House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Sixth Report

5 MANAGING MIGRATION FOR POVERTY REDUCTION

135. The developmental impact of migration depends upon the nature of the migration in question, and on the links which migration establishes between home and host societies. Policies can shape migration in order to make it more development-friendly (see figure 8). In chapter three we examined migration journeys, outlining what policy might do - at various stages of a migration cycle - to make migration work better for development and poverty reduction. In chapter four our attention turned to ways in which policy might shape and utilise the links which migration establishes between home and host societies.

136. Migration must be managed if it is to deliver benefits for migrant-receiving countries, migrant-sending countries and for migrants themselves. Well-managed migration has the potential to bring great benefits. But there are two major stumbling blocks. First, different countries and different social groups have competing interests and each would like migration to be managed so that their gains are maximised. By default, the costs and benefits of migration will be distributed according to who has the most power and resources. If our goal is development and poverty reduction, then mechanisms need to be established to distribute migration's costs and benefits more equitably. Effective partnerships are needed to make migration work for poverty reduction.[376] As the ILO's Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation stated:

377

137. A second issue is that migration is not a closed system. Many other issues, and policies relating to other issues, have an impact on migration; terrorism and security concerns, HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, international trade, urbanisation and gender inequality provide obvious examples. Similarly, migration and policies relating to migration impact on a wide range of other issues. Migration and policies relating to migration must be considered in the round with every effort made to ensure that policies are coherent - both within and between countries - or at the very least that they do not undermine each other (see paragraphs 151—167).

Migration partnerships for poverty reduction

138. Migration links different places; this is the nature of migration. Unless governments in migrant-sending and migrant-receiving places recognise their common interests in, and shared responsibilities for, delivering well-managed migration, the gains from migration will not be secured. Still less will they be distributed equitably and put to work for poverty reduction.[378]

BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS

139. Partnerships entail responsibilities for migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries and regions. National and local authorities in migrant-receiving societies have similar responsibilities no matter what their society's level of development. They need to consider carefully the development implications of decisions about who they admit, from where, for how long, and to do what. Authorities need to tackle trafficking and smuggling en route and, once migrants have arrived, ensure that migrants' rights are protected and that they have access to basic services. Authorities also need to put in place effective systems for temporary and circular migration and sustainable return, do what they can to encourage the flow of remittances for poverty reduction, and work better with diaspora communities.

140. National and local authorities in migrant-sending countries need to meet their responsibilities too.[379] They need to plan for migration and do what they can to make it work for poverty reduction. They should also ensure that people are not excluded from social services, health and education just because they move around.[380] The impact of migration on countries' capacities to provide health and education should also be assessed and efforts made both to cope with expected outflows, and to address the factors which push people to migrate. Schemes should also be put in place to encourage and facilitate sustainable return, to harness the potential of remittances, and to work more closely with the diaspora.[381] And, fundamentally, migrant-sending countries must do what they can to create an economic and political environment which pushes fewer people to leave, and which encourages those who have left to maintain links, to send remittances and to return. Better governance is key: it can reduce the need for migration, and it can make that migration which does occur more development-friendly.

141. Migrant-receiving countries such as the UK have a responsibility to work with their developing country partners - migrant-senders, migrant-receivers, and migrant-senders-and-receivers - to help them to make migration work better for poverty reduction. Bilateral relationships built on long-term historical connections and recognised responsibilities may provide a good basis for effective partnerships to manage migration for poverty reduction. DFID should ensure that its partner governments take account of migration as a development issue and are aware of its potential to deliver development benefits.[382] Beyond this the UK should help partner governments to consider their various options for managing migration, helping them to design effective strategies, and providing support so that they can implement these strategies. This should include, but not be limited to, support for refugee-hosting countries. If migration is unduly neglected in partner countries' development strategies, then UK aid spent in support of these strategies will not be as effective as it could otherwise be.[383]

