Examination of Witnesses (Questions 620
- 639)
TUESDAY 4 MAY 2004
RT HON
DAVID BLUNKETT
MP, MR DESMOND
BROWNE MP, KATHERINE
COURTNEY AND
STEPHEN HARRISON
Q620 David Winnick:—If I may
interrupt, Home Secretary, no one is asking for guarantees because
guarantees do not work in this world but any sort of reassurance
that this would really undermine international terrorists who
will use every form of entry into the country if they are not
here legally in order to carry out the attacks?
Mr Blunkett: To use your words,
any way at all, yes I do believe that. I have also made it clear
this afternoon and it is on the record (I did an interview with
John Humphries on 14 September 2001) that whilst I believe that
such a card and register would help, it would not resolve the
terrorist threat; it cannot. It can make a contribution, which
is precisely what the head of the security service is saying,
not simply because of the importance of the register and the fact
that we would have a system that was verifiable but also because
terrorist networks do go for weaker targets. The weaker we are,
the less we are up-to-date with what is taking place across the
rest of the world, the changes that they will be bringing in,
the more vulnerable we become.
Chairman: Mr Cameron?
Q621 Mr Cameron: Do you think there
is a danger that those in favour of ID cards can fall into a sort
of excuse culture of saying, "There is a problem with illegal
working but we are going to use ID cards to deal with it. There
is a problem with illegal immigration but we are going to use
ID cards to deal with it," rather than getting to grips with
the issue itself?
Mr Blunkett: There is undoubtedly
a danger if people believe that ID cards themselves and the register
itself solves the problem. I have never claimed that. I have always
said that it will be a tool, a means to an end, and that the other
actions we need to take in terms of overcoming illegal working,
organised fraud and the rest of it that draw down on services
to which people are not entitled, all that has to go along in
parallel. It would be of assistance but it would not in itself
be a panacea for all those ills.
Q622 Mr Cameron: Those of us who
are sceptical just listening to evidence sessions today and other
evidence sessions believe that finding benefits of the ID card
is like nailing jelly to the ceiling. Just when you think you
have got a benefit and you think it is about terrorism suddenly
it shifts and we are on to crime or illegal working. The last
point we have heard from Mr Browne is that it is the database
and being able to check against the database rather than the card.
If we take the case of illegal working is not the problem at the
moment nobody is checking? How many prosecutions have there been
in the last few years for illegal working?
Mr Blunkett: Partly because it
is difficult for employers to check, partly because those inspecting
and following through on enforcement have difficulty in proving
that the employer did not take under the section 8 of the 1996
Act steps within the bounds of what is available to them at the
moment to check whether the person was bona fide. The difference
with a clean database and the ID system that we are putting forward
is that there would be one clear, verifiable, reliable way of
doing that and employers would not be able to say that they did
not have it at their disposal.
Q623 Mr Cameron: Would you not have
the case of people saying, "I have only been here three months,"
or, "I have lost my card," or, "The dog has eaten
it," or, "The database is wrong," or, "I am
sorry, you will have to go and check." The last time we had
ID cards there were half a million people who claimed to have
lost their cards.
Mr Blunkett: Yes, but no one would
be able to claim they had lost their card and could not renew
it simply by presenting themselves and having the verification
of their specific biometric identifier to check that they are
on the register and have a fresh card issued. None of "the
dog has eaten this" or "the cat has messed on that"
would hold up for more than a few days. In terms of the question
you have put to me about employers, the employer would still have
to require them to identify themselves whether they had a renewed
card or not. If they have been here for less than three months
they would be registered in terms of the right to work if they
came from outside the EU and they would have to have a work permit
to do so. The reason I am not saying that ID cards is solely for
security in terms of terrorism, organised crime, illegal employment,
illegal entry and residence, draw down on services to which people
are not entitled and have not paid is because it is precisely
going to contribute in its own way to all those things. The fact
that it contributes to all but not to one so significantly that
it eliminates it does not in any way reduce the validity of the
card.
Q624 Chairman: Could I pursue one
point for clarification. Home Secretary, you said those who are
here for less than three months have to be registered if they
are working. Are you saying if somebody presents themselves within
the first three months when they are in the country even though
they would not have an EU card they would in some way have to
give biometric information about themselves so that they were
added to the register so they could not pop up somewhere else
two months later?
