Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report


3 DFID's Kenya Country Assistance Plan

18. DFID policy is driven by the MDGs; its funds are spent in pursuit of these goals. Since the Kenyan elections of December 2002, DFID has taken the view that the Government of Kenya is sufficiently serious about development and poverty reduction to merit a substantial injection of financial assistance, amounting to around £30 million per year. This sum is likely to increase over the coming years, assuming the Government continues to move in the direction and at the speed which DFID deems necessary.

19. DFID's draft Country Assistance Plan for Kenya outlines how DFID intends to assist the Government of Kenya to make progress with its development strategy, the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation. If the purpose of a CAP is to outline and explain DFID's MDG-driven plans to support a country's poverty reduction plans, then it ought to include the following elements:

  • An analysis of poverty and poverty trends[20] in Kenya in relation to the MDGs;
  • An outline of the Government's plans for poverty reduction and meeting the MDGs;
  • An outline and explanation of DFID's plans to assist the Government of Kenya to reduce poverty and to meet the MDGs; and,
  • A framework for monitoring Kenya's progress towards the MDGs and for evaluating the effectiveness of DFID's assistance.

20. DFID's draft CAP for Kenya includes most of these elements, and - particularly alongside other documents such as the UN's excellent progress report on Kenya and the Millennium Development Goals[21]—is a very useful document. It outlines the challenges which Kenya faces; the Government of Kenya's response to these challenges; what DFID has learnt; DFID's plans for assistance; and, in an extremely useful table, provides a framework for monitoring the impact of DFID activities. But there is room for improvement. In the remainder of this chapter we make some observations, and recommendations as to how the CAP could be improved: first, by focussing more on the MDGs; second by setting out in more detail the rationale for DFID's plans and priorities; and third by outlining more clearly how DFID will track and monitor Kenya's progress towards the MDGs, and evaluate the impact of its development assistance.

The CAP and the Millennium Development Goals: Disappearing targets?

21. The Millennium Development Goals do not figure prominently in the draft CAP. Two helpful tables showing progress towards the MDGs are included in it as annexes, but other than that these internationally-agreed goals appear to be marginal. There would be little point in replicating material available in the UN's Progress Report on the MDGs in Kenya (see footnote 21), but given DFID's over-riding commitment to poverty reduction and the MDGs - as set out in DFID's Public Service Agreement - we consider this apparent marginalisation of the MDGs to be a mistake. The MDGs provide a focus, and a common language for talking about the challenges of poverty reduction. The Secretary of State told us that he hopes that in future, when people are looking at DFID's Country Assistance Plans, "they will be able to see quite clearly a consistent focus on the progress that is or is not being made against the MDGs and what it is that we intend to do as part of our contribution in the areas where progress is not being made."[22] The draft CAP for Kenya does not achieve this; but it should. If the UK as a donor country wants to persuade developing country governments to prioritise poverty reduction and the MDGs, it should outline its plans in terms of assistance towards meeting these goals. The UK Government must not allow the MDGs to slip off the international development agenda—globally, or at country-level—by neglect.

Comparative Advantage and Complementarity: The rationale behind DFID's plans and priorities?

22. Development strategies need to be locally-owned if they are to succeed and to be sustainable. Consultations can increase the local-ownership of development strategies. In this respect, the process through which DFID's CAP is being produced provides something of a contrast with the Government of Kenya's Economic Recovery Strategy. As we heard in Nairobi, this strategy - which has in effect superseded Kenya's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—was produced in a hurry with little consultation, a factor which might account for its weaknesses on poverty reduction. But consultation may generate a string of wish-lists. Indeed many of the submissions received by DFID and by us are essentially requests that particular sectors receive more attention.[23] This is understandable, given the lack of resources which many sectors and organisations experience. Nevertheless, in the face of an overall lack of resources for development, this approach does not help donors or governments to prioritise effectively. In the face of multifarious demands from different stakeholders and sectors, the temptation to do a bit of everything is clear. The Secretary of State conceded to us that DFID-Kenya is perhaps spreading itself too thinly.[24]

