Memorandum submitted by UNRWA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Since the outbreak of the intifada
in 2000, the conflict in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT)
has further worsened the already vulnerable situation of the Palestine
refugees and presented the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with new challenges
in continuing to provide essential humanitarian assistance to
the refugees. World Bank socio-economic indicators illustrate
the dire context in which the Agency, as well as other service
providers in the OPT, are operating: approximately 60% of Palestinians
live on less than US$ 2 per day, and about 40% of Palestinians
are unemployed. In response, UNRWA has complemented its regular
education, health, relief, microfinance and social services with
emergency interventions focused on: (1) addressing the refugees'
basic short-term needs; and (2) initiatives that address more
long-term effects of the current situation aimed at preventing
large-scale damage to physical and human capital. It is the view
of the Agency that even under the best economic scenario for 2003-04,
poverty and unemployment rates will continue to remain high in
the OPT, thereby rendering it essential for the donor community,
including the UK and EC, to focus on maintaining their commitment
to emergency humanitarian interventions.
2. Since the early 1990s, UNRWA's operations
in the OPT have increasingly taken on a development orientation.
The UK and EC development assistance extended to the Palestine
refugees through UNRWA in the OPT has played a critical role in
the construction and rehabilitation of essential infrastructure
for provision of basic education, health and environmental sanitation
services. Internally, UK assistance has been critical in upgrading
management information systems and in implementing technical,
programme and management reforms in the Agency.
3. Israeli imposed restrictions on movement
of persons and goods, Israel's continued construction of the separation
barrier in the West Bank, and the continued expansion of its settlements
and settlement-related infrastructure in the OPT, have compounded
the difficulties faced by the Palestinians in the OPT and by UNRWA
and the various other humanitarian organizations working in the
area. UNRWA provides essential services to approximately 50% of
the Palestinian population of the OPT, making it a principal component
of the infrastructure of Palestinian development. UNRWA's assets
(both material and human) have a key role to play in the development
of the OPT, and the Agency is currently working closely with the
Palestinian Authority (PA) and other actors on medium and long
term development plans. A shortfall in funding requirements for
UNRWA's January-June 2003 Emergency Appeal has severely compromised
the Agency's emergency interventions in the OPT, particularly
in respect of emergency food distributions, shelter rehabilitation
and construction, cash-assistance, and emergency health, remedial
education and job creation activities. Should political developments
facilitate a move towards socio-economic reconstruction and rehabilitation
in the OPT, the donor community, including the UK, should provide
increased assistance to the PA, UNRWA and to civil society institutions.
Support for international agencies in the OPT, such as UNRWA,
is complementary to that provided directly to PA institutions,
the consequences of which are mutually reinforcing. Noteworthy
in this regard is that there is little or no overlap between the
scope of responsibility of UNRWA and the PA.
INTRODUCTION
4. UNRWA is one of the main service providers
in the OPT, providing essential humanitarian assistance to Palestine
refugees through its education, health, relief and social services,
micro-finance and micro-enterprise programmes. In the Gaza Strip,
there are approximately 907,000 registered refugees (67% of the
population), while in the West Bank that figure is around 655,000
(28% of the population). Although the social, political and economic
contexts in which the Agency has provided its services over the
years have always presented a challenge, the period since the
outbreak of the "Al-Aqsa intifada" in September
2000 has been particularly difficult. After almost 35 months of
conflict, some 2,400 Palestinians have been killed, with approximately
23,500 injured, a good many of them registered refugees. During
the same period, some 800 Israelis have been killed, with approximately
5,800 injured. Israeli measures taken in the OPT, principally
the widespread imposition of closures and curfews, have had a
devastating socio-economic impact on the Palestinians, particularly
on the already vulnerable refugee segment of the population.
5. The extent of Palestinian socio-economic
devastation over the last 35 months is best illustrated in World
Bank statistics. According to the Bank, approximately 60% of the
Palestinian population in the OPT were living below the poverty
line of less than US$ 2.1 per day as of December 2002. This represents
a tripling of the figure of 21% of Palestinians who were below
the poverty line on the eve of the intifada. Furthermore,
the poor are also getting poorer. Whereas in 1998 the average
daily consumption of a poor person was equivalent to US$ 1.47
per day, as of the end of 2002 that figure fell to US$ 1.32. This
is of even greater concern when one takes into account the 13%
growth of the Palestinian population in the OPT over the past
three years. By the end of 2002, Palestinian real Gross National
Income (GNI) had plummeted by 38% from its 1999 level. Altogether,
GNI losses reached US$ 5.2 billion as of December 2002, a figure
equivalent to almost one full year of Palestinian wealth creation.
