Memorandum submitted by Oxfam
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Oxfam GB has worked in the Palestinian Territories
(West Bank and Gaza Strip) and Israel since 1949 with a variety
of Palestinian organisations and NGOs. We work with five Israeli
partner organisations in the Negev desert supporting the Bedouin
people, the most disadvantaged of the Arab communities in Israel.
We also support an Israeli organisation working to narrow social
and economic gaps in Israeli Jewish society.
2. Oxfam GB receives one million euros per
annum from the EU to carry out essential water and sanitation
programmes with Palestinian communities and organisations in the
West Bank. During the last three years, we have noted a dramatic
deterioration in the humanitarian situation. Israeli policies
of closure have prevented Palestinian communities, particularly
those in remote rural areas, from accessing clean water that they
need for their daily health and hygiene requirements.
3. Action taken by the Israeli Defence Force
(IDF) and settlers has seriously damaged the water infrastructure
in many communities, including projects funded by the EU. The
system of road closures and curfews imposed on the West Bank prevents
many rural Palestinians from reaching or maintaining their water
sources. Roadblocks and checkpoints obstruct water and wastewater
tankers from reaching vulnerable people. Additional transportation
costs resulting from closure have also raised prices by as much
as 80%. As a result, impoverished households can no longer afford
to maintain adequate supplies of clean drinking water, leading
to an increase in the prevalence of water-borne diseases.
4. Despite agreements under the Oslo peace
process that Palestinians and Israelis take joint responsibility
for the water resources in the Joint Water Committee (JWC), this
has never worked. For any activity such as digging wells and repairing
systems, the JWC needs to give permission. They rarely do so,
and the result is that the Palestinian communities are not permitted
to build new water infrastructure. Yet new Israeli settlements
in the West Bank are immediately connected to the main water network
supplied by Mekarot, the Israeli water company. Where there were
Palestinian communities connected to the network, the water supply
has been reduced in some places by up to 75%. On average, settlers
in the West Bank consume up to five times more water than their
Palestinian neighbours.
5. The impact of closure has been compounded
by the construction of the new Israeli security wall and fence
inside the West Bank. This physical barrier has already enclosed
entire towns and villages, directly affecting over 200,000 people[169],
separating them from their land, their water sources and each
other. Fourteen thousand Palestinians living in 17 villages between
the wall and the Green Line are now effectively trapped. A further
35,000 who are living close to the wall have been separated from
their land and are losing their access to a livelihood, water
and basic services such as health and education. The economy of
Qalqilya, once the thriving agricultural centre of the West Bank,
has been strangled by the wall, which has completely encircled
the town and its 41,000 inhabitants.
6. The first phase of the wall has caused
a large-scale confiscation and destruction of water resources
and infrastructure, exacerbating an already critical situation.
So far, 35,000 metres of domestic and agricultural water pipes
have been damaged or destroyed by Israeli bulldozers, and many
communities are now completely cut off from their water sources.
According to the Palestinian Hydrology Group, Palestinians will
lose nearly 18% of their share of the Western Groundwater Basin.
7. The closure of communities threatens
public sanitation and health, as many people can no longer safely
dispose of their household, human and animal waste. The building
of the wall has also reduced access to medical services to a critical
level. Before the construction of the wall, people were able to
make expensive and risky journeys via roadblocks and checkpoints
to visit doctors and hospitals in nearby towns and cities. Now
many people are trapped behind new fences and walls. Village clinics
have assumed the full burden of emergency and chronic cases without
having either the trained staff or equipment to cope.
8. The completion of the wall will seriously
affect the viability of a future Palestinian state. The majority
of the most fertile agricultural areas in the West Bank have been
confiscated and lie outside the current route of the wall, effectively
denying Palestinians the potential to develop a modern agricultural
economy. If the wall aligns itself with the settlement blocs,
then the state will consist of the Gaza Strip and two non-contiguous
Palestinian areas in the north and south of the West Bank, with
a third Palestinian island around Jericho within an expanded Israel.
9. Without an alternative to Israeli occupation,
it is difficult to see how British or European development assistance
can help to achieve UN Millennium Development Goals relating to
health, education, water and poverty reduction in the Palestinian
Territories. The humanitarian situation is already bad and will
not improve without a political solution that guarantees protection
and justice for all the citizens of the region. The British government
is an important donor in the region, an influential member of
the EU, and a key partner of the US in the Middle East. It is
therefore well placed to use its influence in order to bring about
such a solution.