23. The Country Assistance Plan does more than commit DFID to assisting Kenya. It also states DFID's priorities, and ought in our view to explain more clearly how DFID sets its priorities for Kenya.[25] By making explicit its own rationale for prioritising certain sectors and activities, DFID may also encourage its development partners and consultees to ensure that their plans take the form of evidence-based, prioritised strategies, rather than wish-lists. The draft CAP for Kenya does include some useful analysis of the challenges faced by Kenya, analysis which fills in what has been referred to as the "missing middle"[26] between DFID's objectives and DFID's spending plans, but this does not in itself provide sufficient explanation of DFID's priorities.

24. Hilary Benn told us that: "in the end we have to form a judgment about what is the right balance for the range of the programme, recognising that other people are going to do things and just because we are not working in a particular sector does not mean we do not think it is important; we do, but other people may be leading on it."[27] As such, DFID may well be right in its assessment that tourism is not an area where it should be focussing its assistance,[28] and may be wise to leave procurement and civil service reform to the World Bank.[29] We were interested also to hear in oral evidence of DFID's plans to work with the Canadian International Development Agency on education[30]; and with the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency and the World Bank on improving the management of financial information.[31] But the CAP itself would be improved were it to provide more explanation of how DFID sets its priorities, particularly about how DFID ensures that its activities complement those of other donors.

25. DFID's Permanent Secretary, Suma Chakrabarti, has in the past explained the rationale for DFID's allocation of resources between and within countries in terms of comparative advantage. As he made clear to us in 2002: "We are part of a collective effort; we do not have to be in every single sector in every single country and we should look at comparative advantage at a country level to try and work out where we can best make the real difference".[32] That is, DFID should do those things which - relative to other donors - it is good at. This seems a sensible approach given the scarcity of resources for development, and the need to use them effectively if progress towards the MDGs is to be maximised. We acknowledge that comparative advantage, including that which is conferred by history and culture, may be a sound basis for making decisions about priorities and resource allocations. But one donor's comparative advantage only makes sense in relation to the comparative advantage of other donors. Unless information is provided about what other donors are doing, and where their strengths lie, little can be said about DFID's own comparative advantage.[33]

26. Clearly, a CAP cannot contain everything about a country's situation. Nevertheless, it seems to us that a CAP should not simply outline DFID's plans; rather, it should provide a rationale for its plans and an explanation of how its priorities are decided. If priorities are decided on the basis of comparative advantage, then more information should be provided in the CAP about what other donors are doing in-country.[34] In addition, given the need for different donors to work together effectively, and to avoid placing excessive demands on recipient governments, it would be useful if CAPs included more information about the extent of, and mechanisms for, donor coordination and harmonisation.[35]

The Aid Relationship: Balancing local ownership and external accountability?

27. As the former Secretary of State, Clare Short, was keen to stress, aid is not charity; rather, aid is an investment in poverty reduction.[36] Relationships between investor and investee are complex and require delicate balances to be struck, in particular between local ownership and the external accountability which is crucial to ensure that funds—UK taxpayers' funds—are spent wisely in pursuit of the development goals to which the UK Government is committed. Aid is provided to a country in the expectation that it will deliver real returns in terms of poverty reduction. Governments of developing countries must be in the driving seat, but donors will only provide the fuel if the car is being driven in what the donor regards as broadly the right direction and at a reasonable speed. Aid, if we are honest, is used as a way to influence policy, to persuade the (potential) recipient to pursue pro-poor policies, and to deliver poverty reduction.[37]