Real annual change in per capita GDP has plummeted from 3.9% in
1998 to -22.5% in 2002. As of December 2002, Palestinian unemployment
in the OPT was 37%, after having reached 45% in September 2002—the
recent improvement being accounted for by short-lived olive and
citrus harvests. Nearly 100,000 Palestinian workers have lost
their jobs in Israel since September 2000, leading to a 76% decline
in Palestinian worker remittances from US$ 328 million in Q3 2000
to US$ 79 million in Q1 2003. With lower incomes and higher poverty,
dependency ratios for the population soared as much as 50% from
4.3 in Q3 2000, to 6.6 in Q1 2003 in the West Bank, and from 5.9
to 7.5, respectively, in the Gaza Strip. During the past five
years, the real annual change in fixed investment in the Palestinian
economy has dropped from 8.4% in 1998 to -44% in 2002. Israeli
restrictions and closures have crippled foreign trade, with the
real annual change in exports falling from 6.6% in 1998 to -24.3%
in 2002, with the figures for imports standing at 7.4% and -12.9%
respectively.
6. It is in this dire context that UNRWA
has sought to provide emergency humanitarian services, alongside
its regular programme interventions in the OPT. The Agency has
adopted a two-pronged approach in its emergency interventions:
(1) addressing the refugee population's basic needs through
inter alia food aid, cash assistance, and shelter repairs
on the one hand; and (2) implementing activities addressing the
longer term effects of the current situation on the other, such
as infrastructure maintenance through emergency employment generation,
remedial education and psycho-social support, with a view to preventing
large-scale damage to physical and human capital. Between April
and June 2003, the Agency's emergency food assistance benefited
approximately 195,000 families in the West Bank and Gaza fields,
totaling close to one million beneficiaries. Likewise, UNRWA hired
approximately 41,000 people since the start of the emergency appeals
in late 2000, who in turn were able to support over 250,000 dependants.
7. It is against this social, economic and
political backdrop that the Agency makes the following submissions
to the International Development Committee of the British House
of Commons regarding the matter of development assistance in the
OPT.
UK AND EC DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE TO
UNRWA
8. UNRWA's operations in the OPT have increasingly
taken on a development orientation, especially since the early
1990s. With the launching of the Madrid process and the signing
of the Oslo Accords, the UN General Assembly passed resolution
48/40 on 10 December 1993. Noting that this "new context
. . . will have major consequences for the activities of the Agency,"
the General Assembly called upon UNRWA "to make a decisive
contribution towards giving a fresh impetus to the economic and
social stability of the occupied territories." UNRWA launched
the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP) in October 1993 aimed
at making the results of the peace process felt at the local level
through a wide-ranging investment programme to develop infrastructure,
improve living conditions and create employment opportunities
in refugee communities. The first phase of PIP was developed following
consultations with UNRWA's major donors, host governments and
the Palestinian leadership. It drew upon the recommendations of
the Secretary-General's 1993 task force on the economic and social
development of the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The second phase of
PIP was launched in September 1994 in close coordination with
the PA and the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and
Reconstruction (PECDAR). PIP II, while sharing the same basic
goals as PIP I, laid additional emphasis on projects that would
minimize subsequent recurrent costs and those that would complement
projects undertaken directly by the PA. PIP projects reinforced
and supported the Agency's regular programmes by helping to maintain
infrastructure at standards necessary for adequate provision of
services. These projects include construction of schools, additional
classrooms, primary care health centres, and mother and child
health clinics. A special focus of PIP was environmental sanitation
projects, especially in the Gaza Strip. These projects improved
sewerage, drainage and water supply systems, garbage collection
and disposal mechanisms, shoreline protection and aquifer renewal.
In addition, during the current intifada, UNRWA has invested
US$ 18.64 million in 23,665 loans to microenterprises that have
helped businesses survive and provided support to families.
9. Enclosed at Appendix I is a detailed
listing of UNRWA projects funded by the UK and EC, including ECHO-funded
projects since 1993. The UK and EC development assistance extended
to the Palestine refugees through UNRWA in the OPT has played
a critical role in the construction and rehabilitation of essential
infrastructure for provision of basic education, health and environmental
sanitation services. By way of illustration, the impact of these
projects at the ground level in the case of two of the larger
projects in the Gaza Strip is as follows:
— Construction of Sewerage and Drainage
Systems in Beach Refugee Camp, North and South. This was one project
in a series of initiatives to improve the environmental health
conditions in Beach Camp, and with its implementation the whole
of the camp was connected to the sewerage drainage system. Before
1995 only 30% of the camp was connected; consequently, seepage
pits contaminated the ground water and overflowed into surface
drains. Sewage and polluted storm drainage water posed a direct
health threat in terms of diarrhoea and dysentery. Parasites were
alarmingly common. This UK-funded project covered around 65% of
the total area of the camp, benefiting approximately 49,000 persons.