OXFAM GB'S
EXPERIENCE, SOURCES
AND PARTNERS
1. Oxfam GB has worked in the Palestinian
Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) and Israel since 1949 with
a variety of Palestinian organisations and NGOs. We work with
five Israeli partner organisations in the Negev desert supporting
the Bedouin people, the most disadvantaged of the Arab communities
in Israel. We also support an Israeli organisation working to
narrow social and economic gaps in Israeli Jewish society.
2. Oxfam receives one million euros per
annum from the EU to carry out its current programme in the West
Bank. The programme focuses on emergency water, sanitation and
public health in villages in the Nablus, Jenin, Jordan Valley
(Jericho), Tulkarem, Qalqiliya and Hebron districts.
3. Oxfam works on two levels. First, we
operate through local partners (including municipalities and local
village councils) to construct water cisterns at household and
community levels; replace damaged roof water storage tanks and
rehabilitate damaged water networks, wells and springs; give technical
training to other NGOs and local authorities on water recycling
and sanitation systems in institutions and at household level;
and conduct field water analysis training and monitor water and
sanitation needs throughout the West Bank. We also conduct public
health training in all communities where there is technical input.
4. Second, we coordinate with other organisations
by chairing the Emergency, Water and Sanitation and Hygiene Co-ordination
group (EWASH). EWASH is an open co-ordination forum that includes
all of the large water and sanitation agencies working in the
Palestinian Territories, including the Palestinian Water Authority
(PWA) and USAID, the largest donor in the water and sanitation
sector. It meets monthly to share information, prioritise community
needs and coordinate responses.
5. The Palestinian Hydrology Group's (PHG)
Oxfam-funded monitoring programme (WaSH MP) provides the EWASH
agencies with a regularly updated picture of the water, sanitation,
and hygiene situation across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since
June 2002, the WaSH MP has surveyed 643 of the 708 communities
in the West Bank and Gaza[170]
enumerated by the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
6. In this submission, we will address points
3 and 4 in the IDC terms of reference and specifically issues
relating to water, livelihoods, land and the movement of persons
and goods.
CURRENT ACCESS
TO WATER
FOR PALESTINIANS
7. Water remains a critical issue for many
West Bank villages and towns in terms of both quantity and quality.
The unresolved political issues relating to the Israeli occupation
of the Palestinian Territories has meant a continuous degradation
of the infrastructure over 36 years, preventing normal development.
8. The actions of both the Israeli army
and settlers in the Territories during the second Intifada have
seriously damaged the existing water infrastructure of many communities.
In April 2002, Oxfam with the PWA and USAID-funded agencies established
an Emergency Water Operations Centre to restore bulk water supply
to municipalities that suffered heavily from Israeli army incursions.
9. The system of road closures and curfews
has prevented many Palestinians from reaching and/or maintaining
their water sources. Roadblocks and checkpoints have constituted
a major obstruction to the passage of the water and wastewater
tankers, and this has contributed to the deteriorating hygiene
and health status in these communities.
10. The Government of Israel continues to
maintain complete control over the water resources in the Palestinian
Territories. At the June 2003 meeting of the Joint Water Committee
(JWC), established under the interim agreement that Israel and
the Palestinian Authority signed in September 1995 (Oslo II),
the Technical Sub Committee refused to license or approve any
new projects. Previously approved wells were even re-assessed.
In real terms this means a prohibition on drilling any new wells,
repairing water networks, or connecting local networks to the
main supply.
11. The JWC is the body responsible for
approving every new water and sewage project in the West Bank.
The JWC comprises an equal number of representatives of the Government
of Israel and the Palestinian Authority and all decisions have
to be made by consensus. Unfortunately, where consensus cannot
be attained, there is no mechanism for settling disputes. This
means that the Government of Israel is able to veto any request
by the Palestinian representatives to drill new wells or undertake
new building projects.
12. In addition, even if the approval were
to be granted by the JWC, if the site of the project is situated
in Area C (an Oslo division of the West Bank which is solely under
Israeli control and prohibited to Palestinians) the High Planning
Committee of the Civil Administration must therefore also approve
the project. In areas A and B of the West Bank where the JWC has
approved a project, up to 13 different permits must be obtained
for the project to proceed.
WATER QUANTITY
13. In spite of an Oslo II agreement to
increase the annual supply of water to the Occupied Territories
by 28.6 million cubic meters (mcm/year), the amount of water allocated
to Palestinians has remained little changed since Israel occupied
the Palestinian Territories in 1967, and has not been increased
to match population growth or meet the most basic needs of the
Palestinian population.
