Examination of Witnesses (Questions 260
- 279)
TUESDAY 10 FEBRUARY 2004
MR MARTIN
HALL, COUNCILLOR
GERALD VERNON-JACKSON
AND MRS
JAN BERRY
Q260 David Winnick: If you are in
favour of an identity card scheme, does that imply that the present
situation as far as security is concerned is not satisfactory?
Mr Hall: We had a long and difficult
discussion, first of all with the Government and then over a court
case, in respect of access to the electoral roll. The industry
would not argue that credit-checking was a particularly suitable
purpose for using electoral information, but at the same time
we argued that there was no other universal, publicly available
system, and therefore the electoral roll was critical if we were
to (a) be able to identify people and (b) lend responsibly by
checking back how much, collectively, the industry is lending
to particular individuals. I think that we would like to remedy
the shortcomings of the electoral roll, which is far from perfect,
and also not be reliant on specifically electoral information
as such that is on a central database. Other countries have various
kinds of central databases which are available for these sorts
of purposes. Not always ID cards; sometimes National Insurance
numbers, or whatever. That was the thinking behind it, however.
Q261 David Winnick: Would you want
the Committee to take the view from your organisation that, in
the absence of any such card scheme, it will make it that much
more difficult for financial security to be regulated? In other
words, that an identity card scheme is essential for the sort
of security which your organisations want?
Mr Hall: Provided we continue
to have access to what we do have, and with continuing co-operation
in areas of fraud between private and public sectors, we would
carry on as we are, using techniques like this [ultra violet lamp]
to check against forged documents—with the losses from fraud
which the industry continues to suffer. Chip and PIN is another
example of how the credit card industry is reacting. It would
probably have done that anyway, because that is not just identity
fraud. There are a whole lot of other types of fraud as well.
So it is an improvement on the present situation and something
which leaves us less dependent on contested sources of confirmatory
information. I am thinking particularly of the electoral roll.
Q262 David Winnick: So you are not
actually waiting anxiously for a scheme which may or may not come
into operation in 10 to 13 years, in order to secure the security
of your customers?
Mr Hall: We are waiting hopefully
rather than anxiously.
Q263 David Winnick: But in the meantime
you are taking the necessary steps?
Mr Hall: Whatever we can, yes.
Q264 David Winnick: Trying to be
even-balanced, if I remember—not the actual words—the
Home Office document said that one of the disadvantages of having
an identity card scheme is that too much reliance could be placed
by financial institutions on that one card, and thereby not using
the various preventive schemes you have at present. Do you accept
that?
Mr Hall: I do not think so. Certainly,
currently there is a system of two checks in terms of verification
of people's identity, for money-laundering purposes. I think that
we should always be interested in other schemes as well, but I
think that this would become the dominant identity check. However,
identity fraud is only one of the sources of damage to the industry,
so I do not think that it is a risk, no.
Q265 David Winnick: Mrs Berry, perhaps
I can now come to you. It is intended, in time, for the card to
be compulsory in the sense that, as we all know, information will
have to be given by individual citizens, but apparently, at least
as it now stands, it will not be necessary for the card to be
carried. Would the police rather have a situation where, if such
a scheme comes into operation, the card is carried by the individual?
Mrs Berry: I think so. All my
colleagues to whom I have spoken—including other federations
in the UK and operational officers—unless it is compulsory,
we do not believe the full benefits of the scheme will actually
become evident. However, we do accept that there are concerns
about it. That is why the Federation of England and Wales have
said that, in the early stages, it should be done on a voluntary
basis, so that any concerns people have can be dealt with at that
stage, before compulsion comes in later. But I believe that the
true benefits will not be seen unless it is a compulsory scheme.
Q266 David Winnick: Perhaps the word
"concern" is an understatement, but that could be the
subject of debate. Would you be pressing the Home Office to go
further than they have so far done? In other words, to do what
you say the police would like, namely that each individual should
carry the card?
Mrs Berry: I think we have said
in our response, and we have said in all of our policies recently,
that we support a compulsory scheme; but, in order for the benefits
to be seen and experienced, then we would support a voluntary
scheme in the first instance. As I have said, I do not think that
the true benefits of any scheme will really become truly evident
until you have a compulsory scheme. It is also true that you will
need to have pilots to justify particular problems. It is still
very early days for the biometrics, although the signs are very
promising. So to bring in those sorts of things compulsorily while
you are still in this test-bed situation would probably be a bit
too soon.
Q267 David Winnick: Nevertheless,
as you say, the police would rather the card was carried, if we
have a card. Would you accept that there was indeed a great deal
of controversy over stop-and-search?
Mrs Berry: I would accept that
there is a lot of publicity about stop-and-search, yes.
Q268 David Winnick: Is there not
a danger that, if the card came about and it was necessary or
was considered necessary by the government of the day that it
should be carried—because, as people have often said since
Mr Blunkett has put forward such ideas, it will escalate into
precisely that—that this will be seen simply as another
stop-and-search, but with a vengeance?
Mrs Berry: No, I do not think
so. I think that it would have the opposite effect. There is probably
more accountability with regard to stop-and-search today than
there ever has been previously. We are now required to record
all stops and record all searches. If there was an identification
card, then each of those could be properly recorded in a less
time-consuming way than is currently the case. If there are discrepancies
and discrimination and any disproportionality identified, it can
be identified far quicker. Any officer who is not stopping for
the right reasons and cannot justify the action they are taking
would be far more evident. I believe it will actually assist this
purpose, and maybe remove some of the headlines that the police
service in general receive about discrimination and the numbers
of searches. We could deal with the people who are not able to
justify their course of action, rather than the broad-brush approach
which currently attacks the whole police service.