A comparative study on the environmental conditions in the camp
(1st phase March 1994, 2nd phase August 1999) indicates that investment
in the infrastructure has had a marked positive effect on the
incidence of disease in the camp.
| Findings | First phase
| Second phase |
Prevalence of parasites (%) | 58.7
| 36.5 |
| Prevalence of ascaris (%) | 57.6
| 16 |
| Prevalence of giardiasis (%) | 29
| 17 |
| Prevalence of amebiasis (%) | 4.7
| 2.8 |
| No. of ascaris eggs in the soil | 10
| 3.3 |
| Fly index | 27 | 27
|
| Rat index | 2.2 | 1
|
| E coli index | 25% positive
| All negative |
| No of diarrhoeal cases/week | 56
| 15 |
| No. of dysentery cases/week | 19
| 2.8 |
| |
|
— Completion of European Gaza Hospital. The construction
of the European Gaza Hospital funded by the European Commission
saw a 24% increase in the number of hospital beds available in
the Gaza Strip and significantly improved advanced health service
delivery.
10. The significant investments by the international
community in refugee camp infrastructure and refugee human capital
in the OPT through UNRWA faced a serious threat as a result of
the strife engulfing the OPT since September 2000. It is the view
of the World Bank and other humanitarian organizations that the
primary reason for the decline in infrastructure and human capital
levels over the last two and a half years in the OPT is the economically
stifling political and military policies of Israel. The extent
of UK and EC funding, including ECHO funding, of UNRWA's emergency
appeals is outlined in Appendix II. Such assistance prevented
the vulnerable refugee community from further descent into poverty.
However, donor assistance, including from the UK and EC, cannot
be the primary means of poverty alleviation over the long run.
While a resumption of labour exports to Israel would give the
Palestinian economy a short-term boost, long-term and sustainable
economic and social development of the OPT is contingent on a
resumption of the political process and structural changes in
the Palestinian economy focused on a goods-based export policy
and diversification into regional markets. As the World Bank recommends,
a long-term and diversified Palestinian development and growth
strategy must not perpetuate the current overwhelming dependence
on Israel.
11. According to the World Bank analysis, donor commitments
to infrastructure and capacity building work with a medium-term
focus in the OPT fell from US$ 482 million in 1999 to US$ 197
million in 2002. Whereas in 2000 the ratio of overall development
and emergency donor assistance to the OPT was approximately 7:1
in favour of development assistance, by 2002 the ratio shifted
to almost 5:1 in favour of emergency assistance. While there has
been a recent refocus by some donors following the launch of the
"Road Map", the view of the Agency and other humanitarian
actors in the field, is that even under the best economic scenario
for 2003-04, poverty and unemployment rates will continue to remain
high. In the best case scenario, the World Bank estimates that
the poverty rate will be 49.6% in 2003 and 44.5% in 2004, with
respective unemployment rates of 28.9% and 25.3%. Such being the
case, it is essential for the donor community, including the UK
and EC, to focus on maintaining their commitment to emergency
humanitarian interventions even as they consider a fresh focus
on development oriented interventions.
12. In this context, UNRWA received just 34% of the total
funding requirements for its January-June 2003 Emergency Appeal.
The extent of this shortfall has severely compromised the Agency's
emergency response in the OPT. Food distributions were halved
in the Gaza Strip, with only four of the eight food rounds required
being provided for. The West Bank is reducing the volume of food
provided to beneficiaries to stretch existing stocks. Despite
these cutbacks, the Agency used up its remaining food reserve
stocks in the Gaza field by the end of August, and in the West
Bank, stocks will last only until the end of October. Due to funding
shortfalls, the Agency was obliged to drastically reduce its emergency
re-housing programme. In the Gaza field, only US$ 75,000 of the
US$ 7.7 million required for re-housing was available in the first
six months of 2003. With these funds, the Agency was able to purchase
only tents, blankets and mattresses for those made homeless by
recent IDF house demolitions (a total of 112 shelters were demolished
in the Gaza Strip in the month of May alone). Needless to add,
even as the demand for shelter rehabilitation and construction
continues to rise, the Agency was unable to meet the needs of
families whose shelters were destroyed in the past three years.
In the first half of 2003, cash assistance was drastically reduced
from US$ 3.4 million to US$ 950,000 in the Gaza Strip and of the
US$ 3.3 million required in the West Bank, only US$ 2,600 was
allotted. This has meant that the large number of destitute families
could not be assisted with cash for basic needs such as cooking
fuel. Furthermore, of the US$ 2.7 million required for the emergency
health programme during January-June, only US$ 750,000 was allotted.
Funds available for hospitalisation in the West Bank field are
barely sufficient to provide services to those with life-threatening
conditions. Serious under-funding has crippled UNRWA's efforts
to improve environmental health conditions severely affected by
recent IDF activity which damaged sewage lines and waste removal
facilities. UNRWA could not provide any funds towards the US$
3.8 million requested for emergency remedial education and after-school
activities in 2003. While a total of 41,215 Palestinians have
been hired by UNRWA under its direct employment programme in the
Gaza field, no funding was available in the first half of the
year to support planned indirect hire activities for the construction
of vital infrastructure. In the West Bank field , the planned
1,600 active monthly contracts were reduced to 1,300, and no new
contracts for community based projects were issued.
