



House of Commons  
International Development  
Committee

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# **Annual Report 2003**

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**Third Report of Session 2003–04**





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International Development  
Committee

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**Third Report of Session 2003–04**

*Report, together with formal minutes*

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## The International Development Committee

The International Development Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for International Development and its associated public bodies.

### Current membership

Tony Baldry MP (*Conservative, Banbury*) (Chairman)  
John Barrett MP (*Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West*)  
Mr John Battle MP (*Labour, Leeds West*)  
Hugh Bayley MP (*Labour, City of York*)  
Ann Clwyd MP (*Labour, Cynon Valley*)  
Mr Tony Colman MP (*Labour, Putney*)  
Mr Quentin Davies MP (*Conservative, Grantham and Stamford*)  
Mr Piara S Khabra MP (*Labour, Ealing Southall*)  
Chris McCafferty MP (*Labour, Calder Valley*)  
Mr Andrew Robathan MP (*Conservative, Blaby*)  
Tony Worthington MP (*Labour, Clydebank and Milngavie*)

### Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via [www.parliament.uk](http://www.parliament.uk)

### Publications

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at [www.parliament.uk/parliamentary\\_committees/international\\_development.cfm](http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/international_development.cfm). A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.

### Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Alistair Doherty (Clerk), Sarah Hartwell (Second Clerk), Alan Hudson (Committee Specialist), Katie Phelan (Committee Assistant) and Wanda Wilson (Secretary).

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## Background and purpose of the report

The Liaison Committee of the House of Commons has established common objectives for select committees in line with the Resolution of the House of 14 May 2002. The Liaison Committee has further asked that the objectives should be reflected in the format of each Committee's annual report. This report describes the International Development Committee's work over the previous year in relation to these objectives and "core tasks". The format of the report is designed to show examples of the work which the Committee has done in relation to the following core tasks.

- Inquiries carried out into:
  - Government policy proposals
  - areas seen by the Committee as requiring examination because of deficiencies
  - departmental actions
  - associated public bodies
  - major appointments
  - implementation of legislation
  - major policy initiatives
- Examination of any draft legislation
- Examination of expenditure
- Examination of Public Service Agreements.

The core tasks for select committees do not apply in equal measure to all committees. The Department for International Development (DFID), the Department whose area of work we monitor, generates little by way of legislation; it has no associated public bodies; and the Secretary of State is rarely responsible for major public appointments. We have therefore to adapt the core tasks to the circumstances of the government department which we monitor. DFID attaches considerable importance to working with and influencing key multilateral development agencies (in particular the UN system, the EU, and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)). The comments contained in this report reflect the extent to which DFID works through these multilateral bodies.

# I. Identification of inquiries carried out into:

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## Government policy proposals:

1. DFID's primary objective is to meet the Millennium Development Goals, foremost of which is the aim of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty between 1990 and 2015. The MDGs drive DFID's policies, programmes and spending decisions and form the main aim of DFID's Public Service Agreement. As in previous years, our activities over the past year have sought to follow the objectives contained in DFID's Public Service Agreement.

## Trade

2. The major thrust of our work over the last year has centred round international trade and development. Millennium Development Goal 8 is to develop a global partnership for development, and requires the creation of a non-discriminatory trading system which will address the needs of the least developed countries. The UK has been one of the most enthusiastic proponents of a WTO development round. The WTO's Ministerial in Cancún therefore provided the focus for two inquiries. The first into what was needed from DFID (and the EU) for the negotiations to deliver a genuine development round<sup>1</sup>—and a second inquiry to analyse the failure of the negotiations and the lessons for DFID and trade policy makers.<sup>2</sup>

3. To cut through the rhetoric, our pre-Cancún report set out the essential components of a genuine development round. First and foremost was a development-friendly agreement on agriculture. We called for “substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support, export subsidies and tariffs, so that developing countries can trade their way out of poverty”. As a minimum, in our view, any agreement had to end dumping. On the “Singapore Issues” of Investment, Competition, Transparency in Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation the report urged the Government to: “unequivocally drop its support for opening negotiations on the Singapore Issues”. The Singapore Issues in our view risked overloading the Cancún agenda.