14. According to the Palestinian Hydrology
Group, Palestinians are currently using only 12% of the 1.8 billion
cubic meters of water shared by the Palestinians and Israelis
in the Jordan River Basin. Twenty five per cent of the population
of the Jordan River Basin is Palestinian. Political and physical
restraints imposed by Israel mean that these Palestinians consume
only 12% of the water and use less water per capita than any other
population in the Basin.
15. In addition, Mekorot, the only Israeli
company that supplies water to the Palestinians, reduced its flow
rate into the Territories by 10% in 2002 and it remains at the
same level in 2003. In some places it is actively diverting water
out into Israel (eg Bardala, Jordan Valley). Mekorot supplies
approximately 43% of the communities in the West Bank with water
as either a primary or secondary source, ie those communities
that possess a water, network[171].
It also supplies water to every new settlement. Each settler consumes
five times as much water as a West Bank Palestinian[172].
By contrast, in some Palestinian villages surveyed by the WaSH
monitoring project, the current supply has been reduced by as
much as 75%. Since the start of the second Intifada, Palestinian
communities that have been depending on Mekorot for part or all
of their water have found that Mekorot is regularly stopping supply.
16. Mekorot's monopoly on water supply can
also make difficult situations worse. The JWC had agreed to give
the PWA six filling points from which water tankers can fill up
before distributing water to villages. However, Mekorot located
the six filling points in remote areas near checkpoints. The Ministry
of Defence then prevented the PWA from using these filling points
on security grounds[173].
17. The amount of water available has been
significantly reduced by other factors. There are leaks and blockages
in the existing old network; and a sizeable number of water sources
have been confiscated by Israel on the basis of so called "security"
actions such as the building of the wall, or rendered unreachable
by political agreements, such as being placed in Area C which
contains many water sources and is prohibited to Palestinians.
18. Although there is the impression that
Mekorot reduces the water pressure because Palestinians cannot
pay their water bills, all the water bills are paid from the taxes
that Israel has been withholding from the Palestinian Authority.
The reduction in flow therefore seems to be an arbitrary measure.
19. Where communities do not have a Mekorot
supply, they have to rely on springs or production wells. Many
communities and villages, especially in southern Hebron, lost
access to their natural sources of water during the Oslo negotiations
and thus are forced to rely solely on tankered water. Tankers
fill up a 4m3 or 10m3 tank with water from a dedicated filling
point, and then discharge it into a holding tank at a household.
20. The reduction in water quantity plus
the increasing cost of transport to negotiate road blocks has
pushed up the price of tankered water in some places by as much
as 80%. Many Palestinians can no longer afford the water they
need to survive. Oxfam encourages un-networked communities to
build large water storage cisterns for rainwater collection that
can sustain them for a few months into the dry season before they
have to start paying high prices for water.
21. Many communities in south Hebron such
as Al Bourj and Beit Mirsam are in such a predicament. They purchase
water at approximately 200 NIS (GB£28) for 10m3. Many of
these families lost their main source of income from work in Israel
when the second Intifada broke out. They have had to sell off
their assets to allow them to buy basics such as water. Many families
in the West Bank survive on 9 litres per day (l/p/d) because that
is all they can afford. The World Health Organisation recommends
that the minimum amount of water for a person to maintain a healthy
life is 30 l/person/day for rural areas.
WATER QUALITY
22. A water quality analysis survey undertaken
in July 2003 by Oxfam with the Jenin Municipality Water Department
and the Ministry of Health Environmental Units for Jenin and Tubas
produced alarming results. The survey revealed that 69% of all
water samples taken from household water storage tanks, restaurants,
bakeries, pharmacies and other local level institutions failed
the WHO water standard for the Palestinian Territories and as
such pose a health risk to the consumer.
23. As a result of the decrease in quantity
and quality of water available we have documented a marked increase
in water borne diseases in the West Bank. Regular surveys between
June 2002 and January 2003 by the Oxfam Public Health Team reveal
that water-borne diseases are becoming more prevalent throughout
the West Bank where communities are forced to use contaminated
water sources.
24. Poor water quality is the result of
a combination of circumstances. Many of the villages and towns
we work in have experienced damage to all types of water sources
by IDF military action and from vandalism by Israeli citizens
living in the surrounding settlements. Deteriorating sewage systems
and the lack of chlorination have caused wells, cisterns and springs
to become contaminated. Furthermore, closures and curfews often
make it impossible for the Palestinian Ministry of Health and
municipalities to collect and analyse samples and monitor water
quality or make repairs.
