House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Eighth Report

3 Where to and why? Poverty, politics and aid

The poverty-focus of aid and the multilaterals

14. The UK can achieve the best poverty reduction returns on its aid investments, by focussing its aid on the poorest countries, and particularly those which are serious about poverty reduction. DFID aims to spend 90 per cent of its bilateral budget—excluding that spent on humanitarian assistance in low-income countries. The Chancellor reiterated this commitment in announcing the Spending Review's aid increases. DFID expects to meet this target in 2005-06. This is excellent news. But as 43 per cent of UK aid is spent through multilateral agencies—primarily the European Union, the International Financial Institutions and the United Nations—meeting a poverty-focus target for bilateral aid is not sufficient to ensure that UK aid overall is as effective as possible.

15. The Departmental Report 2004 shows a planned increase in "International Programmes" or multilateral aid from £1.496 billion in 2004-05 to £1.896 billion in 2005-06.[13] The bulk of this increase—£250 million—is to finance the replenishment of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) resources. We understand that the IDA has a good poverty-focus, but the Departmental Report should provide information about the poverty-focus of the multilaterals through which UK aid is channelled. In the absence of such information, it is impossible for the reader to tell whether the poverty-focus of UK bilateral aid is diluted by the 43 per cent of DFID's budget which flows through the multilaterals.

16. The European Union has been a particular cause for concern as regards the poverty focus of its aid. Objective 4 of DFID's 2003-06 PSA includes a target of "working for agreement to increase the proportion of EC overseas development assistance to low income countries from 38 per cent to 70 per cent".[14] The Departmental Report suggests that it is too early to say whether progress is being made towards this target, but notes that slippage is likely.[15] In 2002, 42 per cent of EC aid was spent in low-income countries. The Departmental Report shows a sizeable increase in the UK contribution to the European Development Fund (EDF), from an estimated outturn of £211 million in 2003-04 to a planned £260 million in 2005-06.[16] At first glance this seems odd: why channel more funds through an organisation which is failing to focus its aid on the poorest countries? This apparent anomaly is explained firstly by the fact that the EDF—in contrast to budgetised EC aid—is well-focussed on low-income countries, and secondly because the European Commission's performance in spending EDF resources improved during 2003, with commitments and payments exceeding projections.[17] There is no room for complacency—European aid remains insufficiently poverty-focussed—but the Commission deserves credit for the improvements which have been made to the disbursement of EDF funds, as does the UK Government and others who have pushed the Commission to do better.

17. The problems with EU aid relate primarily to budgetised spending. As we, and others, have repeatedly complained, the allocation of these funds is not sufficiently-driven by poverty-reduction goals.[18] Instead, allocations are determined—particularly now that there is no Council of Development Ministers—by Foreign Ministers,[19] whose priorities are foreign policy, security and the "near-abroad". Enlargement is unlikely to make development more of a priority; it may well add to the pressure to focus on the "near-abroad". Progress has been made with making EU development policy more poverty-focussed, but, particularly in terms of spending, much more needs to be done. The UK Government has to strike a difficult balance in its relations with the EU, just as in its relations with developing countries. Financial support can, through policy dialogue, encourage reform. But in the absence of reform, financial support is money wasted. We will be keeping a close eye on the poverty focus of EC aid, and the UK's contribution to the EU's aid effort.

18. The UK taxpayer rightly expects that aid is spent effectively on poverty reduction. To be most effective, aid must be well-targeted. UK bilateral aid is well-targeted, and increasingly so. Other than making the UK's bilateral aid more effective than it currently is, logically there are three (not mutually-exclusive) ways of increasing the effectiveness of UK aid overall:

by spending a greater proportion of UK aid bilaterally;
by improving the poverty focus of those multilaterals through which UK aid is channelled; or,
by channelling multilateral funds through poverty-focussed organisations.