4. The Government's response<sup>3</sup> was comprehensive, with the exception of one issue, that of the Government's role in supporting the inclusion of the Singapore Issues on the Doha Agenda. In July, the then Secretary of State, Baroness Amos, stated that the UK did not regard the Singapore Issues as a development priority. We welcomed this statement, and urged the Government to persuade its EU partners and the European Commission to stop promoting the Singapore Issues. The Government did not respond to this specific recommendation. Rectifying this omission, the Government stated on 27 September that: “we were and continue to be in dialogue with Member States and the Commission

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1 Seventh Report of Session 2002-03, Trade and development at the WTO: issues for Cancún, HC 400

2 First Report of Session 2003-04, Trade and development at the WTO: Learning the lessons of Cancún to revive a genuine development round, HC 92

3 Fifth Special Report of Session 2002-03, Government Response, HC 1093

regarding our view that any WTO agreement on the Singapore Issues must be development friendly.”<sup>4</sup> In other words, the Government continued to hold out for a WTO agreement on the Singapore Issues, including investment.

5. The report was also referred to, both in Geneva and at Cancún, by a range of WTO delegations, including those of the Netherlands and India—it was we hear, “waved around, unprompted” by the UN Deputy Secretary General.<sup>5</sup> There can be no doubt that the report played an important role in informing negotiations. It illustrated that a UK Parliamentary Committee was prioritising a development round, advocating further EU movement on agriculture, and the dropping of the Singapore Issues. The report made clear that developing countries have parliamentary allies in the UK and may have encouraged them to stand firm in their opposition to the Singapore Issues and to hold out for further progress on agricultural liberalisation.

6. One of the strengths of this inquiry was the opportunity to take evidence from people in developing countries. Developing country witnesses included Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Jamaica’s Ambassador to the WTO, and—pioneering the taking of evidence by video-link—South Africa’s parliamentary committee on trade and industry. We intend to build on this work, to encourage “southern voices” to engage with our inquiries so as to add an important dimension to our efforts to scrutinise UK development policy and hold DFID to account.

7. Our post-Cancún report on trade and development sought to learn the lessons of failure at Cancún. The Ministerial collapsed primarily because countries’ positions on matters of substance were too far apart. The developed world, including the EU, failed to offer sufficiently radical reforms of its agricultural policies. As our report made clear, the developed world must accept that if its agricultural policies harm developing countries—and they do—then they must be changed. Without agreement on agriculture, there will be no development round. On the Singapore Issues, our pre-Cancún predictions were borne out. The EU’s insistence that formal negotiations on the Singapore Issues should commence played a major role in the collapse of negotiations. The lesson is simple: developing countries’ concerns should be listened to and taken seriously.

8. Our post-Cancún report also made recommendations about the relationship between the EU, the European Commission and Member States, calling for greater transparency and accountability about the formulation and pursuit of trade policy and objectives. For the WTO itself, we emphasised that lessons must be learned about its governance, role and scope, and changes made. On the Singapore Issues, we believe that we were correct in our analysis. The Government has now come round to our position and is now attempting to persuade a stubborn EU of its merits.

9. We urged DFID to continue its efforts to promote rules and instruments, such as Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism, which would enable developing countries to safeguard their food security needs and to protect themselves from dumping. We were pleased, therefore, that progress was made on such initiatives prior to, and at, Cancún. In addition we recommended that DFID pay special attention to the impact of

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4 Ev 25, First Report of Session 2003-04, Vol II

5 30 October 2003, Official Report, Col 155 WH

liberalisation on developing countries which are reliant on preferential access to markets. We applauded DFID for its role in promoting the IMF-World Bank initiative to help developing countries cope with the short-term costs of liberalisation, and emphasised the importance of DFID continuing to influence the design and operation of this initiative.