HOW SETTLEMENTS
AFFECT WATER
SUPPLY
25. Settlements pose grave danger for Palestinian
villagers trying to gain access to their sources of water. In
some cases where settlers have deliberately committed acts of
sabotage to their water supply, Palestinians have been left with
limited access or without potable water.
26. Oxfam started working in Madama village
close to Nablus in June 2002. Madama has a population of 1,239
(Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics) and one water source,
which is a spring, located halfway up the hill from the village.
Settlers from Yizhar settlement on top of the hill have repeatedly
attacked and damaged the spring and destroyed the water pipe that
carries the water down the hill to the main storage tank in the
village. Oxfam interviewed many people in this village who had
tried to repair the pipe. Many had been shot at, three had received
direct bullet wounds as settlers opened fire on them while they
were carrying out repairs to the pipeline, and two donkeys used
to carry bags of cement and other materials up the hill had been
killed.
27. In response to a request by the head
of the village council, Oxfam undertook to repair the pipes by
coordinating with the IDF to ensure the safety of our staff and
the community members who would carry out the repair work. On
one occasion, the settlers opened fire when an international Oxfam
staff member was with the team of labourers (September 2002).
No one was killed, although several community members, and the
international staff member, were lightly injured while trying
to get out of the direct line of fire. The IDF were immediately
informed but claimed they were not able to control the settlers.
28. After the repair of the pipe for the
third time (April 2003), the settlers came the same day and used
the fresh concrete to re-block the pipe. At the time of writing,
Madama's residents still do not have water from this spring.
29. In the dry summer months some settlements
will sell water to Palestinians. Settlers near the Palestinian
village of Ar Ramadin in South Hebron have constructed a reservoir
inside their settlement using the main Mekorot water pipe line.
They store water in this way, and then sell it at a profit to
Palestinians in Ar Ramadin whose water supply runs out. Many West
Bank communities have no alternative water source so agree to
pay[174].
30. The existence of settlements in the
Territories severely inhibits Palestinian development by dictating
many of the security arrangements by which most Palestinians are
bound. The clearest example of this is the way in which settlements
are dictating the line of the wall being built by the Israeli
government within the West Bank to stop Palestinian militants
from entering Israel.
THE IMPACT
OF THE
WALL ON
WATER
31. The "wall" is in fact a complex
series of trenches, barbed wire, electrified fences, 8m high concrete
blocks, armed concrete turrets, cameras, infrared sensors and
security patrol roads, spanning between 30 and 100 metres. Private
property is being requisitioned under the 1949 Land Seizure in
Emergency Times Act. Property owners have one week in which to
file an appeal for review by an Israeli Army Appeals Committee[175].
Many do not see the notification in time, and when they have done
and can afford a lawyer, the majority of appeals have been rejected.
32. The construction of the wall entails
the large-scale confiscation and destruction of water resources
and infrastructure, exacerbating the already critical situation
described. According to the Local Aid Coordination Committee,
35,000 metres of water pipes that were used for both domestic
and agricultural purposes have been damaged or destroyed by Israeli
bulldozers in preparing the ground for Phase I of the wall.
33. Households trapped on the west side
of the wall now depend entirely on tankered water. This has a
severe impact on levels of household debt, for example, one family
of 18 members in Ras Tira village south of Qalqiliya ran out of
collected rainwater at the end of May this year. They have a natural
spring on their land from which they used to collect water through
the summer months, supplementing it with tankered water. This
year the spring was confiscated for the wall's construction. When
they have tried to access it they have been shot at and told it
is part of a closed military zone. They have to buy 10 cubic meters
of tankered water at a cost of $23 every 10 days. With no income
for over a year, the family's debts are insurmountable.
34. In Phase I of the wall alone, PHG reports
that approximately 36 groundwater wells with an approximate total
discharge of four million cubic metres per year are now located
on the western side of the wall and thereby separated from the
communities and farmers who depend on them. A further 14 wells
are now located in the buffer zone near the wall and are rendered
inaccessible. "As a result, Palestinians will lose nearly
18% of their share of the Western Groundwater Basin"[176]
SANITATION AND
HEALTH
35. Many of the communities with whom Oxfam
works perceive their most common public health problem to be the
need for the provision of containment and disposal of household,
human and animal waste. Many families cannot afford to pay for
sewage evacuation tankers. As a result the risks to health are
increased. Oxfam has established women's groups and recruited
volunteer community public health promoters in these communities.