142. Donors should tread carefully when using the aid relationship as an entry point for policy dialogue on migration. Using aid to limit migration would - for the UK - risk contravening the International Development Act; withdrawing aid to countries which fail to limit out-migration would be counter-productive; threatening such a withdrawal would undermine any notion of partnership (see paragraphs 161—162). Nevertheless the aid relationship and donor support for countries' poverty reduction strategies is the primary means through which donors can encourage developing countries to mainstream migration in their development strategies. As DFID reported to us, the potential poverty-reducing benefits of migration are seldom acknowledged in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs): "A recent review of 48 poverty reduction strategy papers found that 21 made no mention of migration; nine saw it as a cause of 'brain-drain', while others saw internal migration in negative terms, as a cause of urban poverty, the spread of HIV/AIDS or other social ills."[384] To take a specific case, we were told that India's Ten-Year Plan - the nearest thing India has to a PRSP - includes little mention of migration, especially internal migration.[385] The same is true of DFID's Country Plan for India for 2004—2008. Very few PRSPs - even for countries hosting large refugee populations - mention refugees.[386] DFID and other donors have a lot of work to do.

143. DFID and other donors should, where appropriate, encourage developing countries to integrate migration into their development strategies. PRSPs and Country Assistance Strategies should not mention every single development issue, but for countries where migration is important, DFID's Country Assistance Strategies should outline what DFID will do to help developing countries: to improve their data-gathering and information management capacities; to identify specific ways in which the costs and risks of migration might be minimised and the benefits maximised; and, to provide a policy and governance environment conducive to making migration development-friendly.[387] There is also scope for DFID to do more work - as it has in India - with lower tiers of government and NGOs, establishing pilot schemes through which lessons can be learnt, and ways of better managing migration demonstrated.[388] In addition, given that most international migration takes place between countries in the same region, donors should encourage dialogue and cooperation between developing countries on migration. DFID, along with other players such as the IOM, has played an important role in encouraging regional dialogue, for instance through a conference on migration and poverty in Asia held in Dhaka in 2003.[389] We trust that the lessons learnt are being widely disseminated and that this sort of initiative will be established in other regions too.

MIGRATION, THE MDGS AND THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM

144. Considering the range of issues to which migration relates - poverty, economic growth and private sector development, gender equality, HIV/AIDS, the environment, health and education - the absence of any mention of migration in the Millennium Development Goals is surprising. The MDGs are a result of a political process of bargaining and negotiation between different countries and country-groups.[390] Migration was too contentious to be included in the MDGs. Its exclusion from the MDGs is symptomatic too of a lack of coherence between migration and development at the international level, with governments extremely reluctant to cede control over migration policy to international organisations, and many development organisations only recently waking up to the importance of migration.[391]

145. Many international organisations are concerned with aspects of migration. Outside the United Nations system such organisations include the IOM, the OECD, the World Bank and the WTO. Inside the United Nations, UNHCR, the ILO, UNDP, the UN Children's Fund, the UN Population Fund, the UN Population Division and UN Regional Economic Commissions are among the most prominent players.[392] What is lacking is coordination and coherence.[393] As the Doyle Report, an internal UN document on how migration is treated within the UN, noted in 2003, "International migration is very lightly institutionalised within the United Nations system".[394]

146. In January 2004, whilst we were conducting our inquiry, a Geneva-based Global Commission on International Migration began its work. This independent Commission was established by the UN General Assembly following discussion of the Doyle Report and has three aims: to place migration issues on the global agenda; to analyse gaps in current policy approaches to migration and examine inter-linkages with other issue-areas; and to present recommendations to the United Nations Secretary-General and other stakeholders.[395] We look forward to seeing the output of the Commission when its work is completed in mid-2005 and hope that our report may be of use to its work. Also in Geneva, an interagency forum for bringing together the various UN organisations that deal with migration and development has recently been established by the IOM.[396]

