CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
Conclusion 1:
Rates of malnutrition in Gaza and parts of the
West Bank are as bad as anywhere one would find in sub-Saharan
Africa. The Palestinian economy has all but collapsed. Unemployment
rates are in the region of 60-70% and many of those who are employed
are dependent upon NGOs or international relief organisations
for employment. (Paragraph 6)
Answer:
We agree that malnutrition rates are comparable to
certain parts of Africa. The Palestinian Bureau of Central Statistics
notes that unemployment rates were about 30% overall in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip for the time the IDC was conducting its research.
Conclusion 2:
There has to be a sense of realism about what
development assistance can achieve. The World Bank told us that
removing the "access controls" imposed by the Israelis
would have increased real GDP by 21%, whereas a doubling of development
assistance—without easing closure—would only reduce
the number of people living in poverty by 7% by the end of 2004.
The situation in the OPT, in other words, is not one which donor
assistance can resolve. (Paragraph 10)
Answer:
We agree that humanitarian assistance can alleviate,
but not resolve Palestinian poverty under conditions of occupation.
Conventional development assistance under these circumstances
is problematic, but still has a major role to play, including
in supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA) to meet its peace
process commitments and to build the institutions of a viable
Palestinian state. The case for this kind of assistance is arguably
even stronger when the peace process is not going well.
Conclusion 3:
We agree with the UK Government that the Geneva
Conventions apply to the Israeli occupation. The 4th Geneva Convention
should remain the standard by which the GOI should perform in
the OPT. The UK Government has its own obligations to uphold the
Convention, and monitor breaches of the rules of the Convention
as regards to the civilian population. (Paragraph 18)
Answer:
We agree that Israel must respect international law,
including international humanitarian law. It is in Israel's own
interest to comply with its obligations. We have regular contact
with a number of reputable human rights NGOs and we raise specific
incidents of breaches of the Convention with the Government of
Israel at the highest levels.
Conclusion 4:
Settlement activity, with its associated road
building, threatens Palestinian territorial contiguity in the
West Bank and the viability of a future Palestinian State. Freezing
settlement activity and removing outposts would boost Palestinian
confidence in the peace process. (Paragraph 24)
Answer:
We agree. Under the Quartet (US, UN, EU and Russia)
Roadmap the Israelis are required to freeze all settlement activity,
including road building. We are disappointed by the lack of progress
made by both the Israelis and the Palestinians, and we regularly
urge both to do more to fulfil their Roadmap obligations.
Conclusion 5:
We can understand why Israel, fearful of its security,
wants to build the barrier. But any such security fence should
be constructed on Israeli, not Palestinian, land. The construction
process and path which the barrier takes support Palestinian fears
about the motivation which lies behind it. The barrier destroys
the viability of a future Palestinian state. One of DFID's key
objectives is to help build the institutions of the Palestinian
Authority in preparation for statehood—a statehood which
the barrier jeopardises. (Paragraph 34)
Answer:
We support the Israeli government's right to take
legitimate measures to protect its citizens. But unilateral measures,
such as the barrier, will not provide lasting security. This can
only be delivered by a negotiated settlement. Construction of
the barrier on occupied territory is unlawful, inflames Palestinian
public opinion and harms the prospects for peace. The confiscation
of Palestinian land associated with the construction of the barrier
is also unlawful and creates a physical obstacle to the two-state
solution.
Conclusion 6:
Food aid is only ever an emergency solution. But
in the OPT farmers cannot readily fill the gaps in food production
because of the extreme dislocation brought about by closure and,
in particular, the impact that movement restrictions and land
confiscation have had on agriculture. (Paragraph 39)
Answer:
We agree. Dependency on food aid is not sustainable.
Palestinians, supported by donors, continue to seek innovative
ways to maintain production.
Conclusion 7:
Israeli control over water and restrictions on
development of Palestinian infrastructure has, and continues to,
severely affect the development of West Bank and Gaza. The wilful
destruction of water infrastructure by the IDF and settlers is
simply unacceptable. We commend the work that DFID, other donors,
NGOs and their partners are doing in enhancing Palestinian access
to water, a basic human right. But we also think that there needs
to be a revision of water access arrangements. This is an urgent
need, which cannot be deferred to the final status negotiations.