36. Oxfam has observed that there is a correlation
between school attendance by teenage girls and clean toilets.
In schools where there are inadequate sanitary facilities, the
attendance rate of girls drops significantly.
37. Deir Sharaf village near Nablus has
been unable to dispose of its waste since the start of the second
Intifada. The dump they use is in Silat al Dahar a few kilometres
away, but they are unable to cross Shave Shomron checkpoint to
reach it. The garbage tractor they use is also beyond reach behind
another checkpointBeit Iba. While Oxfam was able to negotiate
with the Israeli authorities to rectify this situation, aid organisations
cannot negotiate on behalf of every village. People must be allowed
to move freely in order to carry out everyday tasks.
38. Before the wall was built, Ras Tira
village south of Qalqiliya, used to share one rubbish collection
truck belonging to villages in the surrounding area. The rubbish
was taken to the landfill site in Kufr Thuluth, a few kilometres
east. No one in the five villages encircled by the wall owns a
sewage truck, so the villages may have to resort to using a donkey
to carry the garbage to the edge of the enclave near the wall
where solid waste can be burnt.
39. The wall has reduced the Palestinians'
access to medical services to a critical level. Whereas villagers
could make a risky and expensive trek via roadblocks and checkpoints
to doctors in nearby towns, now they cannot get beyond the wall.
Village clinics have assumed the full burden of emergency and
chronic cases without having either the trained staff or equipment
to cope[177].
Many villages are serviced only by a mobile clinic/doctor visiting
once every two weeks and those beyond the wall now face the prospect
of losing this one remaining facility.
40. A UN Millennium Development Goal and
DFID policy is to increase the number of people worldwide with
access to safe water and sanitation by the year 2015. However,
access to both is being seriously reduced in the Palestinian Territories.
A BETTER USE
OF DONOR
MONEY
41. There are many instances where Oxfam
is unable to make the best use of donor money due to external
constraints.
42. Mekorot, the Israeli water company,
have pipelines that feed settlements but bypass Palestinian villages.
Mekarot would be better placed than other agencies to supply Palestinian
communities with clean drinking water at an affordable price nearby
the settlement. In the meantime, Oxfam has to install a less cost-effective
system in order to meet urgent needs.
43. Oxfam has built household water storage
tanks in some villages that are not connected to the network.
A more cost-effective and less discriminatory system would be
to build communal village cisterns to catch rainwater, but Oxfam
has not been granted permission by the Israeli authorities for
this. As Oxfam is unable to supply every household in the community
with a private tank, this has inevitably created some tensions
in the communities where we work.
44. As described above, many villages possess
a water source yet are unable to gain access to or use it due
to curfews, road closures, the actions of settlers or the security
wall. Using tankers is the only way to supply these villages with
water. This is costly and much less efficient.
45. In the village of Falamia, the largest
producer of citrus fruits in the West Bank, Oxfam, through PHG,
reconnected a water pipe that had been damaged by the Israeli
contractor building the wall. As it is the Israeli contractors'
legal responsibility to repair what they damage, NGOs who want
to enable people to access their water resources are put in a
difficult position when the contractor does not fulfil his obligations.
By carrying out vital work to provide humanitarian assistance,
their work effectively diverts donor funds to subsidise the building
of the wall.
LAND, LIVELIHOODS
AND THE
MOVEMENT OF
PEOPLE AND
GOODS
46. The World Bank reports that by the end
of 2002, 92,000 Palestinians out of 128,000 employed in Israel
before the Intifada had lost their jobs as a result of closures[178].
The majority of those who still manage clandestinely to cross
the Green Line to find work are now also losing their jobs through
the construction of the wall. Without freedom of movement, these
closures have effectively imprisoned two million Palestinians
in the West Bank.
47. At the end July 2003, the Palestinian
Ministry of Planning reported the existence of 133 permanent military
checkpoints in the West Bank. In the North West Bank, there were
also 29 iron gates, 222 earth mounds, 52 roadblocks plus 22,000
metres of ditches and trenches sealing off roads and tracks around
villages and towns. In addition there are always "flying"
or mobile checkpoints erected at random on a daily basis.
48. The cumulative effect of these external
and internal closures has been enormous. In broad terms, the majority
of over three million Palestinians have been kept from their places
of work, education, health and recreation for the last three years.
