Select Committee on Home Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 240 - 259)

TUESDAY 13 MAY 2003

MR PETER GILROY, MR MARTIN HOWE QC AND MS HARRIET SERGEANT

  Q240  Mr Singh: They cannot claim asylum unless they are on British soil.

  Ms Sergeant: The immigration officers I have talked to have said this is actually an initiative that they have found has worked pretty well. I am sure Mr Howe has the legal position. From their point of view, having immigration officers stationed on French soil they found pretty effective in stopping people; they have turned people round saying, "If you want to claim asylum, go to our French counterpart and claim". Of course, they do not want to claim asylum in France. Yes, they found that pretty effective, but the moment it is known that happens at a particular port, they would try to get in at other ports. You are seeing that now. You would have to have it at all the ports.

  Q241  Mr Singh: This is the point I am making, that before anybody disembarks, they would have to produce some relevant identity documents, otherwise the ferry has to take them straight back?

  Mr Gilroy: The point that you made was an interesting one about planes. That may apply to all ports potentially; that is, that you must not only have the document but you must have the facility to photograph the document so that they do not destroy it in transit. That is an interesting thought.

In the absence of the Chairman, David Winnick was called to the Chair

  Q242  Mr Cameron: Presumably, if you had a quota system, you could say to people that you had photocopied their passport and, with anyone who comes over on the ferry from France, that you are returning them to an entirely safe country. You could say, "Go back to France and apply for asylum to this country at our embassy in Paris, thank you very much". To anyone coming on an aeroplane, if you photocopy their documentation, at least at the point at which they arrive, you would know exactly who they are and the same could apply?

  Mr Gilroy: Yes.

  Q243  Mr Singh: Going back to your point, Mr Gilroy, about the Italians sending Albanians back, it sounds an attractive idea but for us it has been far more difficult because where could we send Iraqis, Kurds or Afghans to? The Italians could do that but it is not feasible or opportune for the UK to do it.

  Mr Gilroy: The point I was making is that the Italians are also supposedly complying with the Convention on Human Rights and all the things we have all signed up to. It just seemed odd that they are doing it differently to the way we were doing it. That is the point I was trying to make. In terms of the issue about Iraq, I think we could now, and I do not see why not. We have just seen recently people going back by plane. I think it all comes down to the fact that in the end the Government must decide what countries are in the category that they can return people to and what countries are not. I think that is what the present Government have been trying to do in recent months.

  Ms Sergeant: At the moment, we spend £20 million on refugee camps and we spend £2 billion on the asylum process in this country, which seems to me completely the wrong way round. I think what we are all worried about is sending people back who claim asylum in this country. Where would you send them back to? Obviously none of us would want to send them back to the country they fled from. If you had far more effective refugee camps, and at the moment they are pretty horrible places, and if money was spent on them and they were run properly—at the moment they are very corrupt—then perhaps we would be able to enforce the quota system.

  Q244  Mr Singh: We talk about this country having a huge asylum problem. Would you agree with me that, whatever figures you take, France and Germany and maybe other European countries face a similar problem, if not larger, but ours is clearer because our figures show that people do apply for asylum here, whereas they do not maybe in Germany and France. It is quite obvious that people are lost in the system in Germany and France and not applying. They will have just the same level on the asylum issue that we have?

  Ms Sergeant: Well, they do not. France has half the numbers that we do.

  Q245  Mr Singh: How do we know that?

  Ms Sergeant: That is of asylum applications.

  Q246  Mr Singh: We are saying people do not apply in France; they want to come here and apply. How can you tell that France does not have the same level of problem that we do here?

  Ms Sergeant: Because they have to have identity cards in France. People cannot get lost.

  Q247  Mr Watson: But they are all fake in France, are they not?

  Ms Sergeant: Maybe, but people cannot get lost in the French and German systems as they can in this country. I have met people who have lived for years in this country. You can get illegal housing, you can fake documents, whatever, and you can go backwards and forwards, you can travel. I would not like to say this categorically but I have a feeling that this just simply does not happen in France and Germany, and that is why our country is much more attractive.