It is an area where the UK Government should be applying political
pressure to move negotiations forward. (Paragraph 45)
Answer:
We agree that it would be beneficial for there to
be early progress on securing Palestinian water rights. DFID has
supported the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department to research
their position in preparation for such negotiations. While it
would be possible to advance discussions immediately, the link
between water rights and other issues such as borders and the
separation wall has so far led to a reluctance on both sides to
engage on the issue outside the framework of the overall final
status negotiations.
Conclusion 8:
We accept that ambulances might be used to carry
terrorists and their weapons and that there can be no automatic
exemption for ambulances from the requirement to be searched.
But equally, there is no reason why an ambulance carrying an urgent
case cannot be given priority for any security search, which may
be needed. We discussed these matters with the Israeli authorities
in Tel Aviv and whilst reassurance was offered, their description
of smooth-running arrangements at checkpoints conflicted with
what we ourselves had seen. We were told that checkpoints are
now issued with lists of local people suffering from chronic illnesses
so as to facilitate their speedy transfer to hospital when necessary.
However, such a system would not work for emergency cases and
might cause even more problems for those whose names are not on
the lists. Nor, of course, could this practice work with temporary
or "flying" checkpoints. (Paragraph 48)
Answer:
We agree. Under the Commitments Israel made to the
UN Secretary General's Humanitarian Envoy to the Middle East Catherine
Bertini in August 2002 Israel has committed itself to a maximum
waiting time of thirty minutes for ambulances at checkpoints.
We have pressed Israel to ensure that this becomes routinely implemented
in practice.
Conclusion 9:
The management of checkpoints is all too often
handled by young, inexperienced IDF conscripts who may lack the
training and experience to deal with large numbers of people passing
through on their way to work or to study. We heard that waiting
Palestinians often suffer harassment at the hands of both the
IDF and local settler communities, making checkpoints a flashpoint
for antagonism. A more sensitive and appropriate approach to checkpoint
management could be learned from experience elsewhere, including
British experience in Northern Ireland. (Paragraph 49)
Answer:
We agree. The IDF Chief of Staff commissioned a study
on how to minimise civilian suffering during military incursions.
The report recommended that checkpoints be made 'friendlier' including
the positioning of more experienced and senior reserve officers.
In practice, this policy has only been partially implemented at
best, and only at major checkpoints. Cases of harassment and delays
continue to be reported. As part of bilateral military relations
the MOD regularly engages the IDF on a range of issues including
the conduct of the IDF during operations in the Occupied Territories.
The MOD has, as yet, provided no training on the management and
manning of checkpoints to the IDF.
Conclusion 10:
The import of pharmaceuticals should be prioritised
and classified as "humanitarian" to facilitate speedy
delivery. (Paragraph 50)
Answer:
We agree. In theory, we believe that this is already
the case. In practice it is not uniformly implemented.
Conclusion 11:
In a society where half the population is under
18, the effect of closure on education is widely felt. The psychological
impact on children, arising from school closure and exposure to
violence, is damaging future generations of Palestinians and will
only serve to perpetuate the cycle of violence and hatred. (Paragraph
52)
Answer:
We agree. More than 200,000 children and 9,000 teachers
have been prevented from attending their regular schools. However,
schools and communities go to great lengths to maintain educational
standards and protect children from trauma. The Palestinian Authority
and, more recently, UNRWA schools have, with DFID support, involved
teachers, pupils, parents, the wider community and education supervisors
in monitoring and trying to reduce the effects of such trauma.
UNRWA has arranged staff transfers between schools to minimise
disruption and has strengthened school-based guidance and counselling.
This has kept most schools functioning despite the closures and
has helped reduce the psychological impact on children.