Q269 David Winnick: Perhaps understandably,
amongst the most enthusiastic supporters outside Parliament for
an identity card have been the police. What problems are there
about identity which in your view are so essential to be resolved
by an ID scheme?
Mrs Berry: I think that it saves
time on the street where we are having to check identity. Not
everybody we deal with on the street is willing to give us information
in a very timely way. Sometimes we have to take them into custody
and take them back to the police station, and it takes many hours
in custody before they actually tell us who they are. You also
have situations where people are not necessarily in a fit state
to tell us who they are. They might be mentally ill; they might
be drunk; they might be incapable. There are a whole host of different
reasons why we need to check people's identity. Of course, the
worst-case scenario is that you could have a number of dead bodies.
Again, the identification card could assist you with being able
to identify dead bodies. There are a wide variety of times when
we need to check people's identity.
Q270 David Winnick: Would it be right
to say—and obviously you will correct me if I am wrong—that
in the many problems that the police face, day in and day out,
in trying to resolve criminality, identity is not necessarily
by any means the major problem?
Mrs Berry: I think that is a fair
comment.
Q271 David Winnick: One final question,
if I may. The tragedy of Morecambe Bay was raised, as to be expected,
in the House yesterday. The Minister in reply said that, in order
to do the job which led to the tragic deaths of the Chinese, "applicants
have to provide proof of identity, such as the National Insurance
number and photographic identification", before permission
is given to do that sort of work. Even though that was indeed
and is the position, it was simply ignored by those involved—the
gangmasters. Why should we believe that an identity card scheme
would make the slightest difference, leading to such tragedies?
Mrs Berry: At the moment, the
way in which identity can be checked and is checked is varied.
If the identity card scheme was a national scheme, checked on
one database, then it has to be policed more thoroughly. I do
not think that the identity card scheme on its own will resolve
all the immigration problems. On its own, it will not resolve
terrorism and will not resolve criminality, but it can certainly
assist us in our work.
Q272 David Winnick: Without wishing
to put words into your mouth—heaven forbid!—I must
say that what you have just said in conclusion seems to be, "Well,
it will be a help of a kind, but it is not really going to have
a major effect by any means in carrying out the police work, without
the"—
Mrs Berry: No, not at all. I think
that is probably putting too many words into my mouth!
Q273 Chairman: That was a leading
question.
Mrs Berry: As they say in court!
Q274 David Winnick: I was not too
far off the mark though.
Mrs Berry: I do not think that
we should underestimate how much time is spent by police officers,
checking identities. Whilst there are greater priorities, we could
be using that time to far better effect than checking identities.
Q275 Mr Prosser: I want to go back
to the issue of the database itself, starting perhaps with Mr
Hall. You say in your written evidence that the database should
be available for all legitimate users of information to access,
either directly or indirectly. Can you enlarge upon that? Who
do you mean by the legitimate users? I would guess your own association
might come close to the top of the list.
Mr Hall: Almost by definition,
yes.
Q276 Mr Prosser: But, wider than
that, how wide do you think it should be? And what does indirect
access mean?
Mr Hall: To take the second question
first, by "indirect access" we meant access rather like
the access we now have to the electoral roll, which means that
credit reference agencies—two large ones, one smaller one—operating
nationally, gather together, consolidate and then disseminate
the information for a fee. I do not think any lender would be
seeking direct access to that central database. As to legitimate,
it would be—and I am thinking aloud and speaking as an individual
rather than for the association—people who, for lawful purposes,
would find it important to have access to it. The purposes for
which that data could be used would have to be very strictly defined.
The example with our industry is that there is fairly free access
by the credit reference agencies and also reciprocal access to
information in respect of where there are prima facie grounds
for suspecting fraud, for instance, and for the purpose of credit-checking,
but absolutely not for marketing purposes. That is very strictly
laid down. Certainly there is no suggestion, in suggesting that
our access would be legitimate, that we would want it for those
purposes. It would be for identification purposes, which are largely
related to money-laundering; second, for being able to lend responsibly;
and, third, for the purpose of establishing creditworthiness—having
established who the person is and what their credit record is.
Going outside our industry, various government agencies would
want access to it for particular purposes. There may well be many
other people doing different things in the private sector. You
can imagine that there would be many people who would be checking,
say, the identity of directors of companies for one reason or
another. There may well be lots of other purposes that we have
not thought of, where a case would be made for legitimate use;
but I have not assembled in my mind a universe of legitimate users.
It would flow from the purposes for which Parliament saw fit to
limit the use of the data.
Q277 Mr Prosser: You go on to say
that you envisage a database with different categories of information,
maintained by relevant users. Then further you say that it would
be sensible for credit reference agencies to have access to the
centralised database.
Mr Hall: Yes.
Q278 Mr Prosser: Why is that?
Mr Hall: Because establishment
of the identity of someone is the core to it. It is the main purpose
for which the credit reference agency would want it. If, for instance,
someone was going to finance a car, now they would check a driving
licence and would hope to be able to continue to be able to do
that. They would probably continue to do that physically, because
it is the only way you can find out if someone is entitled. If
there was a possible way of doing that via the database through
an agreed gateway, between different parts of the gateway, it
may simplify the process.
Q279 Mr Prosser: Can you tell us
how easy it is for an individual to access his or her own data
on the credit reference agency database?
Mr Hall: They simply have to ask
for it and have a right to receive it on payment of a fee, which
I think is £2. They have an absolute right to have that data
on request.
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