ISRAELI MOVEMENT
RESTRICTIONS: IMPACT
ON HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS
13. UNRWA now imports 105,000 tonnes of basic food commodities
into the West Bank and Gaza Strip annually, 90,000 tonnes in connection
with its emergency programmes and 15,000 tonnes for its regular
programmes of assistance. These quantities are the equivalent
of 5,200 20ft containers.
14. Since the start of the intifada the Israeli
authorities have instituted new procedures for searching cargo
delivered to the Port of Ashdod. Containers are opened and random
samples of the contents are x-rayed. These searches have led to
considerable delays and additional loading, offloading, storage
and demurrage costs to the Agency. Between 1 September 2000 and
1 February 2003, UNRWA incurred an additional US$ 1.78 million
in storage and demurrage charges on its imports of basic commodities.
Fees levied at the Karni crossing into the Gaza Strip account
for a part of these additional costs. Since October 2000, United
Nations-owned trucks have been barred from moving into or out
of the Gaza Strip. The Agency delivers its shipments to the Gaza
Strip on leased trucks through the Karni crossing. The Israeli
authorities levy a transit charge of approximately US$ 35 for
a 20ft container and approximately US$ 45 for a 40ft container
entering the Gaza Strip and, since mid-August 2002, a charge of
approximately US$ 35 on empty containers leaving the Strip. Karni
handles approximately 60-80 trailers per day (120-160 containers),
with the UN's daily priority allotment changing regularly. In
late May 2003, UNRWA and WFP allowances were reduced to 15 containers
each. This was reduced to 10 containers per day following the
breakdown of the ceasefire. Discussions to resolve this are ongoing.
When deliveries are in full flow, we often need to bring in between
20-30 containers a day (30 being our maximum capacity). Arbitrary
and recurrent changes in entry restrictions effected by the Israeli
authorities at Karni crossing have a significant negative impact
on UNRWA operations. By way of illustration, the total closure
imposed by Israel between the end of March and mid-May 2002 forced
a one-month suspension of the Agency's emergency food distribution
programme.
15. The movement of goods into and out of the West Bank
on Palestinian licensed trucks is forbidden by the Israeli authorities,
and applicable regulations in this regard are continually changed
without notice. It is therefore necessary to use Israeli and Palestinian-licensed
trucks in tandem. The cost of leasing an Israeli licensed truck
is approximately US$ 11 per tonne and the daily cost for a Palestinian
licensed truck is around US$ 7. Additional labour costs are incurred
in connection with loading and offloading, on average US$ 3 per
pallet. Because Palestinian vehicles are banned from a number
of main roads linking the cities of the West Bank, long detours
result in additional running costs (until recently, the movement
of goods between cities in the West Bank was prohibited).
16. Restrictions on movement often fluctuate with changes
in the security situation on the ground. UNRWA's security office
has monitored the flow of Palestinian labourers and goods from
the Gaza Strip into Israel on a daily basis since the start of
the intifada. (The vast majority cross at Erez checkpoint,
with small numbers also able to cross at Sofa checkpoint). According
to Agency records, Erez was totally closed to Palestinians for
486 of the first 1,000 days of the intifada:
| Period | Details
|
| September 2000 | Approximately 30,000 persons per day.[256]
|
| To end of March 2002 | Dropped almost immediately to zero following outbreak of hostilities, averaging around 2,000/day throughout 2001 and Q1 2002.
|
| Q2 2002 | Crossing closed from end-March until mid-June.
|
Mid-June
December 2002 | The number of workers crossing each day gradually increased from 500 at the end of June to 10,000-11,500 by the end of the year. Note: the number of permit holders was typically 25-30% higher than the number of those able to cross. This remains the case.
|
| Early 2003 | Checking procedures were tightened at Erez checkpoint. The number of permit holders dropped by around 25% and the number of crossers also dropped, with between 6,000-9,500 regularly crossing.
|
| 15-23 March | Total closure.
|
| 16 April-1 June | Total closure, except on 11 May, coinciding with a visit to Israel by US Secretary of State Powell.
|
| 1-8 June | Reopened, with up to 9,500 labourers crossing each day.
|
| 8-30 June | An attack at Erez industrial zone on 8 June saw the crossing closed until 30 June, the day after the main Palestinian rejectionist groups agreed to a three-month ceasefire.
|
| 1 July-19 Aug | Erez crossing was reopened coupled with a steady increase in the number of permits issued and daily crossers. By 12 August 17,000 permits had been issued and 12,500-13,500 labourers were able to cross. Palestinians under the age of 28 are prohibited from crossing for work.
|
| 20 Aug— | Erez crossing has been completely closed to Palestinians.
|
| |
17. Taken together, restrictions on movement of persons
and goods, imposition of new charges, higher transport costs and
the time taken to import or export goods severely impede economic
development in the OPT.