If stakeholders, including Parliament, are to be able to assess whether sensible decisions are being made about channelling aid through multilaterals, then the Departmental Report must show clearly the poverty focus of the multilaterals through which UK aid is channelled. The Departmental Report for 2004 fails to do this; such a lack of transparency unhelpfully limits DFID's accountability. Figures on the poverty focus of the multilateral agencies which DFID contributes to are available in DFID's "Statistics on international development" publication,[20] but given the importance which DFID attaches to its poverty focus, and the proportion of funds channelled through multilateral agencies, the Departmental Report itself should include such information.

Iraq: Aid diversion, spending and achievements

19. The overall financing needs of post-war Iraq were calculated by the United Nations and the World Bank. At the Madrid Donors' Conference in October 2003, the Government announced a total UK pledge of £544 million towards the reconstruction of Iraq up to March 2006.[21] This sum is split between DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, with—in the period up to March 2004—DFID committing £278 million for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Iraq.[22] Inter-departmental allocations were determined, it would seem, by already-existing patterns of Departmental spending in Iraq.[23]

20. In November 2003 DFID announced that it was reducing its spending in several middle-income countries (MICs) in order to provide funds for the reconstruction of Iraq following the ousting of Saddam Hussein.[24] Once the Government had decided how much to spend in Iraq, and how much of this spend would be allocated to DFID, funds had to be found. In the absence of sufficient reserves for contingencies of this scale, with a firm commitment to provide 90 per cent of its bilateral aid—excluding humanitarian assistance—to low-income countries by 2005-06 (the so-called 90/10 target), and with Iraq classified as an MIC by the OECD, it was necessary to divert funds to Iraq from MICs. As a result, DFID plans to reduce its spending in MICs in 2004-05 and 2005-06 by a total of around £100 million.[25] This is to be achieved by withdrawing from a number of MICs in Latin America sooner than expected, and reducing spending in other MICs such as China.

21. Christian Aid has been very critical of the diversion of DFID's funds from planned and agreed programmes in MICs to meet foreign policy objectives in Iraq.[26] They criticise the decision to unexpectedly close DFID offices in Peru and Honduras; offices which were performing key roles in the countries' development. The DFID-Honduras office, opened by Patricia Hewitt, MP in September 2003, was for instance facilitating civil society participation in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), work which DFID's Departmental Report itself hails as a success.[27] DFID-Peru had committed to funding, through Oxfam, a small projects fund for grassroots organisations in the rural Andes. This fund was to focus on building awareness about rights, and capacity-building for local communities. In the context of Peru's new policy of decentralisation, work of this nature tackling the root causes of marginalisation and disempowerment of rural communities, and encouraging participation and engagement with local government, is crucial. Regrettably, this programme will now be terminated just two and a half years after its inception.

22. In his evidence to the Committee in 2002, Suma Chakrabarti—acknowledging that there were differences of view within DFID about its involvement in Latin America—put the case for continued engagement:

there are seventy-seven million poor people in Latin America and the Caribbean;
six out of the ten most unequal countries in the world are in Latin America;
by being involved in the region DFID can help governments to see how to successfully redistribute their resources; and,
by being involved in the region DFID can engage with other donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank to get them to be more effective and focussed on poverty reduction.

23. The diversion of funds to Iraq involved difficult decisions. Suma Chakrabarti explained these decisions in terms of: firstly, the pressing need to provide funds for reconstruction in Iraq; and secondly, in terms of the Government's evidence-based commitment to the 90/10 target.[28] As the Permanent Secretary put it, when the Government "decided that Iraq was going to be a development programme" [our emphasis], it had to find the funds from planned spending in other MICs. The arguments in support of DFID involvement in Latin America would seem now to have been outweighed by the pressing needs of Iraq. It is for the Government to balance competing interests, but the diversion of development funds to Iraq raises important questions about the nature of development, the purpose of development spending, and the relationship between development, security and military objectives.

