Memorandum submitted by the Police Federation
of England and Wales
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 The Police Federation of England and
Wales is the representative body for over 95% of police officers.
Established by statute, we are responsible for the welfare of
officers and the provision of an efficient police service.
1.2 The Police Federation welcomes the opportunity
to submit evidence highlighting issues we wish to be raised in
the one-off evidence session, police powers under terrorism
legislation. This memorandum has been composed specifically
for this evidence session. We hope it provides a valuable and
relevant insight into the use of police powers from an operational
policing perspective.
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Debates exploring where the delicate
balance between freedom and security should lie are an inevitable
consequence of introducing new measures to combat terrorism. In
the main we believe it is for public debate, not the police, to
determine where this equilibrium-point should be.
2.2 There are times, however, when it is
abundantly clear—at least from an operational policing perspective—that
added security measures are imperative in order to preserve the
freedoms we enjoy. Updating terrorism legislation, for instance,
can enable the police and courts to secure convictions that dated
legislation would otherwise not allow; added resources enhance
our ability to gather intelligence and can improve our ability
to detect, observe and arrest suspects; and additional training
can improve resilience and cross-agency co-operation. It is on
this basis that we respond to the inquiry.
2.3 This memorandum explores the following
issues:
— The efficacy of the Terrorism Act
2000 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to enable
the police to carry out the necessary checks on suspected terrorists.
— Any need to extend laws or introduce
further legislation.
— The inefficacy of resources and training
to enable the police to provide sufficient resilience in the event
of the successfully executed terrorist attack.
— The protection afforded to those
officers carrying out orders.
Whilst the third and fourth points are not included
within the parameters of the inquiry, they are intrinsically linked
to these issues and we have therefore included them in our response.
3. LEGISLATIVE
OVERVIEW
3.1 In light of the tragic events of 9-11,
Istanbul and Madrid, amongst others, we believe it must be the
responsibility of all appropriate organisations to engage in a
frank and ongoing debate so as to ensure all feasible measures
are taken to thwart terrorists.
3.2 The Police Federation broadly supports
those measures concerning police powers contained within the Terrorism
Act 2000 and Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
STOP AND
SEARCH
3.3 Whilst we fully support the review of
these powers by the Home Affairs Select Committee, it is regrettable
that some organisations without the responsibility for day-to-day
policing are calling for greater restrictions to be placed upon
police officers when carrying out anti-terrorist operations. Since
the inception of the two Acts there has been a sharp rise in the
threat posed to this country. It is therefore rather perverse
that at a time when the value of stop and search has increased
immeasurably, we are still entered into a debate as to its effectiveness.
3.4 We should in no way aspire to a police
service where officers are either worried or precluded from using
their acquired knowledge and experience, or most importantly their
discretion. Whilst this is, for some, a highly emotive subject,
we believe policy must be driven by effectiveness, not emotion.
3.5 As previously stated in memoranda to
the HAC, we strongly believe identity cards could assist stop
and searches, not only as they could allow officers to ascertain
identity quicker, but also because they could introduce added
accountability. Identity cards could therefore negate the need
for the taking of fingerprints which many people would view as
a greater infringement of liberty.
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF STOP
AND SEARCH
UNDER TERRORISM
LEGISLATION
3.6 Prevention is the cornerstone of anti-terrorist
policing. We therefore believe the Newton Report is wrong in its
assertion that stop and search is ineffectual as an anti-terrorist
tool. Whilst no accurate means of assessing whether stop and search
has prevented a terrorist strike exists, this in no way detracts
from its value to police.
3.7 Border controls, to all intensive purposes,
involve the same processes as take place during a stop and search—ie
demonstration of identity—yet no one questions their necessity.
This raises the question, if the police did not have the power
to stop and search, what would the message be to terrorists? In
addition, it should be borne in mind that the preparedness and
powers of law enforcement agencies in other countries have a direct
effect upon both the threat posed to the UK and our ability to
combat it.
ACCOUNTABILITY
3.8 The Terrorism Act states:
"[Authorisation] may be given only if the
person giving it considers it expedient for the prevention of
acts of terrorism."