SEPARATION BARRIER:
IMPACT ON
THE REFUGEES
AND UNRWA OPERATIONS
18. The Government of Israel has continued construction
in the West Bank of the separation barrier (also referred to as
the "wall"). This began in June 2002 and is being built
well inside West Bank territory through large-scale expropriation
and de facto annexation of Palestinian land. Available
reports suggest that the barrier is planned eventually to surround
the area of the West Bank in which the bulk of the Palestinian
population is located and, by means of subsidiary "depth
barriers", fences, and trenches, to enclose many West Bank
towns and villages inside separate enclaves. One of the first
phases of this complex project, a barrier of more than 120 kilometres
which traverses the Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqilya governorates,
was completed in July 2003. The barrier is some 70 metres wide
on average, extending up to 100 metres in some areas. At its most
extensive, it consists of an electronic "smart fence"
in the centre; on the eastern side there is a trench, ditch or
other obstacle to act as a barrier against vehicles, a razor-wire
fence and a paved service road; west of the "smart fence"
are a trace path to disclose the footprints of anyone crossing,
a two-lane patrol road, a road for armoured vehicles and another
fence. In some sections, notably west of Tulkarm town and Qalqilya,
the central fence is replaced by a concrete wall approximately
eight metres high. The barrier also includes watchtowers and entry
gates. In some areas, local residents have been informed that
a "no go" or buffer zone of undefined extent on the
"Palestinian" side of the barrier will also be imposed,
although there has not yet been any official confirmation of this.
19. Even though not yet completed, the barrier is already
having a major adverse impact on the local Palestinian population,
including significant numbers of registered refugees, who have
lost agricultural land to the barrier itself and are faced with
difficult problems of access to land and water resources now isolated
on the other side of the barrier from where they live. In the
future, the local population will have increasing difficulty in
getting to essential services, such as schools, hospitals and
places of work. UNRWA is particularly concerned about the impact
the barrier will have on its ability to continue to provide essential
humanitarian services to registered refugees and other persons
in need throughout the West Bank. The Agency estimates that in
the Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqilya governates alone over 200,000
people will be adversely affected, including nearly 15,000 refugee
families, who will constitute approximately 30% of the total impacted
population. Most affected will be 14 communities which will be
completely isolated between the main separation barrier and the
"Green Line", numbering approximately 13,500 Palestinians,
including an estimated 375 refugee families. Additional enclaves
will be created to the east of the barrier affecting 15 communities
numbering approximately 140,000 Palestinians, including over 13,000
refugee families. The towns of Qalqilya and Tulkarm are to be
fenced off completely, allowing access only through a limited
number of gates manned by Israeli forces. Movement into Qalqilya,
for example, will be possible only through one gate to the east,
severely affecting refugees who rely on the UNRWA hospital and
three UNRWA schools there. Plans to enclose Tulkarm and its immediate
hinterland between a concrete wall to the west and a 10 kilometre-long
"depth barrier" to the east will have a similarly negative
impact on the approximately 8,000 refugee families who reside
in Tulkarm and its two adjoining refugee camps. Refugees constitute
a particularly vulnerable group amid the general population and,
when the barrier is completed, are likely to face a further sharp
decline in living standards and increased dependency on outside
humanitarian aid. This would add to the Agency's already over-burdened
caseload and further strain its limited resources. A detailed
Agency study on the wall may be accessed at: http://www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/stories/barrier/part01.html.
SETTLEMENTS: IMPACT
ON THE
REFUGEES AND
AGENCY OPERATIONS
20. In the Gaza Strip, roads linking the settlements
to Israel cut across the main north-south traffic arteries. Military
checkpoints allow the Israeli authorities to control movement
of goods and personnel. In addition, these checkpoints cut the
Gaza Strip into three separate sections, and allow the Israeli
military authorities to impose internal closures at will. The
impact of such settlement-related infrastructure on UNRWA's operations
provides a useful indicator of their effect on the normal flow
of life in the Strip. Over 750 UNRWA staff members (10% of the
total workforce) daily cross the checkpoints to reach their place
of work. When the coastal road and the Abu Houli checkpoints are
closed they are either unable to reach their duty stations or
forced to work reduced hours (when only the Abu Houli checkpoint
is closed, approximately 350 staff are affected). The Agency estimates
that between September 2000 and July 2003, 395,000 working hours
had been lost by all non-teaching staff, in addition to almost
200,000 teaching days. UNRWA Gaza records indicate that Abu Houli-Gush
Qatif checkpoints were totally closed for 39 of the first 1,000
days of the intifada and partially closed for 498 days[257].
Checkpoints at the coastal road (between northern and middle Gaza)
have caused staff delays on approximately 100 days since September
2000.