Mr Blunkett: There would be two
things. Firstly, if they are from outside the EU and EEA area
they would actually have to have a work permit if they were working.
If they are from inside the EEA area then, of course, under the
proposals that apply to accession countries they would register
for work.[2]
If they were coming for a short term from Europe that would apply
after three months, they would register as an EU National and
the ID card, instead of the piece of paper that we now give them,
would become their registration.
Q625 Mr Cameron: That is really what
I am saying. If you have to have a work permit, is not the problem
that we are not checking enough people's work permits? Have you
done any analysis of the enormous costs of an ID card system against
a modest investment in more people checking whether people have
a work permit?
Mr Blunkett: I do not believe
we are talking about an enormous cost, I think we are talking
about a steady state of around 200 million a year. The accumulated
13 years' roll-up of everything obviously frightens people to
death and, in retrospect, perhaps that figure has misled people.
In my view, the actual steady state is a very reasonable way,
taken alongside biometric passports, because let me make it clear
that I would not be advocating this if it were not that we were
going to have to engage for international travel with biometric
identifiers in passports and visas to ensure that those documents
are secure and, therefore, be able to run the ID card and the
secure register alongside that aspect which in itself will be
the expense that has to be incurred by us whether we go for ID
cards or not.
Q626 Mr Clappison: Home Secretary,
going back to the point of terrorism, I think the way you have
put it today is that you are not looking for guarantees or panaceas
but you see this identity card as an important help in the fight
against terrorism. I think in your consultation paper you refer
to this as being "vital" in order to help deal with
the threat of global terrorism. We have to take that seriously
if you are saying that to us, but would you accept that it might
strike some people as strange that if you are making the case
that it is very important to have identity cards to deal with
terrorism, it is going to take such a long time to bring this
project in and for identity cards to be compulsorily required.
On the timescale which you have told us about, identity cards
will not begin to be issued until 2007 and it would only be in
something like 2013 that significant numbers of people will have
them, but even then they will not be compulsory, and under your
scheme it is at that stage that we will begin to have a debate
on whether they should be compulsory or not. That is an awfully
long time ahead, is it not? Is that not somewhat strange given
that it is said to be vital to have them to fight against terrorism?
Mr Blunkett: Let me take it in
two parts. I am very happy to deal with the issue of incremental
introduction. Across political parties and politicians of all
persuasions there is an understanding of how vulnerable we are
if we do not take the necessary steps that are required and, in
my view, there is quite widespread understanding across political
parties of this. Take one quote that I would simply put on the
record for you. I do it because I think it is important to recognise
the universality of this point. The quote is: "Britain is
the easiest country in Western Europe in which criminals and terrorists
lose themselves. If we are serious about tackling this problem
there is one obvious remedy: identity cards." That was said
by the now Leader of the Opposition just three years ago and I
agree with him. I agree with him because as we build up this database
and as we issue the cards, we gradually, incrementally, secure
ourselves bit by bit. The reason it is incremental is, firstly,
because I know of no technology that could allow us to do a big
bang approach, ie that we could introduce it in three or even
five years' time in one go. Secondly, because I think we have
learnt the lessons, and goodness me there are enough of them from
governments of all persuasions over the last 20 years, that technology,
because it is a moving beast and because of its complexity, is
extremely difficult to implement and if you are going to implement
a substantial scheme you need to make sure you get it right. I
share the public's belief that the most challenging part of this
programme is to get it right. Having, in my own Department, a
recent history of having to learn firstly from what happened with
the computer at Croydon from 1996 and then the UK passports difficulty
and then the Criminal Records Bureau, all of which are now correct
and working properly, we need to make sure that we do learn those
lessons so we get it right. Finally, in doing so we are able to
take people with us, so because we are using the parallel process
of biometrics for passports we can renew the passport and issue
the card, we can take the biometric for the passport and use it
for the clean database and the card and we can do so in a way
which is acceptable in a democracy in terms of the speed and the
compliability of the population. I happen to believe that once
we have got this up and running, as with the pilot for biometrics
that we announced a week ago, people will queue up for it and
we will have to deal with the flow and the flood of people wanting
it much earlier, wanting to renew their passport and get an ID
card very fast. That is my belief, but I cannot work on that belief,
I have got to work on a system which is manageable, and that is
why it is taking a time.