Terrorism Act 2000 (Part V, Section 44 (3))
This requirement, coupled with the due transparency
provided by monitoring of stop and search and the newly formed
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), provides the
appropriate level of accountability for conducting stop and searches.
Moreover, police officers are required to justify their actions.
This in itself is a measure of accountability.
3.9 In addition, we believe the code of
practice for stop and search provides requisite sensitivity with
regard to the requirements that searches must not be carried out
by someone of the opposite sex; and that the removal of clothes
must not be carried out in a public place. It is therefore essential
that appropriate guidance is given to police officers as to how
this is conducted, especially in relation to religion, as this
is not an aspect of policing whereby officers should learn from
experience.
3.10 Community relations are dynamic and
are subject to fluctuations over time. We strongly believe communities
attitudes towards stop and search can also change, as evidenced
by Project Trident; an initiative that now enjoys strong support
amongst what was initially an unconvinced Afro-Caribbean community.
3.11 It is clear that although there have
been valuable discussions vis-a"-vis stop and search and
ethnic minorities, this talk must be matched with action. Scope
certainly exists to provide additional training for officers and
it must also be a priority to clearly communicate "why"
stop and search is undertaken by police to those communities still
wary of it.
THE POWER
TO REQUIRE
THE REMOVAL
OF DISGUISES
3.12 Section 94 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001 grants police officers the power to require
the removal of disguises under specific circumstances. This is
a power we called for with regard to marches in the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act (1994).
3.13 The justifications for this power broadly
mirror those for the power to stop and search. Whilst it is essential
that an individual's religious beliefs should be respected, religion,
or any other factor, should never become a barrier to ascertaining
identity. We believe the legislation as it currently stands provides
appropriate balance in this regard.
4. RESOURCES
AND TRAINING
4.1 We do not believe that it is tangential
to comment briefly upon issues appertaining to police resources
and training. There is little benefit to be gained from empowering
police officers with new legislation if the proper use of these
powers is not properly communicated to the officers. Equally,
effective policing requires sufficient individuals to enact these
powers in the first place.
4.2 Training is a prime example. The Bichard
report highlights that in many cases confusion still reigns around
the application of the Data Protection Act in respect of record
keeping. Ensuring requisite training is given to officers remains
at the whim of Chief Officers. In many cases it is deficient and
this can place operational officers in difficult positions.
4.3 It is a common presumption that all
police officers know what to do in the event of a terrorist attack
or if they suspect an individual of be linked to terrorists. This
is patently not the case. DVDs containing basic information on
CBRN response have been produced but not disseminated. In addition,
in many cases intelligence gathering—the single greatest
barrier to terrorists—is conducted on a very ad hoc basis
due to the lack of direction from Chief Officers and the unavailability
of integrated computer systems with national access.
4.4 Whilst we do not know whether a terrorist
attack on UK soil is "imminent" or "inevitable",
we do know that given this heightened threat, the parallel need
for sufficient legal-backing and resources for police officers
is both "imminent" and "inevitable".
5. PROTECTION
FOR OPERATIONAL
OFFICERS
5.1 Whilst Chief Officers have vicarious
responsibility for their officers, individual officers are also
responsible for their actions. These police officers must be able
to operate with peace of mind that they will not be unfairly treated
for merely carrying out orders. No one responding to a civil emergency,
be it police or other personnel, should become a test case. Lawmakers
must make certain that such a situation cannot arise by clarifying
these nebulous assurances, ensuring they take account of all potential
eventualities in their deliberations.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.2 We believe the extant anti-terrorist
police powers are equitable and commensurate with the threat posed.
Although we are not calling for an extension of any of these powers,
we reaffirm the need to regularly assess and reassess these powers
in line with the threat posed.
6.3 It should be recognised that officers
operate under a microscope without the science of hindsight. In
tackling terrorism officers can be placed in an invidious position
where they are criticised for action or inaction. In order to
eliminate the problems officers face powers must be accompanied
by resources, and resources must be accompanied by training.
June 2004
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