21. Restrictions on movement are particularly severe
in areas in the Gaza Strip close to settlement blocks, such al-Mawasi,
al-Seafa etc. These restrictions include:
(a) Palestinian areas adjacent to Dugit Settlement (population
of approximately 160): on 21 June 2001 the IDF closed the PA area
between Dugit and Ali Sinai settlements and prevented residents
from crossing. Since 9 July 2001 the area has been under curfew
and partial closure, with residents only allowed to cross between
0700-0900 hrs and 1430-1700 hours.
(b) Al Mawasi (population of approximately 6,000): Since
September 2000 the Toufah and Tel es-Sultan checkpoints have been
closed to vehicles, preventing farmers from effectively marketing
their goods and denying pupils access to secondary education.
Restrictions on entry have been severe, with both checkpoints
sometimes closed for several days or only open for a few hours
per day. Age limits have also been enforced, with men under 40
often unable to cross. A curfew was imposed on 12 December 2001
which remained in place until 27 July 2003.
(c) Abu Al Ajeen (population of approximately 4,000):
A curfew on the Abu Al Ajeen and Qarrara areas, close to Kfar
Darom settlement, was in place from 26 Feb 2002 to 27 July 2003.
(d) Al Mughraqa (population of approximately 500): A curfew
on the area close to Netzarim settlement has been in place since
June 2002, although it has been unofficially relaxed since July
2003.
(e) Palestinian area northeast of Kfar Darom Settlement
(population of approximately 135): A fence has been erected around
the Palestinian area with movement in and out only possible during
daylight hours. A curfew has been in place since June 2002, although
unofficially relaxed since July 2003.
22. Throughout the intifada, UNRWA workers have not been
afforded regular access to restricted areas to carry out necessary
work. Due to Israeli restrictions on the entry of vehicles to
Al-Mawasi, the Agency has not been able to deliver food to the
residents—many of whom have lost their livelihoods as a
result of the intifada—since March 2002[258].
In al-Mawasi, before September 2000, environmental health teams
used to visit the area every second day to remove garbage. During
2002, no more than two visits per month were possible. The situation
has improved somewhat this year, following the assignment of an
Israeli military liaison officer to the area; nevertheless, the
Agency is still only able to visit once a week, in view of the
time required to negotiate passage across the checkpoint. UNRWA
is also not allowed to bring in the necessary equipment to these
areas to upgrade the infrastructure.
23. The environmental conditions in much of the Gaza
Strip are dire. There are a number of interrelated reasons for
this: poverty, overcrowding, education levels, access restrictions
and, of course, the impact of Israeli settlements. It is estimated
that the 6,000 settlers living in Gaza control almost one third
of the land and 50% of available water resources. Supplies are
also polluted, due in part to the fact that untreated sewerage
lakes from Israeli settlements are situated over the ground water
stores in northern Beit Lahia and southern Khan Younis.
24. Restrictions on the entry and movement of goods and
personnel into the Gaza Strip imposed by the Israeli military
have led to delays in the implementation of critical infrastructure
projects in the areas of water supply, storm water drainage and
wastewater collection and treatment. As a result, wastewater pollution
of sea and land and underground water has continued and even increased
in many areas. Likewise, solid waste has accumulated in the camps
and municipal areas with consequent health risks. Restricted access
to disposal sites has had other negative results. The municipalities
are forced to use temporary dumping sites or increase open burning
of waste. In the Gaza Strip alone, four temporary dumping sites
have been created with one operated on a piece of land which was
originally designated for artificial aquifer recharge.
25. The Israeli military has appropriated and destroyed
a considerable area of Palestinian land during the course of the
intifada. Since October 2000, approximately 10% of the total arable
land in the Gaza Strip has been razed by the Israeli military.
Whilst media attention has focused primarily on the erection of
the separation barrier in the West Bank, land has also been expropriated
in the Gaza Strip, much of it close to settlements and border
areas, where the Israeli military has created wide "buffer
zones". This was the case recently, close to Morag settlement,
when an estimated 280 dunums of land (28 ha) was expropriated
to make way for a settler bypass road. Likewise, a "buffer
zone" 200m wide on both sides has been created along the
Karni-Netzarim road and close to Gush Qatif settlement block.
The Israeli military is also constructing a "security fence"
several hundred metres into the Gaza Strip parallel to the Egyptian
border at Rafah, for which it has expropriated considerable land
and destroyed dozens of Palestinian homes, including many refugee
shelters.
26. UNRWA provides services and humanitarian assistance
to 648,000 Palestine refugees in the West Bank—175,000 of
which reside in 19 camps. Refugees living outside camps suffer
the same disadvantages as the general Palestinian population from
settlement proximity and by-pass roads. Such problems include
severe restrictions on movement; hindered access to water resources
and land; damage to agriculture, trade and other productive activities;
health hazards deriving from rudimentary sewerage systems, and
inadequate waste disposal.