147. Several proposals have been made to improve the way in which migration is dealt with at an international level. Jagdish Bhagwati - a prominent economist and advocate of trade liberalisation - has suggested that a World Migration Organization is needed to fill what he sees as an institutional gap at the international level.[397] Establishing a WTO-like organisation for migration would in no way guarantee the prioritisation of development and poverty reduction. But if such an organisation was able to protect migrants' basic human rights, and provide a forum in which ground rules for migration management could be agreed and countries' compliance with them monitored and if necessary enforced, then it would be an important step towards making migration more development-friendly.[398] Joseph Chamie of the UN's Population Division reported to us the views of the Secretary-General of the UN: Kofi Annan feels that there is a need for a World Migration Organisation, but thinks that it will probably not come about in his term in office.[399] It seems that the vast majority of states - and particularly powerful migrant-receiving states in the developed world - currently take the view that the potential benefits which a World Migration Organisation offers are not sufficient to warrant the surrender of their control over immigration policy.

148. Until states recognise that heightened interdependence necessitates enhanced international coordination on migration, the international community will muddle through. One way of reducing the muddle would be to bring the IOM into the UN system as the lead migration agency.[400] This seems a sensible suggestion. Regardless of what approach is taken, we agree with the IOM: it is necessary "to integrate migration management approaches more explicitly and coherently within a broader context of economic and social development frameworks."[401] This would make it possible to identify common priorities and to assess what contribution migration management could make towards achieving the MDGs. Greater coordination could also contribute to addressing the lack of good data, accelerate the establishment of a global inventory or "one-stop-shop" for best practice options, and facilitate the search for genuine win-win solutions which would not require states to surrender their sovereignty.[402]

149. The IOM warned us of the dangers of top-down regulation. If multilateral frameworks for migration are to be effective, then they need to be based on a shared consensus between governments. There is little point in developing new far-reaching international rules on migration if states do not accept the legitimacy and usefulness of existing rules.[403] Lessons should be learnt from the existing arrangements, not only at the international level, but also at the regional level. Indeed some of the most promising developments as regards migration and development have been at this level, in regional consultative processes including the Regional Conference on Migration (the Central and North American "Puebla Process"), the Western Mediterranean Cooperation Process, the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa and the Migration Dialogue for Western Africa.[404]

150. We applaud DFID for the leading role it is playing in moving migration up the international development agenda.[405] The Government should consider further what might be done at a multilateral level to manage migration better, and particularly to make it work better for poverty reduction. In addition we would like to be kept informed as to the involvement of the UK Government in the Global Commission on International Migration. This Commission provides an excellent opportunity to promote a more positive and development-friendly agenda on migration; the UK Government should be an active participant.

Towards policy coherence for development

WHAT POLICY COHERENCE MEANS AND WHY IT MATTERS

151. Coherent policies are mutually supportive, or at the very least do not undermine each other.[406] Policy coherence matters in circumstances where policies on one issue impact upon the likelihood of policies on another issue achieving their objectives. It also matters when policies pursued by one country impact on the likely success of policies pursued by another. Policy coherence matters in the sphere of migration and development because patterns of migration shape and are shaped by a range of other issues such as economic development, trade, agricultural subsidies, urbanisation and environmental degradation. Therefore, policies to manage migration are likely to have impacts in other spheres, and policies to shape other spheres are likely to have implications for migration.[407]

152. In some cases there may be a complementarity or synergy between policies; in other cases there may be a tension between policies, reflecting the competing priorities or objectives which they are designed to achieve. The path to policy coherence begins with the recognition of interdependence between issues, and objectives and policies, both within and between countries. The next step is to understand whether and how policies can be made more coherent.[408] In some circumstances policies to make migration more development-friendly will fit well with policies to achieve other objectives; in other circumstances, there will be competing priorities. The next step is to assess how far from the ideal of coherence current policies are.[409] And the most important step is, through the use of effective mechanisms, to move towards policy coherence.