Conclusion 12:
Children's education, be it Palestinian or Israeli,
must be kept free of incitement. We commend the positive work
that the PA has carried out recently as well as the work of organisations
such as Save the Children in working with the Palestinian Ministry
of Education on curriculum development. In light of the allegations
against the PA, we recommend that it acts to counter incitement
allegations and demonstrate that it is upholding commitments made
at Oslo as part of a wider programme of enhancing its public image
across the world. (Paragraph 54)
Answer:
We agree. Both the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA
are taking steps to develop a curriculum that incorporates issues
of human rights, tolerance/respect, conflict resolution and democracy.
A new curriculum subject, "Civics", has been introduced
addressing such issues. We support their efforts to promote these
positive steps.
Conclusion 13:
We strongly support the work of organisations
such as the Parents' Circle in the education of the younger generation
of Palestinians and Israelis. Support for this type of project
is a way in which development can support the peace process. (Paragraph
55)
Answer:
We agree. There is already considerable EC support
for such initiatives. We plan to explore the scope for DFID to
develop conflict prevention activities with both the Palestinian
Authority and civil society.
Conclusion 14:
Whatever immediate security benefits the barrier
may appear to bring to the Israelis, the level of despair and
anger felt by ordinary Palestinians at being denied the possibility
of any semblance of an ordinary life is likely to further increase
the supply of militants and suicide bombers. (Paragraph 57)
Answer:
We have made clear our view that building the barrier
on occupied territory is leading to an intense reaction by Palestinians,
who perceive this as a method to confiscate significant amounts
of Palestinian land. The barrier will not provide lasting security
to Israeli citizens. But the responsibility to prevent suicide
bombs and tackle rejectionist violence lies with the Palestinian
Authority primarily.
THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Conclusion 15:
We are aware of the criticisms of the PA. Nevertheless,
the PA is the only representative organisation of the Palestinians
and, as such, building its capacity and institutions and ensuring
the success of its reform programme, in order to make it an effective
administration, are the keys to laying the foundations of a future
Palestinian state. (Paragraph 63)
Answer:
We have supported the development of more effective
and accountable Palestinian institutions in preparation for Palestinian
statehood since 1994. DFID's current project to support public
administration and civil service reform aims to help develop a
modern, democratic, and merit-based public service. Reform of
its security services should be the highest priority for the Palestinian
Authority, for which the UK is providing a range of assistance.
Conclusion 16:
We are impressed with the reforms implemented
by the Minister of Finance. But there is still need for further
reform in the Palestinian Authority, particularly in relation
to the accountability of the presidential accounts and in terms
of the legal, executive and judicial reforms outlined in the 100
day reform plan. Continuing to drive through planned reforms is
the best way for the PA to deal with its critics. The PA is an
institution which is developing into what could be a credible
foundation for a Palestinian state. It is in everyone's interest
that every penny of international development aid to the PA, whether
from DFID or charities, is fully and transparently accounted for.
Some of the PA's critics would prefer to see donor funding stopped.
But we believe this would do more harm than good. It would push
more Palestinians below the poverty line and lead to total collapse
of the PA. A collapse, which would have a detrimental effect on
the peace process. In the absence of the PA, people would be more
likely to turn to extreme positions and measures and support terrorism.
(Paragraph 68)
Answer:
We agree. DFID is currently working with the World
Bank on a Country Financial Accountability Assessment that evaluates
the strengths and weaknesses of the Palestinian Authority's financial
management systems and identifies where further improvements are
required. This will help strengthen the case for multi-donor support
for the PA's budget.
Conclusion 17:
It is vital for the credibility of the PA that
it obtains a renewed popular mandate through elections as soon
it can, including the election of municipal government structures.
(Paragraph 72)
Answer:
We support Abu Ala's stated intentions to hold elections
this year. This is also a key obligation under Phase One of the
Roadmap. The PA faces a major legitimacy problem within Palestinian
society, which is increasing the further time passes from the
elections of 1996. A renewal of the democratic mandate is therefore
essential and would likely add some impetus to the reform movement.
While the PA has committed itself to organising municipal, legislative
and Presidential elections, the PLC has not yet passed the appropriate
enabling legislation. Elections would be logistically very difficult
and probably flawed without a substantial relaxation of Israeli
movement restrictions. We will continue to lobby both sides to
take the necessary steps to allow for free and fair polls during
2004.
