Select Committee on Home Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280 - 299)

TUESDAY 10 FEBRUARY 2004

MR MARTIN HALL, COUNCILLOR GERALD VERNON-JACKSON AND MRS JAN BERRY

  Q280  Mr Prosser: Do you think that agencies like the police should have access to that database?

  Mr Hall: They do have access to that database.

  Q281  Mr Prosser: With or without the knowledge of the individual?

  Mr Hall: I would have to confirm the answer to that question.

  Q282  Chairman: You can write to us afterwards. That would be helpful.

  Mr Hall: Yes, I will do that.[1]


  Q283  Mr Prosser: Mr Vernon-Jackson, you talked about bringing the database a little closer to home, perhaps allowing local authorities to administer it. What is your thinking? In non-unitary authorities are you talking about shire counties or district councils? Why would that be better for the individual?

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: I think that there are several issues. One of the issues is around people's fear about central government and the use they would put it to; and they are slightly less frightened of us than they are of you—because we are nicer and we just collect the rubbish, and things like that. So people may be happier about giving us local information. Also, people are more used to coming into offices within their local towns, or whatever. It is probably something that would need to be done at county, unitary and met—London borough—level. District councils may be able to do some of the collecting but not holding of data, I expect, just because some of the district councils are really very small in terms of their staffing levels. There would need to be discussion about whether the work that local authorities could do would be about collecting information, collecting data and collecting biometrics on people, and then accessing centrally held data, or whether the data would be held locally. I think that there are arguments on both sides, if I am honest.

  Q284  Mr Prosser: I will not argue with you over the issue of whether the individual trusts local government or national government more or less, but do you not think that there is the other argument: that people would be more relaxed about having all this information, this access, at a central level rather than a chap round the corner, who might be known to you?

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: I think that there are arguments on both sides. There is an argument that says that the stuff which is held centrally in London will not be able to be accessed by people you know, but there is also then the fear of what central government might do with that in terms of people's privacy and the fear of the Big Brother of government. What we would mainly be able to do, and the skill that we have, is about the collecting of data and verifying people's biometrics and so on, and issuing cards or whatever—just because we have offices all round local authority areas.

  Q285  Mr Prosser: But could that not be a problem with security as well? So many offices, so many councils, and so many opportunities for leakage of security?

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: In terms of collecting data, if the aim, as I understand the Home Office's aim, is to try to look at national security issues and issues of illegal immigration, and so it is about being able to identify those people—those 10% of people we do not collect on other databases—it seems to me that you have to make it as easy as possible for people to be able to come and give information, when they are moving, about who they are, et cetera, and reissue cards with new addresses. You will have to make it extremely easy. That is where the large number of offices, connected through the internet, would be useful. The decision about whether the data should be held locally or centrally, now that computers have the ability to talk to each other, is probably less of an important issue—just because people can exchange information so quickly between different computers.

  Q286  Mr Prosser: You reminded us in your earlier evidence today that something like 40% of the population of London moves every year.

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: That is 40% on the electoral register, and we know that we do not by any means hit everybody on the electoral register. So it is probably a higher proportion.

  Q287  Mr Prosser: So on that basis of a locally controlled database you would, in some areas, be changing nearly half of those identities and their stats every year?

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: Yes. It is a vast operation, but if this is what central government asks us to do, I am sure we will help as much as we can, as long as there is the money to do it.

  Mr Prosser: Leave it to us.

  Q288  Chairman: Could I follow that point by asking—and this is a very naïve question, obviously—how essential is the address information on the database, compared with the other elements of identification? I am presumably John Denham, whether I am living at my current address or a different one, and could be identified by a biometric. What is the essential reason why we must have an up-to-date address on the card?

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: I do not want people claiming housing benefit in more than one address.

  Mrs Berry: Clearly we need to know where people are coming from and where we can get in contact with them in the future. I recognise that the address part is probably the part which will need changing more often than anything else—which is where the cost comes in.

  Q289  Chairman: There is a difficulty in getting these addresses up to date, which is the problem of getting people to register for the electoral register and so on. Do they invalidate the reasons for the card? If people are carrying cards whose addresses were not necessarily up to date, would that matter? Presumably with housing benefit one can simply say, "If your card is not up to date, you are not going to be able to claim housing benefit on your new address". So you could sort of force compliance. With people on the streets, the police cannot necessarily.

  Mrs Berry: It does not invalidate the parts around identity theft, where that takes place. The address is not the all-important part of identity theft. I think that it goes back to the point you were making earlier on. We are dealing very often with the very edges here. 90% of the people would be quite happy to carry it; they would be quite happy to update it. It is the people who fall into that other 5 to 10%, who are more likely to be moving around and who are more likely not to turn up when they should do for bail, or court, or something else. The address will be more important for those than probably for the other people.

  Q290  Bob Russell: I will put the first question to the Police Federation, continuing with the cost theme. Any critics of ID cards have argued that they are not cost-effective and that the money could be better spent on, for example, the police. What is your response to the argument of those who say we should spend more money on the police and not on ID cards?