153. In our view poverty reduction and development should be given a higher priority, and policy coherence should be policy coherence for development. But no matter what priority is accorded to development and poverty reduction in designing policies to shape migration, migration should not be considered in isolation. Greater attention must be paid to ensuring that policies relating to migration, and policies relating to other issues, are coherent, both within and between countries. For example, if policy on issue A (providing export subsidies to European farmers to support a particular form of agriculture) is at odds with policy on issue B (providing aid to developing countries so that their farmers can be enabled to sell their produce, and as a result remain on the land rather than migrating to the cities), then one or both of these policies ought to be changed, on efficiency grounds if nothing else. If policies are at odds, the first question for policy-makers is, are there ways of achieving both objectives? Or, if the objectives are fundamentally in contradiction, the question is which objective matters more? By committing themselves to achieve greater policy coherence, and establishing mechanisms to this end, governments can become more effective, and - by making explicit the fact that there are competing priorities - more accountable too.

154. During the course of this inquiry we have come across many instances where the possibility of migration delivering developmental benefits is undermined by other objectives and policies. IIED gave the example of cotton farmers in the Sahel, pushed off the land, in part by cotton subsidies, and drew attention to the migration implications of agricultural mechanisation and poorly planned rural development.[410] UNHCR noted that refugee crises and migration problems are compounded when these issues are isolated from issues of human rights, democracy, good governance, trade and sustainable development.[411] The Campaign Against the Arms Trade drew attention to the possibility that UK arms exports might contribute to human rights abuses, reduce spending on basic needs, and lead to more migration.[412] The Corner House raised the issue of UK support for projects such as pipelines which may not take adequate account of their environmental, social and human rights impacts, and thus may contribute to migration.[413] And Friends of the Earth drew our attention to the knock-on environmental, and in turn migration, effects of investments in pulp and paper projects.[414]

155. Many of the written submissions emphasised the need for improved policy coherence both as regards the UK's policies on immigration and development, and as regards UK-supported development interventions in poor countries.[415] Oxfam argues that: "Migration policy needs to be joined up with asylum, development, humanitarian, trade and foreign policies in order both to effectively address the root causes of migration, safeguard the legal obligations towards forced migrants and ensure the best and most equitable migration outcome for the individual, host and sending countries."[416] Focussing more on interventions in developing countries, IIED suggests that any "poverty reduction initiative that does not include an understanding of the role of migration in the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable groups risks being seriously flawed".[417]

THE HIGH LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON ASYLUM AND MIGRATION

156. Policy coherence is desirable within countries and between countries, whether this is on a bilateral, multilateral or regional basis. Since the treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 the European Union has taken important steps towards greater policy coherence, recognising that an effective EU asylum and (im)migration policy must necessarily involve cooperation with countries of origin and transit, and beginning to integrate migration with the external policy and programmes of the Community.[418] The EU's approach is based on four principles which were reflected in a Commission Communication on Migration and Development in December 2002, which was adopted by the Council in May 2003.[419] These principles are:

integration of migration must respect the overall coherence of the Community's external policies and actions;
a long term priority is to address the root causes of migration, complementing the development policy's focus on poverty reduction and conflict prevention;
the mid-term review of the Country Strategy Paper framework, launched in 2003, is the appropriate forum to review the scope for action; and
additional resources for targeted actions on migration will be necessary, complementing development actions.

157. The centre-piece of the EU's policy and relationship with third countries is the Country Strategy Paper. As Peter Bosch of the European Commission put it, the EU is trying to insert migration into the Country Strategy Papers for those African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries where it is relevant, and is also considering making more resources available to some African countries to help them better manage migration.[420] At a level above the Country Strategy Papers there are other mechanisms for policy coherence. First, there is a Special Working Party within the Commission in which all the various Directorates-General (DGs) are represented. Second, when communications or legal proposals are being drafted there is intensive communication between DGs with responsibility for development, foreign affairs, and justice and home affairs.[421] Third, and perhaps most importantly, the European Council brings together member-state representatives in the High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration.