### **Commission on Intellectual Property Rights**

10. In May 2001, the then Secretary of State set up an independent, international, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) in order to “explore how IPRs could work better for developing countries within the overall framework of development policy.” The CIPR report was published in September 2002<sup>6</sup> and the Government responded formally in May 2003. In July we held an evidence session with officials to probe the Government’s response.<sup>7</sup> The Government agreed with the Commission’s broad conclusion that IPR systems can play a key role in the development of the indigenous scientific and technological capacity of developing countries. Such capacity is a prerequisite for sustainable development. However, the utility of IPR regimes varies between developing countries in relation to their social and economic circumstances and technological capabilities.

11. In our view, the CIPR’s report into IPR showed that clear and transparent flexibilities are a vital component of development-friendly international agreements, and overturned some key assumptions upon which the TRIPS<sup>8</sup> Agreement was implicitly built. In particular that: one size fits all; extended timetables will suffice; fudged terminology can create room for manoeuvre; and that renegotiation is possible. To this might be added the fact that relatively simple framework agreements which are sold to developing countries as development-friendly, can grow into resource-intensive, development-unfriendly monsters. The Commission on IPRs was established some years after the WTO TRIPS Agreement. We believe it would have been better had the Commission been established in advance of the WTO Agreement, suggesting that here was a lesson which might be learned in relation to any future WTO agreement on Investment; that is, that development implications must not be an afterthought.

### **Areas seen by the Committee as requiring examination because of deficiencies:**

#### ***Food security in southern Africa***

12. In March, we reported on **The humanitarian crisis in southern Africa**.<sup>9</sup> Using insights gleaned from our visit to Malawi, the report explained the humanitarian crisis which was gripping the region and extracted the lessons for policy. In southern Africa, people’s livelihoods are precarious. Afflicted by poverty, poor governance and, in many cases HIV/AIDS, the whole society is vulnerable to shocks. We called for short-term humanitarian responses to be integrated into longer-term development, and—in a

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6 Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, CIPR

7 Oral and written evidence, HC 1013 of Session 2002-03

8 Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

9 Third Report of Session 2002-03, The Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Africa, HC 116

recommendation for DFID and other donors—emphasised that the neglect of agriculture must end if rural livelihoods are to be improved.

13. The Government’s response<sup>10</sup> noted that DFID was supporting improved vulnerability assessments in the region—something the report had identified as a weakness. But where we called for DFID to end its neglect of agriculture in sustaining the livelihoods of the rural poor, the response was less positive, emphasising that agriculture was only one way of making a living. Nevertheless, in the past year DFID has begun to emphasise the importance of agriculture to rural poverty alleviation, a move which we warmly welcome.

14. Our report was debated in Westminster Hall on 26 June 2003. In that debate, the Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP remarked: “The report was impressive. It is not unusual to say that about what the International Development Committee produces, but in this case it was particularly impressive because it took such an important issue—the food crisis—and explored the complexities of the various factors and inter-relationships that make up the crisis. More importantly, it asked what lessons we can learn for the medium and longer term to minimise the chances of being in the same position again.” He went on: “The Select Committee has produced an excellent report, which has caused us to think. That is good, because it means that the Select Committee is doing its job.”

15. We returned to the subject of agriculture in our report on DFID’s Departmental Report 2003.<sup>11</sup> For DFID, agriculture has become the strategy which dare not speak its name. DFID claims not to have a strategy for agriculture *per se*. Instead, it has sought to create a climate which encourages private sector investment in agriculture. But the question remains of how far this can be done in poor countries that are unattractive to investors. In the light of chronic food crises in many areas of sub-Saharan Africa, DFID needs to review the effectiveness of its strategy. DFID will support agriculture provided it can pass off the support under a different description. The result has been a strategy (at least in southern Africa) which has been piecemeal and incoherent. DFID is aware of our concerns and intends to discuss these issues with us over the coming months.

