biometric footprint" . . .
Katherine Courtney: It was "biographical
footprint".
Q51 Mr Prosser: "Biographical
footprint"? Okay. In regards to the biometrical information
stored in the card, are decisions made on that yet?
Katherine Courtney: Again, no
decision has been taken on precisely what will be stored on the
card or indeed will be recorded on the Register. We have taken
quite a long look at the biometric technology and the current
state of evolution there and we are now embarking on a process
of design, analysis, feasibility testing and technology tests
to look at, in particular, three types of biometrics, which I
am happy to elaborate on if you would like further information.
Would you care for me to speak further about it?
Q52 Mr Prosser: Yes.
Katherine Courtney: The three
that we are evaluating are; a facial biometric, which is effectively
a digital photograph of an individual's face that can then be
matched against other digital photographs in a database; fingerprints,
which is a digital record again of a person's fingerprints; and
iris, which is a photograph effectively of the shape of a person's
iris. These are unique physical identifiers and when captured
in a digital format can be quite easily compared with other similar
records to see whether there is a match or not. We have the UK
Passport Service just about to undertake a pilot of enrolment
looking at all three of those types of biometric recording to
evaluate the robustness of the technology, the enrolment experience
across a sort of representative segment of the UK population to
see what that end-user experience is like.
Q53 Mr Prosser: We are told that
the facial recognition is not a safe enough system. You have not
dismissed that yet?
Katherine Courtney: Facial recognition
in and of itself is not as robust as iris or fingerprint, but
what is important is that we intend to be using more than one
biometric record because that really gives you a very high level
of assurance that the individual being held in the Register and
presenting themself in front of you not only looks like the picture
but also has an identifying physical characteristic that can really
only be unique to them.
Q54 Mr Prosser: We are told that
one in 10,000 people would not be suitable for iris recognition,
but I suppose if you have got two different recognition patterns
. . .
Katherine Courtney: This is why
we are undertaking this stage of intensive testing and analysis.
We have no intention of launching a technology that is not fit
for the purpose and certainly over the coming year we will be
doing feasibility testing and then over the three years set up
of the programme we will be doing rigorous end to end testing
of the whole system to ensure that it is robust and ready for
launch for when first ID cards are introduced.
Q55 Mr Prosser: How will you break
down the possible public resistance to people having their fingerprints
taken and all the connotations and connections with the criminal
world?
Katherine Courtney: I think this
is a matter for public education because the fingerprints are
not being recorded for the purpose of checking them against any
criminal database or any other policing sort of purpose. The purpose
of taking a picture of your fingerprints, taking a picture of
your iris, taking a picture of your face is to record in your
record in the register unique characteristics that if somebody
were to steal your ID card or if you were to lose it, it would
make it virtually impossible for somebody to pass themselves off
as you.
Q56 Mr Prosser: Have you considered
taking samples of DNA?
Katherine Courtney: No, we have
not considered taking samples of DNA.
Mr Prosser: I am not suggesting it.
Chairman: Do not put ideas into their
heads, for goodness sake.
Q57 Mr Prosser: Do not forget what
I said about the open mind. Just taking the various biometrics
you have told us about, could you give us a rough idea of the
cost comparisons and what part will cost play in deciding which
of the elements or which two of the elements you use in the card?
Stephen Harrison: On the costs,
I think there is an equipment cost and we do not see any great
differential between the equipment costs for fingerprinting and
iris at present. I think what you have got to do is look at the
overall cost of the process and the real costs are in the staff
time involved in actually recording the information in the first
place, as much as the cost of the technology that you might install
at various places around the country. So that is one of the reasons
for the Passport Service pilot in that what we will do is look
at the overall process, how long it takes and whether there are
actually any significant differences between how long it takes,
for example, to record iris information against how long it takes
to record fingerprint information. I think that will then go into
the analysis of whether one is better than the other for these
purposes.
Q58 Mr Prosser: When the system is
up and running, have you given any thought to how you will overcome
the problems of the occasional fault where somebody shows their
identity and it does not match up properly through no fault of
their own?
Stephen Harrison: I think that
a lot of this, in terms of one of the reasons for designing the
pilot with the Passport Service, was a study that the National
Physical Laboratory did for us during the consultation exercise
where they recommended that we do this initial set of feasibility
tests. Part of that will involve actually the degree to which
the system reliably recognises, as much as also how you record
the information in the first place. I think if it failed once,
you can sort of try again, as it were. It is a bit like the three
goes on your PIN number before the machine eats your card, but
obviously we would want to ensure that the system was properly
designed and did not produce that level of false rejects.
Q59 Bob Russell: How many of the
existing European Union countries have the ID system?
Nicola Roche: Nearly all. It is
only ourselves, Ireland and Denmark that do not have an ID card
scheme.
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