24. The Departmental Report provides some information about DFID's financial commitments to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Iraq in 2003-04. A table on page eighty-two of the Report shows which organisations DFID contributed to. For instance £70 million was allocated to the International Reconstruction Fund for Iraq and another £59 million to "other reconstruction work".[29] But the reader is not told what these funds were spent on. On page eighty-three, a facing page, is a box outlining achievements in Iraq 2003-04. Suma Chakrabarti explained that this box gives the reader some examples of outcomes that have been achieved. This is potentially misleading. The first box outlines DFID's contributions, the second outlines achievements in Iraq. Valuable as DFID's contribution in Iraq is, it must be made crystal clear that "achievements in Iraq" are outcomes arrived at through the collective efforts of many agencies, and, of course, the people of Iraq.[30] Just as the report must avoid inadvertently attributing collectively-achieved outcomes to DFID, so too must the impacts of DFID's contributions be made as clear as possible. The difficulty of attribution—saying whose actions led to a particular outcome—does not justify the loose and potentially misleading presentation of information on contributions and outcomes. DFID must present information on spending and outcomes in its Departmental Reports in such a way as to ensure that the potential for confusion is avoided, a point which the Permanent Secretary accepted.[31]

25. Reconstructing Iraq will be a long, difficult and expensive task. The UK must honour its commitments to help the country and its people to recover from the war, and from the legacy of Saddam Hussein. In order to demonstrate that UK development funds are being spent wisely and are leading to desirable development outcomes in Iraq, DFID must—either in its Departmental Report, or by indicating where such information can be found—make as clear as possible how much of its money is being spent on what, and with what effect. We are examining UK development assistance in Iraq in more detail in an ongoing inquiry.

Iraq and Afghanistan: The security/development nexus

26. About five per cent of DFID's spending in Iraq is spent on providing security for DFID's staff and contractors.[32] The security situation in Iraq is exceptionally poor, but there has in recent years been a change in the environment for development workers such that they are now considered by some as legitimate targets to attack. As DFID's Mark Lowcock put it: "what used to be unthinkable is now a real problem we have to deal with all the time."[33]

27. In addition to the bombing of the United Nations and the Red Cross in Iraq, many aid workers have been murdered in Afghanistan[34]. In July 2004, Médecins Sans Frontières announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan because of security concerns. More generally, NGOs, and the United Nations, have voiced concerns about the blurring of humanitarian/development assistance and security/military operations, for instance in relation to the role of Provisional Reconstruction Teams. DFID's Nicola Brewer told us that she had visited Afghanistan in December 2003 along with DFID's Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Gareth Thomas, MP with an eye on this issue, and was reassured by what they learnt.[35] Nevertheless it is of the utmost importance that the distinction between humanitarian/development work, and security/military work is maintained, in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Security is a pre-requisite for development. Unless development workers and DFID staff can travel around the country, beyond the capital or controlled zones, they cannot obtain a full picture of the country's needs.[36] Unless women feel safe walking down the street, they will not be able to play a full role in society.[37] But security is not the same as development. And military objectives must never encroach on humanitarian objectives. We understand that DFID is doing some work on the security/development nexus, and look forward to seeing the results.

Zimbabwe and Sudan: Responding to humanitarian needs and resolving conflict

28. DFID's spending on humanitarian crises varies from year to year, depending on what emergencies occur.[38] Following two internal reviews, DFID has changed the way it allocates funds for responding to humanitarian emergencies. Rather than starting with a modest allocation and then calling on the contingency reserve, DFID will now—beginning with the year 2004-05—allocate more money to humanitarian response at the start of the year. We would appreciate further explanation of the changes made to the way that DFID allocates funds for humanitarian emergencies, and would like to be kept informed as to their impact.