### **European Community development assistance**

16. In previous sessions we have commented critically on the lack of a poverty focus in the EU’s aid programme. We have continued to monitor the use of EU aid. Around 25% of DFID’s budget is absorbed by its contribution to European development assistance. The European Commission’s annual report, though detailed and comprehensive, does not, of course address how EU assistance meets DFID’s own objectives. That is what is required in DFID’s own annual report.

17. The Committee also followed developments in the Convention on the Future of Europe insofar as they related to development issues. In November, we had the opportunity to question the Secretary of State on the Government’s policy on development at the Intergovernmental Conference. This focussed on concerns that components of the draft EU Constitution might, in effect, subordinate development policies, institutions and instruments (including aid resources) to foreign and security policy objectives. Throughout

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10 Fourth Special Report of Session 2002-03, HC 690 – Government Response

11 Eighth Report of Session 2002-03, HC 825

the Convention, development co-operation was discussed as an ‘instrument’ and ‘tool’ of EU external relations. The proposal for “all EC instruments”, including aid, to be at the disposal of a new EU Foreign Affairs Minister could, we fear, entail an increase in the politicisation of development co-operation.

## Departmental actions

18. We questioned witnesses—particularly DFID and NGO witnesses—on specific departmental actions as and when they arose during the course of the year. In addition to questions during evidence sessions, we have maintained a flow of correspondence with DFID about issues of concern as they have arisen. We see our scrutiny role extending beyond DFID to the multilateral bodies through which DFID spends so much of its budget. In both correspondence and in informal private meetings, we have raised questions on actions taken by the World Bank, the European Commission, numerous UN agencies and the governments of countries in receipt of food aid.

### *Iraq*

19. During the period immediately prior to war against Iraq, we conducted a quick inquiry into **Preparing for the humanitarian consequences of possible military action against Iraq**. The report<sup>12</sup> looked at DFID’s actions, and those of the UN bodies to which it contributes, in planning for the consequences of conflict. At the time there was a marked reluctance to be seen to be planning, for fear that plans would be seen as either condoning military action, or accepting the inevitability of war. In fact, planning was taking place but the problem was that planners had little idea of what circumstances they were preparing for.

20. Our main concern was to ensure, in the Prime Minister’s words, that there should be “a humanitarian plan that is every bit as viable and well worked out as a military plan”<sup>13</sup> We called for the UN to have the lead role in Iraq as soon as possible after the conflict and for a UN Special Representative to be appointed, regardless of the US military’s own plans. Clearly, events turned out rather differently. The UN in particular has not been given the role we wished. Many of our comments have been borne out by events. For example, we warned of the risk of state fragmentation in the immediate post-war period. But some have not; there have not been the expected problems with refugees or displaced persons. We did, however, warn that the scale of the relief necessary could exceed the capacity of the international system. We are now concerned that DFID’s provision of emergency relief to Iraq should not be at the expense of its programmes elsewhere. There are some worrying signs; over the next two years, funding for the reconstruction of Iraq includes £50m reallocated from other (middle income) country programmes as well as DFID’s own contingency funding. This is an issue which we will pursue in the coming months.

21. The report on **Preparing for the humanitarian consequences of possible military action against Iraq** was “tagged” on the order paper as relevant to the debate a substantive motion just before the country went to war against Iraq—a significant parliamentary

12 Fourth Report of Session 2002-03, HC 444

13 2 February 2003, Official Report, Col 136

debate. During the debate the Foreign Secretary described the report as greatly assisting the House in its considerations of questions of humanitarian relief.<sup>14</sup>

## **Afghanistan**

22. At the time of our first report on **The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the surrounding region**<sup>15</sup> we committed ourselves to return to the subject and investigate the progress made with reconstruction and development. Our second report on the subject of Afghanistan, **Afghanistan: the transition from Humanitarian relief to reconstruction and development**<sup>16</sup>, drew attention to the lack of security. The Afghan Transitional Authority's (ATA) lack of control beyond Kabul had left "warlords" as the de facto rulers in many provinces. We criticised the international community's lack of will to create security on the ground by providing an ISAF<sup>17</sup> presence in every city.

