Memorandum submitted by the British-Israel
Group (BIG)
OUR ORGANISATION
The British-Israel Group (BIG) is an Israel-based
non-profit association for 35,000 British expatriates living in
Israel. Israelis of British origin do not form a politically homogenous
group in terms of Israel's internal politics, but rather represent
a cross-section of Israeli society; right and left, religious
and non-religious. However, while they do not have any specific
internal political bias, our members do share a pride in Israel's
rebirth in its historic land, strong support for the right of
the State of Israel to peace and security, and growing concern
over the misrepresentation of Israel's case by some segments of
the media in Britain.
BIGS INPUT
ON THE
ISSUES RAISED
BY THE
COMMITTEE
1. The effectiveness of aid from UK and EU
sources on Palestinian poverty levels, how it is targeted and
what could be done to prevent it from being wasted or destroyed
BIG Input: Aid from the UK and EU is targeted
through three major channels: the PA, UNRWA and NGOs. The effectiveness
of each of these routes is described below:
— PA: It has been documented elsewhere
(most recently by the latest IMF report "Economic Performance
and Reforms under Conflict Conditions,") how the PA channels
much of this aid to its "security forces", a further
8% serves as Arafat's personal slush fund, and much of the funds
for education go toward incitement and raising a new generation
of "shaheeds". Even the monies earmarked for
sport go to run a league where the teams are named after suicide
bombers (Al Ayyam, 21 September 2003). Thus the PA is part of
the problem and not part of the solution. In terms of the UK effort
to alleviate poverty in the territories, funding the PA is clearly
the least efficient route. To the extent that the military actions
of the PA's various military arms exacerbate the conflict, it
could be argued that funding the PA is not merely inefficient
but is also counterproductive.
— UNRWA: As detailed in UNRWA's submission
to this committee, the bulk of UNRWA's funding does go in direct
support to the poor. The problem with UNRWA is not its lack of
devotion to the poor but with its over-devotion to its organisational
self-preservation. Whereas the UN High Commission for Refugees
has worldwide responsibility for refugees and has dealt with the
re-housing and re-settlement of millions of refugees worldwide
since the 1940's, UNRWA has done the opposite. Whereas UN policy
worldwide is to resettle refugees where "refugee status"
only lasts for one generation, UNRWA defines all descendents of
Palestinian refugees as refugees as well and tries to maintain
their refugee status indefinitely. For this reason the UN maintains
two parallel refugee organizations, one for Palestinians (UNRWA)
and one for the rest of the world. Thus the refugee status of
Palestinians is maintained indefinitely by UNRWA, thereby perpetuating
the conflict rather than trying to solve it (see Appendix A).
For this reason alone, the UK should not provide funds via this
organisation.
— NGOs: NGOs are the vehicle of choice
to deliver direct aid against poverty to the villages and neighborhoods
where it is needed. However, not all NGOs are alike and so the
choice of which NGOs to support should be made judiciously. As
a general rule, the "local committee" type of NGO is
truly dealing with humanitarian aid in a specific area and should
be supported. Those Palestinian NGOs that need to be reviewed
more critically are those which are national in scope and headquartered
in Ramallah. These range from being virtual arms of the PA to
completely genuine aid organizations. A useful criterion in distinguishing
which national-level NGO falls into which category is the readiness
of that NGO to sign the USAID declaration that they do not divert
any funds to terrorism (See "Palestine Media Watch"
report in Appendix B for a partial list of those not prepared
to sign). Lastly, the non-Palestinian NGOs such as Oxfam and Christian
Aid are a relatively inefficient means of funding the local NGOs
mentioned above. Oxfam for example lists among its partners a
Palestinian organization that refused to sign this USAID declaration,
and many of Christian Aids partners (listed on their website)
are political organisations which spend the funds they receive
on political propaganda instead of alleviating poverty, in a move
that must surely place Christian Aid in violation of its charitable
status.
In summary, channeling UK funds though local
Palestinian NGOs is the most efficient and effective means of
alleviating poverty in the territories. However, the methods and
organizations via which this aid is channeled to those organizations
should be reviewed, and only apolitical organizations entrusted
with this important task.
2. The impact on Palestinian trade, employment
and economic development of customs duties and taxes, and controls
on the movement of goods and people at Israeli ports and airports
and points of entry to the West Bank and Gaza
BIG input: As Israel has the kind of efficient
transportation and tax systems typical in first-world economies,
the PA made good use of these resources in the years prior to
the breakdown of the Oslo process, to the detriment of the development
of the PA's own Gaza port. When the PA reneged on the Oslo process
in September 2000 and effectively declared war against Israel,
its access to these resources naturally became more limited. It
is illogical for the PA to expect that Israel will continue to
pursue economic integration with it in the face of continued terrorism.
On the assumption that this terrorism will continue, the international
community should place an emphasis on the development of alternative
port facilities, particularly in Gaza and a land route from the
West Bank to Jordan, so that the two economies can be effectively
disengaged.