29. There is a continuing crisis in Zimbabwe; a humanitarian crisis caused in large part by the policies of President Robert Mugabe.As Suma Chakrabarti told us in 2003, in a failed state like Zimbabwe it is very difficult to carry out development work.[39] Information provided by DFID shows that nearly 75 per cent of expenditure for 2003/04 was allocated to humanitarian assistance programmes with the balance of expenditure almost entirely allocated to HIV/AIDS programmes.[40] The Department notes that it "is not providing funds for longer-term development programmes at this time".[41] As such, we were keen to understand why the planned allocation to Zimbabwe for 2004-05 and 2005-06 has increased considerably from that set out in last year's Departmental Report—£12 million in each year[42]—to the £27 million per year set out in this year's Departmental Report.[43]

30. DFID explained that Zimbabwe has experienced a humanitarian crisis since 2001 due to the combined effect of weather, poorly-managed land reform, economic mis-management and HIV/AIDS. Food insecurity, hunger and vulnerability remain widespread in large part because of continuing political and economic turmoil. It is in response to these desperate realities that DFID plans to spend more on responding to the humanitarian needs of Zimbabweans. If positive political change came about, the UK would be keen to provide more resources for development.[44] The UK and other donors face a dilemma. Providing humanitarian assistance to countries such as Zimbabwe may serve to prop-up the regimes whose own policies are causing the humanitarian crisis. In this case we believe that the UK is right to provide humanitarian assistance to prevent more deaths.[45]

31. The crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan has built up gradually, with the international community paying progressively more attention. Visits by the UK's Secretary of State for International Development and Foreign Secretary, by Kofi Annan and by the USA's Secretary of State Colin Powell from May to August 2004 have played an important role in focussing some attention on the crisis.[46] Whilst the Darfur crisis raises big issues about the timeliness and effectiveness of the international community's response to the threat of genocide we applaud the role played by the UK Government, and particularly Hilary Benn MP, Jack Straw MP and the Prime Minister, in this regard.

32. There has been some suggestion that the international community was slow to respond to the crisis in Darfur because it had its eye off the ball, looking to a successful resolution of the long-running North/South conflict in Sudan and missing what was happening in Darfur.[47] DFID's Permanent Secretary did not accept this.[48] This begs the question as to why then the international community's response to the crisis in Darfur has been so slow, a question we are addressing in our ongoing inquiry into "Darfur, Sudan: Crisis, Response and Lessons".

Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya and Ethiopia: Picking winners or backing the wrong horse?

33. In several countries—including Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and more recently Ethiopia—DFID's approach has been to ally itself strongly with particular governments which it believes are seriously committed to making the reforms necessary to achieve poverty reduction. As a result of this strategy, DFID puts itself and the UK Government in the firing-line if the government and leadership of the country in question veers off the course which DFID had expected them to take, violating human rights, engaging in corrupt practices, interfering in neighbouring countries, and spending excessively on the military. Such allegations have been seen most clearly in relation to President Kagame of Rwanda, President Kibaki of Kenya and President Museveni of Uganda.

34. For DFID the key consideration is "whether the government in question is fundamentally committed to poverty reduction". Questions about a government's human rights record, and its efforts to improve human rights, are, we were effectively told, secondary; "there comes a point when, if a government's human rights record is so terrible and it is doing absolutely nothing about it, there will be an issue as to whether we have an aid programme there at all".[49] Whether or not this is a reasonable position to take depends, it seems to us, on exactly where the point or threshold is beyond which a country's record is simply unacceptable. Donors and recipients must be clear about this. In the absence of such clarity, a leadership which is so-inclined will seek to get away with whatever they can.

35. Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), argues DFID, provides the UK with better access for high-level policy dialogue about such issues. And, backed up by memoranda of understanding which specify the rights, responsibilities and obligations for each side in the aid relationship, it is through such dialogue that positive change is best-achieved. In the case of Uganda for instance, aid flows have been stopped by DFID on at least four occasions since 1999 because of concerns that too much was being spent on the military.[50] It is too early to say whether policy dialogue, leveraged through PRBS, and buttressed by memoranda of understanding, has been effective in delivering pro-poor policy change. But it would be a big mistake to assume that aid relationships conducted in this way will make corruption, the abuse of human rights, and the curtailment of democratic processes disappear (see paragraphs 50-62 on Poverty Reduction Budget Support).