Agriculture, which has been the main source of income for the
majority in the face of massive unemployment, has been seriously
affected by the presence of settlements that prevent Palestinians
from harvesting their yearly olive crop. Now, vast swathes of
the most fertile West Bank land are being destroyed or rendered
inaccessible by the wall.
THE IMPACT
OF THE
WALL ON
LAND, LIVELIHOODS
AND MOVEMENT
OF PEOPLE
49. In the words of one man who supports
a family of eight in a village now encircled by the wall, "The
wall has stolen the last hope which I have which is the land".
Having lost his job in Israel as a construction worker when the
Intifada started, he had become totally dependent on his olive
groves. He has exhausted all his savings, and even sold his wife's
jewellery in order to make ends meet. The 70m wide wall now cuts
through his land leaving 80% of it inaccessible on the other side.
He reports that the only option now is to smuggle himself into
Israel in unauthorised ways, and at risk to his own life, in order
to search for work and income.
50. The wall, in its completed Phase I stage
alone, is having a disastrous impact on the movement of 14,000
Palestinians who are trapped in 17 villages between the Wall and
the Green Line. It is also affecting a further 35,000 people[179]
living just metres away from where the wall has been built who,
in being separated from their land, are losing their livelihoods
and their access to water and basic services such as health and
education.
51. Of particular concern is the fate of
Palestinian villages caught between the Wall and the Green Line.
For example, Mugharat al Dabr and Ras Tira are two out of five
Palestinian villages trapped by a loop in the wall south of the
Palestinian town of Qalqiliya. The reason is that they are situated
close to the 20-year-old settlement of Alfe Menashe, 4km east
of the Green Line. The wall will keep Alfe Menashe within a de
facto enlarged Israel demarcated by the wall to its east,
and prevent it from becoming an island within a future Palestinian
state (see map).
52. The Israeli State Attorney has declared
before the High Court of Justice that the no-mans land between
the Green Line and the wall will be declared "a closed military
area"[180].
This means that whereas the 3,000 settlers of Alfe Menashe can
freely come and go into Israel on settler roads, the approximately
800 Palestinians trapped in the five villages can go nowhere -
neither East beyond the wall further into the West Bank nor west
into Israel. No one has, as yet, addressed the grave problems
they are facing in terms of access to employment, markets and
medical care as a result of the wall.
53. Economically, Ras Tira village is dying:
80 of the 100 workers in the village are now unable to find or
reach employment; the majority of the village depends on food
aid[181]
and a small amount of agricultural produce from the remaining
accessible land in the village. Ras Tira has an electricity generator,
but the diesel oil and the maintenance of the network come from
outside the village. When the wall finally encircles them, they
will lose all physical contact with the outside world.
54. There are reportedly three different
types of gates planned for the wall for the passage of persons,
agricultural vehicles and goods, transported through a back-to-back
system[182].
However the arrangements for crossing the wall have not been published,
many of the gates have not been built, apparently due to budget
shortfalls, and access for farmers has mostly been lost. Where
farmers have been able to get through they are not allowed to
bring produce back with them.
55. The wall and further walls to protect
the "wall" surround Qalqiliya on all sides. The town
of 41,600 residents, which services a catchment area of 90,700
people, has only a single narrow entrance and exit, controlled
by an Israeli checkpoint. "Once a thriving commercial centre
for its entire region, our city has been reduced to destitution,"
said Qalqiliya Mayor Ma'aruf Zaharan in a recent speech[183].
As a result, 600 shops have closed and 4,000 residents, largely
traders, have left the city[184].
56. There is evidence that the wall may
be bringing about changes that could affect Palestinians' identity
and place of residence and thus their right of access to land
and villages of origin. Israeli officials have been conducting
surveys of the residents of the villages that will end up on the
west side of the wall. Using old lists, they score off the names
of those who have died and register new residents. Anyone who
is not there at the time is not registered. Those who have moved
out to nearby towns are regarded as absentee landowners. They
still own their land and property, but are no longer allowed back,
nor registered as belonging to their village.
57. There is also some evidence that those
who do live in the village are also slowly being registered
elsewhere. Although Ras Tira is registered and coded within the
Israeli computer system, some villagers have found that when they
take their ID cards to be renewed, their registered address has
been changed to another village further east in the West Bank.
Palestinians fear that if they leave their village they will not
be able to return.