Conclusion 18:
We believe that suicide bombing, as well as being
morally abhorrent, has been a catastrophic tactic that has done
great harm to the Palestinian cause, and that the targeting of
innocent civilians is indefensible. The Palestinian Authority,
we are told, also takes this view; its condemnation needs to be
heard more widely. (Paragraph 73)
Answer:
We agree. The Palestinian Authority must take immediate
action on security to tackle rejectionist violence. We are encouraged
by recent Palestinian steps to implement change on the ground
- for example, creating a more visible security presence. We regularly
press the PA to be more vocal in its condemnation of suicide bombings.
Conclusion 19:
We recommend that the donor community targets
the Palestinian civilian police for "technical" assistance
as part of building state institutions and the rule of law. Pressure
should be put on Israel to allow this as part of the building
of state institutions. The issue of security services should be
dealt with as part of political and security negotiations. (Paragraph
75)
Answer:
If circumstances permit we will support the role
of Palestinian Civil Police in improving law and order. As a first
step DFID plans to appoint a police adviser to work in the Palestinian
Interior Ministry. We have already provided funds for vehicles
and equipment. Israel has not blocked UK assistance to the police.
THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY
Conclusion 20:
We know of no other examples where this level
of economic decline has taken place without the complete dissolution
of the governmental apparatus, at least certainly not in a middle-income
economy such as West Bank and Gaza. (Paragraph 77)
Answer:
We agree.
Conclusion 21:
Removing the "access controls" imposed
by the Israelis would increase the size of the economy by 21%,
and reduce the rate of poverty by 15%, whereas a doubling of development
assistance would bring only a 7% reduction in the rate of poverty.
This is not therefore a situation which donor assistance can solve.
The lifting of closures would, in the World Bank's view, allow
the economy to rebound quickly in income terms but not in capital
terms. There would therefore be a role for donors to help replace
assets, which had been lost. (Paragraph 78)
Answer:
We agree; see answer to conclusion 2. However the
provision of infrastructure is not currently an area of focus
for DFID.
Conclusion 22:
Our visit to Awarta demonstrated clearly to us
that the restrictions placed on the internal movement of goods
within the OPT were not always justified by security considerations.
We raised the issue with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and with the Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories
(COGAT). Neither explained the logic of the system. It is hard
to avoid the conclusion that there is a deliberate Israeli strategy
of putting the lives of ordinary Palestinians under stress as
part of a strategy to bringing the population to heel. The West
Bank back-to-back system, operating as we saw it, is not providing
increased security to Israel or to settlers living in OPT. It
merely serves to increase Palestinian poverty and suffering by
strangling the local economy. (Paragraph 83)
Answer:
The Government of Israel could do a great deal more
to ease the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinian
people without threatening Israeli security. Improvements in the
freedom of movement of people and goods would be the most significant
step towards the recovery of the Palestinian economy. We have
urged the Israeli government to take these steps.
Conclusion 23:
Movement restrictions have caused an unacceptable
situation whereby an EU trade agreement is obstructed by a party
(Israel) which itself benefits from preferential EU trade terms.
(Paragraph 87)
Conclusion 24:
Trade agreements are usually based on the principle
of reciprocity: that market access, freedom of movement, and tariff
and duty regimes applied by one state or authority normally has
to be applied even-handedly and in the same way by all participants
in a regional trade agreement. Unfortunately, Israel's restrictions
on the movement of Palestinian goods, its destruction of Palestinian
infrastructure and its total control of the OPT's borders are
denying Palestinian exporters access to EU markets. We therefore
urge the UK Government to propose to the EU Council of Trade Ministers
that Israel's preferential terms of trade with the EU be suspended
until it lifts the movement restrictions, which it has placed
on Palestinian trade. We recognise that EU exports to Israel,
which are greater in value than EU imports from Israel, might
suffer retaliatory action, but we do not believe that the EU's
short-term economic self-interest with one trading partner should
take precedence over a direct challenge to its trade policy in
the region and its trade obligations to the Palestinian Authority.