DFID, poverty reduction and politics

36. DFID's activities over the past year—its withdrawal from Middle Income Countries (MICs) in Latin America and elsewhere, its involvement in Iraq, and its various roles in Zimbabwe, Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda and elsewhere—raise important issues and questions: what is DFID and the international community's strategy for poverty reduction in MICs; what activities are within and beyond the limits of poverty reduction as spelt out in the International Development Act 1998; and, is, or should DFID be, an autonomous poverty-reducing Department?

37. Globally, 43 per cent of bilateral development assistance is spent in MICs. But the aid flows which MICs receive are not achieving poverty reduction, and many MICs risk falling back into the low-income category. There is no international agreement on the purpose of aid in MICs, nor on the volume of assistance. DFID's own paper on "Achieving the Millennium Development Goals: the Middle-Income countries" states that "Poverty reduction is not the starting point either for many donors nor for many governments in MICs."[51] This raises the question of how DFID can ensure that in its relationships with MICs it does not simply become the default provider of poverty reduction programmes. DFID's strategy is to ensure that its programmes in MICs are part of a co-ordinated and focussed international effort, and to increase the effectiveness of the international system as a whole at dealing with the MICs. DFID's bilateral assistance to the MICs will be limited to countries and issues where it can add value: large, strategically important countries that affect the achievement of the MDGs regionally or globally; the poorest MICs; and those that are at risk of slipping back to low-income status.[52] We applaud DFID for its efforts to develop a co-ordinated and poverty-focussed international approach to meeting the MDGs in MICs.

38. A second issue concerns the nature of poverty reduction, and the limits set to DFID's work by the International Development Act in 1998. Even a cursory look at DFID's activities reveals that they span a very broad range of activities: raising awareness about rights in Honduras; empowering women in Afghanistan; improving policing in Iraq; peace-building in Sudan; feeding people in Zimbabwe, and so on. Poverty is multi-faceted, so it is not surprising that actions taken to tackle poverty take many forms. The question is, what limits does DFID's role as a poverty reduction agency set on what it can and should be doing? The answer is not clear. So for instance, in response to questioning about whether improving policing is part of poverty reduction, Suma Chakrabarti told us that the poor tend to suffer most from insecurity, and that therefore, in some contexts, improving policing is fundamental to poverty reduction.[53] We do not disagree.

39. The Permanent Secretary explained that he would not draw the line defining what are and are not poverty-reducing activities so as to exclude improving policing, and that anything that DFID does has to pass the test set by the International Development Act.[54] The Act itself states that "The Secretary of State may provide any person or body with development assistance if he is satisfied that the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty."[55] Our understanding is that the Act was designed to prevent a repeat of egregious misuses and abuses of aid to promote trade and political objectives, such as the Pergau dam in the 1990s. If the Act is to have any meaning, there must be limits to what DFID can do. Those with a commitment to international development and poverty reduction—including ourselves, and DFID—should remain vigilant to ensure that DFID's funds are spent on things which will contribute to poverty reduction, and, in cases where there is disagreement, should encourage a wider open debate.

40. A third and related issue concerns the autonomy of DFID as a Government Department focussed on poverty reduction and meeting the MDGs. The decisions made about funding reconstruction in Iraq, and diverting aid from MICs, showed clearly that DFID is subject to external political influences. The decision to contribute £544 million of UK funds to reconstructing Iraq, and—it seems—the decision that a large chunk of this was to come out of DFID's development spending, was not made by DFID. It was only once this decision had been made that DFID was involved, giving advice about where funds might be found. As the Permanent Secretary put it:

