Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. Rates
of malnutrition in Gaza and parts of the West Bank are as bad
as anywhere one would find in sub-Saharan Africa. The Palestinian
economy has all but collapsed. Unemployment rates are in the region
of 60-70% and many of those who are employed are dependent upon
NGOs or international relief organisations for employment. (Paragraph
6)
2. There has to be
a sense of realism about what development assistance can achieve.
The World Bank told us that removing the "access controls"
imposed by the Israelis would have increased real GDP by 21%,
whereas a doubling of development assistance—without easing
closure—would only reduce the number of people living in
poverty by 7% by the end of 2004. The situation in the OPT, in
other words, is not one which donor assistance can resolve. (Paragraph
10)
3. We agree with the
UK Government that the Geneva Conventions apply to the Israeli
occupation. The 4th Geneva Convention should remain the standard
by which the GOI should perform in the OPT. The UK Government
has its own obligations to uphold the Convention, and monitor
breaches of the rules of the Convention as regards to the civilian
population. (Paragraph 18)
The development context: closure, settlements
and the barrier
4. Settlement
activity, with its associated road building, threatens Palestinian
territorial contiguity in the West Bank and the viability of a
future Palestinian State. Freezing settlement activity and removing
outposts would boost Palestinian confidence in the peace process.
(Paragraph 24)
5. We can understand
why Israel, fearful of its security, wants to build the barrier.
But any such security fence should be constructed on Israeli,
not Palestinian, land. The construction process and path which
the barrier takes support Palestinian fears about the motivation
which lies behind it. The barrier destroys the viability of a
future Palestinian state. One of DFID's key objectives is to help
build the institutions of the Palestinian Authority in preparation
for statehood—a statehood which the barrier jeopardises.
(Paragraph 34)
6. Food aid is only
ever an emergency solution. But in the OPT farmers cannot readily
fill the gaps in food production because of the extreme dislocation
brought about by closure and, in particular, the impact that movement
restrictions and land confiscation have had on agriculture. (Paragraph
39)
7. Israeli control
over water and restrictions on development of Palestinian infrastructure
has, and continues to, severely affect the development of West
Bank and Gaza. The wilful destruction of water infrastructure
by the IDF and settlers is simply unacceptable. We commend the
work that DFID, other donors, NGOs and their partners are doing
in enhancing Palestinian access to water, a basic human right.
But we also think that there needs to be a revision of water access
arrangements. This is an urgent need, which cannot be deferred
to the final status negotiations. It is an area where the UK Government
should be applying political pressure to move negotiations forward.
(Paragraph 45)
8. We accept that
ambulances might be used to carry terrorists and their weapons
and that there can be no automatic exemption for ambulances from
the requirement to be searched. But equally, there is no reason
why an ambulance carrying an urgent case cannot be given priority
for any security search which may be needed. We discussed these
matters with the Israeli authorities in Tel Aviv and whilst reassurance
was offered, their description of smooth-running arrangements
at checkpoints conflicted with what we ourselves had seen. We
were told that checkpoints are now issued with lists of local
people suffering from chronic illnesses so as to facilitate their
speedy transfer to hospital when necessary. However, such a system
would not work for emergency cases and might cause even more problems
for those whose names are not on the lists. Nor, of course, could
this practice work with temporary or "flying" checkpoints.
(Paragraph 48)
9. The management
of checkpoints is all too often handled by young, inexperienced
IDF conscripts who may lack the training and experience to deal
with large numbers of people passing through on their way to work
or to study. We heard that waiting Palestinians often suffer harassment
at the hands of both the IDF and local settler communities, making
checkpoints a flashpoint for antagonism. A more sensitive and
appropriate approach to checkpoint management could be learned
from experience elsewhere, including British experience in Northern
Ireland. (Paragraph 49)
10. The import of
pharmaceuticals should be prioritised and classified as "humanitarian"
to facilitate speedy delivery. (Paragraph 50)
11. In a society where
half the population is under 18, the effect of closure on education
is widely felt. The psychological impact on children, arising
from school closure and exposure to violence, is damaging future
generations of Palestinians and will only serve to perpetuate
the cycle of violence and hatred. (Paragraph 52)
12. Children's education,
be it Palestinian or Israeli, must be kept free of incitement.