58. "The wall has tied our lives to
permits. That's why we are afraid. Those who are registered outside
this address will not be able to go and come back," said
one village council member. The residents of Ras Tira are convinced
that these measures amount to an organised transfer of the villagers,
which serves the Israeli aim of having the land without the people.
The wall is certainly forcing Palestinians to move out of their
original homes to areas where life is more economically viable[185].
59. An obvious consequence of the wall and
its impact on livelihoods, access to water and the movement of
people and goods is on the economic viability of a future Palestinian
state. The majority of the most fertile agricultural areas in
the West Bank have been confiscated and lie outside the current
route of the wall, denying a future Palestinian state the potential
for developing a modern agricultural economy. If the wall aligns
itself with the settlement blocs then the state will consist of
the Gaza Strip and two non-contiguous Palestinian areas in the
north and south of the West Bank, with Jericho as a third Palestinian
island within an expanded Israel (see map).
1. Our submission relates to points 3 and
4 of the IDC terms of reference and specifically to the issues
of water, livelihoods, land and the movement of persons and goods.
In summary our conclusions are:
That the impact of the occupation
of the Palestinian Territories on the daily lives of ordinary
Palestinians is severe, with high levels of household debt, unemployment,
lack of access to key services leading to increased incidence
of poverty and deteriorating health indicators.
That the mechanisms established under
Oslo II for the delivery of vital public services and development
assistance are not working and therefore Millennium Development
Goals will not be met.
That the work of aid agencies is
severely restricted and the effectiveness of EU development aid
is undermined.
That the building of the security
fence by the Government of Israel in response to the deteriorating
security situation is having a devastating and negative impact
on the livelihoods and health of Palestinians whose land is affected
by the building of the wall.
2. We are also deeply concerned that the
current humanitarian situation is not conducive to creating conditions
for peace. The hardship and difficulties faced by ordinary Palestinians
attempting to go about their daily lives is breeding disillusionment
in the peace process and loss of hope. The impact of security
measures taken by the Government of Israel also appear to threaten
the economic viability of any future Palestinian Statea
critical part of the Road Map for peace. Without peace, security
and stability there can be no long-term resolution of the humanitarian
crisis. As detailed in our submission prime agricultural land
and key water resources are being confiscated for the building
of the wall. The wall will also leave thousands of Palestinians
isolated in non-contiguous enclaves.
3. The humanitarian situation is critical
and will not improve without a political solution that guarantees
protection and justice for all the citizens of the region. Only
a comprehensive settlement that takes into account all of the
final status issuesborders, water rights, settlements,
refugees and Jerusalemwill achieve peace. The UK government
is an important donor in the region, an influential member of
the EU and a key partner of the US in the Middle East. It is therefore
well placed to use its influence in order to bring about such
a negotiated solution.
4. Without an alternative to Israeli occupation,
it is difficult to see how British or EU Development assistance
can achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals relating to health,
education, water and poverty reduction in the Palestinian Territories.
We believe that for humanitarian reasons assistance to NGOs such
as Oxfam should continue to be provided but it should be recognised
that current assistance is being used in the form of an emergency
response rather than a long-term development tool.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We would like the International Development
Committee to consider the following recommendations for inclusion
in its report to the House:
1. In order to bring about an immediate
improvement in the humanitarian situation, and in particular Palestinians'
access to water and land, and freedom of movement, the British
government should use its influence with the governments of Israel
and the US to immediately ease the closure policies in force in
the West Bank.
2. While recognising the seriousness of
Israel's security concerns, the British government should press
the governments of Israel and the US to bring an immediate halt
to the construction of the wall inside the West Bank and around
Jerusalem. Those sections that have already been built should
also come down. There is no consensus within Israel that the wall
will guarantee security but Oxfam's experience demonstrates that
it will further impoverish the Palestinian population. By further
confiscating Palestinian land and water resources it is also a
direct threat to the viability of a future Palestinian state and
makes even more remote the possibility of a negotiated settlement.
3. In the light of evidence that the construction
of the wall may lead to the forced migration of some Palestinians
from their land and villages of origin, we urge the Committee
to investigate this aspect of the building of the wall further
as part of their inquiry.
4. In order to achieve real change,
the British government should use its influence with the Quartet
for Peace to explore alternatives to Israeli occupation. Development
aid should be accompanied by international mechanisms for protection
capable of upholding impartially the rights of both Israeli and
Palestinian civilians under international humanitarian law. Only
such an arrangement can ensure an immediate cessation of violence,
the restoration of economic activity, and help foster the trust
and goodwill that will be needed to reach a final settlement.