  Mr Gilroy: In talking to French colleagues about the subject, it is interesting that with countries that have a larger land mass—the issues are similar in the US because the US has a similar attitude—it is more laissez faire, and there is no doubt about it, people can disappear. Although you are correct about the issue of identity cards, people can disappear. If you go to Paris or even to Calais today, you will see that my French colleagues will accept things that we would not accept. There is that issue. I still say that this country in land mass is very small and the population tends to be concentrated much more. Therefore, people are much more exposed as they are not across the European Union. Obviously, you can see that they have asylum problems as we do, the whole of the European Union does, as do the Italians, but there is an issue about people dissipating in the system. People know they are there. The black economy, for instance, in Italy is very large indeed with regard to asylum seekers, as it is in the UK. The whole of the European Union has problems but numerically it is true to say that in actual numbers the UK, in physical terms at any rate, is a very attractive place for many.

  Q248  Mr Watson: People who deal with asylum seekers in my own local authority of Sandwell describe NASS as the most inefficient public sector institution in the country. I am particularly directing my comments at Mr Gilroy. Do you think those criticisms are justified? If you think there is some justification, what could be done to tackle these problems?

  Mr Gilroy: I have made some comments on that in my submissions to this Committee. I start by defending NASS; it did have to pick up a fairly significant issue very fast. It very quickly, and I thought this was a mistake, went to subcontracting in the private sector and in the voluntary sector. It then left it to the contractors to find housing. I think that was the first mistake. The second mistake was not to believe that if you publicly consult with local communities, and I include in that local government in all its forms, on the basis that you are going to get NIMBY-ism and those problems, you are going to have serious difficulty. My experience in Kent is that if you do talk locally, you will get that response but quite often local politicians know their issues and they can turn round and say to you, "You were going to go there. Please do not go there but we do think you might be able to go here". In other words, you get much greater intelligence about the issues of communities, and I think NASS never did that. My other worry about NASS is just simply that they do not have the trained personnel. It is very difficult, and if you look at the providers that they have used in the private sector, there are some providers there that were just into accommodation for students; there are other providers who are into other forms of housing and they have seen that as an opportunity. I have been very concerned, and in fact we are talking to colleagues in the Home Office at the moment about having some proper training on child protection—there was the Climbié case only recently—about a whole range of issues to make sure that ethnicity issues and community issues are covered. There is no point a private provider parachuting people into a town and they will have to drive 50 miles—and we had that in Wales—before they find any evidence similar to theirs. I have some empathy with their problems in the organisation but I do believe that they need to decentralise and have a more managerial approach to their business. If they did that, and with some sensitive consultation with local government and other partners, their reputation may improve.

  Q249  Mr Watson: How effective do you think their moves are to decentralise?

  Mr Gilroy: Decentralising and devolving means you have got to stop trying to micro-manage everything; you have to devolve matters to the regions and allow local government—and we have consortia arrangements in this country—to take an interest in this in a much more creative way. If they are going to decentralise, it means that the regional managers need to have the power and should not be having to refer back to the centre every five minutes; they should be given the power to get on with it and make sure that they have good standards and that they are managing this effectively.

  Q250  Mr Watson: We are told that might well be happening now. Have you seen any evidence of that yet?

  Mr Gilroy: It is a cultural thing, is it not? It is going to take a while if they are genuine about it.

  Q251  Mr Watson: Again, using experiences from Sandwell, people tell me it is virtually impossible to contact NASS when they need to do so.

  Mr Gilroy: That is a problem.

  Q252  Mr Watson: Is it getting better or worse?

  Mr Gilroy: I think at the moment I would like to reserve my judgment on that. Colleagues tell me that they are going to get better at this. Certainly I do not have a problem now with communicating at the highest levels. We now have informal sessions and we talk to each other about these issues. It is always a problem, is it not, if you have a policy, applying and complying with the policy, but putting application to the policy is another matter. I think where NASS has struggled and the civil service has struggled is in putting serous application into the policy intention. That is about training, management and all those things.

  Q253  David Winnick: But you yourself do not have any problems?

  Mr Gilroy: Yes.