(Paragraph 88)
Answer to 23 and 24:
The Government along with EU partners has regularly
expressed our serious concerns about the impact of Israeli actions
on the humanitarian and economic situation of Palestinians. At
the EU/Israel Association Council in November 2003 the EU called
on Israel to take no action that aggravates the humanitarian and
economic plight of the Palestinian people. The roadmap also requires
Israel to lift curfews and ease restrictions on movement of persons
and goods. The Government and EU partners believes that, as a
friend of Israel, constructive engagement with Israel is the best
approach to exert influence on it to take the steps called for
by the EU and in the roadmap. We do not believe that full or partial
suspension of the EU/Israel Association Agreement would help influence
Israel to take these steps or bring the parties any nearer to
a peaceful resolution. This view is not based on the impact that
action under the Association Agreement would have on the EU's
economy, which would be negligible.
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES
Conclusion 25:
The UK Government should seek assurances that
infrastructure will not be destroyed, not only for projects built
by the UK and its partners, but for all projects vital to Palestinian
communities. (Paragraph 96)
Answer:
We and our European and other international partners
have repeatedly made representations to the Israeli government
about the scale of the damage done to Palestinian infrastructure
and the often disproportionate force used.
Conclusion 26:
The international community must put pressure
on the Israeli Authorities to lift, or at least ease restrictions
on the import of goods into the OPT to facilitate delivery of
food-aid to the population of Gaza and the West Bank. Limiting
imports into the OPT cannot be justified as a security measure.
Provided Israel can be sure weapons are not being imported into
the OPT, there can be no justification for further restrictions.
(Paragraph 97)
Answer:
We agree and we frequently make representations to
the Israeli government accordingly, bilaterally and with international
partners.
Conclusion 27:
A future Palestinian state may be in a position
to press for compensation or reparations, but this could only
happen where destruction has been documented. DFID should investigate
the possibility of its assistance to the PA being used for the
systematic documentation of destruction. (Paragraph 100)
Answer:
The EC has established an audit of damage to EC and
member state financed projects, and the World Bank carried out
a thorough assessment of overall damage following Operation Defensive
Shield in 2002.
Conclusion 28:
Rather than concentrating solely on compensation,
donors that invest in physical infrastructure should seek guarantees
that it will not be damaged. (Paragraph 102)
Answer:
There is a need to be realistic about what can be
achieved in the current climate. Additional time invested in seeking
guarantees may not result in any real protection to physical infrastructure.
Conclusion 29:
We would like to see this kind of co-operation
encouraged during any negotiations, not least because MASHAV's
expertise could make a contribution towards building a future
Palestinian state as a viable, stable neighbour for Israel. (Paragraph
103)
Answer:
We agree that co-operation with the Israeli government,
NGOs, and the private sector can offer real benefits. There is
already good co-operation in the water sector and MASHAV has contributed
to Sector Working Groups and the larger forums like the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee. We will explore extending this co-operation
further, particularly if the political situation improves.
THE DONOR / DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE
Conclusion 30:
Such money as the international community, including
DFID, is spending on improving "good governance" and
capacity building within the PA is money well spent. (Paragraph
117)
Answer:
We agree. We remain committed to supporting the PA
to make its institutions and governance systems more effective,
accountable and inclusive.
Conclusion 31:
In the current situation of economic collapse,
wage payment maintained by budget support, is an effective method
of emergency poverty alleviation. (Paragraph 122)
Answer:
We agree, and are actively considering a contribution
to the World Bank Budget Support Trust Fund.
Conclusion 32:
We are reassured by the EU's investigations, but
the EU and other donors must ensure that there is no opportunity
given for justified suspicions to be raised. The use of development
aid to the PA, whether from EU, or elsewhere, must be fully, openly
and transparently accounted for. (Paragraph 133)
Answer:
We agree and are working with the World Bank on a
Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA). This is providing
important information about the strengths and weaknesses of PA
financial management systems, and identifying where further technical
assistance and follow up is needed.