27. Camp residents can be in a worse situation than other
refugees, as settlers tend to specifically target refugee camps.
Incidents of settlers forcibly entering refugee camps and opening
fire on the inhabitants and/or their property have been reported,
for example in the Arroub camp, in the Hebron area. Most settler
attacks are carried out against isolated or small groups of Palestinians
and their property.
28. The construction of settlement-related infrastructure,
such as by-pass roads, has intensified and exacerbated the conflict.
Furthermore, UNRWA's projects to improve water infrastructure
for Palestine refugees have not been approved by the Israeli authorities
over the years. This represents an additional constraint on the
Agency's efforts to improve environmental health and water access
in the West Bank.
29. UNRWA operations are affected by the movement restrictions
imposed by the Israeli military authorities across the West Bank,
which in many cases are dictated by the location of settlements
and related infrastructure. The Israeli military and settler population
in the West Bank have and continue to exhibit hostility towards
the UN. Forms of harassment by settlers range from cursing and
rude gestures (including offensive stickers placed on UN vehicles),
to more serious forms of armed attack and attempts at other types
of intimidation. UNRWA staff members and vehicles have been shot.
Some have been subjected to hit and run attempts by settlers.
The most recent incident occurred on 13 May 2003, when a clearly
marked UNRWA vehicle was attacked by settlers in the proximity
of Yitz'har settlement. The presence of settlements, related infrastructure
and Israeli military installations has effectively divided the
West Bank into 64 separately enclosed sections.
CONCLUSION
30. The dire situation in the OPT today has been the
result of a prolonged period of conflict and resultant socio-economic
regression. Should the political conditions facilitate a move
towards socio-economic reconstruction and rehabilitation, the
donor community, including the UK, should provide increased assistance
to the PA and UNRWA, as well as to civil society institutions.
UNRWA provides essential services to approximately 50% of the
Palestinian population of the OPT. Its network of 269 elementary
and preparatory schools, four vocational training centres, 52
primary health care facilities, a fully-fledged hospital, 25 women's
programme centres and 21 community rehabilitation centres, over
250 poverty alleviation programme projects and an established
microfinance and microenterprise programme, has made UNRWA a principal
element of the infrastructure of Palestinian development in the
OPT. UNRWA's assets (both material and human) have a key role
to play in the development of the territories, and the Agency
is currently working closely with the PA and other actors on medium
and long term development plans. In addition to its tangible assets,
the Agency also has the inestimable advantage of a high standing
with the local population, who put their trust in UNRWA at times
of crisis and rely on its regular and emergency services. The
Agency is currently in the process of re-examining its strategies
and priorities regarding the medium-term development challenges
it faces, and will share its results with the donor community.
September 2003
APPENDIX I
UK FUNDED PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED BY UNRWA (1993-2003)
| Grant amount
| |
| Project | US$ equivalent
| Pledge Year |
| Upgrading classrooms, Construction of Elem./Prep. Girls school in Beit Ula, West Bank
| 817,660 | 1993 |
| Sewerage and Drainage Scheme Beach Camp/ and Southern
| 3,600,000 | 1995 |
| area, Gaza Strip | | & 1997
|
| HQ Move from Vienna to Gaza and Amman | 1,000,000
| 1995 |
| Services provided by KPMG consultants towards New Finance System, Agency Wide
| 744,606 | 2000-01 |
| Expansion of UNRWA's Family Health Programme, Gaza
| 641,271 | 1995 |
| Technical Assistance provided by the British Council in Education planning & Education Technical Assistance. Agency Wide
| 277,273 | 2000 |
| Educational Technical Assistance, Agency Wide
| 3,600,000 | 2000 |
| Overall procurement, training and consultancy assistance. Agency Wide
| 621,125 | 2000 |
| Financial Management System, Agency Wide |
1,273,805 | 2000 |
| Financial, Payroll and Human Resources, Agency Wide
| 1,166,831 | 2002 |
| Junior Professional Officer, Gaza | 107,123
| 2002 |
| Palestine Refugee Records Project, Agency Wide
| 1,612,903 | 2003 |
| |
|
PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE EC INCLUDING ECHO FUNDED PROJECTS
Amount (pledged)
Year
| Project | Programme
| EUR | US$ |
| 1993 | Emergency donation of food commodities (in kind) (EC)
| EMLOT | | 9,412,787
|
| 1993 | Distribution and other costs related to food (cash) (EC)
| EMLOT
| | 1,130,359
|
| 1993 | Environmental sanitation in the Gaza Strip (EC)
| EPA | 650,000 | 742,348
|
| 1993 | Food storage programme, West Bank (renovation of warehouse for food, Jerusalem) (EC)
| EPA | 170,000 | 193,182
|
| 1993 | Shelter rehabilitation, Gaza and West Bank (ECHO)
| PIP | 1,800,000 | 2,045,455
|
| 1994 | Emergency Donation of 8,500 tons of Flour for the OT. (ECHO)
| EMLOT | | 2,227,000
|
| 1994 | Cash for Distribution and Storage Costs of 8,500 tons of Flour. (ECHO)
| EMLOT | 450,000 | 557,851
|
| 1994 | Construction/Equipment of schools and W/B (EC)
| PIP | 10,000,000 | 12,495,929
|
| 1996 | Cash for Purchase of Flour, G & WB (ECHO)
| EMLOT | 280,000 | 353,657
|
| 1996 | Completion of Gaza Hospital (EC)
| European Gaza Hospital | 6,700,000
| 8,267,503 |
| 1997 | Food Commodities, WB & G (ECHO)
| CSP | 400,000 | 452,525
|
| 1999 | Medical Supplies, G & WB. (ECHO)
| | 250,000 | 261,780
|
| 2000 | Shelter rehabilitation in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and WB (ECHO)
| | 720,000 | 665,191
(US$ 107,046
for WB)
|
| 2001 | Environmental and Sanitation Project, Gaza Strip and West Bank (EC)
| | 14,600,000 | 12,852,113
|
| |
| | |
NB: No contributions were received in 2002 and 2003 towards
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
EPA: Expanded Programme of Assistance.