Q627 Mr Clappison: That will be for
the people who actually want to have one of these ID cards, it
will not have the full coverage so it will not give you the security
that you will be looking for against potential evil doers, will
it?
Mr Blunkett: We have talked about
moving to 80% of the economically active population and at that
point delivering to Parliament a report on the technology, on
the acceptability, on the financing and on the purposes and then
being able to move to an affirmative order rather than having
a whole session of Parliament to have to deal with the question
of making this mandatory and, therefore, the registration compulsory.
We believe that at the point that I have just described Parliament
would wish to do it, and I hope that I am right. I certainly believe
that we will then be able to implement the remaining phase which
is for those who do not have a passport, who have not renewed
or who have not wished to take up the card that they would not
have to have. At that point it would be manageable technically,
process-wise and in terms of public acceptability.
Chairman: I am sure you will be pleased
to know, Home Secretary, that some of us at least are going along
to have our irises scanned on Thursday to see how the procedure
actually works.
Q628 Mrs Dean: How confident are
you that your registration procedure will ensure that all entries
on the National Identity Register are accurate and there are no
duplicates or false entries?
Mr Blunkett: The reason why starting
from scratch and having a clean database is so important is that
the moment someone presents the same biometric but with a different
identity, a different name and presentation, that would automatically
show up as already existing on the database. It would automatically
trigger, if you like, just as even low level technology systems,
like ANPR in terms of car registration do at the moment, on a
central database. One of the other reasons why I do not believe
that this scheme could ever have been put forward before is that
even as late as the mid-1990s when the previous government were
considering the issues around ID, the technology did not exist
to be able to do just that.
Q629 Mrs Dean: What sort of details
will you be looking for as part of the "biographical footprint"?
How will you check if they are correct?
Mr Blunkett: We have got the three
known biometrics but we have not gone firm on a decision as to
which of those, or more than one, should be used. There are discussions
taking place in North America and in Europe now about moving to
biometrics in relation to visa and passport requirements and we
are arguing that we should keep the door open so that it is not
closed to using a combination. A chip in the future will be able
to cope with that and it is very important that we do not have
a situation where we make a choice that is not compatible in terms
of other world developments but also that those world developments
do not close down our ability to make a choice of our own internally
which would still remain compatible. Did you want to add?
Mr Browne: I just wanted to reinforce
what you are saying, Home Secretary, by saying that while we have
not yet decided exactly what checks we will make, and that is
something that we will need to trial as well—Part of the
reason why this is going to take such a time in our view is that
we need to trial a significant number of steps in the process
and a lot of them involve interaction with the people and we need
to test in collecting the biometric information how the public
will react to it, how long it will take us to deal with individual
people and what that will cost apart from anything else, which
is a subject we may well get on to subsequently in this session.
We have not yet made up our minds exactly what we will check but
we do have the Glasgow Passport Service pilot to call on where
we checked against credit references, with people's consent, National
Insurance numbers and the DVLA. We have improved our ability to
be able to check against the possible abuse of using dead people's
identities by collecting information from the registration process
into our system. We have some experience of doing that.
Mr Blunkett: I think you will
be quite familiar with dead identities from your previous job.
Mr Browne: We have some experience
of doing that and we will build upon that. One of the big advantages
that we have with this database, which will be helpful for all
the purposes we have been discussing, is that we can hold this
information forever and even after people are dead people will
not be able to come and assume their identities because that information
will be held there, it being a clean database and moving forward.
Can I say something quickly in response to the two comments that
were made by Mr Clappison and Mr Cameron. The point Mr Clappison
makes is a point which is consistently made, which is that this
is of no use against the baddies until we get compulsion. In fact,
that is one of the reasons why we intend to build on the existing
documentation, the passports and driving licences. I am certain
from my previous professional experience that baddies both have
passports and driving licences. 80% of people in this country
are documented. By definition, we will pick up a significant number
of people who may have bad thoughts or bad intentions by building
on the existing documentation and putting them into the system,
whether they like it or not, if they want their passports and
driving licences. The second point I would make to you is I went
through a very similar process to this in Northern Ireland when
we were seeking to get photographic identification to secure the
election and we discovered that the people who did not have existing
secure photographic identification tended not to be the sorts
of people who may have taken advantage of the existing system
but they tended to be the elderly, not to be people who were active
and about but people who we probably would want to have—
Q630 Chairman: I am sorry, we will
come back to this later.
