Memorandum submitted by the Muslim Council
of Britain
1. INTRODUCTION
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is the Muslim
umbrella organisation with over 400 Muslim bodies and associations
including mosques as its affiliates. These submissions are based
upon consultation with affiliates and interested individuals.
The submissions only cover the issues which Committee is specifically
considering.
2. THE ATCSA
2001
2.1 The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security
Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was introduced as a reaction
to tragic events of September 11, 2001. The legislation has created
a twin- track criminal justice system, whereby suspects falling
within the ambit of "special anti-terrorism legislation"
have fewer rights than other suspected criminals. It has given
police unlimited powers for stop and search. The powers of stop
and search as well as the process leading to and including detention
under the Act are manifestly draconian and fall far short of the
well known and greatly cherished values of British justice and
the recognised civilised international norms.
2.2 The Act allows the internment of foreign
nationals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. It
allows the government to detain suspects for an indefinite period.
Although the Act allows scrutiny of the Secretary of State's suspicion
by an "independent" body, the body (The Special Immigration
Services Commission) is, in our opinion, severely restricted in
its power and procedure to carry out a meaningful and fair scrutiny
of accusations does not have to provide any substantial proof
of his accusations. The system as well as the process inspires
no confidence in the proclaimed concept of accountability of decisions
made by the Secretary of State. Access of those detained to their
legal representatives is extremely limited and we believe that
the conditions of detention border on the disgraceful. In our
view the procedures as well as the practices allowed by the Act
are in clear contravention of Article 6 of the ECHR.
3. THE ACT
AND THE
MUSLIM COMMUNITY—REALITY
AND PERCEPTIONS
3.1 The MCB firmly believes that instead
of fulfilling its declared objective of improving and enhancing
security, the Act has in reality, by its strong focus on the Muslim
community, caused further alienation and disillusionment of the
Muslims in the United Kingdom. As Lord Carlile in his Feruary
2003 report on the review of sections 21-23 acknowledged that
the Act had "a significant impact upon a particular group
of the resident community". The members of that group are
all persons who do not hold British nationality. Some police have
expressed misgivings about a law that in practise has only applied
to Muslims (because all those currently detained are Muslim):
there is a sense that it causes real resentment among parts of
the Muslim community who are both "residents and nationals
of the United Kingdom, and possibly makes some aspects of policing
more difficult".
3.2 From the publicly disclosed statistics
we note that until the end of March this year, 562 persons have
been arrested under the Act out of which only 97 were charged
with any of the offences under the Act. This shows that in respect
of over 80% of those arrested under the Act, the police could
find no evidence for charge under the Act. This is an extremely
high percentage and demonstrates an extremely worrying conduct
on the part of those responsible for the enforcement of the Act.
It is also important to point out that out of the 97 charged under
offences under the Act, only 14 persons have been convicted by
the Courts. It should also be noted that the Metropolitan Police
Authority report on the "Metropolitan Stop and Search practice"
has shown a huge rise in the number of Asians who were stopped
by the police in the year 2000-01 to 2001-02. Although it is fair
to say that not all Asians are Muslims, it is equally correct
to say that Muslims form a majority in the relevant ethnic groups
that make up the "Asians" for purposes of the Metropolitan
Police Authority Report.
3.3 Police powers have been used disproportionately
against the Muslim population in the UK. The majority of arrests
have been of Muslims, a large number of whom were subsequently
released without charge, or charged with offences unrelated to
terrorism. All of those detained indefinitely have been Muslim
men.
3.4 From the 25 proscribed international
organisations, 20 are of Muslim background and most, barring the
obvious few whose prime objective is violence, are associated
with liberation movements that have never posed a threat to our
national security. There is a danger that struggles for the right
to self-determination (Article 1 of the UN Charter) recognised
by many as legitimate can be deemed as unlawful, under the Act.
But what is more worrying is the fact that terrorist organisations
with racist or anti-Muslim ideologies are not proscribed. Kach
Kahane a Zionist organisation proscribed both in the US and Israel,
the VHP in part responsible for coordinating the massacre of over
2,000 Gujarati Muslims are not proscribed and able and do collect
funds for overseas activities. A failure to fairly administer
these overwhelming powers may lead to the perception that legislation
is a political tool to suppress political dissent and bite at
its public legitimacy and therefore efficacy.