  Q254  Mr Watson: On the monitoring of the subcontracts, do you know if they have any monitoring regime at all to see how effective the subcontractors are or is there any evidence that they have actually cancelled contracts through inefficient delivery of services by subcontractors?

  Mr Gilroy: Yes, there is some evidence of that. My position on that is that if you are going to use subcontractors, you have to have a highly decentralised monitoring process. You cannot believe you are going to do that from Croydon or London; that is just not possible. I think their infrastructure has yet to deliver on that. To answer your question, did Kent have problems, we did. In 1999, for about six months to a year, we were placing people around the country but we very quickly, within six or seven months, realised that you cannot do that; you actually have to get to local people and get intelligence about those local communities and then you can make judgments. The last thing you do, which we have never done, is leave it to the providers to determine that.

  Q255  Mr Watson: In conclusion, do you think there is an argument that could be put that NASS is the most inefficient public sector institution in Britain today?

  Mr Gilroy: I would not wish to answer that question. I do not know.

  Q256  David Winnick: It is a very provocative question. Would Ms Sergeant or Mr Howe wish to comment on that?

  Ms Sergeant: I went to the refugee centre in Newcastle. They spent most of their time complaining to me about NASS. They said that one of the major problems, and you touched on it, was that NASS's centre of operations was so far from the NASS headquarters in Croydon. They said that NASS had not noticed that a river runs between North and South Shields and that they were expecting asylum seekers to have to take a ferry and a bus in order to collect their money when there is actually a perfectly good post office at the end of the road, but they simply did not know the geography. Their solution to this is that NASS should move its headquarters from Croydon up north, where it would spread a little prosperity by employing people in the north.

  Q257  David Winnick: One can always put that point to the Minister.

  Ms Sergeant: And also that the asylum seekers at the moment are arriving in London and then they are dispersed, whereas if NASS was somewhere else, they would go straight to the place where they were going to stay. I discovered one woman had had three or four moves before she did settle.

  Mr Gilroy: I raise just one other point here. One of the things that has concerned me is the issue of healthcare. We talked to NASS colleagues about this. With women in particular there is the very serious issue about being pregnant and being pregnant through rape. We have had examples where the system was moving people through the NASS operations but unconnected with the health care system nationally. We had women who were expecting to be aborted, for instance, being moved with no communication up-country and who had then found it was too late for an abortion. That sort of operational issue is very serious. We are working closely with colleagues to try to improve all of this but it has been very difficult.

  Mr Watson: I think you really are putting the case that this is the most inefficient public service in Britain.

  David Winnick: You have made your point, Mr Watson.

  Q258  Mr Watson: These questions are just for Mr Gilroy. Mr Gilroy, you mentioned the number of unaccompanied minors coming to the UK as asylum seekers. Could you remind us why that is happening and what services you have to provide for them?

  Mr Gilroy: It is happening because they are brought here, usually through the instigation of their family, mostly their mothers, by criminals. It is mostly young males who arrive here.

  Q259  Mr Watson: How young are they?

  Mr Gilroy: The youngest we have had was eight but the average, probably two-thirds of them, are between 16 and 18. They are mainly male, although in recent times we have had another influx of young women. There is one real issue, and I am glad it has been raised. We look after these youngsters in two categories. We call one category Section 17 under the Children Act, which is where we assist, befriend and provide financial advice and we also provide accommodation. We think legally that is all right. For those youngsters, we do not take the corporate parent responsibility. We do that sometimes with the indigenous population; we just help to see them through, et cetera. The other section we use is Section 20 where for the younger ones, all those under the age of 16, we become the parent of those youngsters while they are in the UK . May I add one point? At the moment, local government is extremely nervous because it looks as though the advice coming out of the Department of Health could well suggest that every single youngster that I have in Kent should be in care under Section 20. The obligations on Kent County Council of that happening, both in social work and all the standards that we have to provide, would be quite horrendous. It would also give me real problems in persuading my director colleagues in the country to take some of these youngsters and to become the corporate parent because their politicians would say that we are giving them the financial commitment, and that would be the case, up until the age of 24 in law.


 
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