3. The impact of the wall of separation for
Palestinian farmers and for employment, movement of people and
delivery of humanitarian assistance.
BIG input: In the medium and long term, the
impact of this security fence (it is a misnomer to call it a wall
as only 5% of it is a wall) will be to greatly improve the freedom
of movement of Palestinians within the territories. Currently,
in order to prevent terrorists crossing the "green line",
the Israeli Army has been forced against its will to re-enter
the territories and restrict the movement of terrorists and armaments
at the local level, causing considerable inconvenience to all.
Once the security fence is complete, the hope is that there will
be no further cause to place roadblocks at the local level to
prevent Arabs from smuggling in explosives using ambulances, or
concealed about their bodies, etc., and thus the overall freedom
of movement for the Palestinian populace will be greatly improved.
The establishment of this fence represents a major victory for
the PA, as Israel had not intended to relinquish land to which
it has historic rights other than within the framework of a true
and lasting peace.
4. The control that the network of settlements
in the occupied territories have over the basic conditions for
the development of the Palestinian economy: agricultural land,
water, movement of persons and goods, environmental impacts
BIG input: Israeli settlement in the territories
in the period 1967 to 1993 provided a major spur to the previously
moribund economy in these areas, when these territories were illegally
occupied by Jordan and Egypt. The Jordanian occupation of the
West Bank was recognized by only two countries (UK and Pakistan),
whereas only Pakistan recognized Jordanian sovereignty over Jordanian-occupied
East Jerusalem. Even though these territories were forced upon
Israel in a war for Israel's very survival, Israel undertook responsibility
for the economic progress of the inhabitants, and statistics show
that Israel was very successful in this task. The 1968-93 Central
Bureau of Statistics document "Demographic Characteristics
of the Arab Population in Judea and Samaria", details
the rapid improvement in living conditions in the territories
during this period. Examples of relevant statistics from this
report include: ". . . infant mortality has declined from
approximately 35 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1968, to 18.1
in 1991", "Washing machine ownership in the Gaza Strip
went from 3% (in 1967) to 91% (in 1992)" (http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0c0m0).
With the onset of the Oslo accords and the arming of the PA in
1993, the latter set about systematically attacking the access
roads to the Jewish villages that had been established in the
territories and had largely (until that point) enjoyed friendly
and economically productive relationships with their Arab neighbors.
From that point onwards, due to the PA policy, these peaceful
Jewish villages ceased to be a contributory factor in the Palestinian
economy. When the PA reneged on the Oslo agreement by launching
the "second intifada" in September 2000, safeguarding
the free passage of the residents of these villages became an
Israeli priority and thus, in an "own goal", the PA's
actions led to the restriction of free movement of the Arab residents
of these areas.
5. The accountability of Palestinian government
institutions and the technical capacities of the public and private
sectors to build an autonomous and viable economy
BIG input: As has been widely reported, including
in the recent IMF report cited above, PA government institutions
have been notoriously unaccountable, even to the extent that hundreds
of millions of Pounds are entirely unaccounted for. As the public
sector, including the major monopolies, is controlled by the PA,
this sector is by definition unable to assist in the task of building
an "autonomous and viable economy". This leaves
the private sector as the only realistic engine for economic growth
in the territories. The term "autonomous and viable"
implies that the economy in this very small geographical area
really can or should be autonomous; something which has never
yet happened. Until 1967 these areas were an integral part of
larger economic units—the West Bank as part of the Jordanian
economy and the Gaza Strip as part of the Egyptian economy—and
since 1967 they have been part of the Israeli economy. With the
construction of the security fence nearing completion, the period
of integration into the Israeli economy is coming to a close and
thus the only way forward for the economy in the territories is
tighter economic integration with the adjoining Arab countries.
To this end, the private sector should be encouraged to establish
industrial zones just across the Jordanian and Egyptian seam-line,
as per the maliquadoras on the US-Mexico border which have
been so successful in promoting economic growth and alleviating
poverty in Mexico. The UK and EU should assist the World Bank
in providing grants to private sector businesses to establish
such factories.
6. The role of civil society, including NGOs,
in ensuring a broad popular participation in the development of
Palestinian society
BIG input: As per BIG's input to issue 1 above,
we favour the extensive use of local Palestinian NGOs in fostering
broad participation in the development of Palestinian society.
To prevent the misuse of funds, these NGOs should be closely monitored
and forced to give strict financial accounting to the funding
bodies. In particular, any diversion of British or EU funds by
such NGOs to incitement or terrorism should cause the immediate
cessation of their funding; with a watchdog organisation being
specifically appointed for this purpose.