We commend the positive work that the PA has carried out recently
as well as the work of organisations such as Save the Children
in working with the Palestinian Ministry of Education on curriculum
development. In light of the allegations against the PA, we recommend
that it acts to counter incitement allegations and demonstrate
that it is upholding commitments made at Oslo as part of a wider
programme of enhancing its public image across the world. (Paragraph
54)
13. We strongly support
the work of organisations such as the Parents' Circle in the education
of the younger generation of Palestinians and Israelis. Support
for this type of project is a way in which development can support
the peace process. (Paragraph 55)
14. Whatever immediate
security benefits the barrier may appear to bring to the Israelis,
the level of despair and anger felt by ordinary Palestinians at
being denied the possibility of any semblance of an ordinary life
is likely to further increase the supply of militants and suicide
bombers. (Paragraph 57)
The Palestinian Authority
15. We
are aware of the criticisms of the PA. Nevertheless, the PA is
the only representative organisation of the Palestinians and,
as such, building its capacity and institutions and ensuring the
success of its reform programme, in order to make it an effective
administration, are the keys to laying the foundations of a future
Palestinian state. (Paragraph 63)
16. We are impressed
with the reforms implemented by the Minister of Finance. But there
is still need for further reform in the Palestinian Authority,
particularly in relation to the accountability of the presidential
accounts and in terms of the legal, executive and judicial reforms
outlined in the 100 day reform plan. Continuing to drive through
planned reforms is the best way for the PA to deal with its critics.
The PA is an institution which is developing into what could be
a credible foundation for a Palestinian state. It is in everyone's
interest that every penny of international development aid to
the PA, whether from DFID or charities, is fully and transparently
accounted for. Some of the PA's critics would prefer to see donor
funding stopped. But we believe this would do more harm than good.
It would push more Palestinians below the poverty line and lead
to total collapse of the PA. A collapse which would have a detrimental
effect on the peace process. In the absence of the PA, people
would be more likely to turn to extreme positions and measures
and support terrorism. (Paragraph 68)
17. It is vital for
the credibility of the PA that it obtains a renewed popular mandate
through elections as soon it can, including the election of municipal
government structures (Paragraph 72)
18. We believe that
suicide bombing, as well as being morally abhorrent, has been
a catastrophic tactic that has done great harm to the Palestinian
cause, and that the targeting of innocent civilians is indefensible.
The Palestinian Authority, we are told, also takes this view;
its condemnation needs to be heard more widely. (Paragraph 73)
19. We recommend that
the donor community targets the Palestinian civilian police for
"technical" assistance as part of building state institutions
and the rule of law. Pressure should be put on Israel to allow
this as part of the building of state institutions. The issue
of security services should be dealt with as part of political
and security negotiations. (Paragraph 75)
The Palestinian economy
20. We
know of no other examples where this level of economic decline
has taken place without the complete dissolution of the governmental
apparatus, at least certainly not in a middle-income economy such
as West Bank and Gaza. (Paragraph 77)
21. Removing the "access
controls" imposed by the Israelis would increase the size
of the economy by 21%, and reduce the rate of poverty by 15%,
whereas a doubling of development assistance would bring only
a 7% reduction in the rate of poverty. This is not therefore a
situation which donor assistance can solve. The lifting of closures
would, in the World Bank's view, allow the economy to rebound
quickly in income terms but not in capital terms. There would
therefore be a role for donors to help replace assets, which had
been lost. (Paragraph 78)
22. Our visit to Awarta
demonstrated clearly to us that the restrictions placed on the
internal movement of goods within the OPT were not always justified
by security considerations. We raised the issue with the Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Coordinator for Government
Activities in the Territories (COGAT). Neither explained the logic
of the system. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that there is
a deliberate Israeli strategy of putting the lives of ordinary
Palestinians under stress as part of a strategy to bringing the
population to heel. The West Bank back-to-back system, operating
as we saw it, is not providing increased security to Israel or
to settlers living in OPT. It merely serves to increase Palestinian
poverty and suffering by strangling the local economy. (Paragraph
83)
23. Movement restrictions
have caused an unacceptable situation whereby an EU trade agreement
is obstructed by a party (Israel) which itself benefits from preferential
EU trade terms. (Paragraph 87)
24. Trade agreements
are usually based on the principle of reciprocity: that market
access, freedom of movement, and tariff and duty regimes applied
by one state or authority normally has to be applied even-handedly
and in the same way by all participants in a regional trade agreement.