September 2003
Annex 1Water and Human Rights
This note is based almost entirely on Thirsty
for a Solution: The Water Crisis in the Occupied Territories and
its Resolution in the Final-Status Agreement, Yehezkel Lein,
Jerusalem: B'Tselem 2000.
Three different systems of international law
are relevant to Palestinian water rights.
1. International water law, in particular
the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Water Courses (henceforward the UN Water Course Convention, adopted
1997). Aquifers in the Palestinian territories are all shared
with Israel, although one sub-aquifer is almost entirely in occupied
Palestinian territory. Shared aquifers are governed by this convention
and customary international water law, based on the principle
of equitable and reasonable use. The UN Water Courses Convention
lists the factors needed to be considered in negotiations between
states on the division of shared aquifers and surface water. These
factors include social, economic and demographic needs, the geography
of watercourses, and existing and potential uses of watercourses.
The convention prohibits states from causing significant harm
to the interests of other watercourse states.
2. International humanitarian law, in particular
the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (The Hague Regulations, 1907), and the fourth Geneva Convention
(GC4, 1949), and its first additional protocol (AP1, 1977). The
Hague regulations severely limit the rights of an occupying power
to use the natural resources of an occupied territory, and to
change the laws of an occupied territory, including those relating
to water. GC4 obliges an occupying power to maintain public health,
and not to discriminate on grounds of race, religion or political
opinion. AP1 prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the
survival of civilian population such as drinking water installations
and irrigation works (Article 54).
3. International human rights law, in particular
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989), the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW, 1979) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESR, 1966). The CRC obliges states party
to ensure the provision of clean drinking water for all children.
CEDAW obliges states party to ensure adequate water supplies for
rural women. The ICESCR gives peoples rights to their natural
resources and obliges states party to ensure an adequate standard
of living for citizens. In 2002, the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) issued a Draft General Comment
on the Right to Water, which stated that the right to an adequate
standard of living includes the right to clean drinking water.
Annex 2

169 The total population affected by the wall is 224,760;
UN OCHA Update, 14-30 June 2003. Back
170
666 in West Bank and 42 in Gaza. Back
171
PHG surveyed 643 communities in the West Bank and Gaza up to May
2003. Of the 601 surveyed in the West Bank, 261 have some kind
of supply from Mekorot (43%); of the 42 surveyed in Gaza, 11 have
a Mekorot supply (26%) (42% overall). Back
172
Stop the Wall, PENGON report, June 2003, p 54. Back
173
Operational Coordination Group, minutes 26 June 2003. Back
174
Basema Bashir at PHG, confirmed by phone research 12 August 2003. Back
175
The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West
Bank Communities-report of the mission to the Humanitarian
and Emergency Policy Group of the Local Aid Coordination Committee,
4 May 2003. Back
176
See the PHG "water for life" campaign website-http://www.phg.org/campaign/emergency/wall.html Back
177
Forgotten Villages, OI No 28 Briefing Paper, p 23. Back
178
Twenty-seven months-Intifada, closures and Palestinian Economic
crisis, March 2003, p 12. Back
179
Figures from Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network report, published
August 2003, excludes East Jerusalem. PENGON represents many NGOs
including PARC. Back
180
The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West
Bank Communities-report of the mission to the Humanitarian
and Emergency Policy Group of the Local Aid Coordination Committee,
4 May 2003. Back
181
From ICRC, the Labour Union and the Palestinian Ministry of Social
Affairs. Back
182
The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West
Bank Communities-report of the mission to the Humanitarian
and Emergency Policy Group of the Local Aid Coordination Committee,
4 May 2003, No 18, p 9-conversation between senior IDF official
& a staff member of UNSCO. Back
183
Quoted in Gush Shalom press release, 31 July 2003 cf. www.gush-shalom.org/english/index.html Back
184
Figures from Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network report, fact
sheet, March 2003. Back
185
Former British Minister for DFID Clare Short recognized this trend
in April: "The fence will have serious humanitarian consequences.
Current estimates indicate the northern and Jerusalem sections
of the fence . . . will leave 290,000 Palestinians on the Israeli
side of the fence. Of those, some 70,000 do not have Israeli residency
permits and may therefore be forced to move east of the fence
to retain access to basic services." Written Statement from
Clare Short on West Bank and Gaza, 29 April 2003. CONCLUSIONS Back
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