23. We paid full tribute to the work of the UN and acknowledged that without it many would have starved. But much of the country was being run almost as a UN mandate and this was undermining the legitimacy of the ATA. The UN was operating a parallel structure to the ATA, rather than acting as an assistant to and advocate for Afghan-led reconstruction. There was inevitably a tension between the need to deliver services quickly, and the need to operate through the ATA and thereby enhance its authority. But nevertheless we were critical of DFID's and other donors' reluctance to channel more of its funding through the ATA in order to build its capacity and its credibility with the Afghan people. We concluded by calling on DFID and other donors to produce a plan for moving from humanitarian relief towards supporting reconstruction and development.

24. We have kept the situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan under review by holding oral evidence sessions with the Secretary of State (in the case of Iraq) and with NGOs operating in both the countries.<sup>18</sup>

## **International Financial Institutions**

25. In November, we took evidence from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, on the Autumn meetings of the IMF and World Bank.<sup>19</sup> The session concentrated on five themes: poverty reduction strategies; the heavily indebted poor countries debt-relief initiative; private sector participation in pro-poor service delivery; voice and governance; and safeguards and standards. The Chancellor clarified the role and functioning of the proposed International Financing Facility, an initiative which has great potential as a way of leveraging the aid increases promised at Monterrey. As the Chancellor has put it: no country genuinely committed to economic development, poverty reduction and to the genuine good governance standards should be denied the chance to make progress because of lack of investment." We are in full agreement. We pressed the

14 18 March 2003, Official Report, Col 899

15 First Report of Session 2001-02, HC 300

16 First Report of Session 2002-03, HC 84

17 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

18 Oral and Written Evidence, 10 and 30 June 2003, HC 780; and 18 September, HC 1116 and HC 1117

19 HC 1266, 6 November 2003

Secretary of State on what the Government's memorandum had referred to as the "multiple and sometimes competing objectives" of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes as well as on the reasoning behind DFID's decision to support the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline

## II. Examination of expenditure

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26. DFID's Annual Report 2003 formed the basis for the evidence session with the Permanent Secretary.<sup>20</sup> The 2002 Spending Review announced an increase in DFID's budget to £4.6 billion by 2005-06 on the basis that there should be demonstrable improvements to the lives of the poorest people. We were concerned at the lack of a linkage between the additional funding provided and any assessment of an increase in what is delivered. We recommended therefore that DFID demonstrate the links between the funds secured and commitments made in the spending review and the performance which the Department records in its annual report.<sup>21</sup>

27. Financial flexibility is essential in an environment where risks as well as opportunities arise which DFID has to respond to but is not in a position to control or even influence—when dealing with financial crises for instance. We used the report to explore the department's risk management and its commitment to making use of financial flexibility in order to link funds with performance. So, for example, in Bangladesh the country team were able to move swiftly to support the government's reform programme in jute production, whilst in Tanzania, budget support was cut after the government decided to purchase a \$40m air traffic control system.

28. We continued, as in previous years, to question DFID's use of direct budget support. Aid-receiving countries should not be overburdened with a range of different reporting requirements for donors. We were pleased, therefore, this year to note the work DFID is doing in conjunction with the NAO on building up the financial management and tracking systems in its partner countries. Recipient governments' performance management and accountability is the key to measuring the impact of budgetary support. We stressed to DFID that the assumed benefits of direct budgetary support may be worth the associated risks but careful monitoring and evaluation is needed to minimise the risks and maximise the benefits.