158. The High Level Working Group (HLWG) on Asylum and Migration was established in 1998. It aims to achieve greater coherence between the EU's policies on asylum, migration, development and foreign policy more widely. The HLWG analyses a variety of issues relating to migration from these countries, and produces Action Plans which suggest policy initiatives that might be taken to regulate migratory flows between the country concerned and the EU. Action plans have been produced for Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia and Sri Lanka.[422] By bringing together areas such as conflict prevention, development, and legal and illegal migration, forcing member states to discuss these issues, and forcing departments within member states to communicate better, the HLWG is a step in the right direction.[423]

159. But there are several lessons to be learnt about achieving policy coherence for development. First, the HLWG has not generated much in terms of follow up actions.[424] Second, questions have been raised about how the HLWG works with countries which are supposed to be partners in the process.[425] Third, there are concerns about a lack of transparency.[426] Efforts to make policies on migration deliver for development must lead to action, need to be based on real partnerships with developing countries, and should be open to public scrutiny and accountability.

160. Perhaps of greatest concern is the fact that the migration control imperative seems to have dominated concerns about sustainable development, human rights and refugee protection. As DFID's Sharon White diplomatically put it, the HLWG "veered off slightly into discussions around border controls".[427] Indeed for some commentators the situation is actually worse: the HLWG includes an attempt to use aid and development policies to achieve migration control objectives. So, for instance, one of the tasks of the HLWG as set out in its terms of reference, is to conduct assessments of "aid and development strategies in the battle to limit economic migration".[428] The Commission's Peter Bosch, not wanting to step on the Council's toes, was unwilling to hazard a guess as to what this might mean.[429] But it does require some explanation. The Government needs to make clear how the HLWG imagines that aid and development strategies might be employed in the battle to limit economic migration, and what its assessments concluded.

161. If processes of consultation and discussion are to be worthwhile, stakeholders need to participate actively, and to support the process with resources and political will. Otherwise such fora will rightly be dismissed as talking shops. We were disappointed to hear that few development ministries regularly attend the HLWG, but pleased to hear that DFID has been one of the few.[430] Indeed DFID's active participation, and the energies of the former Secretary of State, Clare Short, played a major role in heading off one of the HLWG's more outrageous plans at the Seville Summit of 2002. The plan was to use the threat of cutting off aid as a stick to persuade countries to spend more of their scarce resources on stopping migration to the EU.[431] Clare Short did well to block this proposal. Nevertheless there is still a danger of development policies being unduly influenced by migration control and security concerns.[432] As Statewatch notes, whilst the more extreme version of linking aid to cooperation on migration was defeated at Seville, the European Council did agree that each future association or cooperation agreement which the European Union or the European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration.[433] The EU also demanded the insertion of a clause on readmission and repatriation during the final stage of renegotiating the Lomé Convention with its ACP "partners", a feature which will likely be strengthened in the Cotonou Agreement.[434]

162. The UK and other donors rightly use the aid relationship as an entry point for policy dialogue, on migration as well as other issues. It is sensible to support governments which are moving in the right direction, improving governance and fighting poverty, but it would be a mistake to make aid conditional on measures which aim to limit out-migration. Withdrawing aid to countries which fail to limit out-migration would simply plunge them further into poverty; threatening such a withdrawal would force developing countries to spend scarce resources on border controls rather than poverty reduction, would undermine any notion of partnership, and would simply succeed in pushing more migrants into the arms of smugglers and traffickers.[435] Development assistance or the threat of its withdrawal must never be used as a tool for migration management. We trust that this remains the Government's position.

DFID, WHITEHALL AND POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

163. EU policies relating to migration are determined by the member states. Those states who wish to see migration work better for poverty reduction need to work actively at the European level to further this agenda. The Danish Presidency of 2002 played an important role in stimulating policy discussion on migration and development.[436] The Presidency of the European Union in 2005 will provide the UK with an opportunity to promote a positive agenda on migration which takes full account of its development potential. We trust that the Government is preparing now to take this opportunity.

164. Domestically the debate about migration is evolving as the Government seeks to emphasise the benefits which the UK can gain from well-managed migration. But, there is as yet little recognition of the links between migration and development, and the poverty-reducing potential of well-managed migration. DFID's Masood Ahmed suggested that the debate on migration and development is at a similar stage to where the debate on trade and development was about ten years ago; people are beginning to say that there is a development dimension to migration, but there is a lack of joined-up thinking at national and international levels, and some resistance to connecting the issues.[437] We share this analysis and trust that DFID will work tirelessly to move the debate on.