  Mrs Berry: We are always very grateful for any money that is spent on us. Police officers on the street are really important but they also need technology to assist them to do their job. We do need to check that the people we have in front of us are the right people. So police officers are important, but you need to be able to check identity as well.

  Q291  Bob Russell: The next question is to Mr Vernon-Jackson. You have mentioned the cost to local authorities of being able to access the central database. In your view, what would be an acceptable level? Incidentally, I should point out that, in Colchester, I am trusted.

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: I am sure you are, Bob. If this is about a database that is about saving public money, then I would expect that central government would allow us access for free. For instance, housing benefit money is passed down from central government and then given out via local authorities. So I would expect there to be resistance to a fee per use. I would expect this to be a project which is trying to save public money, irrespective of whether it is central government money or local authority money. In some councils 75% of the money they spend comes from central government anyway, in terms of grant. So if you are going to ask us to pay for every time we use it, you are just recycling money back to central government that originally came to you, and you would have to give us a bigger grant in the first place. What we would ask for would be a free system for public good.

  Q292  Bob Russell: Surely nowadays local government is merely a branch office of central government anyway?

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: In some things it is undoubtedly true that we are an agency for central government, but there are some discretions still allowed by central government in terms of things that we provide. I am sure that local people value the fact that in some places—in Colchester—you may choose to do something differently than in Southampton, and that would reflect the needs, aspirations and wishes of your local communities.

  Q293  Bob Russell: In terms of exchange of financial information and public information, you have indicated that it is all public money. Could you not argue that, in the same way as Barclays Bank does not expect its branches—at least I assume they do not—to pay for information they get from their central database, in local government you should not be expected to pay for the central charges of central government?

  Councillor Vernon-Jackson: I am happy to argue that.

  Q294  Bob Russell: There is no fee for that advice! My final question is to Mr Hall. How much would you be prepared to pay to be able to verify identity through an ID card scheme?

  Mr Hall: I have not asked my members, who would of course be the people who pay. The fact is that you would hope that the credit reference agencies would have less work and less difficult work to do to create the databases, and they should therefore be able to charge less to their customers, leaving some saving. You would hope too that there would be less fraud and therefore less loss through fraud and less work on detecting fraud. So there should be some savings to the industry. There are 100-150 million checks, we reckon. I guess you would be talking about a small number of pence per use, provided that payment was accepted by industry at large. I think that if there was a pattern of paying for use of the database, our industry would be part of that and there would be some revenue from it. At the same time, the database would be quite heavily dependent on use of the databases the credit reference agencies themselves gathered. So they would be able to give quid pro quo there. I would expect that we would be contributors to the cost.

  Q295  Bob Russell: You have mentioned the very large number of checks that are being made already. How many ID card readers do you think your members require and, in total, the state would need for all its outlets for which they would need ID checks?

  Mr Hall: I was reserving our position on card readers. If it was a very simple matter—something like a credit card reader—probably most outlets would have them. If the UV lights are anything to go by, we distributed 28,000 to motor dealers, who are all in the process—

  Q296  Bob Russell: If I may just interrupt you, the whole object of these identity cards is that they are going to be biometric. They are going to scan the iris, they are going to have a fingerprint. That is not a simple checker.

  Mr Hall: But whether individual businesses felt it worth their while to have biometric readers would depend on the cost of doing that. It is a simple cost issue.

  Q297  Bob Russell: Perhaps I could press this. Has your organisation thought about how many checkers it will need?

  Mr Hall: We have not got into that degree of consultation, because we do not yet know what sort of thing it will be. I imagine the people who handle a high volume of queries might well find it worth having checkers; but whether every garage and every shop that issued a loan did would be a matter of cost.

  Q298  Chairman: Could I follow that up with the Police Federation? NAFIS, the on-line fingerprint recognition scheme, has cost tens of millions of pounds and is not yet available in every single police station. You suggested earlier that the police would need operationally some form of handheld or at least mobile devices to check the biometrics. Does the technology for that currently exist and, secondly, do we know what the cost of providing that in an effective operational form would be?

  Mrs Berry: The answer to the first part, I am told, is yes, it does. I believe there are a variety of trial schemes.

  Q299  Chairman: Is this based on fingerprints or the iris scan?

  Mrs Berry: Both, is my understanding. The cost of it is not within my knowledge. I think that the iris has not been tried and tested in this country although, to my knowledge, it has been in other countries. The fingerprint part, as I understand it, even going down to a nightclub in Essex has been extremely successful. The other example we put in our evidence was in north Somerset, where it is combined with pin numbers to assist identification. So my understanding is that the technology is there. To fit it into some of the mobile data machines that the service has currently would not be difficult. I think that the difficult part is the co-ordination and the compatibility of the whole system.


1   See Ev 188-190. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004
Prepared 30 July 2004