"At the end of the day, Ministers take all of the decisions on the allocations. What Ministers decided on—you are absolutely right—is they wanted to make a particular contribution to Iraq, and that was based, as I said, partly on UN and World Bank assessment of needs in Iraq and partly on wishing to galvanise the international system generally. That is absolutely correct. Then we had to find the money, and we were asked, as officials, quite rightly, for advice on where the money should come from, given that Ministers wished to stick to the 90-10 target, which they believed in."[56]

Responding to questioning, the Permanent Secretary refused to accept the implication that DFID is not objectively and single-mindedly focussed on poverty-reduction.[57]

41. Poverty reduction and development comes about as a result of a range of processes—economic growth, social and cultural change, and political development. Therefore, DFID is right to argue that a wide variety of activities are intended to lead to poverty reduction. And DFID itself is part of the Government as a whole. One would not expect or want DFID to operate independently from the rest of Government,[58] particularly given the importance of development goals being supported by policies which are the responsibility of other departments (so-called "policy coherence for development"). The Permanent Secretary is right to defend DFID's role as an agency focussed on poverty-reduction. But DFID's role and relative autonomy is proscribed in part by the Government of which it is part. Operating as part of the Government which determines its role, DFID needs to strike a careful balance between protecting its autonomy as a poverty-reduction agency, and promoting development issues and policy coherence for development across Government.

HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health

42. Fifteen years ago tackling HIV/AIDS would not have been seen as central to poverty reduction; today, it is. This shows that understandings about which activities are about poverty reduction changes, as understandings of poverty, its causes and ways of tackling it, change too.[59] As the recent National Audit Office (NAO) report acknowledges, DFID is at the forefront of responding to the HIV/AIDS epidemic which threatens to derail the development effort in many developing countries.[60] Nevertheless, the NAO's report does raise some issues for DFID and those concerned with DFID's performance to consider.

43. A first point concerns DFID's spending on HIV/AIDS and the transparency of DFID's reporting in this area. The NAO makes the point that it is hard to tell exactly how much money DFID is spending on HIV/AIDS. This seems to be true, but for good reason. Some spending is clearly, and solely, for HIV/AIDS, but other spending—on sexual and reproductive health—is intended to secure multiple objectives, both as regards sexual and reproductive health and as regards HIV/AIDS.[61] For purposes of audit it might be desirable to state precisely what funds are spent in pursuit of what objective, but in some areas this is not realistic. This is one such area. Transparency and accountability are important, not least because they can lead to improved performance, but the organisation of efforts to tackle HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health must be driven by realities on the ground rather than by a desire for a clear audit trail. Targets, transparency and accountability matter; results matter more.

44. A second point raised by the NAO report concerns the extent to which DFID's 2001 HIV/AIDS strategy actually informs the work of country offices. Suma Chakrabarti acknowledged that the strategy had perhaps not been closely followed by country offices, but that a new strategy, to be published in July 2004, would address this issue as well as seeking to get the balance right between prevention and treatment.[62]

45. A third issue raised by the NAO concerns DFID's work on HIV/AIDS with both the USA, and with multilaterals including the Global Fund. There are real concerns here, with the USA adopting an ABC approach to tackling HIV/AIDS—Abstinence, Being faithful, and, in the last resort, using Condoms—and both the USA and the Global Fund providing huge injections of resources which risk swamping existing in-country programmes. DFID sought to reassure us. We were told that the work of DFID's country teams is informing the work of the Global Fund, and that following some early problems the Fund is now operating better and moving in the right direction.[63] As regards the USA, country teams are working well together on the ground, finding practical ways to collaborate and coordinate their efforts despite the different approaches to tackling HIV/AIDS.[64] It would be better if the USA's Emergency Plan on HIV/AIDS did not create rigidities and obstacles to be worked around at country-level, but given that it does, we were pleased to hear that at country-level, a pragmatic response is beginning to produce results.