165. The interests and objectives of DFID are unlikely to be the same as those of the Home Office, or other Departments with an interest in migration. DFID's focus is poverty reduction; the Home Office is rightly concerned with immigration and asylum.[438] But the Government as a whole must ensure that it works effectively in pursuit of its overall goals, and, where there is a tension between different policies or objectives, should ensure that priorities and policies are determined on the basis of open, informed, evidence-based discussions rather than being the result of institutional inertia. It is only through such discussions that Departments can explore whether and how their policies can be made more coherent. If development objectives are to get a fair hearing, then it is important that DFID has a seat at the table. Hilary Benn assured us that the Departments do talk to each other, but it was somewhat disappointing to learn that DFID was not represented either at the Prime Minister's "summit" on immigration held on 6 April 2004 or at the "immigration stocktake" held on 12 May 2004.[439]

166. DFID has performed well on the international stage, influencing the debate and policies on migration at European and international levels, and beginning to raise the issue of migration with its developing country partners.[440] DFID also has an important role to play in the domestic context, helping the Government to examine the development implications of its migration policies, and working hard to ensure that development objectives are not marginalised.[441] Immigration from developing countries has been increasing, in absolute terms and in terms of its share of the whole. The Office for National Statistics estimates that in 2002 52.5 percent - 269,500 people - of immigrants arriving in the UK came from developing countries. In 1993, immigrants arriving from developing countries numbered 91,000 or 34.4 percent of total immigration.[442] On this basis alone, DFID must be fully involved in the formulation of policies on migration. A clear statement of the objectives of UK development policy in relation to migration will also be valuable; this is something we expect to see from DFID by the end of 2004.[443]

167. In evidence to us, DFID explained that over the last year or so it has begun to play a more active role in inter-departmental discussions on migration and development, and that there is less of a separation "between development as done by DFID and asylum and migration policy as done by the Home Office."[444] This is welcome news, but it begs several questions: how much of a separation remains, what scope there is to reduce the separation, and - if there is scope to reduce the separation - what is being done to reduce it? We invite the Government to outline, in relation to migration initially: the issue areas where Departments' objectives and policies overlap; the nature of each of these overlaps; what scope there is for increasing policy coherence in these areas; and finally, what mechanisms are in place, and how they are being used, to achieve greater policy coherence for development.

168. DFID has been working to deepen its knowledge of the issues surrounding migration and poverty reduction, to improve its understanding of the impact of migration, and to develop a comprehensive approach to migration issues. The aims of DFID's work on migration and development are: to sharpen and strengthen DFID's country work; to equip DFID to play a more effective role in inter-Departmental discussions on policy; and to support the Government's efforts to provide a more balanced debate on migration and its policy of managed migration.[445] DFID is working hard to achieve these aims. We hope that this report will help to accelerate the journey which DFID, the Government and others with an interest in migration and development are making towards policies which will make migration work for poverty reduction. It must not take ten years to reach the stage we are now at on trade and development.

376 Patrick Weil, Towards a Coherent Policy of Co-Development, International Migration, Vol. 40, Issue 3 - Special Issue 1, 2002. Available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-2435.00196/abs/ Back

377 ILO, A fair globalization: The role of the ILO, Report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, 2004, p.xii. Available at http http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/index.htm Back

378 Ev 173 [COMPAS memo] Back

379 Ev 173 [COMPAS memo] Back

380 Q 120 [Catherine Barber, Oxfam] Back

381 Ev 277 [Unlad Kabayan memo] Back

382 Q 120 [Catherine Barber, Oxfam]; Q 327 [Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development] Back

383 Q 68 [Priya Deshingkar, ODI] Back

384 Ev 127 [DFID memo]; Ev 205 [IIED memo] Back

385 Q 85 [Priya Deshingkar, ODI] Back

386 Q 317 [Anita Bundegaard, UNHCR] Back

387 Ev 210 [IIED memo]; Ev 256 [Oxfam memo] Back