Mr Browne: In relation to Mr Cameron's
point about—
Chairman: I am sorry, I would like Mrs
Dean to carry on. We do need to move through the questions and
the Home Secretary was able to answer those.
Q631 Mrs Dean: What estimates have
you made of the numbers of registration centres you will need?
Mr Blunkett: I am not giving a
number at the moment. They would have to be accessible. We believe
that there needs to be mobility. In terms of being able to provide
mobile provision we are very mindful that we need specific support
and help for the frail and those who would not be able to reach
a centre and obviously we would have to make special arrangements
with rural areas. Given that the process in future can be made
as easy as having to take your photograph for the passport that
we all hold at the moment, we believe that this should not be
a problem.
Q632 Mrs Dean: Thank you. In addition
to the National Identity Register, there are plans for a Citizen
Information Project. Departments and public bodies, such as the
NHS, have their own separate databases. Can you be confident that
they will all be maintained to the necessary standard?
Mr Blunkett: The CIP—and
I know Len Cook has been giving evidence to you about this—is
about bringing together existing information. The reason why we
are convinced that we have to have a clean database and start
from scratch is that simply drawing together existing material,
albeit that it can be used for back-up verification of identity,
and will be, would be unsatisfactory because you would pull into
the system mistakes and fraudulent identities that already existed.
Whilst it can run alongside and whilst in the interim it would
be helpful, they are two entirely different operations.
Q633 Mrs Dean: The Office of National
Statistics told us that it will not be possible to eliminate all
multiple identities on the population register and their records
will need to be authenticated from the National Identity Register.
So each of you expects to rely on the other. Is that an example
of the potential for muddle and confusion?
Mr Blunkett: They will be complementary.
Obviously this is something that has got to be worked through
because the Citizen Information Project was a glint in the eye
of the ONS long before people thought, believed, or were led to
believe, that Government would actually take on the issue of a
biometric ID card system and it was not all that long ago that
I kept reading that we were not going to be doing it, it had all
been overturned. I can understand why they had progressed in that
way but obviously they will be able to draw down for a complete
clean-up of the system from the ID Register, from the database,
once we have completed it.
Q634 Chairman: Can I be quite clear,
Home Secretary. If I have successfully assumed a fake identity
in this country, obtained a National Insurance number, somebody
else's name, and perhaps I had done this a few years ago, can
you be absolutely sure that I would not be wrongly issued with
an identity card and able to register on the National Identity
Register?
Mr Blunkett: It would be possible
for you to be issued an ID card on the identity that, to use your
words, you had assumed some years ago, but that would be your
identity for the rest of your life coming in or going out of the
country. You would have adopted by your own actions an identity
that you could not change.
Q635 Chairman: Will that put a premium
on people establishing false identities in the next few years
before the register comes into play?
Mr Blunkett: As we are moving,
firstly, to ensure that people coming into the country—we
had a long discussion about this earlier this afternoon—would
be issued with a card, whatever method of entry they came by if
they were staying and, secondly, that we are using the passport
renewal system to engage with identity, I think it would be the
opposite. I think people who have adopted a false identity will
either return home or they had better get on to their true identity
pretty quickly otherwise they are going to find themselves in
a real mess in terms of what it is they think they have done to
establish what would be an identity for life, including their
family, their heritage and any other relationship they have outside
this country, including inheritance.
Mr Browne: It is also the case,
of course, that background checks can go back quite far. There
is absolutely no reason why background checks cannot go back quite
significantly in the records and we have been discussing other
government records that exist that can be checked, subject to
the frailties of it. The important thing about this process is
that if somebody takes an actual identity and does not make one
up, but takes an actual identity, as the register builds progressively
their chances of getting away with that will be reduced and eventually
they will be discovered, and they may be discovered sooner rather
than later.
Q636 Mr Clappison: Can I ask you
about the costings of this because your officials giving evidence
to the Committee in December refused to be more precise about
the costs of the scheme except to say that they would be between
1.3 billion and 3.1 billion, which may strike people as being
a rather wide range. Is there any reason why you cannot give more
details about that?