Conclusion 33:
DFID has provided substantial support to the PA
in the form of technical assistance. DFID could usefully provide
greater levels of technical assistance and in particular could
support the Palestinian Authority in developing poverty alleviation
policies and enhancing Palestinian involvement in development
planning. (Paragraph 128)
Answer:
DFID's support to a Participatory Poverty Assessment,
carried out by UNDP in conjunction with the PA is planned
to continue through a Participatory Poverty Planning initiative
in partnership with the Ministry's of Planning, Local Government
and Finance. Together with other donors we will explore ways in
which this might be developed into a full poverty reduction strategy.
Conclusion 34:
If DFID were to move towards providing budget
support it should investigate the possibilities of a unified monitoring
system with other donors. Failure to do so could result in the
PA being faced with managing a range of donor conditions and monitoring
requirements. If development assistance is to be efficient and
effective, aid must be delivered without putting an unbearable
strain on an institution with weak capacity. (Paragraph 129)
Answer:
We agree. The World Bank Budget Support Trust Fund
to which we are considering contributing would establish a common
donor approach to conditions and monitoring.
Conclusion 35:
Donors operate in different ways but co-ordination
is necessary to ensure that both development and emergency relief
are delivered effectively. The OPT receives a large amount of
donor aid. What this aid can achieve would be maximised if all
donors can work towards an overall strategy for development. The
best way of achieving this would be through a Palestinian-led
process of development planning. (Paragraph 133)
Answer:
We agree. The Palestinian Socio-Economic Stabilisation
Plan is a good starting point. We plan to work with the PA, and
other donors, to develop further the PA's ideas on co-ordination
and planning. DFID is putting an increasing proportion of its
funds through co-ordinated multi-donor mechanisms.
Conclusion 36:
While we commend the work of the Task Force on
Project Implementation, we are concerned that it is under strain
and has difficulty undertaking such a huge and sensitive task.
(Paragraph 138)
Answer:
We agree.
Conclusion 37:
In light of the continuing negotiations between
Israeli Authorities and International agencies and the discrepancy
between high-level military policy and the on-the-ground reality,
we consider that details of cases of obstruction of humanitarian
workers should be routinely documented. (Paragraph 140)
Answer:
We agree. The Task Force for Project Implementation,
the Palestinian Red Crescent Society and the UN Office for the
Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs already document such cases.
Conclusion 38:
The USA should use the leverage it has with Israel
to facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief. (Paragraph 140)
Answer:
The USA, together with other members of the Quartet,
has pressed both sides to implement their obligations under the
Roadmap. The USA regularly presses the Israeli Government at high
levels on issues of humanitarian access, with some success.
Conclusion 39:
There is clearly a need for a respected international
interlocutor to negotiate with the IDF to try to ensure that the
day to day conditions for occupied Palestinians are as humane
as possible. (Paragraph 141)
Conclusion 40:
There is a multiplicity of UN Agencies and NGOs,
all seeking to deliver a variety of humanitarian and other services
to the Palestinian community, but none of these are in a position
to negotiate successfully with the IDF or the GOI more humane
treatment for occupied Palestinians, and indeed themselves in
reality are subject to exactly the same restrictions of movement
imposed upon Palestinians. (Paragraph 142)
Conclusion 41:
The fact is that Palestinians in Gaza and the
West Bank have no state, neither de jure, nor de facto; no citizenship;
no rights; no remedies, and no one from the international community
taking the responsibility to seek to ensure that an occupied people
in these circumstances are treated as humanely as possible. (Paragraph
143)
Conclusion 42:
UNSCO's authority, role and resources need to
be strengthened. (Paragraph 144)
Conclusion 43:
In addition to strengthening the role of UNSCO
and the Special Co-ordinator, it is time for the Secretary-General
of the United Nations—with the authority of the Security
Council—to appoint a further Humanitarian Envoy or Special
Representative to undertake the specific task of ensuring that
the occupation is as humane as possible and that there is a coherent
and co-ordinated international scrutiny of what is taking place
in the OPT. Such an appointment will need to be accompanied by
provision of the necessary money, materials and resources. (Paragraph
144)
Answer to 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43:
We and other governments regularly discuss our humanitarian
concerns with the Israeli and Palestinian governments. In addition,
Marc Otte, EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace
Process and Terje Reod-Larsen, UN Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process, raise humanitarian and other issues
of concern with interlocutors at all levels. The humane treatment
of Palestinians, the facilitation of adequate humanitarian assistance,
and dialogue about economic and political rights of Palestinians
feature prominently in all these discussions. We and other governments
provide funding for UNSCO to play its full role on these issues.