EMLOT: Extraordinary Measures for Lebanon and the Occupied
Territory.
PIP: Peace Implementation Programme.
CSP: Capital and Special Projects.
APPENDIX II
UK CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA's EMERGENCY APPEALS 2000-03
| Year | Emergency Appeal US$
| TOTAL US$ |
| 2000 | 7,142,857
| 7,142,857 |
| (GB£ 5 million 1st EA)
| |
| 2001 | 4,347,826 | 12,164,727
|
| (GB£ 3 million 2nd EA)
| |
| 2,816,901 |
|
| (GB£ 2 million 3rd EA)
| |
| 5,000,000 |
|
| GB£ 3.4 million part of US$ 10 million)
| |
| 2002 | 7,142,857 | 10,267,857
|
| (GB£ 5 million received in March 2002)
| |
| 3,125,000 |
|
| (GB£ 2 million received in October 2002)
| |
| 2003 | 2,857,143 | 4,470,046
|
| (GB£ 1.8 million received in March 2003)
| |
| 1,612,903 |
|
| (GB£ 1 million staff for Jenin rehabilitation project-2002 EA)
| |
| TOTAL | 34,045,487 |
34,045,487 |
| |
|
NB: Sterling figures are converted at the prevailing monthly
rate for the US Dollar set by the UN.
EMERGENCY PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE EC INCLUDING ECHO
FUNDED PROJECTS
Amount (pledged)
Year
| Project | Programme
| EUR | US$ |
| 2000 | Emergency medical requirements(ECHO)
| Flash Emergency Appeal | 120,000
| 106,995 |
| 2000 | Emergency food distribution, Phase I
(ECHO)
| 1st Emergency Appeal | 4,300,000
| 3,719,725 |
| 2000 | Emergency food distribution, Phase II(ECHO)
| 1st Emergency Appeal | 10,000,000
| 8,650,519 |
| 2001 | Post injury physical rehabilitation
(ECHO)
| 2nd Emergency Appeal | 1,000,000
| 875,503 |
| 2001 | Emergency food distribution
(ECHO)
| 3rd Emergency Appeal | 5,000,000
| 4,620,616 |
2001
| Emergency food distribution
(ECHO)
| 3rd Emergency Appeal | 7,500,000
| 6,758,068 |
| 2001 | Rehabilitation of Palestine refugees' shelters, Gaza
(ECHO)
| 3rd Emergency Appeal | 700,000
| 621,149 |
| 2001 | Self help shelter rehabilitation, WB
(ECHO)
| 3rd Emergency Appeal | 500,000
| 443,678 |
| 2001 | Re-housing of refugees in Gaza Strip
(ECHO)
| 3rd Emergency Appeal | 1,430,000
| 1,253,281 |
2001
| Community-based activities in WB
(ECHO)
| 3rd Emergency Appeal | 1,070,000
| 933,946 |
2003 | Emergency food aid in the West Bank (ECHO)
| 5th Emergency Appeal | 2,234,400
| 2,555,148 |
| 2003 | Emergency Food aid in the Gaza Strip (ECHO)
| 5th Emergency Appeal | 3,148,047
| 3,599,949 |
| |
| | |
256
Note: the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that
the Gaza Strip's workforce was 194,000 persons in September 2000.
The 30,000 workers crossing into Israel and the settlements each
day represented about 15% of the total workforce and provided
30% of Gaza's real gross national income. Back
257
"Partially closed" is defined as any period of closure
other than that enforced for a short time when settler traffic
is passing on the settler road. Back
258
Residents have to collect the parcels themselves from Rafah or
Khan Younis and pay for their back-to-back transfer into the enclave. Back
|
