4. Memorandum submitted by
Asylum Aid
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Asylum Aid is an independent, national
charity providing free legal advice and representation combined
with policy work and campaigning for the fair treatment of refugees
in the UK. We have over twelve years experience in this field.
1.2 The Refugee Women's Resource Project
is an arm of Asylum Aid. This project, which includes a dedicated
team of researchers, focuses on the situation of refugee women.
1.3 This submission is specifically prepared
in response to the Home Affairs Committee's invitation (Inquiry
into Asylum Applications). Where appropriate, we have given recent
examples. Nevertheless, unless otherwise stated, our observations
are based upon our experience.
MAIN SUBMISSION
What are the reasons for the rise in asylum applications
over the last 10 years?
2.1 A detailed analysis is beyond the scope
of this submission and the expertise of Asylum Aid. However, we
would offer the following observations.
2.2 The end of the Cold War, collapse of
the Soviet Union and opening up of Eastern Europe over the period
has undoubtedly eased the freedom of movement of persons both
within Europe and more generally across the globe.
2.3 As for rises during particular years,
these can be seen to be directly related to particular conflicts
and instabilities. Thus 1998 saw a substantial rise in applications
from former Yugoslavia (to 7,980), the numbers of which peaked
in 1999 (14,180) and have fallen substantially year on year since
then (2,685 in 2002). This coincides with a substantial year on
year decline in applications from European nationals (28,280 in
1999; 13,630 in 2002).
2.4 Applications from Africa, however, have
most recently risen in each of the last two years (from 17,920
to 29,805); a significant reason being the corresponding rise
in applications from Zimbabwe (from 1,010 to 7,695). The region
that has most contributed to the rise in applications over the
last four years is the Middle East (from 2,785 to 18,735); as
applications from Iraq have risen (from 1,800 to 14,940).
2.5 Discounting the rise from these two
countries, asylum application numbers in 2002 (72,050) are similar
to 2001 (71,365) and 1999 (71,160), and substantially below those
for 2000 (80,315).
How adequately and fairly are asylum applications
managed today? How did the backlog arise? Is it being dealt with
satisfactorily?
3.1 Happily the backlog has been significantly
reduced. However, it is not being dealt with satisfactory. The
Home Office effort has been disproportionately targeted towards
new initiatives and new applications. This has meant that significant
numbers of individuals, whose applications are outstanding from
2000 and previous, are subjected to increased delay.
We are aware of asylum applications that
continue to remain pending after several years. In one instance,
the decision to refuse was not served for over four years.
3.2 We believe that a significant cause
of backlogs in the asylum process has been the habitual overhaul
of process over the period, including four Acts (1993, 1996, 1999
and 2002). Constant change, and ever increasing complexity, in
the system can only reduce the effectiveness of those charged
with its management; as was dramatically the case in October 2000
when the Home Office was unprepared for new human rights grounds
of appeal.
3.3 A further, substantial cause of delay,
compounded by the foregoing, is the inability of the Home Office
to manage coinciding applications: eg asylum and marriage applications.
This both causes delay in the particular case and unnecessarily
ties up resources that could be expended on other applications.
We are aware of instances where applications
(based on marriage or policy concessions) are effectively ignored,
despite continued lengthy delay at the Home Office, and an appeal
is needlessly required.
3.4 The care with which asylum applications
are handled and decided remains poor. The Home Office target for
its limited monthly monitoring of refusal decisions, is that 80%
should be "satisfactory". It is deplorable that a failure
rate of one in five should be considered adequate. Moreover, our
experience continues to be that refusal letters habitually disclose
gross misstatements of the application's details or the country
information (including contradictions with the Home Office's own
assessments); and of significant numbers of erroneous refusals
for non-compliance.
We are aware of instances where refusal letters
contain serious errors; and in one case two contradictory refusal
letters have been issued simultaneously.
3.5 The application and pre-decision process
has become increasingly inaccessible. The Home Office enquiry
line (INEB) and Asylum Screening Unit (ASU) are particularly unsatisfactory;
a considerable number of practitioners have raised similar complaints
with us. INEB, even when the caller gets through, now appears
incapable of offering any useful information. ASU is slow, insensitive
and increasingly likely to be the cause of complaint, litigation
and cost as its enquiries delve deeper into the substance of asylum
claims; an enquiry it had expressly disavowed.
3.6 There continue to be grave inadequacies
with the processing of women's asylum applications. Unlike the
Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA), the Home Office has failed
to adopt gender guidelines; and despite limited improvement the
Home Office country evidence is inadequate in treating information
on women's situations as an afterthought. The Home Office continues
to refuse to guarantee women interpreters and interviewers, if
requested, despite acknowledging the importance of an all female
environment (eg in cases involving sexual abuse) and despite the
prospect of imminent removal before appeal for those subject to
the non-suspensive process.
How adequately is support provided to asylum seekers
by NASS?
4.1 NASS continues to be woefully inaccessible
and prone to error; this despite pledges by the Minister that
there would be "a significant difference" this year.
These grave concerns are now compounded by the sweeping powers
the department enjoys to potentially refuse support to large numbers
of asylum seekers.