UN and other organisations already provide regular and detailed
information about the humanitarian situation and rights violations.
Monitoring of wider political developments and Roadmap implementation
is the responsibility of the Quartet.
Based on previous experience, we do not believe that
the appointment of a further Humanitarian Envoy or Special Representative
by the UN will lead to a significant improvement in dialogue between
the international community and the Government of Israel, or in
changes in the behaviour of the IDF.
Conclusion 44:
Unusually for us, during our visit to the West
Bank, no one asked us for money! Neither the PA, nor the NGOs,
nor the UN Agencies saw their problems as rooted in a shortage
of funding. But they all asked for advocacy and political pressure
to end the occupation. (Paragraph 146)
Answer:
We agree that many of the problems these organisations
face are rooted in the occupation and the movement restrictions.
But shortage of funding does prevent them from responding as adequately
as they would like until advocacy and political dialogue resolve
the causes of the situation. During this time aid is vital as
a development tool and in preventing larger numbers of people
falling into extreme poverty and desperation. The shortfall in
the PA's budget for 2004, and the need for UNRWA to maintain its
regular and emergency services, are very real challenges.
Conclusion 45:
All actors need to remind themselves of the need
to avoid anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism, as well as stereotyping
Arab or Jewish societies. International agencies that are engaged
in dealing with the crisis and are witnesses to many of the problems
Palestinians face could do much more to convey these facts, in
an authoritative and non-polemical manner, to the media and the
general public in the UK and Europe. An awareness programme of
this kind, by neutral witnesses, and carried out by NGOs, donors,
and the NSU, could provide a much-needed education of the public
as to the everyday realities in the OPT. (Paragraph 149)
Answer:
We agree that an awareness programme about the everyday
realities in the Palestinian Territory could be useful in Europe.
We will consider this further in the context of DFID's overall
approach to external communications. It could also be extended
in the region. The Negotiations Support Unit has a particular
role in supporting Palestinian negotiating capacity and communications,
and would not be an appropriate organisation to do this kind of
work on behalf of the UK government.
Conclusion 46:
We agree with the Government's position and urge
it to be more forceful in its advocacy on these issues. We see
DFID as having an advocacy role to play within the UK Government.
The Secretary of State assured us that co-ordination with both
the Foreign Office and the Department of Trade and Industry was
good. It is essential that the Government's position is harmonised
across departments and is consistent with all the parties' obligations
under international law and agreements. (Paragraph 150)
Answer:
We agree. DFID will continue to work closely with
the FCO and other parts of the UK government to ensure that our
assistance to the Palestinians is integrated with other aspects
of UK policy towards the region, and that humanitarian and development
concerns are properly taken account of in relevant UK positions.
Conclusion 47:
We do not agree with the European Commission's
approach. We believe in principle that where a sufficiently egregious
case of human rights abuse has been established as to warrant
economic sanctions, the EU should not be deterred from imposing
them simply because the trade balance with the country concerned
is in its favour. We urge the UK Government to take up this point
with the European Commission and with its EU partners. (Paragraph
151)
Answer:
See answer to conclusion 24.
Conclusion 48:
We welcome the change of policy on the part of
the GOI. In this case economic pressure was successful. However,
there remains a risk of goods being falsely labelled as produced
in Israel rather than in the settlements. We trust that HM Customs
will maintain a close watch for false origin labelling (Paragraph
152)
Answer:
This change in Israeli policy came about after a
long and careful period of negotiation. HM Customs and Excise
maintain a close watch on the origin of all goods. They are aware
of the potential risk of false declarations of origin of certain
goods. If these products are suspected of having originated in
the Palestinian Territory, HMC&E will request a guarantee
against the difference between the preferential and the normal
tariff applied to these goods, as well as initiating verification
enquiries with the Israeli authorities.