28. Developing countries need to be able to determine and pursue their own policies, but in circumstances when DFID is providing them with assistance, DFID must be able to check that its funds are being well-spent. As Hilary Benn put it: "It is very important that we are able to manage both the progress of the elements of our own programme and also the way in which the spending of the Government of Kenya on what I think we collectively regard as the priority sectors actually moves."[38] We agree. Responding to a question about what rate of progress would be acceptable on tackling corruption in Kenya, and at what point DFID might say "We are sorry. This is not working out", the Secretary of State told us that:

"Sometimes I sit and I think 'Are we being over-ambitious and having excessive expectations about rate of progress?' and on the other hand sometimes one thinks, 'Well, we know this is absolutely fundamental to dealing with some of the broader problems and therefore it is in everybody's interests that people should crack on as quickly as possible', and in the end it has to be a balance between the two."[39]

29. We agree that there has to be a balance between maintaining a sense of urgency and being realistic about what is achievable in a certain time-scale. But when DFID's funds are being spent, thoughts about the appropriate balance must be translated into agreed, if flexible, timetables for making progress towards the MDGs.

30. We welcome the fact that DFID's CAP sets out how it intends to support Kenya's development strategy, rather than superimposing DFID's own strategy. DFID ought not to micro-manage Kenya's development effort. But DFID must be able to assess whether sufficiently speedy progress is being made towards agreed objectives. DFID must be able to monitor Kenya's progress towards the MDGs, and to evaluate the effectiveness of its assistance. The Secretary of State accepted that DFID "ought to do more on how we track and monitor".[40] Well-designed processes for poverty reduction and development assistance are crucial, but they must be judged by whether or not they deliver the outcomes required in an agreed timescale. We look forward to hearing from DFID as to how it intends to do more on tracking and monitoring Kenya's progress towards the MDGs.


20   "Poverty and poverty trends" is used here as a shorthand for the range of development issues faced by Kenya. Back

21   UNDP, Millennium Development Goals: Progress Report for Kenya, 2003. See http://www.undp.org/mdg/kenya.pdf Back

22   Q 9 [Hilary Benn] Back

23   Q 36 [Hilary Benn] Back

24   Q 7 [Hilary Benn] Back

25   The ways in which DFID prioritises and allocates resources across countries is an equally important related issue. See: International Development Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2001-02, Department for International Development: Departmental Report 2002, HC 964, especially paragraph 39. Back

26   Ibid., paragraph 34. Back

27   Q 36 [Hilary Benn] Back

28   Q 14 [Hilary Benn] Back

29   Q 36 [Hilary Benn] Back

30   Q 12 [Felicity Townsend, Senior Education Advisor, DFID-Kenya] Back

31   Q 31 [Hilary Benn] Back

32   International Development Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2001-02, Department for International Development: Departmental Report 2002, HC 964, paragraph 39. Back

33   Q 36-41 [Hilary Benn and Matthew Wyatt] Back

34   There is, for Vietnam for instance, a publication which outlines the activities which different EU donors and the European Commission are involved in. EU, European Union Development Cooperation Activities in Vietnam 2002, Hanoi, September 2003. Available at http://207.201.187.56/en/whatsnew/bluebook/fore_word.htm Back

35   The draft CAP notes in table G that donors are "poorly harmonised around Government's national strategic plan", and includes at E13 an objective of "increased harmonisation and alignment of donor resources behind ERS priorities", but says little more about the nature of donor harmonisation or coordination.  Back

36   International Development Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2001-02, Financing for development: Finding the money to eliminate world poverty, HC 785-I, paragraph 71. Back

37   There is a large literature on the effectiveness or otherwise of conditionality, and different forms of conditionality, but donors clearly try to achieve policy influence through their use of aid. See IDC, Fifth Report of the Session 2001-02, Financing for development: Finding the money to eliminate world poverty, HC 785-I, paragraphs 78-81 (see footnote 36 for full reference). Back

38   Q 4 [Hilary Benn] Back

39   Q 35 [Hilary Benn] Back

40   Q 7 [Hilary Benn] Back


 
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