7. Priorities for UK aid through bilateral
and multilateral channels to strengthen the infrastructure of
Palestinian development
BIG input: The determination of priorities for
UK aid should arise from an anticipation of the likely ramifications
of the completion of the security fence. The completion of this
fence will, on the one hand obviate the need for all the roadblocks
and other impediments to free movement of people and goods. On
the other hand, the revenue currently enjoyed by day labourers
working in Israel will probably be sharply curtailed. Thus the
infrastructure of the Palestinian economy needs to undergo a structural
change in order to orient itself towards fuller integration with
the Jordanian and Egyptian economies. Priorities for UK aid should
include transportation projects (roads, railways, etc) for facilitating
this integration, and the provision of loans, guarantees and micro-credit
to Palestinian entrepreneurs participating as contractors in these
infrastructure projects.
8. The role of aid in supporting political
solutions to the conflict
BIG input: Until now, much of the aid provided
by the international community, in particular the funding of the
PA and UNRWA, has hindered progress toward political solutions.
The funding of the PA has enabled the PA to institute not only
terrorism on an unprecedented scale but also to raise a younger
generation schooled in hate (see Appendix C and the other material
on the Palestine Media Watch website: www.pmw.org.il).
As described above, UNRWA's contribution to prolonging the conflict
is the maintenance of the refugee problem as a permanent obstacle
to peace. Likewise, much of the funding to European-based NGOs
is channeled to partners who disseminate one-sided political propaganda,
thereby stimulating continued hatred of Israel and adversely affecting
the chances of a political solution to the conflict. To give one
example among many, Christian Aid supplies funds to Palestine
Monitor which, via its website, disseminates a totally inaccurate
historical analysis of the conflict in which no mention is made
of the Arab rejection of the 1937 partition plan or the Arab rejection
of the 1947 UN partition resolution, or of the fact that 5 Arab
countries invaded the area immediately the British Mandate ended
in May 1948 with a view to eliminating the nascent Jewish state.
The funding of such blatant propaganda by a "Christian"
organisation which is supposed to be seeking a peaceful solution
not only defies logic, but also does little to support Christian
Aid's somewhat hollow claim that its main purpose is to eliminate
poverty. However, now, with the building of the security fence,
aid organizations finally have a window of opportunity to make
a positive rather than a negative contribution to reaching a political
solution. This solution needs to focus on halting funding for
violence and incitement, building infrastructure to facilitate
the economic integration of the territories into Jordan and Egypt,
and the building of a peaceful Palestinian society. Additionally,
much can be done in the educational field to reduce the level
of racism and incitement in Palestinian society. Possible methods
include supporting a joint Jewish-Arab "think tank"
and promoting joint Jewish-Arab projects in the school and university
educational systems to promote mutual tolerance, uproot negative
stereotypes and encourage dialogue.
9. Future development needs of a Palestinian
state and the potential for its economic cooperation with Israel
BIG input: At this point, much of the PA territories
have descended into anarchy, with inter-clan killings of so-called
"collaborators" often serving to conceal the closing
of personal accounts in an arena where societal frameworks have
broken down. At the same time, Arafat's health is widely reported
to be rapidly deteriorating. As Arafat is the "symbol"
of Palestinian nationalism, it is unclear whether there will be
any continuation of a specifically "Palestinian" national
identity in a post-Arafat era. Accordingly, it is an open question
whether, after the unsuccessful experiment of Oslo, there will
continue to be movement toward a Palestinian state. As regards
the potential for economic cooperation with Israel should such
a state be formed, this is largely a function of whether the security
fence does indeed bring an end to terrorism and usher in a period
of peaceful relations. If Arab attacks against Israelis continue,
then it is difficult to imagine that Israel will have any motivation
to cooperate economically with this state, in the same way that
most countries at war with each other do not cooperate in the
economic sphere. Thus the major question is whether a future Palestinian
state will wish to live in peace with Israel. As per a poll taken
in September 2003, "59% of Palestinians said that even
if Israel were to leave all territories and a Palestinian state
was to be formed, Hamas and Islamic Jihad should continue terrorist
attacks against Israel" ("Poll Paints Dim Picture
for Israeli/Palestinian Peace", Steve Brown, Staff Writer,
CNSNews, http://www.crosswalk.com/news/1226762.html). Given these
Arab attitudes to Israel, there is clearly a question whether
Palestinians envisage a future Palestinian state existing alongside
Israel or as replacing Israel. As long as such polls seem to indicate
that the latter is the case, it would seem to be against Israel's
existential interest to furnish such economic cooperation.
The following appendices have not been printed,
but copies have been placed in the Library:
Appendix A—Recent Article Concerning Refugee
Problems Worldwide, Who Wants to be a Palestinian Refugee?,
by Steven Plaut
Appendix B—Palestine Media Watch Report
on NGOs Refusing to Sign USAID Declaration, PA NGOs Defy US—Refuse
to Sign Anti Terror Document, by Itamar Marcus
Appendix C—Planting seeds of the next
war: The truth about the Palestinian schoolbooks, by Itamar
Marcus
November 2003
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