4.2 The ability of an asylum seeker to adequately
pursue an application/appeal is inevitably linked to whether support
and housing is available; and whether meaningful contact with
representatives can be maintained. Asylum seekers wrongly treated
as "end of line" with support terminated, and others
dispersed mid-process, are all too common. This substantially
interferes with the asylum seeker's and representatives' ability
to adequately pursue an application/appeal.
We are aware of several instances where NASS
support has been wrongly terminated, and in one instance of correspondence
being ignored over a period of 8 months while an asylum seeker,
eligible for support, has been dependent upon family members themselves
supported by NASS.
4.3 The lack of an official complaints procedure
compounds the lack of accountability, This, and inaccessibility,
are exacerbated by the highly centralized nature of the department.
We would welcome the establishment of regional NASS offices as
an opportunity to significantly improve accessibility and accountability.
4.4 NASS particularly fails the most vulnerable.
For these (eg the mentally ill, children, trafficking victims,
women in violent relationships), sudden and wrong termination
or dispersal can be disastrous because any established environment
in which the asylum seeker is able to disclose details of the
claim is immediately destroyed.
4.5 Another route towards improving accountability,
and thereby performance, of NASS would be to extend the powers
of the Asylum Support Adjudicators to hear appeals and - as important
- to enforce their determinations.
How appropriately is detention used in respect
of asylum applicants?
5.1 We note, with grave concern, the increasing
tendency to detain children, women and pregnant asylum seekers.
We have raised with the Minister, and received little comfort,
our serious concerns regarding the safety of women and children
in detention, who may be detained with historical or future abusers.
We are firmly of the view that there remains insufficient regard
to detainees' safety.
5.2 Generally the use of detention is arbitrary.
Frequently, detention is used when there is nothing in an individual's
immigration history to indicate a risk of absconding; or when
there is no real prospect of removal in the foreseeable future.
The practice of requiring sureties in all cases produces an effective
bar upon bail, regardless of whether the detainee has any reasonable
prospect of obtaining these.
5.3 These concerns are compounded by inadequate
internal systems of review, which are not adequately transparent.
We are aware of one instance where a detainee
was read the contents of a monthly detention review (no interpreter
was used) but a copy of the review was initially refused him.
5.4 Generally, we are concerned with detention
as an unnecessary interference with an individual's liberty, which
may have serious ill effects on a detainee's mental health.
5.5 We are also concerned with its serious
interference with the ability of an asylum seeker to adequately
pursue a claim. The new Procedure Rules substantially curtailing
detainees' appeal rights. There are serious restrictions on legal
and other visits; and inadequate facilities at some establishments.
What will be the effects on the management of
asylum applications of changes made in the Nationality, Immigration
and Asylum Act 2002 and the Prime Minister's pledge to halve the
number of asylum seekers by September 2003?
6.1 The Act has already contributed to substantial
regress. The impact of section 55 (refusal of NASS support) has
led to the situation at ASU, which we have earlier highlighted.
The redistribution of case management from immigration at ports
to the Residual Casework Unit has compounded the general inaccessibility
of the process, which we have addressed in connection with INEB's
deficiencies.
6.2 It remains to be seen how the Home Office
will seek to develop the application of section 94 (non-suspensive
appeals). Whereas this currently is applied via a "white
list" that predominantly relates to countries from which
asylum applications continue to substantially fall, broadening
the application of section 94 will likely lead to increasing,
expensive litigation. This is so, not least because the obvious
difficulties in pursuing an asylum appeal from overseas would
be compounded the further afield the individual is removed.
6.3 Generally, by investing so much in the
curtailing of individual's appeal rights, without addressing the
ongoing poor quality of initial decision making, the Act is unwelcome.
Moreover, in such circumstances, there must be a risk that the
Act will simply encourage greater litigation surrounding the inadequacies
of that initial applications process.
6.4 The Prime Minister was wrong to speculate
on the "appropriate" numbers of asylum applications
at a future date. It would be equally wrong for us to be anything
but cautious in speculating about the impact of that statement
at any future date. If there is generally more stability and less
conflict come September, it may be that his pledge is of little
consequence. If that is not the case, we would be deeply concerned
that this pledge will increase the likelihood of bad practice
and consequent litigation.
CONCLUSION
7.1 We have noted a clear distinction between
the beginnings of this decade and the last. We believe that closer
enquiry, than we are able to offer, into the rises and falls in
asylum applications over the period would demonstrate the connection
between relative instability and numbers of applications.
7.2 Our firm view is that the management
of asylum applications remains poor, causing considerable distress,
delay and cost. Improvement can best be achieved by rationalising
and simplifying the process; and improving the quality of the
decision making at the earliest stage.
7.3 We find NASS to be simply inadequate;
and it is a matter of grave concern that a department that has
shown itself to be so consistently incompetent should be further
empowered to refuse support to large numbers of asylum seekers.
7.4 We believe the increased use of detention
serves only to further marginalise asylum seekers, increasing
the cultural, legal and environmental difficulties in the way
of several asylum seekers in their attempts to adequately disclose
their previous experiences and future fears.
7.5 We find the Nationality, Immigration
and Asylum Act 2002 generally unwelcome, particularly in failing
to address the several and serious deficiencies in the initial
applications process; and believe additional complexities will
be to the detriment of the quality and management of the asylum
process.
7.6 We deeply regret the Prime Minister's
pledge: setting arbitrary targets is unsafe.
25 March 2003
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