Unfortunately, Israel's restrictions on the movement of Palestinian
goods, its destruction of Palestinian infrastructure and its total
control of the OPTs' borders are denying Palestinian exporters
access to EU markets. We therefore urge the UK Government to propose
to the EU Council of Trade Ministers that Israel's preferential
terms of trade with the EU be suspended until it lifts the movement
restrictions which it has placed on Palestinian trade. We recognise
that EU exports to Israel, which are greater in value than EU
imports from Israel, might suffer retaliatory action, but we do
not believe that the EU's short-term economic self-interest with
one trading partner should take precedence over a direct challenge
to its trade policy in the region and its trade obligations to
the Palestinian Authority. (Paragraph 88)
Development challenges
25. The
UK Government should seek assurances that infrastructure will
not be destroyed, not only for projects built by the UK and its
partners, but for all projects vital to Palestinian communities.
(Paragraph 96)
26. The international
community must put pressure on the Israeli Authorities to lift,
or at least ease restrictions on the import of goods into the
OPT to facilitate delivery of food-aid to the population of Gaza
and the West Bank. Limiting imports into the OPT cannot be justified
as a security measure. Provided Israel can be sure weapons are
not being imported into the OPT, there can be no justification
for further restrictions. (Paragraph 97)
27. A future Palestinian
state may be in a position to press for compensation or reparations,
but this could only happen where destruction has been documented.
DFID should investigate the possibility of its assistance to the
PA being used for the systematic documentation of destruction
(Paragraph 100)
28. Rather than concentrating
solely on compensation, donors that invest in physical infrastructure
should seek guarantees that it will not be damaged. (Paragraph
102)
29. We would like
to see this kind of co-operation encouraged during any negotiations,
not least because MASHAV's expertise could make a contribution
towards building a future Palestinian state as a viable, stable
neighbour for Israel. (Paragraph 103)
The donor/development response
30. Such
money as the international community, including DFID, is spending
on improving "good governance" and capacity building
within the PA is money well spent. (Paragraph 117)
31. In the current
situation of economic collapse, wage payment maintained by budget
support, is an effective method of emergency poverty alleviation.
(Paragraph 122)
32. We are reassured
by the EU's investigations, but the EU and other donors must ensure
that there is no opportunity given for justified suspicions to
be raised. The use of development aid to the PA, whether from
EU, or elsewhere, must be fully, openly and transparently accounted
for. (Paragraph 133)
33. DFID has provided
substantial support to the PA in the form of technical assistance.
DFID could usefully provide greater levels of technical assistance
and in particular could support the Palestinian Authority in developing
poverty alleviation policies and enhancing Palestinian involvement
in development planning. (Paragraph 128)
34. If DFID were to
move towards providing budget support it should investigate the
possibilities of a unified monitoring system with other donors.
Failure to do so could result in the PA being faced with managing
a range of donor conditions and monitoring requirements. If development
assistance is to be efficient and effective, aid must be delivered
without putting an unbearable strain on an institution with weak
capacity. (Paragraph 129)
35. Donors operate
in different ways but co-ordination is necessary to ensure that
both development and emergency relief are delivered effectively.
The OPT receives a large amount of donor aid. What this aid can
achieve would be maximised if all donors can work towards an overall
strategy for development. The best way of achieving this would
be through a Palestinian-led process of development planning.