## III. Examination of public service agreements

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29. During the evidence session with the Permanent Secretary mentioned in paragraph 26 above, we examined progress against the targets contained in the Department's 2001-2004 Public Service Agreements. Performance was below target for six of the 26 targets. The Departmental report contained, in our view, insufficient information about how the department was addressing this underperformance. We examined two missed cases of

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20 *Op cit.* HC 825

21 *Ibid*

underperformance: debt relief and primary school enrolment. We were critical of DFID's intention only to report progress against its new Public Service Agreement targets. The department should remain accountable for outstanding targets from previous PSAs, rather than just dropping them with each spending review. The new PSA contains fewer targets and we were concerned therefore to ensure that there were satisfactory internal performance and accountability measures in those areas which are not now covered by PSA targets.

## IV. Other areas of activity

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### Major appointments

30. We have not had the occasion to interview any new appointees to major posts in the last year. As DFID has no associated public bodies, the Secretary of State makes very few major appointments. The heads of multilateral organisations such as UN agencies, are appointed by the member governments and as such the Secretary of State does have a role to play. We have taken formal evidence from the Director of UNOCHA and held informal meetings with the Heads of the World Bank, IMF, UNDP and USAID in the context of the inquiries and visits which were underway at the time.

### Associated public bodies

31. DFID has no associated public bodies.

### Examination of draft legislation

32. The Department has not produced draft legislation.

### The Quadripartite Committee

#### *Seventh Report of Session 2002-03, Strategic Export Controls (HC 474)*

33. We described in last year's annual report our participation, together with the Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry Committees, in the 'Quadripartite' Committee on strategic arms export controls. That scrutiny continued in 2003, when the Quadripartite Committee published two reports. The first of these was a detailed examination of the Government's proposals for secondary legislation under the Export Control Act (see paragraphs 36 and 37 below) and the second was its regular examination of the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report. The latter report built on the work done in previous years, which had resulted in the establishment by the Government of a system for scrutinising and approving (or refusing) applications to export armaments to certain destinations.

34. The 2003 Report on the latest Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report (for 2001), as in previous years, examined a wide range of issues related to the UK export

control regime, as well as scrutinising specific licensing decisions. The Committees looked at new rules on the export of components in multilateral manufacturing projects, the Government's regulation of defence sales by British industry and the operation of the Export Control Organisation, which is responsible for administering the export control system. Among other recommendations, the Committees urged the Government to clarify the sustainable development criterion against which an export licence would be refused on the basis that it would hamper development in the recipient country. Some improvements have been made since the Committees last looked at this issue. Guidance has been published but we considered it to be couched in such a way that it is unlikely to be much help to industry in judging whether a licence application is likely to be approved. We also looked closely at the potential impact of the export of small arms to certain countries and examined the particular case of Nepal.

35. We look forward to continuing this collaboration with our fellow Committees on this important subject and have already begun the initial scrutiny of the Strategic Export Controls Report 2002, which was published in 2003. In particular, we intend to continue our dialogue with the Government on how best Parliament may become more involved in the prior scrutiny of export licences.

### ***Sixth Report of Session 2002-03, The Government's Proposals for Secondary Legislation under the Export Control Act (HC 620)***

36. Working with our colleagues on the Quadripartite Committee, we also conducted a detailed scrutiny of the Government's proposals for introducing a regulatory system under the Export Control Act 2002. The Committees took oral evidence from NGOs and the Government, and recommended a number of important improvements to the proposals contained in the consultation paper. We identified several areas in which the Government could have been more visionary and less bureaucratic.

37. The four Committees concluded that the legislation needed to be targeted more effectively towards deterring the irresponsible proliferation of military equipment by British citizens and companies wherever they are in the world, while at the same time ensuring that the burden on industry was kept to a minimum. They also recommended that the Government's proposals needed to be more flexible and extend beyond controlling physical exports to other activities, such as electronic communications and brokering. We were very pleased to contribute to the formulation of such key legislation, and will continue to scrutinise the impact of the regulatory system it introduced in the future.