3.5 This has no doubt led to the disproportionate
and discriminatory application of ATCSA freezing orders against
Muslim international humanitarian relief agencies and charities.
(O'Neill, Sean, "Judge brands freezing of suspects bank account
"draconian", The Daily Telegraph 13 November
2001). Even after investigation and exoneration by the Charity
Commission these organisations suffer the indelible stigma of
being affiliated with terrorism. The effect of this is to further
compound the feeling of victimisation of the Muslim community
thereby compromising the necessity of Anti-Terror legislation
and blurring it with that of insubstantial "them and us"
jingoism surrounding the Bush Administrations foreign policy.
3.6 The wide and violent powers conferred
by the act, lack of transparency and accountability inevitably
leads to the abuse of power by it's administrator's as experienced
in Northern Ireland. This has led to the holding of foreign Muslims
under Part 4 powers on the basis of evidence according to the
courts is "unreliable", "contradictory" and
"exaggerated". Persons of Muslim appearance are arbitrarily
stopped and forced to undergo humiliating and sometimes abusive
experiences. Flamboyant but illogical operations such as placing
tanks outside Heathrow Airport on Muslim Festivals also have contributed
to the perception that vilification and discrimination are acceptable
in the exercise of anti-terror law enforcement.
3.7 The ways in which anti-terror powers
are being used has led to feelings of isolation amongst the 1.6
million Muslims in the UK. There is disillusionment with the Government
which, rather than protecting them from the evil of Islamophobia,
is effectively criminalising them as community by indiscriminate
and disproportionate use of the Act. Muslims feel as if they are
under siege.
4. THE
EFFECT OF
THE ACT
ON COMMUNITY
RELATIONS
4.1 While many of those wrongfully targeted
under the act are released or acquitted, they can never recover
from stigma attached to them and their community. High profile
media attention on arrests under the Act and relative silence
on acquittals has resulted a stream of inaccurate and sometimes
fabricated reports that leave the devastating impression of the
Muslim UK community being a fifth column and inevitably damage
race relations as communities feel prejudice and discrimination
are becoming more normative practices. The recent Commission on
British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI) report warns that more
and more Muslims feel excluded from society and simmering tensions,
especially in northern English towns, are in danger of boiling
over.
4.2 We draw attention to Peter Hillyard's
study (Suspect community—people's experience of the prevention
of Terrorism Acts in Britain) which noted that one of the results
of the police treating the Irish as a suspect community is that
the public are encouraged to do the same[3]
This is manifestly applicable in this context to the Muslim community.
Recent research, such as that undertaken by the European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and xenophobia, has revealed a huge increase
in anti-Islamic feeling since 11 September 2001. The backlash
has manifested itself in various forms. The number of reported
verbal and physical assaults against Muslims has risen sharply
and mosques across the country have been vandalised and Muslim
cemeteries desecrated.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The MCB relies on and fully supports the conclusions
and recommendations of the Newton Committee. We also request the
Committee to take on board the conclusions and recommendations
of the Report on Islamophobia so as to give its relevant recommendations
the official authority that they currently lack. In particular
we wish to bring the Committee's attention to the following points
addressed by the Newton Committee[4]
— The suspect faces no specific charge
and is not presented with the evidence against them.
— The SIAC standard of proof is the
low balance of probabilities
— SIAC rules don't oblige the Home
Secretary to reveal material that could help the suspect.
— The UK is the only country to have
felt it necessary to derogate from Article 5 in order to allow
detention.
— Detention is potentially indefinite.
— The selective nature of detention
and small number of detainees might avoid political retribution
but this does not justify the principle.
— Part 4 has efficacy problems in that
it can be used to counter threats from foreigners.
— If those are terrorists then seeking
to deport them as an alternative will only export the problem
and (given the international nature of terrorism) not offer protection
to the UK. They should be tried in a British criminal court.
— There is a serious risk of disenfranchising
the British Muslim population.
— There was a one and a half year gap
between detention and the first appeal hearings.
— Each appeal requires a new security
cleared special advocate who not seen closed material. The supply
of such advocates is limited.
— Despite statements that prosecution
should be favoured the authorities have given little thought to
methods of alternate resolution.
July 2004
3 "Suspect Community-People's Experience of the
Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain", Paddy Hillyard,
Pluto Press (1993). Back
4
Newton Committee report paras 185-201 Back
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