(Paragraph 133)
36. While we commend
the work of the Task Force on Project Implementation, we are concerned
that it is under strain and has difficulty undertaking such a
huge and sensitive task. (Paragraph 138)
37. In light of the
continuing negotiations between Israeli Authorities and International
agencies and the discrepancy between high level military policy
and the on-the-ground reality, we consider that details of cases
of obstruction of humanitarian workers should be routinely documented
(Paragraph 140)
38. The USA should
use the leverage it has with Israel to facilitate delivery of
humanitarian relief. (Paragraph 140)
39. There is clearly
a need for a respected international interlocutor to negotiate
with the IDF to try to ensure that the day to day conditions for
occupied Palestinians are as humane as possible. (Paragraph 141)
40. There is a multiplicity
of UN Agencies and NGOs, all seeking to deliver a variety of humanitarian
and other services to the Palestinian community, but none of these
are in a position to negotiate successfully with the IDF or the
GOI more humane treatment for occupied Palestinians, and indeed
themselves in reality are subject to exactly the same restrictions
of movement imposed upon Palestinians. (Paragraph 142)
41. The fact is that
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank have no state, neither
de jure, nor de facto; no citizenship; no rights;
no remedies, and no one from the international community taking
the responsibility to seek to ensure that an occupied people in
these circumstances are treated as humanely as possible. (Paragraph
143)
42. UNSCO's authority,
role and resources need to be strengthened. (Paragraph 144)
43. In addition to
strengthening the role of UNSCO and the Special Co-ordinator,
it is time for the Secretary-General of the United Nations—with
the authority of the Security Council—to appoint a further
Humanitarian Envoy or Special Representative to undertake the
specific task of ensuring that the occupation is as humane as
possible and that there is a coherent and co-ordinated international
scrutiny of what is taking place in the OPT. Such an appointment
will need to be accompanied by provision of the necessary money,
materials and resources. (Paragraph 144)
44. Unusually for
us, during our visit to the West Bank, no one asked us for money!
Neither the PA, nor the NGOs, nor the UN Agencies saw their problems
as rooted in a shortage of funding. But they all asked for advocacy
and political pressure to end the occupation. (Paragraph 146)
45. All actors need
to remind themselves of the need to avoid anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism,
as well as stereotyping Arab or Jewish societies. International
agencies that are engaged in dealing with the crisis and are witnesses
to many of the problems Palestinians face could do much more to
convey these facts, in an authoritative and non-polemical manner,
to the media and the general public in the UK and Europe. An awareness
programme of this kind, by neutral witnesses, and carried out
by NGOs, donors, and the NSU, could provide a much-needed education
of the public as to the everyday realities in the OPT. (Paragraph
149)
46. We agree with
the Government's position and urge it to be more forceful in its
advocacy on these issues. We see DFID as having an advocacy role
to play within the UK Government. The Secretary of State assured
us that co-ordination with both the Foreign Office and the Department
of Trade and Industry was good. It is essential that the Government's
position is harmonised across departments and is consistent with
all the parties' obligations under international law and agreements.
(Paragraph 150)
47. We do not agree
with the European Commission's approach. We believe in principle
that where a sufficiently egregious case of human rights abuse
has been established as to warrant economic sanctions, the EU
should not be deterred from imposing them simply because the trade
balance with the country concerned is in its favour. We urge the
UK Government to take up this point with the European Commission
and with its EU partners. (Paragraph 151)
48. We welcome the
change of policy on the part of the GOI. In this case economic
pressure was successful. However, there remains a risk of goods
being falsely labelled as produced in Israel rather than in the
settlements. We trust that HM Customs will maintain a close watch
for false origin labelling (Paragraph 152)
49. Few would argue
for a resumption of Israeli, as opposed to PA, administration
in the OPT. However it does seem that Israel's policies and actions
in the last ten years have acted as an obstacle to the development
of the PA into a government that is able to deliver services to
its people—as was intended in the 1993 Declaration of Principles.
(Paragraph 153)
50. In the absence
of any international authority mandated to represent the interest
of the Palestinians under occupation, and until such "observers"
are in place, this presence of bilateral and multilateral donor
agencies provide a modicum of international "monitoring",
if not protection. (Paragraph 154)
51. To a degree we
can understand the ICRC strategy. We do not think there should
be a withdrawal of aid to the OPT but are concerned that the current
situation cannot continue indefinitely. (Paragraph 156)
52. We think that
DFID can have an influential role in increasing donor harmonisation
through its support for Palestinian-led development. DFID's work
in building the PA's capacity has been effective and meets its
objectives of supporting the peace process and the development
of a viable future Palestinian state. It could increase support
to the PA in the area of planning capacity and effective communication
with donors. (Paragraph 157)
53. DFID is developing
a country strategy for the OPT. We believe its strategy should
seek to alleviate poverty not only through service provision or
development, but also through the working to the broader objective
of increasing aid effectiveness through donor harmonisation and
through a development conversation with the GOI about the relative
responsibilities of Israel as an occupier, and the responsibilities
of donors in relieving suffering. DFID should also be considering
its involvement with advocacy as part of long-term poverty reduction.
In particular it should give greater attention to pressuring the
GOI for freedom of movement for humanitarian goods and personnel.
(Paragraph 158)
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