### **Visit to Washington D.C. and New York**

38. In March, as the conflict in Iraq began, we visited Washington D.C. and New York. The Committee met representatives from the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, the US Administration, NGOs, think-tanks and members of both Houses of Congress. Formal evidence was not taken, but extensive discussions were held on: Iraq and the role of the United Nations; trade, including agriculture; the role and organisation of US development assistance, including the Millennium Challenge Account; debt relief; poverty reduction strategies; and the need for developed countries' policies on trade and other issues to support development policies and efforts to work towards the MDGs.

39. We place considerable value on building a consensus for development among parliamentarians in both donor and recipient countries. There are numerous channels through which we can share information and raise concerns with parliamentarians in Europe. But the US is a different case. There is a challenge to be met in persuading the United States that aid works and should be focussed on poverty reduction. The US visit enabled us to speak to our counterparts in the USA and to meet the key players in US development assistance and the multilateral financial organisations. Civil society groups have a vital role to play in the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategies. But all too often parliamentarians are overlooked in this process. We have sought to use our recent visit to Africa to help promote the role of developing country parliamentarians as partners who have a crucial role in holding donors, as well as their own governments, to account for the aid they both spend.

## Formal minutes

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**Tuesday 3 February 2004**

Members present:

Tony Baldry, in the Chair

John Barrett  
Mr John Battle  
Hugh Bayley  
Ann Clwyd

Mr Tony Colman  
Mr Quentin Davies  
Mr Andrew Robathan  
Tony Worthington

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report, [Annual Report 2003], proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read the first time.

*Ordered*, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 39 read and agreed to.

*Resolved*, That the Report be the Third Report of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the list of Committee reports and Government replies in 2003 be an Annex to the Report.—(*The Chairman.*)

*Ordered*, that the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 10 February  
at 2.15 pm.]

## Annex

# Reports from the International Development Committee since 2001

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The Government Responses to International Development Committee reports are listed here in brackets by the HC (or Cm) No. after the report they relate to.

### Session 2003-04

First Report	Trade and Development at the WTO: Learning the lessons of Cancún to revive a genuine development round	HC 92-I and HC 92-II
Second Report	Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories	HC 230-I and HC 230-II

### Session 2002-03

First Report	Afghanistan: the transition from humanitarian relief to reconstruction and development assistance	HC 84 ( <i>HC 621</i> )
Second Report	International Development Committee: Annual Report 2002	HC 331
Third Report	The humanitarian crisis in southern Africa	HC 116-I and-II ( <i>HC 690</i> )
Fourth Report	Preparing for the humanitarian consequences of possible military action against Iraq	HC 444-I and-II ( <i>HC 561</i> )
Fifth Report (First Joint Report)	The Government's proposals for secondary legislation under the Export Control Act	HC 620 ( <i>Cm 5988</i> )
Sixth Report (Second Joint Report)	Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2001, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny	HC 474 ( <i>Cm 5943</i> )
Seventh Report	Trade and Development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún	HC 400-I and-II ( <i>HC 1093</i> )
Eighth Report	DFID Departmental Report 2003	HC 825 ( <i>HC 231, Session 2003-04</i> )

### Session 2001-02

First Report	The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the Surrounding Region	HC 300-I and-II ( <i>HC 633</i> )
Second Report	The Effectiveness of the Reforms of European Development Assistance	HC 417-I and-II ( <i>HC 1027</i> )
Third Report	Global Climate Change and Sustainable Development	HC 519-I and-II ( <i>HC 1270</i> )

Fourth Report (First Joint Report)	Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000, Licensing Policy and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny	HC 718 ( <i>Cm 5629</i> )
Fifth Report	Financing for Development: Finding the Money to Eliminate World Poverty	HC 785-I and-II ( <i>HC 1269</i> )
Sixth Report	DFID Departmental Report 2002	HC 964 ( <i>HC 357, Session 2002-03</i> )