Mr Blunkett: The figures that
were given at that time related to the nature of the scope of
the card and what was going to be required from it, particularly
usages. If we take the figure, and I repeat this is the roll-up
over the 13 years, then we do so in a way that does not allow
us, ie all of us, to be ripped off by people being able to get
into the detail before that commercial competition has taken place.
Perhaps I can just spell out what we have done so that people
can see that we take seriously the need to engage the commercial,
the expert sector in this and to build up a picture of the total
costs and to ensure that we get the best possible price for what
we are asking. In May 2002, as I was moving towards making the
first statement in the consultation to Parliament in early July,
we started to engage with the private sector on a confidential
basis. We have built up that relationship since then, and you
are familiar with this because our officials have given evidence
about it, in terms of the process that has been undertaken with
the umbrella body. They would not describe themselves as representatives
but they have got over 1,000 component parts in the Intellect
group and we have been working with them. As part of their recommendations
and as part of going through zero gateway we agreed to develop
a development partner, which will be done this month, and will
hold a seminar on 24 May with the sector to try to ensure that
we now bottom this once and for all in terms of the ongoing costs,
the technology that is known to be available, the challenges and
the pitfalls. With a private development partner, which again
has been done under proper competition rules, and this partner
will not be seeking to win contracts, so they have won a contract
to be the partner, they will not seek to be a contractor, they
will be able to advise and helps us. That is a crucial part of
ensuring that we get the final costings right given what we are
demanding from the scheme. Of course, it can be as cheap or as
dear as you like in terms of what you are requiring of it.
Q637 Mr Clappison: Perhaps Mr Browne
would be the right person to ask this question of. As far as you
can say, what exactly is going to be included in the costing which
you have just given? Does the costing include, for example, the
biometric readers and equipment which is going to be installed
in other Government departments, such as the Department for Work
and Pensions, the Health Service and so forth?
Mr Blunkett: It does not,[3]
and the reason it does not, and this is another reason why taking
this incrementally makes sense, is having made the decision, and
it is only recently that we have decided this, to publish the
draft Bill and to indicate that we will legislate and we are serious
in going forward on this—it has taken me two years of very
constructive discussion to get to this point—we are now
in a position to say to department agencies and to the private
sector that you will over the next ten years be in a position
where if you choose to do so, or if we designate a service to
do so, the technology that you are using for other purposes should
now be presumed to have an appropriate reader for your proposes,
depending on what it is. As with the Minister of State, who I
think gave evidence to you last week, we would have a situation
where as the electronic medical record programme is developed
across the whole of the NHS, that it is done so in a way that
the equipment they are using and the computers that they are operating
can also build in this facility. That will be true of JobCentres,
that will be true of GP practices, it will be true of the commercial
sector. We are giving fair warning that we will be developing
over the next few years the capacity of everyone to be able to
build in. I think this would be a tremendous opportunity commercially
in this country if we were ahead of the rest of Europe and North
America. We know they are moving in the same direction and what
a tremendous piece of enterprise and innovation can now be offered
by British companies and by us in terms of delivering a set market
for them to be able to determine their likely take-up, to be ahead
of the game, and I hope that British enterprise will rise to the
occasion.
Q638 Mr Clappison: I do not want
to probe you too much on some of the constructive discussions
which you have had with other Government departments, and I know
you cannot give precise details of them, but do you expect that
the card readers which there will be in other departments and
other Government organisations will be reading cards or biometrics?
Do you have a view on that?
Mr Blunkett: I think it depends
on their particular level of identification required. Where there
is absolute security required then it is important that they are
able to read the biometric and not just the card. For other purposes,
people would be quite satisfied to take alongside a credit card
or whatever the card itself to be read. I think both the services
and the commercial enterprises, who have great use of this, need
to think this through and make decisions as to what level of verification
they actually required.
Q639 Mr Clappison: Are you proposing
to have any further public debate, technical debate, about the
architecture of the system?
Mr Blunkett: Yes. Part of the
process to be launched on 24 May is to be able to open this up,
so all the experts, all the backroom experts, all the people who
think they know it all, and I certainly do not, will be able to
place their potential as well as their doubts on the table. I
think this is going to be a really crucial three years ahead in
getting this right.
2 Note by witness: This reference to the accession
countries means the 8 Central and Eastern European states and
does not include Cyprus and Malta. Back
3
Note by witness: Meaning the costs referred to in Q 636. Back
|