46. There are of course other issues around HIV/AIDS which were not the focus of the NAO report. One concerns DFID's approach to tackling the epidemic in middle-income countries. There is a potential problem here; HIV/AIDS is a growing problem in many middle-income countries[65], but DFID is committed to spending no more than 10 per cent of its bilateral funds in such countries. DFID acknowledges this dilemma but suggests that in many MICs what is needed is not a transfer of resources, but support for innovative ideas.[66] In South Africa, and in southern Africa more widely, DFID is supporting valuable education and awareness-raising projects such as the TV programme Soul City. In Russia, DFID has encouraged the government to adopt a government-wide approach to HIV/AIDS, as well as supporting south-south cooperation for instance between Russia and Brazil to encourage the sharing of best practice. And DFID supports MICs' efforts to tackle HIV/AIDS through its contribution to the multilateral agencies.[67]

47. Expenditure by the department on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) programmes including HIV/AIDS was £270 million in the year 2003-04.[68] In their memorandum Marie Stopes International criticised the increasing focus on HIV/AIDS rather than broad SRHR programming on the basis that this will result in an emphasis on treatment to the exclusion of prevention which is best addressed as part of a broader SRHR strategy. As girls between the ages of 15 and 24 represent the largest group currently at risk of infection, both Marie Stopes International and Interact favour the promotion of condoms as preventing both infection and unwanted pregnancy.[69] The Departmental Report mentions technical assistance to provide access to a range of contraceptive methods, however is not clear if such technical assistance also covers the much needed capacity building to improve the logistics of providing SRH supplies, particularly condoms, as well as the forecasting and estimation of needs in these supplies. In addition, the report does not specify if technical assistance includes local production and strengthening of local manufacture of high quality commodities.

48. DFID acknowledged that the Departmental Report probably could be more explicit and direct, and say more about what progress is being made with ensuring the security of the sexual and reproductive health commodity supply chain to countries.[70] There are, as we were told, three ways in which DFID works towards this end. First, through the bilateral provision of commodities, including 490 million condoms. Second, by trying to ensure that condoms and other sexual and reproductive health commodities are prioritised by governments in developing countries. And third, by working with multilaterals such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Global Fund, particularly given the lack of support for aspects of these agencies' work by the USA.[71]

49. As Masood Ahmed explained, DFID's work on HIV/AIDS and on sexual and reproductive health is about introducing the linkages between sexual and reproductive health and HIV/AIDS on the one hand, but also recognising that there is a distinct agenda on sexual and reproductive health which is not subsumed within the HIV/AIDS agenda. There are two connected but separate agendas. We support, and encourage DFID to maintain this approach,[72] an approach which is spelt out further in DFID's recent position paper on sexual and reproductive health.[73]

13 Department for International Development, Departmental Report 2004, Cm 6214, Annex 1, table 4-see footnote 3 for web-site. Back

14 For further information about DFID's Public Service Agreement see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/psa/index.asp Back

15 Department for International Development, Departmental Report 2004, Cm 6214, Annex 3-see footnote 3 for web-site. Back

16 Ibid., Annex 1, Table 4. Back

17 Ev 29 Back

18 International Development Committee, Second Report of Session 2001-02, The Effectiveness of the Reforms of European Development Assistance, HC 417-I-available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmintdev/417/417.pdf; see also House of Lords European Union Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2003-04, EU Development Aid in Transition, HL Paper 75 -available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/75/75.pdf Back

19 Q 90 [Suma Chakrabarti, DFID] Back

20 Ev 38; DFID, Statistics on International Development, 1998/99-2002/03, pp.191-192. Available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/statisticsondevelopment03.pdf Back

21 Q 27 [Suma Chakrabarti, DFID] Back

22 Department for International Development, Departmental Report 2004, Cm 6214, p.80-see footnote 3 for web-site. Back

23 Q 27-29 [Suma Chakrabarti, DFID] Back

24 Written Ministerial Statement, Hilary Benn, HC Deb, 6 Nov 2003, Col 39 WS Back