Conclusion 49:
Few would argue for a resumption of Israeli, as
opposed to PA, administration in the OPT. However it does seem
that Israel's policies and actions in the last ten years have
acted as an obstacle to the development of the PA into a government
that is able to deliver services to its people—as was intended
in the 1993 Declaration of Principles. (Paragraph 153)
Answer:
Actions by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority
have contributed to the current crisis. It is in Israel's interest
to have a stable Palestinian government delivering services effectively
to its people. The PA must also take responsibility for its own
actions including law and order, and failures.
Conclusion 50:
In the absence of any international authority
mandated to represent the interest of the Palestinians under occupation,
and until such "observers" are in place, this presence
of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies provide a modicum
of international "monitoring", if not protection. (Paragraph
154)
Answer:
The UK supports the establishment of a credible and
effective third-party monitoring mechanism as set out in the Roadmap.
The USA began this process in 2003, and is likely to resume when
the political process is further advanced. In the meantime the
EU carries out informal monitoring using existing resources on
the ground. Donor agencies usefully contribute to this process.
Conclusion 51:
To a degree we can understand the ICRC strategy.
We do not think there should be a withdrawal of aid to the OPT
but are concerned that the current situation cannot continue indefinitely.
(Paragraph 156)
Answer:
We agree. This decision is for the ICRC to comment
on, but we do not think there should be a withdrawal of aid
to the Palestinian Territory. We note that the ICRC is only ending
its emergency food aid in the West Bank, not closing its programme
of assistance to the Palestinians altogether, and that other agencies,
particularly World Food Programme and UNRWA, will continue to
meet the needs of the poorest Palestinians.
Conclusion 52:
We think that DFID can have an influential role
in increasing donor harmonisation through its support for Palestinian-led
development. DFID's work in building the PA's capacity has been
effective and meets its objectives of supporting the peace process
and the development of a viable future Palestinian state. It could
increase support to the PA in the area of planning capacity and
effective communication with donors. (Paragraph 157)
Conclusion 53:
DFID is developing a country strategy for the
OPT. We believe its strategy should seek to alleviate poverty
not only through service provision or development, but also through
the working to the broader objective of increasing aid effectiveness
through donor harmonisation and through a development conversation
with the GOI about the relative responsibilities of Israel as
an occupier, and the responsibilities of donors in relieving suffering.
DFID should also be considering its involvement with advocacy
as part of long-term poverty reduction. In particular it should
give greater attention to pressuring the GOI for freedom of movement
for humanitarian goods and personnel. (Paragraph 158)
Answer to 52 and 53:
DFID's draft Country Assistance Plan identifies the
more effective delivery of international assistance as one of
three outcomes we can best contribute to. Humanitarian and development
assistance is most effectively delivered by donors working together
to provide harmonised support under the strategic guidance of
the recipient. Progress on this has been made in recent years,
and there are some good examples of several donors pooling resources
effectively behind PA priorities, but more can still be done.
The PA's capacity to lead on strategic planning and donor co-ordination
has been constrained during the intifada. Yet with support from
international partners it is now starting to play a more proactive
role. DFID's proposed support to the Participatory Poverty Planning
initiative would focus on the Ministry of Planning and could advance
this process.
DFID's draft Country Assistance Plan would commit
us to promoting a coherent donor response to Palestinian development
priorities, as currently set out for 2004-05 in the Socio-Economic
Stabilisation Plan. We are supporting the creation of a harmonised
mechanism to support the PA's budget. When the time is right,
we will support the PA in its desire (as set out in the Socio-Economic
Stabilisation Plan), to develop "a priority-based, transparent,
national development vision and framework supported by the international
donor community". We will work towards creating the necessary
conditions for donors to channel an increasing proportion of all
aid through the PA budget, in support of PA reform and well defined
plans that focus on poverty.
DFID will be consulting on the draft Country Assistance
Plan in Israel. As part of these consultations, we will explore
the scope for us to play more of a role on issues of humanitarian
advocacy. In doing so, we will need to take account of what value
we could add to what other international agencies are already
doing in these areas and what can realistically be achieved in
the current climate.
Department for International Development
16 March 2004
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